Human Dignity in Jewish Law

Hershey H. Friedman, PhD*

Professor of Business and Marketing

Brooklyn College

*The author wishes to thank Adam (Ari) Deutscher for his help with this paper.

Introduction

Scholars have noted that human rights are grounded in the Torah and Talmud (Cohn, 1989). The same can be said of kvod habriot (human dignity), which is inextricably linked with human rights and belief in the brotherhood of all humankind. This paper will demonstrate how central kvod habriot is to Judaism. Kvod habriot is so significant that it applies to the dead as well as the living. Rakover (1998: pp.29-30) cites Rambam (Maimonides),Yaakov Emden, and other sources to show that kvod habriot applies to gentiles as well as to Jews (briot means creations). Rabbi Yehuda Chasid (Sefer Chassidim, 358) says that one should not humiliate a gentile who observes the seven Noachide laws; rather, he should be honored even more than a Jew who does not engage in the study of Torah. According to Rabbi Soloveitchik, kvod habriot and social justice “are implicit in the Biblical concept that man was created in God’s image” (Besdin, 1979: 190). Rabbi Hertz (1959: p. 265) declares: “The belief in the unity of the human race is the natural corollary of the unity of God, since One God must be the God of the whole of humanity…Through Hebrew monotheism alone was it possible to teach the Brotherhood of Man.”

Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Shmittah 13:13) makes a powerful statement that demonstrates the spiritual foundation of universal brotherhood.

Not only the tribe of Levi, but every single man of all the inhabitants of the world whose spirit and wisdom have inspired him to stand before God, to serve Him, to revere Him, to know God and to walk uprightly the way God made him; and he removed from his neck the yoke of the numerous calculations that people seek; this individual becomes sanctified, a Holy of Holies, and God shall be his lot and portion forever and ever …

If any inhabitant of the world has the potential of being a “Holy of Holies,” one can understand why kvod habriot is so essential. The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kama 83b) makes a similar statement about the Jewish people. In a discussion dealing with the amount one must pay in damages for causing someone embarrassment (boshet), it is stated that damages depend on the status of the humiliator and the humiliated. In other words, if a low- status individual insults a high-status individual more has to be paid in damages than in the opposite case. One opinion cited in the Talmud (ibid. 86a), however, is that “they are all the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.” All have status. In some cases where there is a question as to what is the law, the Talmud (e.g., Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 45a, Eruvin 14b) states: “Go out and see how the people are accustomed to act.” Scholars can learn the law by observing how ordinary individuals behave.

Rabbi Shmuelevitz (2002, Maamar 89) discusses the importance of kvod habriot. He observes that when the Israelites were on the other side of the Jordan and ready to enter the Promised Land, Moses rebuked the Israelites using veiled references to the sins that had been committed during the forty years of wandering in the wilderness. For instance, “Di-zahab” (Deuteronomy 1:1), is not the name of a place but alludes to the sin of the golden calf (zahab is gold in Hebrew). The reason Moses rebuked the Israelites indirectly was because he did not want to embarrass them; Moses was concerned with their dignity (see commentary of Rashi).

Rabbi Shumelevitz adds that even the dignity of individuals who are wicked must be protected. Bar Kamtza suffered great humiliation when he was ejected from a party to which his enemy inadvertently invited him. His embarrassment turned into anger and he decided to make trouble for the Jewish people with the Roman emperor. God did not prevent Bar Kamtza from achieving his goal and the Temple was destroyed and a large number of Jews were killed because of the mortification of one individual (Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 57a). Bilaam was a wicked person but God made his donkey die after it had chastised him because of kvod habriot (see Rashi Numbers 22:33). God was concerned about the dignity of Bilaam. If the donkey had lived, people would have pointed to it indicating that it was the donkey that rebuked Bilaam and made him look foolish. Therefore, to spare Bilaam embarrassment, the donkey had to die.

Problem of the Slippery Slope

Rabbi Dratch (2001) quotes Rabbi Lichtenstein, who says that his father-in-law, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, told him that he considered kvod habriot in his halachic rulings. Rabbi Lichtenstein suggests that what prevents many halachic decisors from relying on kvod habriot is the fear of the “slippery slope.” If it is used “too often and too liberally” it could result in “changing the face of Jewish law and practice.” Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2: 77), in discussing the rules of harchakot (safeguards to place some “distance” and thus minimize intimacy between husband and wife when the latter is a niddah, i.e., menstruating), makes the point that one cannot use the principle of kvod habriot to permit the superseding of laws or customs because one is embarrassed among people who do not observe the law. He asserts that, on the contrary, one should not be ashamed about observing Jewish law.

Rabbi Nebenzahl (2004) also emphasizes that kvod habriot is sometimes used to justify incorrect positions. One individual claimed that a guest is permitted to eat food that may not be kosher rather than insulting the host. Rabbi Nebenzahl stresses that there is no way one can use kvod habriot to permit the eating of food that may be prohibited! Rabbi Nebenzahl proves this by pointing out the Yochanan Kohen Gadol (Yochanan the High Priest) established the laws of demai (food that may be untithed). This forbade the eating of the food of an am ha’aretz (ignorant person) without personally removing the tithes, even if the am ha’aretz claims that he removed the tithes. This rule was enacted despite the fact that the majority (there was, however, a substantial minority that did not) of ignorant people did indeed remove the tithes. There is no question that shaming another human being is a very serious transgression, but it cannot be used to justify eating food that may be unkosher or violations of any Torah law.

The verse (Leviticus 19:2) states: “You shall be holy for I the Lord your God am holy.” Mortals have an obligation to imitate God. Rabbi Shmuelevitz (2002) quotes the Midrash (Midrash Genesis Rabbah, 90:2; Midrash Leviticus Rabbah 24:9) that asserts that “My [God’s] greatness will be higher than your greatness [man’s]” and “My holiness is above your holiness.” The point of this unusual Midrash is to to emphasize the prominence of humanity. People can never become as great as God; however they can achieve godliness. Indeed, humankind has the ability to engage in heavenly acts such as helping the poor, healing the sick, and improving the world. This, is in fact what the Torah requires of us, according to the Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 14a). Humankind has the obligation to (Deuteronomy 13:5) “You shall walk after the Lord your God” by emulating Him: God made clothing for Adam and Eve, visited Abraham when he was ill, comforted Isaac after Abraham died, and buried Moses. Therefore people have the obligation to perform acts of kindness such as clothing the poor, visiting the sick, comforting the mourners, and burying the dead.

Rabbi Dratch (2001) notes that the term kvod habriot and kvod ha-adam do not appear in the Torah (there are, however, several allusions in the Torah to the importance of human dignity). This is probably due to the fact that “God’s honor always overrides Man’s.” The Talmud, as we shall see, uses a verse from Proverbs to demonstrate that “when there is a desecration of God’s Name, no respect is paid [even] to one’s teacher.” Rabbi Koenig (Sheilot V’Teshuvot Chukei Chaim, 28) discusses the issue of berating an individual who talks during the services. He asserts that while it is true that this might result in the embarrassment of the individual, “when there is a desecration of God’s Name…”

The Talmud (Jerusalem Talmud, Chagigah 2:1; Midrash Genesis Rabbah 1:5) states: “One who gains honor through the degradation of his fellow human has no share in the World to Come. All the more so if one gains honor at the expense of the honor of the Eternal One.” The Talmud is making it clear that the honor of God takes precedence over the honor of mortals.

One more case that demonstrates the problem of balancing the principle of kvod habriot with other principles such as kvod haTorah (respect for the Torah). The Tur (Orech Chaim 142) cites the opinion of the Manhig that if the Torah reader makes a mistake ― even one such as pronouncing Aaron as Haran ― we do not correct him and make him go back in order not to publicly embarrass him. Maimonides disagrees and says that we do make the reader go back, even for a very small mistake. The opinion of the Manhig is not the accepted opinion. There is no question that human dignity is important, but there are other considerations and we cannot allow people reading the Torah to make mistakes without correcting them. One can easily see how this might cause serious problems and result in the distortion of Jewish law.

Human Dignity in Aggadah

Even in aggadah (the part of the Talmud that does not deal with halacha -- consisting of stories, parables, wise sayings, homiletical interpretations of Scripture, folklore, legends, ethical teachings, advice, etc.) we see the importance of kvod habriot.

(Aggadah 1) The following three statements from Ethics of the Fathers (Avot) make it very clear what honor and dignity are about:

“Let your fellow-man's honor be as dear to you as your own” (Babylonian Talmud, Avot 2: 10).

“Who is honored? One who honors his fellow human being” (Babylonian Talmud, Avot 4: 1).

“Whoever honors the Torah will be honored by people; whoever disgraces the Torah will be disgraced by people” (Babylonian Talmud, Avot 4: 6).

(Aggadah 2) In the Talmud, Shmuel’s father quotes the Angel of Death as saying (Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah 20b): “If I did not care for the dignity of human beings, I would cut open the throat of man as [wide and gaping as] that of a slaughtered animal.” In aggadah, the Angel of Death is seen as using the poison on the tip of his sword to kill mortals when their time has come rather than the sword itself because he does not feel that people should be mutilated by death.

(Aggadah 3) The Midrash (Numbers Rabbah 20:14) provides an interesting reason as to why animals do not speak. According to the Midrash, the above-mentioned donkey said to Balaam:

You cannot kill me unless you have a sword in your hand. How then do you intend to eradicate an entire nation [with your curse]? Balaam was silent and unable to answer her... The Holy One had consideration for the dignity of mankind and knows what is best for them. He therefore muted the mouth of the beast. For had animals been able to speak, man would have been unable to work them or to stand up to them. Here was the dumbest of all animals, and Balaam was the wisest of all wise men, and yet as soon as the donkey began to speak he could not stand up to her.

It would be quite embarrassing for humanity if every time they committed a misdeed an animal would rebuke them.

(Aggadah 4) This story demonstrates that a nasty remark made to an innocent person is a great sin. It also provides a beautiful reason that Torah scrolls are written with pens made from quills. There is a disagreement among the sources whether this story happened to Rabbi Shimon b. Elazar or Rabbi Elazar b. R’ Shimon.

Once Rabbi Shimon b. Elazar was coming from the house of his teacher in Migdal Gedor. He was leisurely riding on his donkey by the shore and felt very jubilant and proud because he had studied much Torah. He encountered a person who was exceptionally ugly who said to him: “Peace on you Rabbi.” Rabbi Shimon did not return the greeting and said: “Empty one, how ugly you are. Are all the people of your town as ugly as you?” He responded: “I do not know, but go tell the Craftsman who created me, ‘How ugly is the vessel that You have made.’” Immediately, Rabbi Shimon realized that he sinned and descended from the donkey and prostrated himself before the person saying I beg your pardon, please forgive me. The man replied: “I will not forgive you until you go to the Craftsman who created me say to him, ‘How ugly is the vessel that You have made.’” Rabbi Shimon followed the man trying to gain his forgiveness until they reached his town. The people of the town came out to greet Rabbi Shimon and said to him: “Peace be upon you Teacher, Teacher, Master, Master.” The man said to them: “Whom are you addressing as Teacher, Teacher?” They said to him: “The man who is traveling behind you.” He said to them: “If this man is a teacher, may there not be more like him in Israel.” They asked him: “Why?” He responded: “Such-and-such he did to me.” They said to him: “Nevertheless, forgive him since he is a man greatly learned in Torah.” He replied: “I will forgive him for your sake, but only on condition that he does not do this again.” Immediately after this, Rabbi Shimon entered the academy and lectured: “A person should always be gentle as a reed and not tough as a cedar tree.” This is the reason the reed merited that of it should be made a pen for the writing of Torah scrolls, tefillin (phylacteries), and mezuzot. (Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 20a-b; Babylonian Talmud, Avot D’Rabbi Natan 41)

Elsewhere, the Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Nedarim 81a) asks why do Torah scholars rarely have children who are also Torah scholars? One answer given is because they call people donkeys. Rashi’s explanation of this is that they do not respect others who are less learned because of their knowledge of Torah. The above story illustrates how easy it is for great scholars to fall into the trap of looking down at simple people.

(Aggadah 5) The Midrash (Ecclesiastes Rabbah 11:2) relates an interesting story about a Roman whose ship sank and he was washed up naked and helpless on the beach. The Jews, victims of Roman tyranny and persecution (the Romans destroyed the Second Temple), refused to help him. He pleaded to Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua in the name of human dignity to help him. Rabbi Elazar provided him with clothing, food, money, accompanied him a distance of 14 parsangs to his home, and gave him much honor. Some time later, this Roman became the emperor and issued an edict of destruction against the Jews. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua was sent to the emperor with a bribe of 4,000 dinars, hoping he would get the emperor to change his mind. When the emperor recognized Rabbi Elazar, he jumped off his throne and bowed with his face to the ground before Rabbi Elazar. In the end, the emperor rescinded the decree and gave many gifts to Rabbi Elazar.

A similar story is told about Diocletian. He was a swineherd and was ill-treated by the students of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. When he became Emperor of Rome, he tried to retaliate against the Jews. If not for a miracle, there would have been a great tragedy (Jerusalem Talmud, Terumot 8:4; Midrash Geneiss Rabbah 63:8).

(Aggadah 6) The Torah is stricter with one who steals an ox (or other large animal) and sells or slaughters it than one who steals a sheep: The former pays a fine equal to five times the value of the animal while the latter pays four times the value of the stolen animal. Rabban Yochanan b. Zakkai provides the following reason (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kama 79b): “Come and see how great is human dignity, for in the case of an ox which walks away on their legs [when the ox is being stolen] the payment is five-fold; in the case of a sheep which has to be carried on the robber’s shoulder [an act which diminishes the dignity of the thief], the payment is four-fold.” Incidentally, regarding Rabbi Yochanan b. Zakkai, the Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 17a) relates: “They said about Rabbi Yochanan b. Zakkai that no one ever greeted him first, not even the gentile in the marketplace.” Rabbi Price, in the name of his mashgiach, Rabbi Tzvi Feldman, connects the two Talmudic passages. Rabbi Yochanan b. Zakkai was very concerned about human dignity as can be seen by the fact that he greeted everyone. He was also sensitive to the dignity of the thief and therefore made the observation about paying four-fold. One might add that it may not be a coincidence that Rabbi Yochanan b. Zakkai was the individual who was instrumental in keeping Judaism alive and strong after the Temple was destroyed (it was destroyed because of baseless hatred). He had an audience with Vespasian and one of his three requests was to spare the city of Yavneh and its scholars (Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 56b).

(Aggadah 7) If a man or woman commits bestiality, the animal must be killed (Leviticus 15-16). Clearly, the animal has not done anything wrong and is an innocent victim. Why then must the animal be killed? One reason given is that it is killed because it would be embarrassing if people would point to it and say that this is the animal that caused so-and-so to be stoned (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 54a). The Torah is even concerned with the dignity of the sinner.

(Aggadah 8) The Torah exempted a person who built a new house, planted a new vineyard, or betrothed a woman from going to war (Deuteronomy 20: 5 – 9). According to Rabbi Yosi the Galilean (Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 44a), these exemptions were there as a smokescreen to allow the individual who is exempt because he is “fearful and fainthearted,” which he interprets as being due to transgressions that he has committed, to go home and not be embarrassed. The other soldiers would not know that he was going home because he was afraid to fight because of transgressions, but would assume that he was leaving because of the other reasons (house, vineyard, or wife).

(Aggadah 9) The Torah states (Deuteronomy 21: 22-23): “If a man guilty of a capital offense is put to death, you shall hang him from a tree. You must not let his body remain on the tree overnight, rather you must bury him that day, for a hanging person is a curse of God and you shall not defile your land that the Lord your God is giving you as an inheritance.” It is not clear why leaving the body of a person who has committed a capital offense (there is an dispute in the Talmud whether the Torah means anyone who is executed by stoning or only one who blasphemed or committed idolatry) cannot be allowed to remain on the gallows overnight. The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 46b) provides an explanation.

Rabbi Meir said: I will tell you a parable to explain the verse. There were two twin brothers who lived in the same city. One was appointed king and the other became a thief. The king issued a decree against his brother and he was hanged for his crimes. Everyone who passed by and saw the thief hanging from the gallows said: “The king as been hanged!” Therefore, the king ordered that the body should be taken down.

Since man was created in the image of God, when a corpse, even of a criminal, is placed on public display, God is being dishonored. This is why halacha (Jewish law) does not permit one to benefit from a corpse (Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah 29b). The Mishna (Yadaim 4:6) notes an interesting reason (stated by the Sadducees to the Pharisees) for the ritual impurity of human bones: There is a fear that one may turn the bones of his father and mother into spoons. Whether done out of love or profit, one is not permitted to benefit from a dead body.

(Aggadah 10) The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 62b) relates that Rabbi Akiva had 12,000 pairs of disciples, from Gabbatha to Antipatris. All of them died between Passover and Shavuot because they did not treat each other with respect. Till this very day, we mourn the disciples of Rabbi Akiva during the period know as sefira (when we count the omer).

(Aggadah 11) The Mishna (Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 26b) describes the great days of joy on the fifteenth of Av and Yom Kippur when the single girls of Jerusalem would dance in the vineyards in front of the single men in order to attract a spouse. The Mishna notes that the girls went out in “white garments which they borrowed in order not to shame those that did not have the means,” and could not afford nice clothing. The sages did not enact this, but the girls on their own recognized the importance of protecting the dignity of girls of limited financial means.

(Aggadah 12) “Why was it established that prayers should be said quietly? In order not to embarrass the sinners. For [note that] the Torah did not make a distinction as to the place where a sin-offering and a burnt-offering should be sacrificed” (Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 32b).

(Aggadah 13) The following is one of the more powerful statements made in the Talmud about shaming another person (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 58b-59a). “It is better for a person to have sexual relations with a doubtful married woman rather than shaming his fellow human in public.”

The reason for this is that adultery (with witnesses and a warning) is punishable by death. The adulterer, however, has a share in the world to come since his death atones his sin. One who shames another publicly has no share in the world to come (unless he repents and asks his friend's forgiveness). The Mishna (Avot 3:11) states that one loses his share in the world-to-come for embarrassing another person publicly. The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 58b) also notes: “Whoever shames his fellow-man in public is considered as is he shed blood.” The reason: the ruddiness of one’s complexion blanches from the embarrassment. This may not be murder from a halachic point of view but it is from a philosophical one.

The Talmud states a very important principle about human dignity: “It is better for a person to throw himself into a fiery furnace than to embarrass a fellow human being in public.” (Babylonian Talmud, Kethubot 67b). This principle is derived from the story of Tamar who was prepared to be burned to death rather than embarrass her father-in-law, Yehuda (Genesis 38). Mar Ukva and his wife actually ran into a sizzling furnace to avoid shaming a poor person who had been secretly receiving charity from Mar Ukva. They did not want the pauper to see who his benefactor was since this would embarrass him (Babylonian Talmud, Kethubot 67b).

It is not clear whether the statement that one should rather throw himself/herself into a fiery furnace rather than embarrassing someone is figurative or literal. Some commentaries view this figuratively and believe that one is not obligated to die to avoid shaming another. After all, there are three serious transgressions where a Jew is required to give up his life rather than violate Jewish law (yehareg v’al ya’avor): idolatry, illicit sexual relations with an ervah (e.g., adultery or incest between very close relatives), and murder (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 74a; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, 157a). Other commentaries include embarrassing others in public in the group of transgressions that require martyrdom

(Feldman, 2004; Feldman 2005: pp. 1-28).

(Aggadah 14) The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 58b) states: “The wrong you do by means of words is worse than monetary wrongs.” An example of a verbal wrong is reminding a penitent person of his past misdeeds. Monetary wrongs are subject to restitution, verbal wrongs cannot be "returned."

(Aggadah 15) The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 11a) enumerates several stories where someone prevaricated in order to prevent the humiliation of another person. For instance, once Rabbi Gamliel asked that seven scholars join him the following morning in the upper chamber for the purpose of intercalating the year [i.e., proclaiming a leap year]. The next morning, they noticed that there was an extra person there. Rabbi Gamliel asked: “Who is the one who came up without permission?” Jewish law mandates that the year may be intercalated only by a court whose members were specifically designated for that purpose the previous evening. Rabbi Shmuel Hakatan arose and declared: “It was I who came up without permission. My purpose was not to participate in the intercalation, but to learn how the law is applied in practice.” The Talmud states that Rabbi Shmuel Hakatan was actually invited to join in the intercalation, but stated a falsehood in order not to cause embarrassment for the intruder.

Something similar happened when Rebbi was delivering a lecture and the strong odor of garlic caused a disturbance. Rebbi said: “Let the person who has eaten the garlic, please leave.” Rabbi Chiya arose and left; then all the disciples arose and left. Again, it turned out that Rabbi Chiya had not eaten garlic, but left in order not to shame the true perpetrator.

(Aggadah 16) The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 11a) relates another story in the same vein. To understand this story one must know how marriage worked in Talmudic times. In those days, the first stage of marriage known as erusin was followed a year later by the final stage known as nesuin. Erusin, could technically be done via cohabitation, but this method was strongly frowned upon. A woman appeared at the academy of Rabbi Meir and said that one of the students betrothed her [i.e., erusin] by cohabitation. Apparently, the woman did not remember which of the students betrothed her. The woman wanted the student to either complete the marriage [nesuin] or give her a divorce. Even though Rabbi Meir was not the guilty one, he gave her a bill of divorce and then all of the students gave her one as well.

(Aggadah 17) Abba was a bloodletter who was held in great esteem by the Talmud for his exemplary business practices (Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 21b). His patients paid as much of his fee as they could afford, leaving the money in a box in an outside room so that he could not see who had paid and who had not. He did this so as not to embarrass the poor. In addition to this, when it was clear that a patient was impoverished, not only would Abba refuse payment but he would give the patient money for food. He did this because he felt that it was important to eat a very substantial meal after a bloodletting. Incidentally, he would receive greetings from the Heavenly Academy every day.

(Aggadah 18) The Altar of stones was made with a ramp, not steps (Exodus 20:22-23). Rashi, quoting the Mechilta, explains that steps cause one to take wide paces; this uncovers the nakedness of the person ascending them. While it is true that the priest ascending the steps would be wearing linen pants so it is not actual exposure of nakedness, it still is close to uncovering one’s nudity. This would be disrespectful of the stones of the altar. Rashi then continues:

The following statement follows logically a fortiori. Now, if in the case of stones which do not have the intelligence to care about disrespect shown to them, the Torah says that since they serve a useful purpose you should not treat them with disrespect. Then in the case of your fellow man who is made in the image of the Creator and who cares about any disrespect shown to him, how much more so is it that you should treat him with respect.

Human Dignity in Talmudic Law

The classic discussion regarding human dignity appears in the Babylonian Talmud (Berachot 19b-20a) where it states that “The value of human dignity is so great that it supersedes a negative commandment of the Torah.” The Babylonian Talmud, however, concludes that human dignity overrides Rabbinic law and precepts of the Torah where the person is not actively engaged in a violation but is rather sitting and refraining from performing the commandment. In Jewish law, this is referred to as "shev v'al taaseh" (literally, sit and do not act). The opposite of a shev v’al taaseh is a kum aseh (literally, stand and act) an active transgression of Jewish law.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Yerushalmi) has a somewhat different version of the above (Jerusalem Talmud, Berachot 3:1): “The value of human dignity (the term used is kavod harrabim which means the dignity of the many) is so great that it supersedes a negative commandment of the Torah for one hour.” The Talmud is discussing a case where a kohen (priest) becomes tamei (impure) and it involves an impurity that would be forbidden by the Torah. The Torah (Leviticus 21: 1-3) does not permit the kohen to contaminate himself by coming into contact with a dead person except for very close relatives.

(Case 1) The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 19b) discusses the case where someone finds that he is wearing kilayim, i.e., shatnez (kilayim is a forbidden mixture; in the case of a garment it is one made of wool and linen ―referred to as shatnez ― and it is a violation of a Torah precept to wear it) and is in public. The Talmud concludes that he must remove the garment even if he is standing in the marketplace and it will result in a loss of dignity since he has to walk home without his garment. The reason given is a quote from Proverbs (21:30): “There is no wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against the Lord.” The Talmud interprets this verse to mean that when there is a desecration of God’s Name, no respect is paid [even] to one’s teacher. This verse demonstrates that the honor of God overrides all human concerns, even that of human dignity. If an individual wears shatnez in public, s/he is desecrating God’s name.

The Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Kilayim 10:29) had a slightly different version of the above Talmudic text. Rambam’s Talmudic text did not have the word ba-bigdo (on his own garment). Thus, Rambam’s states that if an individual sees another person wearing kilayim that is prohibited from the Torah, even if the person is in the marketplace, he is obligated to tear the garment off this individual immediately, even if the person is his teacher who taught him Torah. As noted above, when it comes to desecration of God’s Name, even the respect of one’s teacher is ignored. Thus, according to Rambam, the obligation to remove kilayim in a public place applies both to one’s self and even to others. Rambam notes that human dignity does not supersede a prohibition that is explicit in the Torah. However, if the person is wearing shatnez that is Rabbinically prohibited, then human dignity overrides Rabbinical law and one can wait until the wearer of the forbidden garment gets home before tearing it off.

According to the Rosh (see Tur, Yoreh Deah 303:1) the Talmudic text is discussing a case where the person finds the kilayim on his own garment (this is in fact the text we have). Therefore, the Rosh states that one must remove the garment if he himself finds out that it is shatnez, and even if he is in the marketplace. If, however, another party is wearing the shatnez and it is inadvertent (shogeg), then he is under no obligation to say anything and can wait until the wearer of the forbidden garment gets home.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 303:1), agreeing with Rambam, also asserts that one is obligated to remove another person’s shatnez garment even if the other person is his teacher and even if the person is in the marketplace. The Remah adds that some authorities (i.e., Rosh) state that if the person was wearing the shatnez garment unintentionally (he did not know that the garment was made of wool and linen), then one is under no obligation to inform the person that he is wearing a forbidden garment and the obligation to tear off the garment can wait until the other party gets home.

(Case 2) A funeral procession is returning from a burial and the mourners take a road which was tamei (impure, i.e., it passed over a grave). Out of respect for the mourner, the procession, even if it includes a kohen (priest who as noted above is not permitted to became tamei), may accompany the mourner. The Talmud (Babylonina Talmud, Berachot 19b) concludes that this case refers to a beis hapras (a field where a grave has been plowed up so the bones are scattered about) where the prohibition against becoming tamei is Rabbinic, and not a violation of Torah law. Normally, when one is permitted to walk through a beis hapras (e.g., to offer the Passover sacrifice), he must blow on the ground in front of himself to blow the small bones that might be there. In the above case, blowing on the ground is not necessary since it would be undignified in a funeral procession (Tosafot, Babylonian Talmud, Bechoros 29a).

As noted above, the Yerushalmi (Jerusalem Talmud, Berochos 3:1) disagrees with the Babylonian Talmud and states that human dignity supersedes the law prohibiting a kohen from becoming tamei in the case of the dignity of the public even if it is a contamination prohibited from the Torah. However, the Torah law is only superseded for a short period of time.

(Case 3) Rabbi Elazar b. Tzadok, who was a kohen, stated that “we used to leap over coffins containing dead people in order to greet the kings of Israel. The Talmud adds that this is permitted even to greet Gentile kings so that if he is privileged to live in the times of the Messiah, he will be able to see the difference between the honor given to Jewish kings in Messianic times and gentile kings (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 19b). The Talmud concludes that climbing over a coffin is not a problem for a kohen with regards to Torah law since coffins have a hollow space of a handbreadth and this serves to act as a barrier against the tumah (impurity) of the corpse. Thus, it is only a violation of Rabbinic law and human dignity overrides it.

(Case 4) The Torah requires that an individual return a found object to the rightful owner. However, the Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 19b) uses the verse (Deuteronomy 22: 1) “You shall not see the ox of your brother or his sheep wandering and hide yourself from them” to exegetically derive the law that there are exceptions to this rule. One exception is an elderly person where it is beneath his dignity to deal with the lost object (it has very little value and he would not bother with it even if it were his own); he is permitted to ignore it. This is clearly a case where human dignity overrides a Torah law. The Talmud indicates that the reason we cannot generalize from here that human dignity always overrides Torah law is that returning a lost object is monetary law; monetary law is not as stringent as prohibitory law. The Meiri notes that this is not a situation where the individual is actively violating Jewish law; rather, the individual is passive and refraining from performing the mitzvah of returning a lost object. The Talmud, however, prefers using the reason making the distinction between monetary law and prohibitory law. This implies that human dignity overrides Torah law if it deals with money, rather than prohibitory law.

(Case 5) There is a special law regarding a met mitzvah, the burial of an unattended corpse (e.g., if a body is found in a lonely place and there is no one to take care of it). According to the Torah, even a priest or nazir is obligated to bury the met mitzvah. Thus, if a kohen or nazir is traveling and sees an unattended corpse on the side of the road and there is no one else to take care of it, he is obligated to bury it. Of course, this makes him tamei (unclean) and disqualified from priestly functions until he becomes purified. This is a case where human dignity (leaving a corpse unattended is an embarrassment for the deceased) overrides Torah law. Moreover, burying a corpse is not a passive case of sitting and not acting; after all, the kohen is burying the deceased and is most certainly engaged in an act.

Many of the commentaries deal with this question as to why we do not use the case of met mitzvah to derive a general principle that human dignity overrides Jewish law even in a case where the individual must actively violate a precept. Rashi’s (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 20a) answer is that the Torah law that a nazir or kohen may not make himself impure by coming into contact with a corpse never included the met mitzvah. Thus, human dignity does not override a Torah law; rather, this law never included a met mitzvah. Tosafot rejects Rashi’s answer and has a different explanation. The law of not becoming tamei applies only to Kohanim and does not apply to all Jews (it is a lav she'ein shaveh ba'kol); thus, one cannot make generalizations from it. The concept of lav she’ein shaveh ba’kol is used by other commentaries, not only Tosafot (see Meiri Berachot 19b who discusses this). The end result is that one cannot derive a general principle from the case of met mitzvah that human dignity allows one to actively override Torah law.

Tosafot (Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 30b) makes a distinction between a minor embarrassment and a major embarrassment. Tosafot feels that having to walk home naked or leaving an unattended corpse unburied is a major embarrassment. For a Rabbinical scholar to testify before an inferior court is not a great embarrassment. The Tumim (Hilchot Edot, 28:12), also makes this distinction and concludes that where there is a minor embarrassment, even if it is a lav she’ein shaveh ba’kol, human dignity does not supersede Jewish law. However, if we are dealing with a major embarrassment, it is a lav she’ein shaveh ba’kol, and it is a shev v’al taaseh then everyone agrees that human dignity overrides Torah law. In the case where it applies to all (lav ha-shaveh ba’kol) even if it is a great embarrassment, one should be strict (machmir) even if it is a shev v’al taaseh.

The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Megilla 3b) demonstrates the importance of met mitzvah by making it clear that if one has to choose between reading the megilla on Purim or burying the met mitzvah, the individual must bury the dead person. Met mitzvah is so important that even the High Priest (kohen gadol) must bury the met mitzvah.

(Case 6) The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 19b) notes that the obligation to bury a Met mitzvah overrides the law of offering the Paschal lamb (a positive precept of the Torah which cannot be performed by someone who has become unclean because of contact with a corpse) and the circumcision of a son. Thus, an individual who is on his way to slaughter the Paschal lamb and encounters an unattended corpse will be obligated to bury the corpse even though this means that he will not be able to perform the mitzvah of eating the Passover sacrifice that year. Human dignity overrides Torah law in a case where there is a shev v’al taaseh (sit and do not act), i.e., the individual is passive and not performing the mitzvah, but not where the individual actively violates the Torah law. Not performing the commandment of offering the Paschal lamb is not the same as actively violating the prohibition against wearing shatnez.

(Case 7) In ancient times, people cleaned themselves with stones after defecating. The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 81b) concludes that one may carry the stones to the roof and use them for cleaning purposes on the Shabbat because of human dignity. According to Tosafot, the problem with the stones is that they are muktzeh, since they were not set aside before the Shabbat for this purpose. [Muktzeh generally refers to objects which are not used on the Shabbat or Yom Tov (e.g., money or a radio); Rabbinical law does not allow one to move such objects on those days.] Rashi believes that the problem involves the additional exertion related to carrying the stones. Either way, there is a Rabbinical prohibition that is superseded by a concern for human dignity.

(Case 8) A karmelit is an area that cannot be classified as either a public domain (reshut harabim) or a private domain (reshut hayachid). It is Rabbinically prohibited to carry in a karmelit on the Shabbat. The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 94b) discusses an incident where a corpse was lying in the town of Dakura and Rabbi Nachman b. Yitzchak permitted it to be moved into a karmelit because of human dignity (Rashi speculates that the corpse may have been in the sun and there was a fear that it would rot or the body was lying in a degrading place).

(Case 9) It is Shabbat and one is wearing a garment with tzizit (fringes) and one of the fringes tears, the individual must remove the garment. Since the tzizit are not valid anymore, he would be considered in violation of the prohibition against carrying. If the individual is in a karmelit (where the prohibition against carrying is Rabbinical), he is not obligated to remove his garment and walk home undressed. This is because human dignity overrides Rabbinic law (Babylonian Talmud, Menachot 38a).

The Remah (Orech Chaim 13:3) discusses the case where someone is in the synagogue on the Shabbat, the tzizit on his tallit (prayer shawl) tore off, and he is embarrassed to sit without a tallit (there is no other tallit to borrow). Since it is Shabbat and one may not make tzizit, he is permitted to wear it without making a blessing because of kvod habriot. The Mishna Berurah makes the point that this is a case where the embarrassment is very small. This is why we do not permit him to wear the tallit if it were a weekday when one is permitted to make tzizit. On the weekday, he is in violation of the Torah law of not having tzizit on his tallit every moment. Since the embarrassment is minor, kvod habriot does not supersede the Torah law of wearing tzizit on a four-cornered garment.

(Case 10) The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Moed Katan 27a-27b) notes that the following changes were enacted in the funeral ceremony in order not to embarrass the impecunious.

Our Rabbis taught: Formerly, they would bring food to the house of mourners in following manner: to the rich, in baskets of gold and silver and to the poor in wicker baskets made of peeled willows. And the poor people were ashamed. The sages therefore instituted that all should be provided with food in wicker baskets made of peeled willows out of deference to the poor.

Our Rabbis taught: Formerly, they would provide drinks to the house of mourners in the following manner: to the rich, in white glass [which was very expensive] and to the poor in colored glass. And the poor people were ashamed. The sages therefore instituted that all should be provided with drinks in colored glass out of deference to the poor.

Formerly, they would uncover the face of the rich [corpse] and cover the face of the poor because their face became blackened by famine. And the poor people were ashamed. The sages therefore instituted that all faces should be covered out of deference to the poor.

Formerly, they would carry out the rich [corpse] in a state bed and the poor on a common bier. And the poor people were ashamed. The sages therefore instituted that all should be carried out on a common bier out of deference to the poor…

Formerly, the expense of carrying out the dead was harder on the family than the death itself; the family therefore abandoned the corpse and fled. Until Rabbi Gamliel [President of the Sanhedrin] disregarded his own dignity, and had his body carried out in flaxen shrouds. Afterwards, all the people followed his lead and had themselves carried out in flaxen shrouds. Rabbi Papa stated: And nowadays, all follow the practice of being carried out even in a canvas shroud that costs but a zuz.

Friedman (2003) discusses the halachic issues involved in living an ostentatious lifestyle. Judaism is concerned about any behaviors that will shame those of limited means. This was the rationale for many sumptuary laws [Helfgott (undated)]. Rakover (1998: 153) describes an interesting takana that was enacted in Yemen in 1828 in order to prevent the embarrassment of the poor. The takana first discusses the problems of the huge expenses related to all the feasts after the wedding. Because of this, many people were forced to postpone getting married. Therefore, the takana declares that if the groom can afford it and insists on sheva brochos during the seven days of feasting, it is permitted. However, the meals must be small and only 10 people may be invited each day, no more.

(Case 11) The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 82a) discusses why an individual was not permitted to burn a Paschal lamb that became ritually unclean in front of the Temple with his own wood. Rabbi Yosef offers the following reason: The sages did not want to embarrass the poor people who did not have their own wood so they, therefore, enacted that everyone had to use the altar wood that belonged to the Temple.

(Case 12) The Mishna (Bikkurim 3:7) relates that at first those who knew how to recite the prayer of gratitude to God (in Hebrew) that is said when bringing the bikkurim (first fruits) to the Temple (see Deuteronomy 26: 1-12) would recite them; those that could not would repeat the words of the prayer after hearing the priest say them. This caused a great deal of embarrassment for those that were ignorant so they refrained from bringing the first fruits. The rabbis therefore enacted that both the person who knew how to recite the blessings and one who did not know would repeat the words.

(Case 13) When the Temple was in existence, the people had to be familiar with numerous laws dealing with ritual purity. There was a suspicion that the am ha-aretz (ignorant person) was not very careful about obeying these laws and there was a Rabbinical enactment to treat any foods touched by them as tamei (impure). The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Chagigah 26a) states that during the three pilgrimage festivals (Passover, Shevuot, and Sukkot) the am ha-aretz was treated like a chaver (individual meticulous in his observance of ritual purity) and foods touched by them were not treated as contaminated. The reason for this was not to publicly insult the ignorant people by avoiding foods touched by them and thereby hurt their feelings (see Rashi, Babylonian Talmud, Beitzah 11b)

(Case 14) An individual is being shaved and in the middle is told that his father died. He is permitted to have the job finished (Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 1:2). As a mourner for a parent he would not be permitted to take a haircut or shave his beard until his friends scold him for his unkempt appearance. However, walking around with a half-shaven head would be very embarrassing and undignified. Therefore, because of kvod habriot, he is permitted to have the job completed (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 390:2).

(Case 15) Geneivat da’at is a term used in Jewish law to indicate deception, cheating, creating a false impression, and acquiring undeserved goodwill. It is prohibited and, according to most authorities, is a violation of Torah law. The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Chullin 94a) also states that one should not go to a mourner’s house with a bottle of wine that is only partially full since this would be geneivat da’at. Apparently, in Talmudic times, comforters would bring bottles of wine for the mourners. An individual could easily bring a bottle that was nearly empty and strategically place it among the other bottles in a way so that the mourners would assume that the reason the bottle was empty was that people had drunk from it (see Maharsha). Nor should one fill the partially empty wine bottle with water since he deceives the mourner. This is also a case of geneivat da’at since the mourner will think he is being given a full bottle of wine. The Talmud adds that if there is a big assembly of people at the mourner’s house and the comforter wants to show respect for the mourner (but cannot afford to bring a full bottle of wine), he is permitted the above deception. Clearly, if the purpose of the geneivat da’at is not to receive undeserved gratitude but to show honor or pay tribute to another person, it is permitted.

(Case 16) Rabbi Dratch (2001), in his paper on kvod habriot, relates the following law to kvod habriot: The Talmud (Jerusalem Talmud, Berachot 2:9) permits even an ordinary person to adopt a chumra —halachic strictness going beyond the requirements of the law— when it involves pain (e.g., fasting on certain days). However, it should be done privately; otherwise, it may cause embarrassment for others who do not act beyond the requirements of the law.

(Case 17) Rabbi Berkovits (1983: p. 22) is of the opinion that Jewish law was not “comfortable with the idea of corporal punishment” because there was an “element of insult in it to the dignity of man.” For various violations of negative precepts involving an action, the punishment is being flogged; the maximum number of lashes was set at 39. The verse in the Torah (Deuteronomy 25:3) “Forty stripes he may give him, and not exceed” is interpreted to mean up to 40, i.e., 39 lashes. However, Rabbi Berkovits notes, that the lashing was done with a strap made from the skin of a calf, which is much softer than the skin of a full-grown animal. In addition, the individual who administers the lashing was “lacking in physical strength but superior in wisdom.” Experts had to determine exactly how many lashes the person could endure. If the experts felt that the most the person could endure was, say, ten lashes but it became evident during the flogging that he could withstand the full 39, the flogging would still stop at ten. The Torah (Deuteronomy 25: 3) states: “Lest your brother shall become dishonored before your eyes.” Once the sinner has become dishonored by being lashed (even if he has not received the full amount), the Talmud notes, he is again your brother. If the transgressor embarrasses himself by relieving himself out of fear, this is considered a sufficient degree of humiliation, and the flogging stops.

The purpose of the lashing, as well as any death sentence, was to get the person to repent. The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 45a) describes how the execution of stoning was done. The guilty party was thrown from a high place — high enough to ensure a swift death but not so high that the body would be mutilated. All executions were done in a way to minimize the pain of the offender but at the same time try to keep the body from being debased. The Talmud interprets the verse (Leviticus 19:18) You shall love your fellow as yourself” to include the principle of choosing an easy, quick death for those who are executed. However, we still do everything possible to minimize the disfigurement of the body. More on the subject of capital punishment and Biblical law may be found at Rapps, Weinberg, and Lewin (1999).

(Case 18) Charity, ideally, should be given in secret so that the two parties, the giver and the receiver, do not know each other (Babylonian Talmud, Chagigah 5a; Maimonides, Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 10: 7 -14). Rambam lists eight levels of charity: There is only one level above completely anonymous charity – providing a poor person with employment. Providing a job to a pauper or giving him money in secret are the two best ways to preserve his dignity.

A wonderful example of kvod habriot is the Carmel Ha’Ir soup kitchen in Jerusalem where the people who enter receive honor as well as food. It was designed to look like any other restaurant, only with no bill to pay at the end of the meal. The restaurant serves 500 portions a day and there is a large wooden box near the exit so patrons can leave anything they wish. Many leave a napkin with a scribbled thank you.

(Case 19) One is permitted to greet with God’s name (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 54a). This is derived from Ruth (2:4) where Boaz greeted the reapers working his field saying: “The Lord be with you.” They responded: “May the Lord bless you.” It is also derived from the verse (Judges 6:12) where the angel says to Gideon: “The Lord is with you, mighty man of valor.”

Incidentally, Shalom is also a name of God (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 10b) and is used in greetings. The Midrash (Midrash Ruth Rabbah, 4:5) makes the assertion that Boaz and his court enacted this ruling (possibly only for their generation and it had to be enacted again in talmudic times). The major reason for this enactment was to get people accustomed to using the name of God. There were people trying to get the populace to forget about God (idolatry was rampant in those days). By using His name all the time, it ensures that the name of the Almighty will always be in people’s minds. The Sages were not afraid that this would be seen as demeaning the honor of Heaven for the sake of human dignity. This case does not prove that kvod habriot supersedes any laws since the purpose was to ensure that people are always remembering God and thus strengthen the honor of the Almighty. It does, however, indicate that human dignity is not a trivial matter, albeit considerably below the honor of Heaven.

(Case 20) The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 33a) relates that Rabbi Yochanan, who was a great scholar, would stand up before elderly gentiles and say: “How many troubles and experiences have passed over them.” There is a great deal of wisdom one accumulates with age and thus all elderly people deserve respect. Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch (Orech Chaim 85:7) makes the point that one must show respect for the elderly.

Human Dignity in Post-Talmudic Halachic Literature

(Case 1) The Cheating Spouse

The Noda Be-Yehuda (Orech Chaim, Responsa 35) deals with a fascinating case. A young student had an affair with his hostess, a married woman, for several years. Subsequently, he married her daughter. In Jewish law, if a married woman commits adultery, she is prohibited from having intercourse again with both her husband and the adulterer (even after she is divorced). The young student decided to do teshuvah (penance) for his sin and wanted to know whether he was obligated to tell his father-in-law about his affair. The question was whether kvod habriot was a good enough reason to permit the penitent son-in-law to “sit and not act” and not inform his father-in-law of what he had done. The fear was that making the adultery public would cause a great deal of embarrassment for the entire family, including the children who were very respected. The Noda Be-Yehuda related this question to the above-mentioned argument between Rambam and the Rosh. Rambam, who stated that one must tear off shatnez worn by another in the marketplace, would believe that the adulterer should tell his father-in-law what he had done. The Rosh, whose opinion is that one is not obligated to tell another party that he is wearing shatnez, would feel that the son-in-law may “sit and not act” and not say anything. The Noda Be-Yehuda discusses other issues (the reader is urged to go to the original source) and concludes that the son-in-law must tell his father-in-law in private what he had done. This will ensure that the father-in-law will believe him since the truth has a way of making itself known. Otherwise, the father-in-law might continue to have sexual relations with his wife and as noted above she is no longer permitted to him. Since the father-in-law was an older man and would not remarry anyway, the Noda Be-Yehuda was able to come up with a solution that would not cause a public embarrassment. He states that the husband is under no obligation to divorce his wife; he is simply not permitted to have relations with her. Thus, they may remain married and continue to live together in the same house but never again have sexual relations. Of course, the public and family would not know about the wife’s infidelity since the couple would continue to be married. This would spare the family from being embarrassed.

The Divrei Chaim (She'elot U'Teshuvot Divrei Chaim, Orech Chaim 35), on the other hand, felt that since the prohibition against living with a wife who has committed adultery is not explicitly stated in the Torah, the adulterer should keep the affair secret because of kvod habriot.

A similar case is that of a woman who was promiscuous when she was younger and had an abortion. Later on she changed her ways, married, and gave birth to a son. Once a woman has an abortion, there is no longer an obligation to perform the ritual of pidyon haben (redemption) on a first-born son; after all, the child is not the first born. However, since no one knew of the women’s past, it would be very embarrassing for the family not to have a pidyon haben. Permitting the pidyon haben, on the other hand, means that unnecessary blessings will be made. Indeed, the entire ceremony would be a sham. Feldman mentions this problem and provides sources that discuss this question in detail (2005: p. 203).

(Case 2) The Kohen Sleeping Naked in a Room With a Corpse

As noted above, a kohen (priest) is not permitted to make himself tamei by coming into contact with a corpse. Thus, if there is a dead person in a room, a kohen should not enter the room. Suppose a kohen is sleeping in a room and is naked and someone dies in the room. There is no question that he must leave the room as soon as he is aware that there is a corpse there. Is he permitted to get dressed? This is a question that is discussed by many commentaries. The Remah (Yoreh Deah 372) says the kohen must leave the room immediately and is not permitted to spend even a moment getting dressed. Others disagree with the Remah and consider spending a few seconds getting dressed as a shev v’al taaseh (passive) prohibition which is superseded by human dignity. They allow the kohen to put on enough clothing to maintain his dignity (e.g., a robe), but not to get completely dressed (Panim Me’irot 2:27).

(Case 3) The Kohen Leading the Services on Yom Kippur

Rabbi Shlomo Kluger (Teshuvot Tuv Taam Vedaat 3:2:211) discusses the case where a kohen is leading the services on Yom Kippur and an individual dies in a room next door. He concludes that it is a great embarrassment for the shliach tzibbur (individual leading the prayer or cantor) to interrupt the prayers and leave the reader’s desk (tayvah) empty. Therefore, we do not inform the shliach tzibbur that someone has died and allow him to finish the prayer services.

(Case 4) Reattaching a Kohen’s Finger

What is the law if a kohen’s finger was accidentally cut off so it is hanging and the surgeon will first have to remove it totally before reattaching it. The problem is that once the surgeon removes the finger it is an organ from a living creature and will contaminate the kohen (make him tamei). As discussed above, a kohen is not permitted to contaminate himself. Rabbi Sternbuch (Teshuvot V’Hanhagot, 4: 262) uses the argument that kvod habriot enables us to supersede the prohibition against becoming tamei, even with a kum aseh. It is certainly quite embarrassing to walk around with a partially attached finger. He does, however, recommend using a gentile surgeon and putting the kohen to sleep so he does not assist in any way.

(Case 5) Getting Married on Shabbat.

One is not permitted to get married on Shabbat. This is Rabbinically prohibited because of a fear that one may come to accidentally write something, writing on the Shabbat is a violation of Torah law. There was a custom in many communities to get married on Friday afternoon. What is the law if the financial/dowry arrangements take very long and it is nightfall, i.e., the beginning of Shabbat. May the wedding be permitted? According to the Remah (Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chaim 339:4), we permit the wedding to take place on the Shabbat. Since the wedding meal is already prepared and it would be very embarrassing for the bride and groom not to get married, we use the principle of kvod habriot to allow the chupah and kiddushin. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1: 196) uses the Remah to support his opinion regarding a Pidyon Haben (redemption of first born son) where a mistake was made with the date. Using the reason of kvod habriot and embarrassment, the family is permitted to make the pidyon haben even though a period of 29½ days and 793 chalakim from the birth have not elapsed.

(Case 6) Getting Called up to the Torah

Normally, one is called up to the Torah using one’s name son (ben) of father’s name, e.g., Shimon ben Yaakov. What happens if one’s father was a heretic and it is an embarrassment for the son to be called up using his name? The Remah (Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chaim 139:3) allows the person to be called up using the grandfather’s name. If the son was an adult and was accustomed to be called up using his father’s name and now his father has become a heretic, we continue to use the father’s name. Now, it would be embarrassing to make a change in the name; a change would draw attention to the fact that the father is a heretic. These laws were established because of kvod habriot, we do whatever is possible to minimize the embarrassment of the person being called up to the Torah.

Closely related to the above case is the situation where a woman does not know the name of her father. This causes problems with her ketubah, a name must be mentioned. What makes it even more complicated is that the ketubah is read out loud for all the wedding guests to hear and we do not want to embarrass the couple. One solution is to write the brides’ name in such a manner: Rachel, who is called Rachel daughter of Jacob, (Rochel bas Yaakov), if she was raised by Jacob. Of course, this is a giveaway that Rachel is not really Jacob’s daughter. Therefore, when the ketubah is read out loud, we either skip the words “Rachel who is called” or say it quickly so those words are not heard (Sheilot V’Teshuvot Minchas Yitzchak 5:44).

(Case 7) Counting the Omer (Sefirat Ha’Omer) Out Loud

Suppose the rabbi of a synagogue missed one day of counting the omer (49 days are counted from the second day of Passover to Shevuout). Normally, an individual who missed a day of counting is not permitted to make the blessing. The rabbi of the synagogue is usually given the honor of saying the blessing out loud and it would be embarrassing for him to admit that he is not permitted to say it. This is a question addressed by several poskim (see, for example, Sheilot V’Teshuvot Shevet Halevi 3: 96; Nitei Gavriel, Hilchot Pesach 3: 17: 27) and they conclude that the rabbi or permanent cantor is permitted to make the blessing to avoid embarrassment.

(Case 8) Taking Medications on Shabbat

There are opinions that allow one to take medications on Shabbat if there is concern for kvod habriot. For example, if one has a very bad runny nose s/he may be permitted to take medicine for this since it is undignified to walk around like this. The same may be true for allergy medications and antacids if the person is afraid that not taking the medication may result in some embarrassment (Jachter, 2001).

(Case 9) Wearing a Hearing Aid on Shabbat and Using an Electric Wheelchair

Rabbi Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg (Sheilot U’Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 6:6) states that a deaf person may wear a hearing aid on Shabbat since the principle of kvod habriot overrides the problem of muktzeh. After all, it is extremely embarrassing for a person to go to the synagogue and not be able to respond to people who talk to him. In addition, there is a great deal of mental anguish for a person to go to a synagogue and be unable to listen to the reading of the Torah, pray along with others, and perform other mitzvot. Rabbi Waldenberg compares this to the case of using stones for cleansing oneself. Kvod habriot supersedes the Rabbinic law not permitting one to use something that is muktzeh on Shabbat.

Closely related to this issue is the problem of an electric wheelchair on Shabbat or Yom Tov. The Zomet Institute in Israel designed an electric wheelchair for Shabbat use that does not involve the violation of any Torah laws. The source of the electricity in such a wheelchair is a battery; a battery releases power stored from before the Shabbat and does not generate power. The development of such a wheelchair was encouraged by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l who felt that being forced to stay at home for several days results in a loss of human dignity and self-worth. Therefore, kvod habriot overrides any problems with muktzeh and other Rabbinic violations (Meir, 1990).

Meir (1990) quotes the Kalkelet HaShabbat who permits the opening an umbrella on Shabbat in special cases where human dignity is involved. As far as insisting that a person remain indoors all Shabbat, “there is no greater anguish than that” (based on Tosafot, Shabbat 50b, s.v. “bishvil”). Tosafot explicitly states that there is no greater pain than being ashamed to go out among people (and thus having to stay indoors).

(Case 10) Tearing Toilet Paper on Shabbat

What is someone supposed to do on Shabbat if he finds himself in the bathroom and there is no pre-torn toilet paper or tissues? Many authorities feel that tearing toilet paper on Shabbat is a violation of Torah law since it is being torn for a constructive purpose (see Mishna Berurah 340:41). If it is prohibited from the Torah, the solution is to tear it with a shinui (a way that is different than the usual way, e.g., holding the toilet roll in place with an elbow and tearing off the paper with the other hand). Tearing with a shinui lowers the prohibition to a violation of Rabbinic law which is set aside for kvod habriot (see Shmirat Shabbat K'hilchata 23:16).

Closely related to the above is the law that one is permitted to build on Shabbat a temporary toilet made out of stones to sit on when relieving oneself. Building a temporary structure on Shabbat would be a violation of Rabbinic law but is permitted because of kvod habriot (Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chaim 312:9). Also, a case discussed by Rabbi Abraham Weinfeld (Lev Avraham, 1: 52) regarding washing and scrubbing one’s beard on Shabbat if it has become filthy. He permits the scrubbing of the beard —not only simply making it wet— if there is a question of kvod habriot and there is no other way to get the beard clean.

(Case 11) Wearing a Handkerchief Around One’s Neck on Shabbat

The Levushei Mordechai (Sheilot V’Teshuvot Levushei Mordechai, Orech Chaim 2: 133) discusses the problem of wearing a handkerchief around one’s neck on Shabbat where there is no eruv. It is obvious to everyone that the handkerchief is not being worn as a scarf, particularly when the weather is not cold. Indeed, it is very obvious if the handkerchief is worn on top of a scarf. Clearly, it is a noticeable legal fiction to get around the law (haaramah) and should not be permitted. He, however, notes that the Chatam Sofer wore a handkerchief around his hand. It is permissible because taking something outside the eruv in an unusual manner (hotza’ah shelo k’darko) is Rabbinically prohibited. Kvod habriot supersedes Rabbinical law; it is embarrassing for someone with a runny nose to walk around without a handkerchief.

(Case 12) Wearing a Colostomy Bag on Shabbat

Some individuals have to wear a colostomy bag under their clothing after surgery. This can be a problem on Shabbat in a public domain (reshut harabim) where there is no eruv. This question relates to an issue that is discussed in the Shulchan Aruch (Orech Chaim 301:13) regarding the zav (individual suffering from venereal discharges) who wears a pouch under his clothing to protect them from becoming soiled. One may not go into a reshut harabim with the pouch since its only purpose is to protect the garments from becoming besmirched. Wearing something in order to protect one’s clothing from being soiled does not give the worn item halachic status as a garment (malbush); thus using it constitutes carrying. The same is true of a woman who wears something under her clothing to protect them when she is menstruating. However, if something is being worn to reduce pain, it is permitted. The issue of wearing a colostomy bag and going into a reshut harabim is discussed by Rabbi Abraham Weinfeld (Lev Avraham, 1: 46) and he uses the principle of kvod habriot to permit going outside with the bag. He also relies on the above-mentioned Tosafot (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 50b, s.v. “bishvil”) and avers that the psychological pain of shame is no worse than physical pain.

(Case 13) Playing Music on the Second Day of Yom Tov to Honor the King

Rabbi Meir Simcha Cohen of Dvinsk (Ohr Someach, Hilchot Yom Tov 6:14) permits musicians to play music on the second day of Yom Tov in order to honor the king. Celebrating the second day of Yom Tov outside of Israel nowadays is a minhag (custom) and is superseded by kvod habriot. The Ohr Someach relates this case to the one above dealing with leaping over coffins in order to greet kings.

The Ohr Someach also discusses another issue: May one make garments on Chol Hamoed for a brit milah (circumcision) for a child that was born on the first or second day of Sukkot because of kvod habriot? This is a question that is discussed in the Rivash (1: 226). The Rivash feels that it is not much of an embarrassment for the father if the infant does not wear new clothing. The Ohr Someach also does not permit it. He states that we use the principal of kvod habriot if the mitzvah that will be superseded and the embarrassment occur simultaneously; the act of not doing the mitzvah removes the embarrassment. For instance, allowing the kohen to bury the unattended corpse (and thereby becoming tamei) eliminates the embarrassment of having an unburied body. In this case, while the garment is being sewn, the person is not being saved from any embarrassment. The embarrassment will occur in the future at the brit ceremony and the family does not have nice clothing to wear.

(Case 14) Having an Abortion

Rabbi Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg (Sheilot U’Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3) states that abortion is permitted in the following situation: If a married woman either had an affair (then repents) or was raped and she has become pregnant (even if it was from a gentile where the child does not become a mamzer). This is a case where there is great embarrassment for the family; therefore, we allow the abortion because of kvod habriot.

(Case 15) Dyeing One’s Beard

The Torah (Deuteronomy 22:5) prohibits a man from wearing women’s clothing (and vice versa). The Talmud includes under this prohibition men who groom themselves the way women do, e.g., shaving underarm hair (Babylonian Talmud, Nazir 59a) or plucking out white hairs (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 94b). This law would also apply to a man who wishes to dye his hair or beard for grooming purposes. An interesting question arose when half of the beard of a young person mysteriously turned white and he was embarrassed with it. He asked whether he would be permitted to dye his beard black. He was permitted to dye his beard because of kvod habriot (Sheilot U'Teshuvot Shoel U’Meishiv 1:1: 210).

(Case 16) Mourning One Who Committed Suicide

Suicide is a serious transgression in Jewish law (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kama 91b), since one’s life belongs to God. One who commits suicide is not entitled to mourning rites (i.e., sitting shiva and rending of clothes) or supposed to be eulogized; rites that are for the honor of the survivor, e.g., lining up at the conclusion of the burial, should be performed (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 345:1). There are, however, some situations where the family is permitted to mourn the person who committed suicide. This is the case when it will cause the family a considerable amount of embarrassment that a member committed suicide, we allow the family to mourn. The Chatam Sofer (Sheilot V’Teshuvot, Yoreh Deah 326) adds that when it comes to the embarrassment of the family (pegam mishpacha), we do not follow any view that is lenient with the dignity of the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The law discussed above regarding one who commits suicide is referring to one who did it with a clear head and had no regrets while committing the act. If this is the case, he has to be buried in a special part of the cemetery away from the Jewish graves. In almost all cases, the assumption is that the person who committed suicide was not totally rational so the deceased is treated like any Jew (Weiss, 1991: 81-82). The fact that we make the assumption that the person who committed suicide was temporarily insane and treat the deceased like any other Jew probably has a great deal to do with the fact that we wish to spare the family additional pain.

(Case 17) Resisting the Urge to Eliminate

It is not clear whether or not the prohibition against holding back the urge to eliminate is Biblical or Rabbinic (Shaarei Teshuva,Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chaim 17). The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Maakot 15b) derives the prohibition from the verse (Leviticus 11:43): “You shall not make yourself abominable...” This may, however, be an asmakhta (the verse hints at the prohibition and provides support for it, but it is not Biblical). Regardless, if one has the urge, because of kvod habriot, s/he may wait until an appropriate, private place is found (Pri Megadim, Orech Chaim, Mishbetzot Zahav 3:7:13).

If the individual leading the services (shliach tzibbur) discovers he has the urge to relieve himself in the middle of the tefilla (prayers), he may complete them because of kvod habriot (Magen Avraham, Shulcahn Aruch, Orech Chaim 92:2).

(Case 18) Town With One Etrog

Rakover (1998) discusses a query by Rabbi Dovid Pardo (Sheilot V’teshuvot Michtam L’Dovid, Orech Chaim 6). A town had only one etrog (citron) and was asked by an emissary of another town that did not have any etrogim to give it to them so that they could do the mitzvah during chol hamoed. The people of the first town had already performed the mitzvah during the first two days of Sukkot. Rabbinical law, however, requires that the four minim be used during chol hamoed. Rabbi Pardo used the argument of kvod habriot – the town without the etrog would suffer greatly if they could not perform the mitzvah at all – and said that the town with the etrog should give it to the other town. After all, they sent a messenger with the hope that he would bring back an etrog for them. Were he to return empty-handed, it would cause them great sorrow. There is no greater kvod habriot than allowing the people from the other town to have an etrog, even if this means that the people of the first town will not be able to do the mitzvah during chol hamoed.

(Case 19) Humiliation of a Debtor

Not paying a debt is a violation of Torah law. The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kama 11b) states that the creditor has the right to take “even the cloak off the shoulder of the debtor.” Tosafot, however, notes that this is only true if the debtor possesses more than one cloak or if the debtor owns a very expensive cloak. In the latter case, we force the debtor to exchange it for a less expensive garment. Rakover (1998: p. 139) cites sources such as the Maharam (Teshuvos Maharam 400) that clearly make the point that because of human dignity we do not allow a creditor to take the only garment of the debtor. This, despite the fact that it is a mitzvah from the Torah to pay one’s debts.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 97:2) emphasizes that a creditor should try to avoid being seen by the debtor if he knows that latter does not have the means to repay the debt because a person who owes money and cannot pay back will be ashamed.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is not to provide psak halacha. Please consult with a rabbi if you have a specific question since kvod habriot is a complex subject. What I have attempted to demonstrate is how fundamental kvod habriot is to Jewish law. All the more so, in everyday situations, people should be especially careful to show respect to all of God’s creations.

Malachi said (2:10): “Have we not all one father? Has not one God created us? Why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother…? Human dignity is based on the belief that we were all created in the image of God. Prejudice, racism, sexism are totally inconsistent with Torah ideals. The classic argument between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Azzai (Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 9:4) as to which is the fundamental principal that summarizes the entire Torah. Rabbi Akiva believed that it was the verse (Leviticus 19:18) “You shall love your fellow as yourself.” Ben Azzai disagreed and felt that it was the verse (Genesis 5:1) “This is the book of the generations of Adam. On the day that God created man, He made him in the likeness of God.” From the principle of loving your fellow human being as yourself, one can deduce “that which is hateful to you, do not do to others.” A lofty ideal but problematic if one does not much care about his own dignity. One who accepts the view that all of humankind was made in the likeness of God must respect all people, regardless of how s/he feels about her/himself (Pnei Moshe, see also Torah Temimah on Genesis 5:1). Amsel (1994) quotes the Midrash (Genesis Rabbah 24:7) that maintains when you insult another person you have insulted his Creator, i.e., God, because man was created in the image of God.

It is hoped that this paper sheds some light on why the Meiri (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 19b) proclaims that the attribute of kvod habriot is very precious and there is no virtue more beloved than it. Human dignity is important to all of humankind. The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” on December 10, 1948. Article 1 of the Declaration states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” René Samuel Cassin, one of the major architects of this declaration, was a French Jew and he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1968. He did not hide the fact that the idea of human dignity and rights came from the Scriptures (see his essay “From the Ten Commandments to the Rights of Man”).

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