12/6/63

Bobby Baker scandal, farm bill, managing Congress

President Johnson and B. Everett Jordan, with Walter Jenkins, 5:34 PM

President Johnson: Hi, Everett! How you doing, my friend?

Jordan: Fine, Mr. President.

President Johnson: Good to hear you.

Jordan: Well, I’m mighty glad to be able to call you, "Mr. President."

President Johnson: Well, you did your part, my friend. You’ve done everything in the world a human could, and I’ll never forget you and that sweet wife of yours. All the times we’ve ever needed you. I’m sitting here with Lady Bird right now and she sends her love.

Jordan: Well, bless her soul.

President Johnson: She just came down to the office to try to get me away. I’ve been staying here—

Jordan: Well, I’ll tell you one thing. I’m going to join with her in helping her get you away from that place, too. Damn your hide! I don’t want you to get killed in office, now, just by work.

President Johnson: I’m not. I’m not. I’m not.

Jordan: [jovially] There are two ways to die: work yourself to death and let you somebody shoot you. But I don’t want anything to happen to you.

President Johnson: Well . . .

Jordan: By all means. Well, tell Lady Bird hello for both of us.

President Johnson: Fine. I sure will.

Jordan: Mr. President, you know about the cotton bill.

President Johnson: Yes.

Jordan: You know a lot about the cotton bill. You helped get it through the House. And it’s just absolutely imperative that this bill get through the Senate and get through here quick. And I’ll tell you why. You’ve been in business a long time and know as much about it as anybody in business. When it looked like this bill was going to pass, and when it did get through the House, the big buyers just quit buying cotton textiles. They figured, well it’s going to go down now—which it will if we can get this 8.5 cents equalizer [tax], or a good portion of it.

Well, J.C. Penney—now, now this is just confidential—

President Johnson: Yes.

Jordan: [continuing] J.C. Penney is the largest buyer of cotton textiles in the United States. He buys more men’s underwear, pajamas, everything—and socks—than any of them. I know his figures. Well, they’ve just put out an order, which I know from one of the biggest—well, the biggest—supplier of men’s underwear, that they’re going to work on a ten-day basis until this settled. Well, when you cut all the mills down to ten days, they just almost stop.

Now, this can be put through the Senate all right. It’s the best bill—it’s the only bill that’s been offered that’s got the support of everybody. I attended every one of the hearings in the Senate here, and the farmers, the warehousemen, the ginners, the cotton merchants, the seed crushers, the manufacturers have all agreed to this bill. Now, that’s the first time we’ve ever had them all to agree to anything.

President Johnson: Yes.

Jordan: [continuing] That’s your big ones in California and Arizona and Texas and the Carolinas and Mississippi and all of them. They all were here. And they don’t have anything against the [Herman] Talmadge bill. Neither do I. Except there’s nobody that’ll tell you they can pass that bill.

President Johnson: Uh-huh.

Jordan: And they can’t go back to pass it through the House to save their necks.

President Johnson: Why don’t you just get, try to get your bill out? What’s [Allen] Ellender going to do about it? Is he going to hold hearings or . . .

Jordan: Well, we don’t need to hold any hearings. We held the hearings this spring, three or four months ago.

President Johnson: Well, why don’t he take a vote on it and try to get it on out?

Jordan: Well, he needs some prodding or some help from . . . Now, you know, Ellender is not sold on this bill. He’s not sold on any kind of cotton bill.

President Johnson: Yes.

Jordan: He says it costs too much money. Well, the figures on it now is about 118 billion the first year and about 75 the next, and it’ll cut our export subsidy down. Well, it’ll cut it 2.5 cents a pound, which is a devil of a lot of money. If you’d get a hold of Ellender and three or four people on that committee, we can get that . . . It ought to be gotten out of here next week.

President Johnson: I’ll check into it the first thing in the morning.

Jordan: Will you help us on it?

President Johnson: Yes, I’ll get my boys and get them to look right into it and tell them to do everything they can.

[The tape then briefly interrupts.]

Jordan: . . . Go down there, and put that old charm on him.

President Johnson: Well, I’ll talk to . . . Let me talk to the secretary [Orville Freeman] and see what he says, and then let me talk to my legislative boys and see what they say, and then I’ll get back in touch with you.

Jordan: All right. Now, is George [Reedy] around anywhere?

President Johnson: No, I can transfer you.

Jordan: Well, I want a little information.

President Johnson: Let me transfer you right now.

Jordan: Wait. Let me ask you one other thing.

President Johnson: All right.

Jordan: Senator Ervin—

President Johnson: Walter is here in the next office, if you want to talk to him.

Jordan: Who?

President Johnson: Walter Jenkins.

Jordan: Oh, yes, I want to speak to Walter.

President Johnson: All right. [aside:] Sixty in here and get—

Jordan: All right, but let me tell you one thing. Have you got time to?

President Johnson: Yes. Yes.

Jordan: Sam Ervin and I on the 1^st of November recommended a young man.

Jenkins: Yes, sir.

Jordan: [continuing] For a federal judge in North Carolina, and we haven’t heard bee from bullfoot about it. Would you sort of look into that thing?

President Johnson: I sure will. I sure will.

Jordan: Eugene Gordon. He’s taking the place, we hope, of the federal judge—that’s Judge [Richardson] Preyer— that Kennedy turned down with [Terry] Sanford’s direction—wouldn’t appoint him, and when we went home for the recess or adjourned last year, he put Judge Preyer in there as a recess appointment. Of course, he was confirmed when we came back. Now this Judge Preyer, he’s pulled out, and given up is federal judgeship and running for governor—Terry’s running boy down there. And . . .

President Johnson: Hm. We’ll check right into that and get back to you.

Jordan: And we need to get this boy appointed to get him going.

President Johnson: All right.

Jordan: Let me speak to Walter.

Jenkins: I’m on the line now, sir. I’ve just been making notes on what you said on Eugene Gordon.

President Johnson: I think the best thing to do, though, if you don’t mind . . . Why don’t you get Bill Whitley to call Larry O’Brien and tell him you want to check and get a report for you on it. Walter, then you follow up on it and get a copy of the report.

Jenkins: I will, sir.

President Johnson: Get Bill to call him, too, first. Because we haven’t settled down Bobby [Kennedy] yet. If I go to inquiring, why, we may tip our hand. Just let Bill ask Larry O’Brien to get him a report, and you tell Larry that you’ve had a call on it too, and you want a copy of it when he gets it.

Jenkins: All right, sir.

Jordan: Goodbye.

President Johnson: All right, goodbye.

Jordan: Thank you so much, Mr. President!

Jenkins: How you doing, Senator?

Jordan: Walter—fine. Clark Mollenhoff—you know him?

Jenkins: Yes, sir.

Jordan: [continuing] Was in here yesterday afternoon, and he was prodding and bearing down on Bill and me both, about all the stuff he knows, what he knows . . . everything. He’s been talking to this damned fellow . . .

Jenkins: [Don] Reynolds?

Jordan: Reynolds. And he said, "Hell, that insurance was bought by the LBJ Company. It was $200,000." I said, "I don’t know. We haven’t made any inquiries into that thing. I don’t know who bought it. I just heard he bought some one time, a long time ago. That’s all I know about it."

He said, "Well, you know . . ." He’s been talking to this fellow, Reynolds. That damn Reynolds is nuts! I don’t know what all he hasn’t told, or who he hasn’t talked to. But I didn’t tell you before because I didn’t know.

Jenkins: No. But what’s wrong with the LBJ Company buying it? Of course, as you know, that’s what happened, as I told you the other night.

Jordan: Well, I thought he . . . I thought Leonard [Marks] did. I didn’t know there’s anything. I didn’t know there was anything wrong with it.

Jenkins: Yes.

Jordan: [stuttering] But I didn’t know that you . . . I thought that . . . I understood before that Lyndon had bought it and you’d arranged for the details with Reynolds, whatever it was . . .

Jenkins: No. As I told you, I just put him in touch with the people at the LBJ Company who bought it.

Jordan: Yes. Well, whatever it was. Now, that was the additional information.

What they’re trying to set up there [is] that there was a conflict of interest, that he was using his . . . See, he [Johnson] was in the Senate then.

Jenkins: Mm-hmm.

Jordan: I guess that’s right. That’s what he said.

Jenkins: That’s right.

Jordan: And they’re asking me . . . Well, he also asked me the other day—yesterday—"You all said you made a statement that you didn’t discuss two senators in there." I said, "That’s exactly right. I told you the truth. [John] Williams did not mention any senators." He said, "Did he mention any former senators?" I said, "Not that I know of. What are you talking about?" He said, "There’s a former senator who now is President of the United States. Did he mention him?" I said, "Well, I have no recollection of him mentioning him."

He was really bearing down. He said, "Going back to this conflict of interest, he was using his office to pressure people into buying radio time and television time and all of this stuff." I said, "I haven’t the slightest idea about that. I don’t know anything about it. But I do know people that buy radio time and they sell it. That’s what they got the station for. And I didn’t know there was anything wrong with it."

But I just wanted you to have that extra information on it.

Jenkins: Right.

Jordan: [continuing] If it’s worth anything.

Jenkins: Yes, I think I ought to know about it.

Jordan: Now, when I came out of this—we had a hearing today in the Rules [Committee], with this Melpar outfit out here.

Jenkins: Yes, sir.

Jordan: We had the president and the executive vice president in for a long [meeting], about three or four hours. Of course, that was where Bobby [Baker] got these things in and so forth. When I came out, gee, they got the television on—[they’re] standing in line. That whole place was just covered up with radio people and television people.

He wanted to know [whether] since Lyndon had become President, was he putting the pressure on to hush this thing up? I said, "Absolutely not." "Have you talked to the President?" I said, "I have not spoken to the President since he became President of the United States. I wanted to make that positive statement. I have not talked to him."

So—that was at 2:30 today.

Jenkins: Mm-hmm.

Jordan: So they keep boring in, and they ain’t going to get anything out of Everett, I can tell you that!

Jenkins: Well, that’s good. All right. Then what do you . . . Are you through with those people, now, that are there today?

Jordan: The Melpar?

Jenkins: Yes.

Jordan: No. We got three or two more Monday. I beg your pardon, yes and no. We’ve got the crowd that got thrown out—you know about this suit?

Jenkins: Yes, I read about it.

Jordan: And another crowd in there—we’re hearing the other side of this thing Monday.

Jenkins: All right, sir. I sure thank you. Can you think of anything else I ought to know?

Jordan: Well, I believe not. I want you to help me push this thing on this cotton, because that’s the most imperative thing facing this country right now that I know of. It affects every segment of the textile industry from the cotton grower right on up to the store counters. And without the boss’s help on it, it’s going to die right here in the Senate. And next year, it’s going to wreck this textile industry.

Jenkins: All right.

Jordan: If you run the store, Walter, you wouldn’t put a damn pound of cotton goods on the shelf if you thought it was going to be five cents a yard cheaper next month, would you?

Jenkins: No.

Jordan: And nobody else will. And that’s exactly what they’re doing it right now. They just quit as soon as the House passed it, and they’re just buying enough to . . .

Well, one man told me that one of the big Penney stores ordered six dozen. He said about six dozen. And they’re just buying every three days and have them shipped by mail. Said, "We’re not going to get caught with an inventory of socks, or anything else."

Jenkins: Right.

Jordan: So we’ve got to move on this thing.

Jenkins: All right. I heard the President already tell you he’d get some people to work on it.

Jordan: Yes.

Jenkins: Now, let me be sure that I go over just briefly again what I told you the other night, so there’d be no question about it. They were looking for this insurance—this company was. They were going to buy it on him, so that if something happened to him, Mrs. Johnson wouldn’t be in real serious trouble and have to give up everything she had to pay the taxes that would be due on his death. They found this one company that was particularly interested in doing that kind of business. This fellow [Reynolds] had it, and Bobby brought him to me, and I put him in touch with the people that wanted to buy the insurance, and they bought it from him. And that’s just about it. I don’t think there’s any serious problem with it, and, as you indicated to me the other night, that you didn’t think so, either.

Jordan: No. I don’t see anything wrong with it. Nothing.

Jenkins: Good.

Jordan: But what they’re trying to do with it . . . I don’t know what this fellow Reynolds, what he has told Williams and a lot of other folks. Of course, that stinking hi-fi set in there—they’ve got the darned invoice on that, and they’re trying to make something out of that. And Bobby got a lot of money out of it. And it’s one thing or another.

Jenkins: I’m sure, as I told you, that as far as we were concerned, that was something between us and Bobby, and we didn’t know the other fellow had anything in the world to do with it.

Jordan: Yes. That’s between Reynolds and Bobby. What Reynolds wanted to give Bobby, that wasn’t none of your business. I don’t presume it was.

Jenkins: That’s right. We didn’t know he was involved in it at all.

Jordan: Well, I’ve told you all that I’ve heard, so you’re all pitched on your end of it.

Jenkins: How’d it look today? Was it—

Jordan: It didn’t get around to—

Jenkins: Bobby?

Jordan: Bobby’s all fouled up in this vending machine business. There’s ain’t no question about that.

Jenkins: Mm-hmm.

Jordan: I don’t know whether . . . Now, this fellow said that he didn’t pay Bobby any money, but he got the contract. They gave it to him on Bobby’s say-so. That Bobby was just disinterested as a friend. But the other fellow said he paid him so much a month to keep it in there, and then he took it away from him. So I . . . I’m afraid Bobby’s . . . I don’t know that he did anything criminal in that—I don’t think he did.

Jenkins: Mm-hmm.

Jordan: But it certainly looks like a lot of influence peddling.

Jenkins: [sourly] Yes. [Pauses.] All right, we’ll be back in touch with you on this other thing—

Jordan: Of course, I’m trying to keep the Bobby thing from spreading, too.

Jenkins: I know you are.

Jordan: Because, hell, I don’t want to see it spread either. It might spread to a place we don’t want to see it spread. I don’t want it to spread at all, but it may be a place we can’t stop it from spreading.

Jenkins: Mm-hmm.

Jordan: Mighty hard to put a fire out when it gets out of control.

Jenkins: That’s right.

Jordan: But, thank you, Walter.

Jenkins: Thank you, sir.

Jordan: All right.

Jenkins: I appreciate it very much.

Jordan: You’re welcome.

Jenkins: And we’ll be reporting back to you on the cotton thing.

Jordan: OK. Fine.

Jenkins: Thank you, Senator.

Jordan: Bye-bye.

12-20

foreign aid; LBJ-Ford

President Johnson and Gerald Ford, 4:08 PM

President Johnson: Jerry, I’ve got in the middle of a wasp’s nest down here with our friend Otto [Passman] and the day I talked to you. I wanted to tell you about it, and see if there’s not some way of extricating ourselves.

Ford: I sure hope we can.

President Johnson: I have in front of me what Otto promised me. I guess he thought that I could prevail on you.

He told me that if we would go to 2.8 [billion] and let him roll us in the House, that we could roll him on the bill—that he would go to not 2.8 [billion] in conference, but if we could get the Senate to pass a higher bill, that he would go up to as much as 3.2 [billion], if I’d get you to go with him. I asked him if you would go with him, and he said he thought you would go with him, and that if you didn’t go with him, he’d go as much as 300 [million] in a supplemental.

Now, I don’t think that this means that much to the people of Louisiana or the country—whether it’s 100 [million] or 200 million. We had 3.9 [billion] last year, and I’m taking over a job where the world is in worse shape now than it was last year.

Ford: Right.

President Johnson: [continuing] And I just think it’s cruel to give us that little pocketbook. Now, I don’t care whether I get it supplemental or how I get it—I’m not trying to play the galleries—I just want to get something that can function. And I had on my desk the other morning $130 million that they wanted me to act on immediately, and I said, "I just can’t do it. I don’t know what we’re going to have."

But every report we get is bad, and I never saw a place where we needed help more. Now, I told the Senate boys that I was going to try to get Otto to keep his agreement with me—go to $3.2 [billion], plus the 209 [million]—if I could get you to go along with him. They sad he wouldn’t dare go that far; you had to have a pretty even split regardless of what he said to me—and I’ve got it typed out on the Speaker’s own stationery; the Speaker brought him down here.

Now, isn’t there some way that you could join him and ask him to keep his commitment to me, and go to the 3.2 [billion]?

Ford: Sir, could I take just a minute—

President Johnson: Yes.

Ford: [continuing] To tell you what my agreements are with . . . My agreements first are with the Republicans.

President Johnson: Yes, I knew that. You told me that the other day.

Ford: [continuing] But Otto agreed—and he’s told me 1,000 times since then—we won’t go above 3 billion. I said, "Well, this is what we understood." He said that 1,000 times.

President Johnson: Well, now. Do you want me to read you what we’ve got down with John McCormack—what he agreed to with me and John McCormack, just as—

Ford: Let me just take a second here. I’m more anxious to get dollars. I mean, I’m for the program, and you know that.

Now, in the meantime, this damn wheat thing has come up. Mr. President, this is a cause celébré with a hell of a lot of Republicans. I voted for the motion to recommit, as did John Rhodes, and, I guess, four out of the five conferees did on the House side.

Now, I would go to 3.2 [billion] this minute, and I would guarantee [Republican support], but I’ve got to have something on that wheat deal.

President Johnson: Now, Jerry, we’d rather not have any bill than to get in a war with Russia. We just think that when you say you’re going to discriminate against them . . . They’re not going to use the Export-Import Bank. You haven’t got any money in this bill for the Export-Import Bank.

Ford: Right.

President Johnson: The amendment’s not worth a damn. It’s just a play to the galleries, because you’re prohibiting something you’ve got no money in there for to prohibit.

Ford: I’ve read that about five times, and, as a lawyer, that language is full of loopholes.

President Johnson: [forcefully] Of course it is.

Ford: I agree with you.

President Johnson: Now, all it does is hit Russia right in the face at the time we’ve got them split with the Chinese Communists. That’s all it does.

Now, I wouldn’t have a bit of hesitancy in doing away with the bill rather than take that amendment. The Secretary of State feels the same way about it. He just told me. He said, "I’d rather have no bill than to have that kind of amendment."

Because here we are, everything that we’ve done is undone in one amendment with the Congress. [It’s] a new administration, and it puts President Johnson in the position of saying that he puts Russia in the same class as the Chinese Communists, that he’ll discriminate against them, and not discriminate against anybody else in the world.

Now, why don’t you do this? Why don’t you go in there and give them a 3.2 [billion], and the 209 [million] carryover? That’s what Otto promised me—let me read you what he promised me. "I’ll report out of the House [Foreign Operations Sub]committee 2.8 billion, plus a carryover of 209 million, and any other items in the bill where unobligated balance may go out on a point of order. In conference, I’ll go to 3 billion, plus the carryover of 209 million minimum.

"If Jerry Ford will go with me to 3.2 billion, I will go. If the conferees agree on 3 billion plus the 209 [million] carryover and Jerry Ford will not go with me for the 200 extra million as set forth in paragraph three"—which I just read—"then I will go to 300 million in a supplemental where a case can be made out for either military or economic or both, as much as 200 [million] of it to be economic aid if needed. But of a total of 300 [million], going up to 200 million as needed on either item. And if any one item doesn’t go to 200 million, up the balance of 300 million on the other item.

"In other words, if the conferees bring in more than 3 billion, outside of the 209 million carryover, the difference between that and 3.3 billion will be taken care of in a supplemental."

Now, that’s all I want done. If you’ll give me 3.2 billion, and, if I have to, come back in a supplemental for the 100 [million], that’s fine.

Now, on the wheat amendment, what I think you ought to do there . . . Your prohibiting language does no good. And I think you can put me on the spot there, and make it affirmative, where you don’t throw a red flag.

They’re not going to use it. They’re going to pay cash for it if it goes through. What we’re arguing about now is the bottoms that we ship it in, and the $3/ton, which is less that 7 million, that they’re arguing about. But they’re going to pay cash—they paid cash to Canada—we think. They just don’t want to be discriminated against.

But you can say that the Export-Import Bank is permitted to give any assistance that the President may find is required by the national interest. In other words, instead of a prohibition socking them in the face, put the load on me and let me make the decision, if I have to make it—which I don’t think I ever will have to do.

Ford: Let me ask you this, sir.

President Johnson: Yes.

Ford: If I went that far, could I have the best assurance you can give me that you’ll make them pay on the barrel?

President Johnson: I’ll do everything that a human being can.

Ford: [Unpersuaded.] Well . . .

President Johnson: The odds here—they tell me the odds are 90 percent that they don’t even want the Export-Import Bank, because the interest rate is higher than they have to have. One of the reasons is that they don’t want to pay that interest. They paid Canada straight cash. They think they’ll pay us straight cash. They think what’s thing that’s holding up the deal—and the only thing that’s holding it up—is they’re trying to chisel out of 7 or 8 million dollars on the shipping charges.

Ford: Right.

President Johnson: Now, we’re just letting them argue it out. We’re not taking part. That’s between the private grain dealers and them.

Ford: Mm-hmm.

President Johnson: But I will not let them use the Export-Import Bank unless I take a positive certification that the national interest requires this.

Ford: Well, let me—

President Johnson: And then you can beat me over the head [in] every community in Michigan that you want to for saying that I’m communist.

Ford: Well, no—

President Johnson: But I don’t mind doing it. I’m going to make them pay cash if there’s any way in the world of making them do it. And I don’t think we ought to get into an international row over this thing. I think our relationship is better with them right now than they’ve ever been. They’re dropping their budget military-wise.

Ford: Mm-hmm. Mr. President, let me sit down—I’ve got to talk with John Rhodes.

President Johnson: Yes.

Ford: [continuing] Because I don’t break agreements with people, and I don’t—

President Johnson: I know you don’t. I know you don’t. Jerry, you try to do this for us. Otto has promised us this if I could get you to go along. Now, you know that you oughtn’t to have given Kennedy 3.9 billion last year and give me 3.1 billion this year. So give me 3.2 billion and let me try to make it work. If I have to, I’ll come back not to exceed 100 [million]. That’s what he’s told me.

Now, on the wheat amendment: change the wheat amendment around where you make the President find that the national interest requires it.

Ford: Let me talk—

President Johnson: Then you’re off your hook there, aren’t you?

Ford: [skeptically] Well, it helps. It helps. Whether or not it’s going to satisfy some of these other people that are real hot on this thing is another question, but . . .

President Johnson: Well, we’d rather give anything in terms of money than that, because we just don’t want to provoke these folks into another Cuba deal. We just don’t want to do it.

Ford: Let me ask you this: is it vitally important that we get this thing done before we reconvene?

President Johnson: I would like to, for two or three reasons. You’ve got the McGregor Burnses and the rest of them that says that the Congress has done nothing. One hundred of them out of town now—everybody’s calling us all day.

Ford: Right.

President Johnson: And I think we’re just as close to an agreement as you can ever get. I think you can wind it up in five minutes if you just go in there and say, "Let me rewrite this wheat amendment, and provide that ‘however, if the President certifies the national interest, the Export-Import Bank can act accordingly.’"

Ford: Let me check with our people, Mr. President. I can’t make any commitment to you, because I’ve got to talk to them.

President Johnson: I know that. I know that.

Ford: [continuing] But I do understand your viewpoint. I will be as helpful as I can, bearing in mind my other arrangements.

President Johnson: [pleading] Do that, Jerry, and try to get back to me with something, won’t you?

Ford: I’ll do what I can.

President Johnson: Thank you. Call me. Call me.

Ford: All right, bye.

[Thomas comes to the line.]

Thomas: Mr. President, don’t be upset over that language, now. That language don’t mean a blessed thing. I’ve worked with it for two or three years. You know what you can do under that thing? It says all you’ve got to do is notify them. It don’t mean you have to wait three minutes—

President Johnson: No. Every time you notify them, though, Albert, they write a story that you’re pro-Russian. That’s what our experience has been.

Thomas: Mr. President, you can notify them and put it in the mail. That’s notification—whether they do it or not.

President Johnson: That’s right. And then they get it—

Thomas: And then you can sign the contract in two minutes.

President Johnson: That’s right. And then they say that you’re yielding to the Soviet Union, and H.L. Hunt puts out a news release—

Thomas: You mean the committee does?

President Johnson: I mean that they do, every time you do it. That’s what the boys here tell me, that all that notification means is a little publicity to make the Russians mad when you’re trying to get along with them.

Thomas: I don’t know, Mr. President. It hasn’t been my experience. I don’t think you’ll hear anything about it, because under the language they’ve got no right to come back at you. It’s just purely a question of telling them what you’re doing.

President Johnson: I don’t want to debate it—

Thomas: You’re not inviting their opinion: you don’t care what it is. Just look at your language, now. You don’t have to wait three minutes after you tell them what you’ve done.

President Johnson: [softly] That’s right. I don’t want to debate it with you, my friend. I love you. But you know goddamn well that when I ask them not to make me notify them publicly so it wouldn’t be in the papers . . .

Thomas: Well . . .

President Johnson: You know I know what I’m doing.

Thomas: Frankly—

President Johnson: You know, and we screwed it up. This damn fool Humphrey put that paragraph on.

Thomas: That’s right—

President Johnson: I told [Carl] Albert to get it off, cut it off.

Thomas: I think it’s your partners over on the Senate side. Old Otto played ball. He told me he was going to do his damnedest to take it out. Have you got the language in front of you?

President Johnson: Yes, sir, I’ve got it front of me. And it oughtn’t to be in there. It’s just a damn—

Thomas: [hurriedly reading] "Agency or nation in connection with the purchase [etc.]."

President Johnson: That’s right.

Thomas: [continuing] "Or national except when the President determines that such guarantees would be in the national interest."

President Johnson: That’s all right—period.

Thomas: [continuing] "And reports each—

President Johnson: No! No! Period after "national interest."

Thomas: I know, but read your language further. "And reports each determination."

President Johnson: [loudly] Why should I want to report to everybody that I screwed a girl? You screwed one last night, but you don’t want to report it.

Thomas: [slyly] I wish I did.

President Johnson: You know what I’m talking about. That made it come home to you, didn’t it?

Thomas: It ain’t going to—

President Johnson: Well, don’t you think I’m a damned idiot, now.

Thomas: Now, now, now, now. Of course not. But I don’t think it’s going to hamstring you a bit on—

President Johnson: It doesn’t hamstring me. It just publicizes that I’m pro-Russian right when Nixon is running against me. That’s all it does.

Thomas: Well, he ain’t going to run, because he ain’t going to—[Both talk simultaneously.]

President Johnson: Listen, Albert. Listen, Albert. You and I are buddies now. You understand politics, and I do, too. I’m telling you that we’re working with the Republicans up there 100 percent.

Thomas: Well, I’m on your side.

President Johnson: All right. You just don’t ever agree that’s a good clause, because you know goddamn well it ain’t. Don’t try to shit me, because I know better.

Thomas: Here’s the Speaker. Well, I’ve worked with it in the—

President Johnson: Yes, you’ve worked with it, but you’ve been working with it under Republican Presidents, not under Democrats. When a Democratic President has to report that he makes a determination that it’s in his interest to go with Russia, it’s not good when you’re running for office. Now, you know that, don’t you?

Thomas: Oh, now I think you’re . . .

President Johnson: Well . . .

Thomas: [continuing] Letting your imagination run wild.

President Johnson: Now, Albert, don’t you demagogue in there with your audience!

Thomas: I’m not going to ever kid you.

President Johnson: You’re kidding me there with that audience.

Thomas: No, I’m not. No, I’m not.

President Johnson: You know damn well that it’s not—how do you think it is to Nacogdoches, [Texas]? Now ask Lera. Ask Lera if you think it’s smart in Nacogdoches for me to certify that I’m strong for the Negroes—

Thomas: [forcefully] You don’t have to certify. All you have to do is notify them—and if they don’t like it, it comes under the heading of too bad. You’ve already done your duty—

President Johnson: I see now I can’t reason with you. I ain’t going to try to argue with you.

Thomas: [in a friendly tone] Wait a minute. Here’s the Speaker. Here’s the Speaker.

2-1

Texas politics

Frank Erwin, 1:25 PM

President Johnson: Now, if I ever knew anything in my life, I know it that we oughtn’t to have a contest this summer. John’s not physically able to have one, oughtn’t to have one, and oughtn’t to go through with one. I can’t take one. I can’t win 49 states if they’re fighting at home. We’re always fighting. That’s what they’ve stirred up down there—that’s not anything to be desired.

Hell, I don’t know why they’re always so interested in what the votes up here are. If I can get along with the senator from Texas, it looks like you-all could. He’s insulted me more than he has anybody else. And if I can endure his program, if I can take Charlie Herring, it looks like you-all could. If I can get along with Ralph Yarborough, I don’t know why you-all have to run the Washington end of the deal. You all go on and run Austin.

Erwin: Mr. President, I think that this "you-all" you speak of has got everybody else in the same shape I am. I mean, a lot of people love you and John both, and aren’t taking sides between you and John, but are just in the middle, being pulled both ways, and that’s . . . it’s a disaster for everybody.

President Johnson: Yes.

Erwin: I understand that. If I knew what to do about it, I would. The reason that I felt like that if you and John could talk and maybe get whatever it is that each one of you is upset about out of the way, maybe you-all could sit down and work something out.

President Johnson: I don’t have John’s confidence. He doesn’t call me and ask me any of these things. He goes off with Shivers and plans these things. And Shivers has been an anti-Johnson man that got defeated at my hands.

Erwin: [quietly] Yes, sir.

President Johnson: John doesn’t show me respect enough to say, "Now, I know you’re going to be running for President, and I don’t want to do anything but help you, and I don’t want to embarrass you." He goes off to Sid Richardson’s island, and the paper comes out that he and Shivers and Joe Kilgore have met and plotted.

I can’t do anything about that, but maybe some of you that talk to him, that he does trust, can. He doesn’t trust me to that extent. He never has called me and asked me "what should I do" about anything. When he was in private life, I called him and asked him what I should do about everything. But he’s sensitive about being independent, and he . . . [Long pause.] Just after he announced and got in that thing, why, he thought he could have all my friends, and be awfully clear that . . .

Now, the Houston Chronicle called this morning and said the rumors are widespread and will be printed in Houston that Joe Kilgore had 500,000 [dollars] pledged and this has been cut off by the President in phone calls to Texas. Now, I haven’t called a human about that. That’s what John said, and what you said the other night. I haven’t called a person about Joe Kilgore. I haven’t talked to one human. You’re the first one that I’ve talked to about Joe Kilgore, except Joe Kilgore. They ought to quit putting—

Erwin: I want to correct you in one little item. I didn’t say this. I was simply reporting [what was said]. All I’ve tried to do is to be a conduit through John, because apparently there wasn’t another line of communication open.

President Johnson: Yes. I think that’s good.

Erwin: I was just hopeful that maybe if we could establish some kind of communication, we could resolve this problem.

President Johnson: Well, I think that Shivers wouldn’t give a damn what happened to me. I think he’s going to be supporting the Republican ticket. And I just hate to see him get my friends sucked into this thing. Now, the Chronicle is going to say that Kilgore is now meeting with Shivers in Austin, and if Kilgore doesn’t announce, Shivers will. And I’d let Shivers announce. Because we ain’t going to have a Republican senator. They ain’t going to turn me down to elect a Republican senator.

Erwin: No, sir. I don’t think they are, either.

President Johnson: And I’d just quit messing with Shivers. Shivers ain’t got a goddamned bit of strength that you-all haven’t got anyway. Why do we want to let him to take over the direction of our party? And why do we want to publicly do it?

Here, John’s got a good image here with Negroes and the Mexicans and with being a pretty moderate fellow. And now, by God, he starts meeting with the [Dallas] Citizens Council. And he’s off with Joe Kilgore, who’s one of 25 voting against the President on his first votes—from his own state. And he’s off meeting with Shivers, on how to do what? Start a hell of a fight in Texas that can’t do anything but embarrass the President.

Now, I don’t know what you can do about it. Maybe you can’t do anything. But Jack [Valenti] said you had called, and I told Jack that I thought I ought to tell you how we felt and what we’re willing to do. I think we can and will and should try to get this boy [Don Yarborough] out of the race. I don’t think John ought to have a race. I told him that when I saw him. And he said, "Well, who’s going to be built up?" I’d build up somebody, whoever he wants—I don’t care. I don’t want to tell you who to be as governor. You all pick out the governor. But I don’t want you saying up here that you’re going to send a man that’s an enemy to me into the Senate. That’s a fair deal, isn’t it?

Erwin: Yes, sir. Now, let me tell you—

President Johnson: And I think what we ought to do is make every effort we can over the weekend, Sunday—this Don Yarborough hasn’t paid his filing fee—to get these fellows to tell him that come up here and go around over the country for the National Committee or something else in the election or the labor groups that we will not have any opposition for Ralph Yarborough. If we can do that. And I think that’s what you ought to ask the governor to try to do.

If the governor is just hell-bent on having opposition, well, then we can’t help it. We’ve done our best. Now we just have to say to him that we can’t do it, we can’t deliver. But I begged them all to do this for me, and I think everybody is willing to do it, if the governor is willing to do it for me. If he hates so bitter, and he’s so vindictive, that he’s just got to have a man up here to pull out this fellow that’s voting with me, then I can’t help it. But you do your best to get him to do otherwise, and still be as loyal as you can to him and to me.

Erwin: I don’t have any trouble being loyal to both of you.

President Johnson: I know that.

Erwin: It just made me sick to see here when everything ought to be at the very zenith of everybody’s career, that we have this kind of problem.

President Johnson: It’s unthinkable. It’s unthinkable that a boy that would work for me for 20 years would do this without ever talking to me, and run off with Shivers. It would be just exactly like if I came down there, and went off with Price Daniel and took in after John. I just can’t understand it.

Erwin: The problem is that when a statement is made like that to the governor, he’s got his version of the thing, and he just comes back with his version. That’s the reason—

President Johnson: [sharply] Now, what is his version? His version is that he’s gone off with Shivers, who is a bitter political enemy of mine that he fought himself, and who has joined the Republicans and bolted to them in every election, including mine, and opposed me for Vice President. And he’s gone off with him to knock out a man who’s voting with me.

Erwin: Well, sir, his answer to that, I’m confident, would be that you’ve turned your back on your friends and gone off with Ralph Yarborough, who’s been your lifelong enemy.

President Johnson: Ralph Yarborough has voted for me every time my name’s been on the ticket. So I wouldn’t say he’s my lifelong enemy. I’ve never asked his office that he hasn’t voted for me. And I haven’t turned my back on my friends, because Mr. Shivers wasn’t my friend. He ran against me.

Erwin: Well now, please understand. What I’m saying is, so that you can understand the problem that everybody’s got unless you and the governor can find some way to sit down and talk this thing out because--

President Johnson: [forcefully] I’m ready to talk to the governor anytime the governor feels like talking.

Erwin: I don’t know that he does feel like talking.

President Johnson: Well, that’s right. I just can’t—

Erwin: I have done everything I know how to do to get him to call you. He says, "There’s nothing to talk about. The President knows my views, and I know the President’s views, and there’s nothing to talk about."

President Johnson: Well, then, there’s not--I think there’s a good deal to talk about, and I’m willing to talk about them. And want to. And I just don’t want to talk to somebody that doesn’t want to talk, you see.

Erwin: I understand that, sir.

President Johnson: Well, I’m going to be reasonable and I’m not going to be revengeful or vindictive of anyone. But when they go to talking about Yarborough being a lifelong enemy—he’s been a lifelong friend. He’s supported me in every race I ever made, and he’s never cast a vote against me. And that’s more than Mr. Shivers can say. He tried to keep me from being chairman of the delegation [in 1944]. He tried to keep me from being senator. He tried to keep me from being Vice President. And he went on television and said so.

And now, for my so-called protégé to go off and meet with him and say, "We’re going to knock off a man that’s supporting the President, and we’re not only going to run the state and everything in it, but we’re going to run Washington as well," I think, by God, they might be getting a little bit fast. "And if we can’t have it, we’re going to take our marbles and go home and quit and ain’t even going to run."

I’ve worked with John a long, long time, and I think I know him, and I think I love him more than any other white man. I think I know him better, and I think sometimes he gets pretty adamant on these things. I’ve heard him pretty adamant on the Negro question. I’ve heard him pretty adamant on the labor question. I’ve heard him pretty adamant on the Eisenhower-Republican question. I know his tendencies, and I think that’s why he needs some folks around him that will say to him what I’m saying to you now. Let’s just don’t take off the whole goddamned thing in one bite: on what kind of meat have we been feeding?

Now, I’m not trying to tell him who to elect in his State Senate to support his program. Why in the hell is he trying to tell me who to elect to support my program? He ought to be happy that he’s governor. I ought to be happy I’m President. We ought to be able to work together, and meet together, and talk. And I’m anxious to. All the talking that’s been done, I’ve initiated. I have called Texas, I think the record will show, since the assassination, I’ve called 15 times to talk to him or his family. I don’t think there’s ever been one call originated there. I think everything he’s ever asked here he’s gotten, forthwith—period.

I don’t think we’ve ever asked anything there—except we did suggest that Jimmy Turman, that he told me that he wanted me to help him get a job. I got him one. Then he said he’d like to see president of this college, and I told him I sure would love to see it, because I might want to be president someday, myself. And [I asked John] to get his three men, and we went out and got about two or three of ours, and his, all three, voted against [Turman], because he hadn’t been talked to—José Marin or Martín or whatever his name is [San Martín] in San Antonio, and the rest of them.

So I’m willing to talk, walk, scoop—nothing proud about me. But I think that John is taking off a pretty big dish when he’s . . . I never did understand why he had to do what he did on public accommodations. I didn’t think he helped himself. I didn’t think it was necessary any more than it was for me to come out against going to Floresville on the weekend. I didn’t think that was a state matter—that he’d already legislated plenty in that field in the state of Texas. But he did, and that got some national publicity, and I think it temporarily improved his position with a few people in Texas, and cut me a little bit. But I took it like a man, and smiled and didn’t do anything about it.

[The connection was then was cut off.]

President Johnson: Yes?

Erwin: Yes, sir.

President Johnson: [resuming] So if you can’t do it, I don’t know who can, because, as you know, from your intimate association, he has not required my judgment on anything. And I have been reasonably anxious for him to succeed, and I still am. But I’m not anxious to the extent of him sending a Republican up here to beat me. I think that’s what will happen. And I think the Republicans are in this so damned deep that he’s never recognized it. I think they’re in on it on Don Yarborough’s side and I think they’re in on it on the Ralph Yarborough deal. And I think they’re determined to get Don Yarborough to run against John to keep that fury going, and they’re determined to get John to get somebody to run against Ralph, and I think Shivers—it’s the hand of the Republicans and the voice of Shivers.

I just cringed this morning when I read the story about my governor, my friend, my protégé going off and meeting with Allan Shivers in the dark of the night and talking about how he’s going to have to beat senator up here in Washington and never having even discussed the thing with me.

So I just hope that what you can say to him is that it would be better for all of us if we didn’t have an opponent. We’ll try to get Yarborough out if he’ll try to keep his people out. If he can’t do that, then he can run his best man and we’ll just do the best we can. We’re going to try to keep them from having somebody here to vote against us. If they’re going to come in and kill our wife, we’re going to bar the door and try to defend ourselves the best we can. And if they’re going to start a plan to send somebody up here that will gut me—and I’ve seen nobody suggest that it won’t . . . There are 25 men voted against me on the first vote I had in the House, and one of them was Kilgore.

Erwin: What vote was that?

President Johnson: That was the vote on the wheat bill—foreign aid. Had to call them back here Christmas, my first test of strength, and the Republicans were determined to defeat me on a foreign policy decision. He didn’t; he couldn’t even leave. We asked him not to vote, but he had to stand in and vote against me. How in the hell can I ever explain to anybody that I’m supporting a man that cast his first vote against me?

How can I ever explain to a man that I’m for Shivers against a fellow that’s always voted for me and voting for me every day now, 100 percent of the time, on every measure I’ve got? And just because we’ve got little piques, Little Boy Blue personalities, get mad about something. Hell, I didn’t like for him to say he wouldn’t ride with me. But, hell, John and Nellie had said they wouldn’t ride with him [Yarborough] and they wouldn’t ride in the same car with him, so I guess he got mad, too.

Of course, both of them (I laughed, I thought it was little boy stuff) and both of them wound up together riding with each other. Nellie was in the car. We just talked big, but when the nut-cutting was down, why, we got in the car and bowed nice. I didn’t think it hurt me a damned bit to ride with Yarborough. And I thought that both, Nellie and Yarborough both, had to come a good deal to get in the car after they’d said what they did. But they’ve said it now, and . . .

I just want to see my friend elected without an opponent, and I’ll do all I can to get him out. If you-all do all you can to get the other fellows out. That’s the way it ought to be, then you can spend your next two years getting ready to elect whoever you want to as governor. I don’t make any recommendations. If you want Waggoner Carr, I’ll support him. If you want whoever you want.

Erwin: I have great doubts that there’s going to be an opponent for Yarborough, not because—

President Johnson: Well, that’s all the more reason, though, why we ought to spend all of our time on getting Don Yarborough out. And I think we can if we know it. So you try to get us some information, and some word. Now, we’ll do whatever we need to take care of Joe Kilgore. We’ll do whatever we need to take care of Don Yarborough. We’ll do whatever we need to support the governor. We need him out speaking for us, though, instead of staying at home and fighting with Don Yarborough.

Erwin: I’m just very much afraid that the governor ain’t going to run for re-election. I don’t think he’s bluffing.

President Johnson: Well, I think that would be the best thing that could happen to him, and to all of us, if he didn’t. If he’s sick and doesn’t feel like it, I’d just let Waggoner Carr run. If he’s not happy and doesn’t want to do it, [is] not feeling good, that would suit me fine. I wouldn’t beg him a minute. I think it’s a terrible imposition. I wish I didn’t have to run for this job—I may not run for it. I don’t know how to get out of it. If I did, I would. If it was as easy for me as it is for him, I wouldn’t be running.

Because you can imagine how, if I spend this much time on Texas, how I’m handling the world. I’ve got right at this moment a press conference at 3:00. I’ve got Zanzibar. I’ve got Cyprus. I’ve got Panama. I’ve got a plane shot down in Berlin. I’ve got all of these things, and I’m talking to my best friend, begging him please not to get an opponent for a man that’s supporting me. That’s a hell of a thing to have to do, isn’t it?

Erwin: [quietly] Yes, sir.

President Johnson: I just don’t know what’s happened to the boy, so maybe it would be better if he didn’t run. Encourage him not to. Just let him say that he’s not going to run.

Erwin: I haven’t heard that he’ll run.

President Johnson: If he’s sick, the last thing I want to do is to kill him. I want to do everything I can to help him, including getting rid of his opponent. But you please get Jack [Valenti] some kind of information as to what we can do, because I’ve got every force that I know in this town working on that man not to run and they always come back and say, "All right, what are you going to do about Ralph?" You follow me?

Erwin: Yes, sir. I follow you. I understand exactly what you’re saying.

President Johnson: OK, partner.

Erwin: Thank you, sir.

2-3

Vietnam

President Johnson and John Knight, 5:54 PM

President Johnson: Jack?

Knight: Yes, Mr. President?

President Johnson: How you doing?

Knight: Pretty good, thank you.

President Johnson: You quit pretty early down there. They said you was on your way home. My gosh, we’re just starting to work up here.

Knight: [Laughs.] I have one excuse: I stayed in the office for lunch.

President Johnson: Well, that’s good. I just wanted to call you and tell you I was talking to old Houston Harte, and he called my attention to a column you’d written. I got a copy of it in the Detroit Free Press of January 26, about Johnson and the Bobby Baker case. I thought it was a damn good column. I sure appreciate it. I thought it was very fair and just, and I think the facts will bear you out when all’s said and done.

Knight: Thank you, sir.

President Johnson: How else are things going?

Knight: Pretty good. George Smathers is a little irritable about all of this, but I pointed out to him that when you’re in public life, why, stories do happen. [Chuckles.] George is always very sensitive.

President Johnson: Well, you have to do that. My daddy said one time, "You don’t want to get on the firing line if you don’t expect to get shot at."

Knight: Right. I wrote something last Sunday on Panama that I hope you’ll see.

President Johnson: I didn’t. Tell me about it.

Knight: Well, out of a background, some knowledge down there, and things I read by John O’Rourke of the Washington News, who’s a very good friend of mine . . . This anti-American spirit has been going on there for some time, organized by many people. The Arias family and the newspapers are very anti-U.S. I just expressed the hope that you’d be damn firm about it.

President Johnson: We are going to be. That’s what we have been.

Knight: No unwillingness to talk, but no retreat, either.

President Johnson: We called him [Roberto Chiari] the moment it happened, and told him we’d talk about anything anywhere, anytime, and do what was fair and just, but we wouldn’t have a pistol at our temple, and wouldn’t negotiate when there was violence, and we wouldn’t have them telling us we had to rewrite treaties in advance, and so forth.

We’ve leaned over backwards to be fair and just, and to tell them that we would look at anything, and do anything that was right, but that we weren’t going to be intimidated. But they have insisted that we agree to rewrite treaties before they even resume relations with us. And we just said we’re not going to do that.

Knight: Well, I stated most of that, but there are some of these sobbing columnists now.

President Johnson: And we got the New York Times and the Washington Post that are raising hell.

Knight: Yes, well. Anyhow, you know, every time, you can be just, but when we get soft with those people (I know something about them) they kind of think that’s a victory. We lose face.

President Johnson: We haven’t done that, though, Jack.

Knight: I know we haven’t.

President Johnson: And we’re not going to. I think it’s sad that they feel they won’t even talk to us, but that’s their hard luck.

Knight: Well, they have an election coming up. They’re all whooping it up, and creating all the confusion.

President Johnson: We’ll watch it, and we’ve got problems.

What do you think we ought to do in Vietnam?

Knight: Well, of course, I’ve had a record on that for about ten years. It’s a little late, now, but I never thought we belonged there. That’s a real tough one now, and I think President Kennedy thought at one time that we were overcommitted in that area. And—

President Johnson: Well, I opposed it in ‘54. But we’re there now, and there’s one of three things you can do.

One is run and let the dominoes start falling over. And God Almighty, what they said about us leaving China would just be warming up, compared to what they’d say now. I see Nixon is raising hell about it today. Goldwater too.

You can run, or you can fight, as we are doing, or you can sit down and agree to neutralize all of it. But nobody is going to neutralize North Vietnam, so that’s totally impractical.

So it really boils down to one of two decisions: getting out or getting in.

Knight: You know, at the time of SEATO, when that was organized, these other nations were supposed to be a party to these problems, but France, none of them—

President Johnson: None. They just want to create problems. France does.

Knight: [The British are] worried about Malaysia. Well, I just felt badly about Laos, at that time, because that was no place to fight a war.

President Johnson: No.

Knight: The place down here is that way, too. I just hope we don’t get involved in anything that’s full-scale. I don’t know. See, I don’t have all the facts. But I’ve worried about that thing for ten years.

President Johnson: I agree. I agree.

Knight: It’s very, very difficult.

President Johnson: I sat down with Eisenhower in ‘54 when we had all the problem. But we can’t abandon it to them, as I see it. And we can’t get them to agree to neutralize North Vietnam. So I think old man [Charles] De Gaulle is puffing through his hat.

Knight: Long range over there, the odds are certainly against us.

President Johnson: Yes, there is no question about that. Anytime you got that many people against you that far away from your home base, it’s bad.

Knight: The big question is how far you can commit over the globe with the resources you have. It’s a pretty difficult problem, and I have the greatest sympathy for you in it. It’s not something to which one can give an easy answer.

President Johnson: Let me hear from you, Jack.

Knight: Thank you very much.

President Johnson: Bye.

2-7

President Johnson and Mike Mansfield, 11:30 AM

President Johnson: These people in State and Defense met during the evening on this Guantánamo thing. We’re going to meet again after lunch. They’re trying to find out exactly what has happened. I wanted to get any reactions you might have to it, before I went back to meet with them again.

Mansfield: Well, evidently it appears that they violated not international law, but a state law. It is my understanding that water is being rationed on a three-hour-a-day basis there, and that Castro has allowed the water to flow from the river for an hour each day. So we ought to have plenty. But here’s a statement that I made this morning, if you have a minute or so?

President Johnson: [unenthusiastically] Yes.

Mansfield: [reading] "Mr. President, no matter how the Cuban government may act, the Cuban fishermen are entitled to, and will receive, the same justice, the same impartial protection of domestic and international law, as any other alien persons in similar circumstances. The fact that they are Cubans or that Cuba retaliates for their arrest is irrelevant insofar as the judicial processes of this nation are concerned. However the Cuban government may regard the matter, there will not be any mixing of justice and water on our part.

"Insofar as the water supply is concerned, if the pretext of the arrest of the Cuban fishermen had not sufficed, the Havana government would have had no difficulty in creating another. It is obvious that Castro wants us out of Guantánamo, and it is obvious that he is not going to make it easier for us to stay. It is equally obvious that we have no intention of being pressured out.

"At this time, the need is for cool water at the Guantánamo base. Hot words on the floors of the Congress will not supply it. We have the technical means to supply the water for as long as it takes, and in whatever quantities it takes. I have every confidence that the President will see to it that we are not parched out of Guantánamo."

And then Tommy Kuchel came in and supported it in effect.

President Johnson: That’s good. That’s a good statement.

What I think—

Mansfield: [Unclear] aren’t you? This will save you $14,000 a month, I understand, which you won’t have to pay to Mr. Castro’s government.

President Johnson: Yeah. He’s got a good many people working there, too, and we probably ought to make, if he’s not going to allow us to have water, we probably ought to try to make the whole base independent of him, and secure. We’re going to think about that today, and probably issue a pretty strong statement later in the day that, namely, that he’s breached a contract, that’s his choice.

Mansfield: Mm-hmm.

President Johnson: That’s a bad way to do it, but he’s done it, and, therefore, we’re going to supply our own water and supply our own personnel, and operate our own base.

Mansfield: You mean all the Cubans, all of them would be off?

President Johnson: Except those that live on the base.

Mansfield: Mm-hmm.

President Johnson: We could do that. We haven’t decided to do it; that’s a possibility. Just declare complete independence of it. We could do that. Now, I don’t know what else we can do. You got any other thoughts?

Mansfield: I would think that one thing which might be worth considering—this would call for a great deal of handling—would be for the Florida courts just to release these people with an admonishment and send them home. We could afford to be big-hearted. But that’s a state matter, and that could get you into trouble because of the feeling down there.

President Johnson: And it may look like we’re being awfully soft.

Mansfield: Or being awfully big.

President Johnson: I think it ought to follow its normal course, whatever they do to them. I think most of the time they fine a captain. It looks like, from the information we have, that this is deliberate.

Mansfield: I see. If I get any ideas on the basis of what you said, or any other, I’ll pass them on—

President Johnson: Now, you going to finish your [tax] bill today?

Mansfield: Yes, sir. We ought to finish it around 3:00 or 4:00, and then we ought to go on Monday resolutions. Then I’ve got to get together with Hubert [Humphrey] and a few others and decide what our policy will be on the civil rights bill.

President Johnson: All right. That’s something I sure want to talk to you about.

Mansfield: Yes, sir.

President Johnson: You may want to intercept that thing at the door, so you don’t have a motion to take it up, and then let the conference report, get this bill in conference. Tell our boys to agree just as quickly as they can, so they can get ahead of it if they can. If they can’t, we may just, we might even decide to let it stay behind for a few days.

Mansfield: That would be far better because, evidently, Harry Byrd, who I understand you’re going to see shortly, figures they can’t take it to conference till a week from Monday.

President Johnson: Oh-h-h, God, no. Why can’t we do that?

Mansfield: Well, they can do it tomorrow, and Monday and Tuesday.

President Johnson: Yeah.

Mansfield: And there isn’t so much in the way of differences that they can’t reconcile what they are.

President Johnson: Of course. Does he want to wait until a week from Monday to take it up?

Mansfield: Yes.

President Johnson: Why?

Mansfield: Well, I suppose, because the Republicans are going away, but I think you can prevail upon him. The conferees will be [George] Smathers and Russell Long and Byrd and [John] Williams and [Frank] Carlson, I believe. I think they’d be willing to go ahead if the House would.

President Johnson: You just tell him that we’ve just got to do it. You just tell them that. And you tell [John] McCormack too. I’ll talk to Wilbur Mills, but, God almighty, we want to get this thing adopted before that civil rights [bill].

Mansfield: That’s right. Will you talk to Harry Byrd?

President Johnson: I sure will. OK.

Mansfield: OK, Mr. President.

President Johnson and Richard Russell, 4:30 PM

President Johnson: Dick, we’re going to meet again at 4:30.

Russell: That’s right now.

President Johnson: Yeah. I wanted to talk to you before I went into the meeting. They’re meeting downstairs. Now here’s the [situation].

Nobody wants to do much. They think that in the first place these fishermen oughtn’t to even have been picked up, that it was a mistake, that they were over the limits, but we ought to have told them to get on back home and not make a big incident out of it, because there’s not anything to be gained from it. We ought to let [Castro] show his hand, whether this is in concert with Khrushchev, and what all it means, before we act irrational.

There’s an opposing viewpoint—that’s pretty well the viewpoint of Rusk and McCone, and, I would say, Bobby Kennedy. He wants to turn everybody loose and let them go on home. McNamara feels like the sentiment in this country is such that we’ve got to do more than that, and that even though we would stand acquitted in the eyes of the world and maybe some of the liberal papers in this country, that we probably ought to do two things: declare the independence of that base by saying, "We’re going to furnish our own water, and we don’t want your damn water, and to hell with you"; and, number two, tell the people that are on there that they can pledge allegiance to us and live there—the 600—and the other 2,500 to go on back, and we’re going to quit financing [Cubans]. We’re going to operate the base independently, so our country can be secure, and so we can operate it independently. It’s going to hurt you more by this action than it hurts us, and we just don’t need your people.

Now, that’s his feeling. He’s about the only one that feels that way. That’s my feeling. I think we ought to rap them.

Russell: That’s mine.

President Johnson: [continuing] I think they’ll say we’re cruel, and these people have been loyal to us for two or three generations, been working there. We’re just firing them outright without anything on their part, because Castro did this. USIA thinks it will get a good deal of sympathy from the rest of the nations, and . . .

Russell: Well, that’s their professional attitude. These nations ain’t as silly as we attribute them to be, as we seem to think they are. And while they’re envious as hell of us, when they get down to where their self-interest is involved—and when we get hurt, their self-interest is injured—they’re not nearly as bad as everybody makes out like they are.

This Panama thing will demonstrate that beyond any doubt. If our people will just sit tight, give them the facts, say, "Here it is now. You’ve got a stake in this." Same thing is true here in Cuba. They don’t want Castro to prosper—none of the leaders do. There are thousands of the little people who are Communist that do.

They’re not going to raise any hell about it. Khrushchev will blow up like hell. Comrade Mao Tse-tung will come in with a prolific of some kind. But the world as a whole will say, "Well, that’s very logical position to take. You got to know that you can protect this."

If Khrushchev pulled them out all at once, which he could do, if he’d stopped them all one morning, and you hadn’t even had an hour’s notice, you would need them. But now you’re giving yourself the hour’s notice, and you’re preparing against the probability that he will do another asinine thing by declaring that no Cuban national can enter on the base. You’ve got to be ready for that. But I know—

President Johnson: What do you think? I don’t like to see them so split and so divided—State, Defense, and CIA. What do you think the attitude of the country is? The Senate? Are they indignant about cutting this water off? I don’t guess many of them feel as strongly as Goldwater does, but I guess a good many of them feel—

Russell: No. No, they don’t. But a great many of them, they don’t know exactly what they want done, Mr. President, because they don’t know what can be done. But they want something done.

President Johnson: That’s right. There ain’t much you can do, but this.

Russell: That’s right. They don’t know just exactly what to do. They’re not in favor of any war, I don’t think. I don’t believe 10 percent of them would vote for that right now, under these circumstances. But they’re just tired of Castro urinating on us and getting away with it. They don’t like the smell of it any longer, and they just want to sort of show that we are taking such steps as are within our power without involving the shedding of a lot of blood. That’s my analysis of the sentiment in Congress. And, I think, in the country.

President Johnson: [softly] Mm.

Russell: Of course, it would be mighty easy to whip them up to where they’d be ready to go to war over it if you to cut loose, and fanned it up, instead of playing it in low key like is being done. But I approve of the low-key play. But I think there’s a latent feeling there, and it may not explode right now, but one of these days, they are going to say, "Well, we’ve just been a bunch of asses in this country to continually just back down and give away and say excuse me every time we come in collision with one of these little countries, because they’re small—and particularly these Communist countries." And when that there blows, now, somebody is going to get hurt, and nobody will know just when the boiler is ready to give on it. But there’s a slowly increasing feeling in this country that we’re not being as positive and as firm in our foreign relations as we should be, and that we just lean over backwards, that we worry more about our image than we are about our substance, and that we’re backing down.

Now, that feeling is in the country. Just how far it’s gotten, I don’t know. A demagogue with any strength could blow it up. I don’t know of anyone who’s got enough strength to do it. The people don’t trust Goldwater’s judgment. A lot of them like his independence, and his . . .

President Johnson: You think a lot of people are going to think you’re hotheaded when you just fire a bunch of innocent Cubans?

Russell: I don’t think so. I don’t believe that even the Times and the Post could stir up 5 percent of the people about this. I would make it perfectly clear that this is regrettable, that our association with these people has been pleasant and mutually profitable over a period of years. But they were within the power of Castro, and not in our power, and that we have to make this base independent, and we hope that in happier days, our pleasant relations with them could be renewed.

I’d sure throw that in there. You get one of them, why, he’d be a potential assassin of Castro. Yes, I’d certainly put it in there that way: that our relations with these people have been mutually pleasant and profitable. Castro has control of them, he could stop them any morning, and not a one of them could come, and we couldn’t afford to be placed in that uncertain position, if we had to rely on our own resources.

President Johnson: If he is going to cut off our water, tomorrow he can cut off our people.

Russell: Pardon?

President Johnson: If today he can cut off our water, tomorrow he can cut off our people.

Russell: Sure, sure, sure. He can stop them at the gate, where not one could come in without a moment’s notice. We just can’t operate that important establishment in that uncertain atmosphere. And as regrettable as it is, we’ll have to make other arrangements for the time being, and hope that in better days when the Cuban people and the American people are permitted to fraternize as they have in the past, and as we are anxious to do today, that we hope to be able to renew this.

President Johnson: I had planned . . . I think I’m going to make some kind of a statement on it, at least authorize the press to, after we have our meeting this afternoon, because I think they’ll want to hear something after working all day.

Russell: I think you’re going to have to say something.

President Johnson: Then I think I’m going home for the weekend. Do you see any reason why I shouldn’t?

Russell: No, I do not.

President Johnson: I think there’s every reason to kind of ignore him, go on and make your statement, and then go on, not hang around.

Russell: I agree. I don’t think there’s any reason why you shouldn’t.

President Johnson: OK. Goodbye.

President Johnson and Richard Russell, 6:30 PM

President Johnson: [in background, to aides:] We’ve got a war going on in the administration.

[Russell then comes to the line.]

President Johnson: I hate to bother you so much, but I’m getting ready to leave, and I’ll be gone a day or two. We may have a lot of them—U-2 shot down tomorrow, and we may have people marching the gate. We’ve got a good deal of division in our government, and I wanted you—

Russell: It’s a shame when the President of the United States makes up his mind and speaks . . .

President Johnson: Well, it is, because it happens here every day. You’ve got them out talking to the columnists. You’ll see the [Rowland] Evans column this morning—every day it does it. We’re not bothered about that. I wanted you to know so that you would be somewhat prepared for what happened. It was about the line the three of us had—you and McNamara and me versus Bundy and Bobby and McCone. Bobby and McCone were very much together.

So we are putting out this statement. This is my statement that my boys wrote; they amended it a little bit, but they had their alternative and we—I—rejected it. "The United States is determined to guarantee the security of the Guantánamo Naval Base." Wait a minute—we changed these paragraphs. "When the Cuban government shut off the water supply to Guantánamo, it deliberately broke a contract made in 1938, reasserted in 1947, and supported by Fi-del Castro in 1958." That’s paragraph one.

"The United States government is determined to guarantee the security of the Guantánamo Naval Base and does not intend to submit that security or the welfare of the servicemen and their families who live there to irresponsible activities by the Cuban government."

Do you agree with that statement?

Russell: Yes, sir. That’s all right.

President Johnson: "Therefore, the President has instructed the Department of Defense to make the Guantánamo base wholly self-sufficient. In response, the Secretary of Defense has issued instructions to: one, assure the base control over its own water supply, both by conversion of sea water to fresh water and by the transportation of water by ship; two, to reduce the employment of Cuban personnel under the control of the Castro government."

Russell: Put the word "living under the control."

President Johnson: No. "Reduce the employment of Cuban personnel who are subject to the control—

Russell: Subject. That’s all right.

President Johnson: [continuing] "Of the Cuban government and whose wages contribute to its foreign exchange. The Cuban government remains a constant threat to the peace of this hemisphere. The consequences of further provocation of the United States by Castro should be carefully weighed by all nations. These matters are being called to the attention of the members of the OAS for consideration in connection with charges now pending against Cuba in that organization. They will be discussed by the members of NATO in order that those governments can take them into account in connection with their determination of their own policies toward the threats to the security of the Western Hemisphere posed by the Castro regime."

Russell: [disappointed] You’re not going to say anything about Khrushchev?

President Johnson: Well, we said all nations and we’ve already notified the Soviet ambassador this afternoon that what I told you about we agreed upon. This is an irrational man.

Here’s what they wanted to do. They want to say, "The United States is determined to protect the security of the Guantánamo Naval Base. When the Cuban government shut off the water supply to Guantánamo it broke an agreement. The President has instructed the Department of Defense to make the Guantánamo Naval Base wholly self-sufficient with fresh water, and to prepare to take such other measures as may become necessary to ensure that the base shall be wholly secure against any further harassment by the Cuban government." But to do nothing about it, you see—just prepare to take such other [measures].

Russell: I much prefer the first one.

President Johnson: All right.

Russell: [continuing] I think that the people will too. I haven’t had any response to it. I was just looking over my mail here tonight. There’s four or five letters saying, "Well, we’re absolutely dead. We’re just going to let everybody kick us over, including Castro here. Now, we’ve yielded to him." So I’m glad that you’re going to take some affirmative action.

President Johnson: Now, Mann thinks that anybody that wants to live on this base, they can live on it, and we ought to do it. Or anybody that wants to live off of it, we can operate it without the Cubans and leave his money on it, but we oughtn’t to be financing.

Russell: That’s exactly right.

President Johnson: [continuing] We oughtn’t to be financing Cuba, and he thinks that the rest of the hemisphere is just watching us and that this ties right into Panama, and if we get soft with them, we’ll be soft with Panama. And that everybody else will start kicking us in the pants, because they’ll think they can.

Russell: I couldn’t agree with him more. I couldn’t agree with him more.

President Johnson: Well, I hope, then, that you’ll help me formulate some opinion, because this crowd here—

Russell: I will do all I can. I’m going to Georgia tomorrow night myself.

President Johnson: That’s good. What are you, going to stay a few days?

Russell: Yes. I’m going to speak to the legislature down there the next . . .

President Johnson: You must be running for office.

Russell: No. I get out, I try to make at least 30 speeches in the state every year, always have. Haven’t made but two this year. Going to make this one; this will be three. I’ll have 27 more.

President Johnson: I may have to call you. Hate to bother you, but I need to talk to you every once in a while.

Russell: All right, sir. For whatever it’s worth.

President Johnson: Well, you think, then, that we’ve done the right thing?

Russell: Yes, sir, I do.

President Johnson: OK.

Russell: I know that is better than the other one. No question in my mind in comparison. Have a good visit to the ranch.

President Johnson: Bye.

2-25

Vietnam

President Johnson and Robert McNamara, 11:45 AM

President Johnson: Bob, I hate to modify your speech any, because it’s been a good one, but I just wondered if we shouldn’t tonight still give our relative strengths and still give a very brief summary. I wouldn’t go into the anti-defense and stuff.

McNamara: Yeah.

President Johnson: But a very brief summary of what you’ve cut in the budget. I’d go into that a good deal. You could say that we’re not—they asked for $10 billion more than we gave them, so whenever anybody says that we’re giving something to everybody, why, we’re giving them a billion less than they’d like to use. But find two minutes in there for Vietnam.

McNamara: [Pauses.] Yeah, but the problem is what to say about it.

President Johnson: All right—I’ll tell you what I would say about it. I would say that we have a commitment to Vietnamese freedom. Now, we could pull out of there, the dominoes would fall, and that part of the world would go to the Communists. We could send our Marines in there, and we could get tied down in a third world war or another Korean action.

The other alternative is to advise them and hope that they stand up and fight. Now, we think that by training them and advising them in the period of three years, we can have them trained. And we removed some there who were guarding the establishments that didn’t need to be guarded any more, absolutely no need. We’d put in 10,000 more if they could be useful and if we needed them for training, but this 1,000 we didn’t need, because they were guarding whatever they were guarding, and that’s why we pulled them out.

Now, we estimate that with the 15,000 we’ve got left, that all the rest of this year and a large part of next year, that we can just train anybody in that period of time, and for that reason, we’ve said that we can reduce that number after they’re trained. Now, this nation has made no commitment to go in there to fight, as yet. We’re in there to train them and advise them. And that’s what we’re doing.

Nobody really understands what it is out there. They don’t know, and they’re getting to where they’re confused, and they’re asking questions, and they’re saying why don’t we do more. Well, I think this: you can have more war or you can have more appeasement. We don’t want more of either. And it’s their war and it’s their men, and we’re willing to train them. We have found that over a period of time that we kept the Communists from spreading.

We did it in Greece and Turkey with the Truman Doctrine, by sending them men. We did it in Western Europe by NATO. We’ve done it there by advice. We haven’t done it by going out and dropping bombs, and we haven’t done it by going out and sending men to fight. We have no such commitment there.

But we do have a commitment to help the Vietnamese defend themselves. We’re there for training and that’s what we’re doing. They say that the war is not going good. Well, there are days when we win, and there are days when we lose, but our purpose is to train these people. Our training is going good, and we’re trying to train them.

McNamara: All right, sir. I’ll get right on—

President Johnson: I don’t know if I’ve said anything there that I shouldn’t say.

McNamara: No, no. I think that’s—

President Johnson: But that’s the way you said it to me, and it appealed to me when I say why in the hell . . . I always thought it was foolish for you to make any statements about withdrawing. I thought it was bad psychologically. But you and the President thought otherwise, and I just sat silent. Now, you’ve made them, and I asked you for your explanation, and you give me a good explanation. There’s not a damn bit of use of having 1,000 people sitting around guarding something that they don’t need to guard.

McNamara: No question about that, Mr. President. The problem is—

President Johnson: All right, then the next question that comes is how in the hell does McNamara think that when he’s losing the war that he can pull men out of it? Well, McNamara’s not fighting a war. He’s training men to fight a war. When he’s got them through high school, they will have graduated from high school, and will have 12 grades behind them next year, and he hasn’t taken on any agreement to keep them for the rest of their life. He’s just made a commitment to train them to fight. And if he trains them to fight and they won’t fight, he can’t do anything about it. Then he’s got to choose whether he wants to fight, or let them have it.

McNamara: This is the problem exactly. And what I fear is that we’re right at that point. Well, anyhow, I’ll get this out to you.

President Johnson: Now, we’ve got to decide who goes with you, because they tell me that everybody in town is wanting to go, and I sure wouldn’t haul anybody out there that I just didn’t have to have.

McNamara: I feel exactly that way.

President Johnson: One man that I want to suggest—and I’m sure you can cut him right back, right quick, and I won’t hesitate and if you don’t mention him any more I’ll just know that you haven’t used him—but from the psychological standpoint, and from a political standpoint, there’s one man that I would have on that plane with me—and that’s [David] Shoup. I would put a stop to [Mike] Mansfield’s speaking up there on it every day, and Shoup would put a stop to it.

I’d have Shoup just go out there, and sit in on these meetings with [Maxwell] Taylor, just kind of ex officio. He’s out, he hasn’t got anything to do, and he’s got that medal on his breast, and Mansfield is just worshipping the Marines, and the rest of them that are raising hell do the same thing. Then I’d use Shoup to go up and tell these boys some things. He’s worth a dozen Averell Harrimans to you.

That’s my judgment, but I’m not any expert on it. I think that he’s quiet enough and humble enough that he’s not going to be bossing around and threatening any. He can sit in the back row. You don’t have to mess with him. But when he gets back here, he can take the McNamara line and sit down with Mansfield and sit down with the rest of them, and say, "Now, here’s the story." We can get him invited to come and see them. You give a little thought to that.

McNamara: I sure will.

President Johnson: All right.

McNamara: All right, sir. Thank you.

2-27

Hoover

President Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover, 8:53 PM

President Johnson: Edgar, I don’t hear you well. What’s the matter? You got this phone tapped?

Hoover: [Chuckles nervously.] No. I should say not. I can hear you perfectly, sir.

President Johnson: All right. Did they talk to you about this statement down here tonight?

Hoover: No, they have not.

President Johnson: Well, they talked to somebody over in your shop.

Hoover: I think they talked to [Nicholas] Katzenbach.

President Johnson: I wanted to talk to you before I say it. Here’s what I was going to say. They had this bombing this afternoon. Have you got any leads on that at all?

Hoover: No. We have been working on that case very intensively ever since these bombings got started down there. We’ve had special men. We have three offices in Florida—in Tampa, Jacksonville, and Miami—and I ordered this afternoon one of the inspectors of the Bureau to proceed to Florida and coordinate the entire operation.

President Johnson: One of who?

Hoover: One of my chief inspectors, to coordinate the entire operation of the three offices. In other words, we have been going all out on it.

President Johnson: How much can I say about that?

Hoover: You can certainly say that the FBI is giving top priority to these various bombings that have taken place.

President Johnson: Why can’t I say that I talked to Mr. Hoover, and he tells me that the FBI has its full force investigating the bombing, and some of his top men are on the spot now?

Hoover: That’s correct. You can say that.

President Johnson: OK. All right. That’s all I wanted to know. I didn’t want to get into your Bureau without talking to you.

Here’s what I’m going to say. You listen to this now. Forget the FBI, and just listen to it as my adviser.

Hoover: Yes.

President Johnson: I don’t want to say anything wrong that hurts the decent union movement, and I don’t want to say anything that does that, but at the same time I’m not going to tolerate blowing up people with bombs—whether it’s the business people or the unions or who. And I don’t think a good union ought to want to.

Hoover: No, they ought not to.

President Johnson: And it may be business. We don’t know who’s doing it.

"The continued violence against the Florida East Coast Railroad is appalling."

Hoover: It certainly is.

President Johnson: [continuing] "Without regard to who is right and who is wrong in this labor dispute, this criminal action has got to stop"—

Hoover: Exactly right.

President Johnson: [continuing] "We don’t settle things in this way in this country."

Hoover: Right.

President Johnson: [continuing] "I talked to Mr. Hoover tonight, and he informed me that one of his chief men is en route to Florida now, and the FBI has thrown its full force into investigating this bombing. In the meantime, I urge the parties to renew their efforts to find a way of settling this dispute. I’m asking the Secretary of Labor to confer with Governor [Farris] Bryant immediately, and give me their recommendations promptly."

Hoover: Good.

President Johnson: Is that all right?

Hoover: That’s all right with me, Mr. President.

President Johnson: OK.

Lady Bird

Lady Bird Johnson, 4:10 PM

[Unclear office conversation precedes the call.]

President Johnson: Yes?

Lady Bird Johnson: You want to listen for about one minute to—

President Johnson: Yes, ma’am.

Lady Bird Johnson: —my critique or would you rather wait until tonight?

President Johnson: Yes, ma’am. I’m willing now.

Lady Bird Johnson: I thought that you looked strong, firm, and like a reliable guy. Your looks were splendid. The close-ups were much better than the distance ones.

President Johnson: Well, you can’t get them to do it.

Lady Bird Johnson: Well, I will say this: there were more close-ups than there were distance ones.

During the statement, you were a little breathless and there was too much looking down. I think it was a little too fast. Not enough change of pace, dropping voice at the end of sentence. There was a considerable pickup in drama and interest when the questioning began. Your voice was noticeably better and your facial expressions noticeably better.

The mechanics of the room were not too good, because although I heard you well throughout every bit of it, I did not hear your questioners clearly.

President Johnson: Well, the questioners won’t talk—

Excised material.

Lady Bird Johnson: Some of them you could hear, but in general you could not hear them very well. Every now and then you need a good crisp answer for change of pace. Therefore I was very glad when you answered one man, "The answer is no to both of your questions."</