UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
OLIVER L. NORTH, Defendant.
Criminal No.
88-0080 02 - GAG
You are instructed that the United States has admitted
for purposes of this trial the following facts to be true:
1. In 1983,
DCI Casey asked Secretary of Defense Weinberger if the Department of Defense
("DoD") could obtain infantry weapons that Israel had confiscated from PLO
forces. Following discussions between Major General Meron of Israel and Retired
Major General Richard Secord of the United States government ("USG"), Israel
secretly provided several hundred tons of weapons to the DoD on a grant basis in
May 1983. This was known as Operation TIPPED KETTLE. In February 1984, the CIA
again asked DoD if it could obtain additional PLO weapons from Israel at little
or no cost for CIA operational use. After negotiations between March 1984 and
July 1984, Israel secretly provided the additional weapons to DoD in Operation
TIPPED KETTLE II. The DoD then transferred the weapons to the CIA. Although CIA
advised Congress that the weapons would be used for various purposes, in fact
many of them were provided to the Nicaraguan Resistance as appropriated funds
ran out. (The effort to funnel materiel to the Contras at a time when there were
limits on the amount of funds the USG could spend to support the Resistance also
found expression in 1984 in Project ELEPHANT HERD, under which the CIA was to
stockpile weapons and materiel provided by DoD at the lowest possible cost under
the Economy Act.) DoD assured Israel that, in exchange for the weapons, the U.S.
Government would be as flexible as possible in its approach to Israeli military
and economic needs, and that it would find a way to compensate Israel for its
assistance within the restraints of the law and U.S. policy.
2. In late
March 1984, National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane suggested that he
pursue funding alternatives for the Resistance for use after Congressional
funding ran out. McFarlane proposed putting a member of the NSC staff in touch
with an Israeli official to pursue funding alternatives with the Israelis. In an
"Eyes Only," Secret memo, DCI Casey agreed with McFarlane's proposal. Casey
informed McFarlane that the CIA was exploring two alternative means of acquiring
equipment and materiel from Israel for use by the Resistance after the funding
ran out. First, the CIA was considering the acquisition from Israel of ordnance
captured from the PLO. Casey advised McFarlane that in 1983 the USG had acquired
some $10 million worth of weapons and ammunition in this manner from the
Israelis (in Operation TIPPED KETTLE). Second, the CIA was considering procuring
additional assistance from another country. Casey informed McFarlane that a
foreign government official had indicated that he might be able to make some
equipment and training available to the Resistance through Honduras.
3.
In April 1984, McFarlane directed Howard Teicher of the NSC staff to discuss aid
to the Resistance with David Kimche of the Israeli Government. McFarlane
instructed Teicher to tell Kimche that the USG would not press Israel on
assistance to the Resistance; that aid to the Resistance was an important matter
to the USG; that the USG faced a temporary shortfall in supporting the
Resistance; that the USG understood the risks involved for Israel; that Israeli
aid to the Resistance should be arranged through Honduras; that the USG would
furnish a point of contact; and that, although McFarlane was disappointed with
Israel's reluctance to assist directly, the USG would not raise the matter
further.
4. In early 1984, in a discussion with the Ambassador from Saudi
Arabia, McFarlane encouraged that country to support the Resistance. A short
time later, the Ambassador informed McFarlane that his government would
contribute $1 million per month. The money became available during the early
summer of 1984.
5. On June 25, 1984, the National Security Planning Group
("NSPG") -- including President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State
Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, DCI Casey, U.N. Ambassador Kirkpatrick,
CJCS Vessey, Admiral Moreau, Counselor to the President Meese, McFarlane and
Admiral Poindexter (among others) -- discussed third country funding for the
Resistance. Director Casey noted that the CIA considered El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras and one South American country as possible sources of support for the
Resistance. He suggested that the USG provide Honduras and Costa Rica with
increased economic assistance as an incentive for them to assist the
Resistance.
6. In late summer and early fall 1984, CIA stations reported
to CIA Headquarters concerning apparent offers by the Peoples Republic of China
("PRC") to provide assistance to the Resistance.
7. At a meeting in
mid-July 1984 between DCI Casey, Deputy DCI John McMahon, and Deputy Secretary
of State Dam, Casey indicated that those present ought to get moving on non-USG
funding for the Resistance since Attorney General Smith had recently concluded
that raising the funds in this manner would not be an impeachable offense, as
had been suggested at the NSPG meeting on June 25, 1984.
8. In August
1984, the U.S. government learned of a meeting between Adolfo Calero and a
senior military official of Taiwan to solicit support for the Resistance. The
Taiwan official had emphasized the need for secrecy. Taiwan initially decided to
reject the Resistance because of patently adverse diplomatic consequences. The
Taiwan official did not inform Calero of this decision, but he recommended to
his government that aid be provided to the Resistance through third parties so
that it could not be traced to Taiwan. In July 1984, Calero had renewed his
request to Taiwan, which again rejected his proposal for diplomatic reasons.
U.S. Ambassadors in Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, the Southern
Command of the Armed Forces of the United States (SouthCom), CIA, the Defense
Intelligence Agency ("DIA"), DoS, and the National Security Advisor were advised
of this information.
9. In December 1984, LtCol North advised McFarlane
of efforts to obtain aid for the Resistance from third countries, including
Taiwan, the PRC and South Korea. Admiral Poindexter acknowledged receiving the
information that LtCol North provided.
10. With McFarlane's approval,
LtCol North had met with a senior military official of the PRC in a meeting
arranged with the assistance of Dr. Gaston Sigur of the NSC. The meeting was
precipitated by reports that the PRC had decided not to proceed with a
Canadian-originated sale of anti-aircraft missiles to the Resistance using
end-user certificates provided by Guatemala. LtCol North told the military
official that Calero would agree to a diplomatic concession to the PRC if the
Resistance prevailed in Nicaragua. LtCol North advised McFarlane that the
meetings with the PRC official were likely to be reported in FBI channels. The
FBI had been requested to make no distribution of this information except to
McFarlane. LtCol North asked McFarlane to inform FBI Director William Webster
that McFarlane had endorsed the contact with the Asian official and further to
apprise Webster that dissemination of intelligence regarding the meeting could
jeopardize the operation.
11. General John Vessey, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff ("CJCS), followed up on LtCol North's approach to the PRC
military officer. The PRC agreed to provide anti-aircraft missiles to the
Resistance, and Retired General Richard Secord consummated the transaction and
arranged shipment through Guatemala. The CIA reported the details of this
transaction to McFarlane.
12. LtCol North also advised McFarlane that
General Singlaub had met with the South Korean Ambassador and a representative
of Taiwan to urge them privately to support the Resistance.
13. In late
December 1984, LtCol North advised McFarlane that a former European officer had
reported that anti-aircraft missiles might be available in a South American
country for use by the Resistance in dealing with the Soviet supplied HIND
attack helicopters. Calero had discovered that, while the South American country
had the missiles, they would need a European country's permission for their
transfer since the missiles initially had been obtained from the European
country. North furnished McFarlane with a memorandum to the President
recommending that the President raise the anti-aircraft missile issue with a
senior European government official. The memorandum recommended that the
President offer a quiet expression of USG thanks, since the European official
might not be fully aware of the constraints Congress had imposed upon CIA and
DoD with respect to the Resistance. In late January 1985, LtCol North
recommended to McFarlane that NSC official Lyle Cox hand-carry a secure, "Eyes
Only" letter to another senior European government official regarding the anti
aircraft missile matter.
14. In early January 1985, CIA Headquarters
requested that U.S. officials attempt to determine why the South American
country had canceled the sale or donation of anti-aircraft missiles to the
Resistance.
15. In February 1985, General Singlaub met with South Korean
officials and discussed the possible provision of a substantial sum of money for
weapons to the Resistance from South Korea. General Singlaub also discussed this
possible military aid with a senior CIA official. General Singlaub also
discussed with a senior South Korean official the interdiction of a shipload of
arms to the Sandinistas. In that regard, General Singlaub told the senior South
Korean official that the CIA and General Stilwell of DoD knew he was meeting
with the senior South Korean official.
16. In early 1985, President
Reagan urged the Head of State of Saudi Arabia to continue its support for the
Resistance. Saudi Arabia subsequently made a contribution of more than $25
million.
17. In early February 1985, LtCol North advised McFarlane that,
as a consequence of Singlaub's recent trip, both the Taiwanese and the South
Koreans had indicated to U.S. officials that they would help the Resistance.
Clair George, CIA Deputy Director of Operations ("DDO"), withheld dissemination
of the offers and contacted LtCol North privately to ensure that they would not
become common knowledge. LtCol North sought and received McFarlane's permission
to have Singlaub approach officials of the Embassies of Taiwan and South Korea
to urge them to proceed with their offers. Singlaub would then put Calero in
direct contact with the officials.
18. In mid-March 1985, at a meeting
with DCI Casey and Deputy DCI John McMahon, Secretary of Defense Weinberger
stated that he had heard that the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia had earmarked $25
million for the Contras in $5 million increments.
19. At a meeting in
late March 1985 with McFarlane and Deputy DCI McMahon, DCI Casey expressed his
concern that the Administration would request authorization from Congress only
for non-lethal aid to the Resistance and rely on third countries to supply
weapons or funds for weapons. McFarlane stated that he would take the issue to
President Reagan for his decision.
20. In mid-April 1985, LtCol North
advised McFarlane that the Resistance had received a total of $24.5 million
since appropriated funds had run out, of which more than $17 million had gone
for arms, munitions, combat operations, and combat support activities. (This
money consisted primarily of the Saudi contribution of which McFarlane was
aware.) Future operations included increasing the Resistance force, launching a
special operations attack against Sandino Airport to destroy Soviet supplied
HIND attack helicopters, launching an operation against a Nicaraguan mines
complex and opening a Southern Front along the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border.
LtCol North informed McFarlane that the funds remaining were insufficient to
support these operations and recommended that efforts be made to seek an
additional $15 million to $20 million from current donors.
21. In early
May 1985, LtCol North provided McFarlane and CJCS General Vessey with an
analysis of Resistance expenditures and outlays for, among other things, weapons
and other ordnance, and a summary of Resistance military operations since
October 1984. LtCol North recommended that the current donors to the Resistance
be approached to provide the remainder of their $25 million pledge and an
additional $15 million to $20 million between May 1 and June 1, 1985. McFarlane
approved LtCol North's recommendation that the current donors be approached to
provide the remainder of their pledge, but McFarlane turned down the
recommendation that the donors be asked to provide an additional $15 million to
20 million.
22. In early August 1985, the White House and various CIA
stations learned of reports that, during the visit of David Kimche to the U.S.
in May 1985, he had met with Michael Armacost, the U.S. Undersecretary for
Political Affairs, and had negotiated the continuation of military aid from
Israel to Central America.
23. In August 1985, Gaston Sigur approached a
senior intelligence officer of South Korea to meet with LtCol North to discuss
Central America and the Resistance.
24. In October 1985, the President of
an Asian country was approached and advised that other concerned private and
foreign sources had been supporting the Resistance with munitions and combat
supplies, and that their identities had not been revealed. The Resistance had a
specific need for communications equipment, and the Asian country produced some
of the best in the world.
25. In November 1985, LtCol North asked Vince
Cannistraro of the NSC to contact a senior South American government official to
encourage the sale by that country of planes and spare parts to A.C.E., a
company that was providing private support to the Resistance.
26. In
early December 1985, the U.S. became aware that a South American country had
offered to sell combat materiel/equipment to the Resistance. A U.S. Chief of
Mission requested that the developments be brought to the attention of Elliott
Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. Abrams
discussed those offers with LtCol North and other USG officials.
27. In
early December 198S, a CIA officer requested that Headquarters provide the
number of anti-aircraft missiles in the Resistance inventory. The CIA officer no
longer had their original reporting, but recalled that the Resistance had
purchased five launchers and ten missiles from the PRC.
28. In early
March 1986, Retired General Secord notified LtCol North that the purchase of
anti-aircraft missiles from a South American country had stalled because it
wanted approval from a European country before any transfer. The arms dealer
attempting to arrange the transfer had asked that a U.S. government official
contact the South American government to emphasize the interest in a quick
transfer of the missiles.
29. In early May 1986, LtCol North notified
Admiral Poindexter that a representative of Israeli Defense Minister Rabin had
offered on behalf of Israel to furnish Spanish-speaking military trainers and
advisors to the Resistance. Advisors would be placed in Hondu in connection with
an Israeli plan to sell the Kfir fighter to the Hondurans. Other advisors would
be placed on the southern Front. LtCol North advised Admiral Poindexter that
Defense Minister Rabin wanted to meet with him privately in New York to discuss
the details, and that Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams liked the
idea.
30. In early May 1986, McFarlane noted that the U.S. might obtain
assistance for the Resistance from certain Asian countries, although he had lost
confidence in the discretion of those countries. McFarlane told LtCol North that
he would try to find a better alternative.
31. In May 1986, U.S.
intelligence reports reflected that a South American country was aware that the
Reagan administration had asked Israel, Taiwan, South Korea and an organization
headed by a U.S. resident to contribute to the purchase of weapons for the
Resistance. The South American country was aware that the PRC had already given
anti-aircraft missiles, and that Honduras hoped that Israel would give extensive
aid, including military assistance.
32. In mid-May 1986, Donald Fortier,
the Director of Political Military Affairs at the NSC, was advised that the
situation for the Resistance was bleak. President Reagan needed to pursue means
of obtaining additional aid promptly, including talking personally to heads of
state to tell them that he was dispatching a special emissary with his personal
request for their assistance to the Resistance.
33. In mid-May 1986, a
senior European official notified Admiral Poindexter that the European country
would not approve the transfer of anti-aircraft missiles and launchers from a
South American country to El Salvador, for use by the Resistance. The European
official was concerned about the risk that the intended final destination of the
missiles would leak. A senior Salvadoran military official had furnished a false
end-user certificate for the missiles, but the certificate was not used in light
of the European response.
34. At the NSPG meeting of May 16, 1986
(attended by President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz,
Secretary of the Treasury Baker, DCI Casey, Admiral Poindexter, and LtCol North,
among others), Secretary Shultz mentioned an Asian country and DCI Casey
mentioned Israel, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia and South Korea as possible sources of
additional support for the Resistance.
35. At the President's National
Security Briefing on May 19, 1986, Admiral Poindexter discussed Israel and South
Korea as possible sources of additional support for the Resistance.
36.
In early June 1986, Admiral Poindexter and President Reagan discussed funding
for the Resistance. Admiral Poindexter mentioned aid from third countries and
the possibility of a letter from a private organization.
37. In early
June 1986, LtCol North advised Admiral Poindexter to talk with Assistant
Secretary of State Abrams about arranging the transfer of funds from third
countries to the Resistance. North said he knew of the accounts and the means by
which the funds could be transferred. North also suggested that the U.S.
government renew its earlier request to a senior European official for
anti-aircraft missiles. North recommended that Poindexter and McFarlane discuss
how much Shultz knew about previous support for the Resistance by Taiwan and
Saudi Arabia. Poindexter answered that, to his knowledge, "Shultz knows nothing
about prior financing. I think it should stay that way."
38. In mid-June
1986, Admiral Poindexter advised LtCol North that he was attempting to get the
State Department to seek funding for the Resistance from third countries so that
North and the NSC could disengage from the effort. Assistant Secretary Abrams
had suggested Brunei as a potential source of funds, and Poindexter had
responded that the transfer should be accomplished by having Brunei's Washington
Embassy receive a person designated by Poindexter and North.
39. In the
summer and fall of 1986, the DoS -- particularly Abrams, Sigur, U.S. Ambassador
to Brunei King, and Secretary Shultz -- had discussions with a senior Brunei
official in an effort to obtain a contribution from the Sultan to the
Resistance. Brunei subsequently agreed to contribute $10 million to the
Resistance.
40. In mid-September 1986, LtCol North reported to Admiral
Poindexter after another meeting with Defense Minister Rabin of Israel. Defense
Minister Rabin was pleased with the reaction of Poindexter and Secretary Shultz
to Rabin's plans to introduce Kfir fighters into Honduras and in the process to
provide advisors to the Resistance. Defense Minister Rabin also offered North a
recently seized shipment of PLO arms for use by the Resistance. Rabin agreed
that the ship Erria be sent to Haifa to pick up the weapons. Admiral Poindexter
approved the plan to pick up the weapons, noting that the transaction would
appear to be a private deal between Retired General Secord and the
Israelis.
41. In mid-September 1986, Amiram Nir, an advisor to Israel's
Prime Minister, indicated that Prime Minister Peres would raise several topics
in his upcoming private discussion with President Reagan, including Israel's
offer to provide captured PLO arms to the Resistance. LtCol North suggested that
Admiral Poindexter tell President Reagan that the arms would be picked up by a
foreign flag vessel and delivered to the Resistance. If Prime Minister Peres
raised the issue, President Reagan should thank him, since the Israelis held
considerable stores of weapons compatible with ordnance used by the
Resistance.
CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES
42. In
early July 1984, a CIA officer reported to CIA headquarters that Honduras was
taking the position that it would continue to support the Resistance following
the U.S. funding cut-off, but Resistance operations would have to be covert to
avoid political embarrassment to Honduras.
43. In mid-August 1984,
Poindexter discussed with President Reagan and others a proposal ascribed to
Secretary Shultz that would permit Congress to "wink" at lethal support for the
Resistance. Under Shultz's plan, the U.S. government would supply non-lethal aid
directly to the Resistance. The U.S. government would provide military aid to El
Salvador, which in turn would provide lethal aid to the Resistance.
44.
In mid-November 1984, a CIA officer reported to CIA Headquarters concerning
support for the Resistance by Guatemala and Honduras. Guatemala had provided
aircraft and had agreed to facilitate Resistance shipments of munitions and
other materiel. Honduras had permitted the Resistance to operate from within its
borders, had repaired Resistance aircraft at cost, had allowed government
aircraft to bring in aircraft parts, had permitted the Resistance to borrow
ammunition when Resistance stocks were too low, and had provided the Resistance
with false end-user certificates.
45. In mid-November 1984, DCI Casey
requested that LtCol North be provided with a CIA analysis of recent performance
and near-term prospects for the Resistance. (Vice President Bush and McFarlane
also received copies of the analysis.) According to the analysis, the Resistance
had spent approximately $5 million since the funding cutoff. Calero had raised
between $2 million and $2.5 million from undisclosed private donors. A Southern
Front Resistance leader had received $100, 000 from Panamanian Defense Forces
Chief Noriega in July 1984 and $20,000 from a European official, who had
previously given $40,000. In addition, the Resistance had received increased aid
from some Central American governments. Honduras had facilitated the purchase of
ammunition and hand grenades and had donated 10,000 pounds of equipment and two
C-47 aircraft. El Salvadoran military officials continued to allow the use of a
military airbase in support of ARDE air operations but had not yet supplied
rifles previously promised. One European leader had reacted favorably to a
request from a Southern Front Resistance leader for arms and funding but had not
yet followed through, while Taiwan had refused a request for aid from FDN
officials. The analysis reported several specific Resistance operations inside
Nicaragua. These operations and other Resistance military activities were
hindered by logistics problems, particularly difficulties in airlifting supplies
into Nicaragua.
46. In December 1984, a CIA assessment concluded that the
future of the FDN without U.S. government support depended on the FDN's ability
to obtain continued private funding and continued support from Honduras. The
leader of that government had threatened to cease support for the FDN unless it
received a signal of U.S. government support. LtCol North urged McFarlane to
visit Central America and deliver a signal of U.S. resolve.
47. In
mid-January 1985, in anticipation of McFarlane's trip to Central America, LtCol
North furnished an analysis of U.S. government policy options in Central
America. The options included seeking a negotiated solution toward Nicaragua,
restoring U.S. government support to the Resistance, or using U.S. military
force to overthrow the Sandinista regime. North recommended the second option --
restoration of U.S. government support to the Resistance -- and discussed in
detail variations on the provision of that support. The possibilities included
legislation authorizing only third country support; restoration of the original
CIA managed program; U.S. non-lethal and third country lethal support; seeking
congressional clarification on third country support; overt assistance to a new
state established by the Resistance; and funding a collective security
organization that would, in turn, provide aid to the Resistance. North
recommended that the Administration discuss those options with congressional and
Central American leaders before selecting one. North noted that support for
military operations by the Resistance should be accompanied by support for
non-military activities. In addition, an effort should be made to identify
leaders within the FSLN who did not support the Sandinista Revolution. The
Department of State ("DoS"), the Office of the Secretary of Defense ("OSD"),
CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff ("JCS"), and NSC felt that the third option -- non
lethal U.S. support with third country lethal assistance -- should be
pursued.
48. In mid-January 1985, LtCol North arranged a visit to Central
America for McFarlane with stops in Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala. One purpose of the trip was for McFarlane to discuss with his
counterparts in those countries their continued willingness to support the
Resistance. At McFarlane's request, North arranged a secret meeting between
McFarlane and Calero during the visit to Honduras. North accompanied McFarlane
on the trip, together with (among others) Vice Admiral Moreau and General
Gorman, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Southern Command.
49. In the course of
McFarlane's trip, Alan Fiers (CIA's C/CATF) briefed him privately on political
action programs in support of U.S. government objectives. McFarlane was advised
before his departure that Guatemala would continue to support the Resistance,
provided that it received a quid pro quo from the United States in the form of
foreign assistance funds or credits, diplomatic support or other forms of
assistance. In El Salvador, McFarlane urged President Duarte to continue his
support for the Resistance, including facilitating Resistance resupply
operations, and McFarlane told Duarte that such regional support was essential
to resumption of U.S. government support.
50. On February 2, 1985, the
CIA reported to NSA, DoS, DIA, FBI, White House, NSC staff, and U.S. SOUTHCOM
(among others) that Honduran military officers were assisting the Resistance in
transporting materiel (including ammunition) bought on the international arms
market through Guatemala to Resistance camps in Honduras. The report noted that
the Resistance was having difficulty maintaining their logistical
network.
51. At a February 7, 1985 meeting of the Crisis Pre-Planning
Group attended by Admiral Poindexter, Don Fortier (NSC), Ray Burghardt (NSC),
Michael Armacost (DoS), Fred Ikle (DoD), Nestor Sanchez (DoD), Clair George
(CIA), Alan Fiers (CIA), VADM Arthur Moreau (JCS) and LtCol North, among others,
the CPPG principals agreed that a Presidential letter should be sent to
President Suazo of Honduras and to provide several enticements to Honduras in
exchange for its continued support of the Nicaraguan Resistance. These
enticements included expedited delivery of military supplies ordered by
Honduras, a phased release of withheld economic assistance (ESF) funds, and
other support. The CPPG was in agreement that transmission of the letter should
be closely followed by the visit of an emissary who would verbally brief the
"conditions" attached to the expedited military deliveries, economic assistance,
and other support. The CPPG did not wish to include this detail of the quid pro
quo arrangement in written correspondence.
52. On February 12, 1985,
North proposed that McFarlane send a memo to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey and
Vessey informing them of the recommendation of the CPPG that expedited military
deliveries, economic funding, and other support should be offered as an
incentive to Honduras for its continued support to the Nicaraguan Resistance.
The memo stated that this part of the message should not be contained in a
written document but should be delivered verbally by a discreet emissary. The
McFarlane memo sought approval to send a Presidential letter to Suazo through an
emissary. If Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, and Vessey agreed, then President
Reagan's letter would be signed and delivered through the U.S. Ambassador to
Suazo, and a U.S. government emissary would advise Honduran officials of U.S.
government expectations concerning support for the Resistance.
53. On
February 19, 1985, McFarlane sent a memorandum to President Reagan informing him
of the recommendation of the CPPG to provide incentives to Honduras so that it
would maintain its aid to the Resistance. The memorandum described each of the
agreed-upon incentives. It further recommended a Presidential letter to the
leader of Honduras, to be delivered by an emissary who would very privately
explain U.S. criteria for the expedited economic support, security assistance
deliveries, and other support. President Reagan personally authorized the entire
plan.
54. Later in February 1985, President Reagan sent the agreed-upon
message to Suazo via the U.S. Ambassador. The letter urged that Honduras do all
in its power to support "those who struggle for freedom and democracy." Shortly
thereafter, McFarlane sent a memorandum to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, and Vessey
informing them that President Reagan's letter had been sent and proposing steps
to be taken to implement the President's intent. The memorandum requested DoD to
commence expedited delivery of military items, as previously planned and
personally authorized by President Reagan, and it requested necessary
documentation to enhance other support programs in Honduras.
55. In early
March 1985, Vice Admiral Moreau was advised that military leaders of Honduras
had offered assurances that the Resistance could continue to deliver supplies
through Honduras, and that Honduras would continue to supply end-user
certificates for arms purchases by the Resistance. Major munitions deliveries
were scheduled for mid-to-late-March. LtCol North recommended that Honduran
military officials be told that the United States Government would soon discuss
enhancing other support programs. Vice Admiral Moreau was informed that senior
Salvadoran military officials had provided maintenance and storage for the
Resistance at a military airfield. President Darte was concerned that further
support for the Resistance would be detected by congressional investigators and
would result in a cut-off of U.S. security assistance for El
Salvador.
56. In early March 1985, Vice President Bush sought McFarlane's
judgment as to whether he (Vice President Bush) should encourage a private group
to donate a plane load of medical supplies that would arrive in Honduras
coincident with the Vice President's meetings with President Suazo. Bush
strongly favored such a flight, noting that the group was supportive of the
Resistance. At LtCol North's recommendation, McFarlane advised Bush that the
flight was a good idea.
57. In early March 1985, Secretary Weinberger
informed McFarlane that the DoD had commenced expedited procurement and delivery
of military and other items to Honduras.
58. When Vice President Bush met
with President Suazo, Bush told Suazo that President Reagan had directed
expedited delivery of U.S. military items to Honduras. Vice President Bush also
informed Suazo that President Reagan had directed that currently withheld
economic assistance for Honduras should be released; that the United States
would provide from its own military stocks critical security assistance items
that had been ordered by Honduran armed forces; and that several security
programs underway for Honduran security forces would be enhanced.
59. In
March 1985, LtCol North proposed that McFarlane send a memorandum to Secretary
Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, DCI Casey, and CJCS Vessey recommending that the
U.S. government furnish additional assistance to Guatemala through the State
Department. North advised McFarlane that the assistance was a means of
compensating Guatemala for the assistance it was providing to the Resistance.
Guatemala had provided end-user certificates for the purchase of nearly $8
million of munitions to be delivered to the Resistance. The ammunition and
weapons identified in the certificates would be delivered in several shipments
to be receipted by Guatemalan military officers and turned over to Resistance
representatives at the point of arrival. North advised McFarlane that Guatemala
had presented a list of military equipment that it needed. North noted that once
U.S. government approval had been obtained for some of what Guatemala wanted,
Guatemalan officials could be made to understand that the additional U.S.
government assistance was the result of Guatemala's assistance to the
Resistance.
60. In late March 1985, the CIA reported to NSA, DoS, DIA,
White House, NSC staff, USSOUTHCOM, and U.S. Ambassadors in Honduras, Panama,
Nicaragua and Costa Rica that a ship was scheduled to arrive in Honduras in
mid-April 1985, carrying munitions worth almost 2 million that the Resistance
had purchased on the international arms market. The CIA reported that a Honduran
military official had agreed to arrange transportation of the weapons from the
port of arrival to Resistance units.
61. In late March 1985, North
advised McFarlane that the initial deliveries of U.S. arms from DoD to Honduras
had gone well. The Honduran government had expressed its gratitude through those
who were supporting the Resistance. North proposed that McFarlane ask Secretary
of Defense Weinberger to convey President Reagan's and McFarlane's thanks to DoD
personnel who had effected the expedited procurement for the Honduran
government, including Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage and
General Gast.
62. On April 25, 1985, McFarlane informed President Reagan
that military support for the Resistance from Honduras was in jeopardy as a
consequence of the House vote refusing to provide new funds for the Resistance.
The Honduran military had stopped a shipment of ammunition from an Asian country
en route to the Resistance after it had arrived in Honduras. McFarlane
recommended that President Reagan call President Suazo to make clear that the
Executive Branch was determined to maintain pressure on the Sandinistas. During
the call between the two leaders, Suazo urged that the U.S. government continue
to oppose Communism. President Reagan's personal notes of his telephone call
reflect that President Suazo told President Reagan that the Honduran military
commander would be ordered to deliver the ammunition to the Resistance.
President Reagan pledged his continued support for the Resistance; President
Suazo raised the subject of U.S. government aid for his country and the fact
that he hoped Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger would meet with a
high-level group of Honduran officials in Washington.
63. On April 26,
U.S. Ambassador Negroponte notified McFarlane that President Suazo had called
Negroponte immediately after Suazo's telephone conversation with President
Reagan to say that Suazo was satisfied with the U.S. government commitment to
continue support for the Resistance. President Suazo told Ambassador Negroponte
that he (Suazo) had assured President Reagan of his full support and had
promised that he (Suazo) would check into the interdicted munitions shipment,
which he did immediately after the conversation with President Reagan by calling
a senior Honduran military official. Suazo told Negroponte that Honduras
supported the Resistance fully, and Suazo asked that Negroponte convey his
strongest assurances to President Reagan that Honduras would not let down the
Resistance. Ambassador Negroponte recommended under the circumstances that the
Honduran delegation be received in Washington by Vice President Bush in
President Reagan's absence.
64. In May 1985, President Reagan personally
approved increased U.S. special support to Honduras and Guatemala for joint
programs with those countries
65. During the period when the Boland
Amendments were in effect, individuals within the State Department, DIA,
National Security Agency ("NSA"), White House, and NSC, among others, were
informed about the following support for the Resistance by Central American
countries: that Honduras had agreed to provide the Resistance with end-user
certificates for hand grenades and for rounds for grenade launchers, which the
Resistance wanted to purchase from South Korea; that the relative success of the
Resistance since the United States government funding cutoff depended upon its
ability to raise private funds and to operate from Honduras with its approval;
that a Honduran military official in charge of providing support to the
Resistance had agreed to provide the Resistance end-user certificates for
automatic rifles; that a senior Guatemalan military officer had said that a
decision had been made at the highest levels of his government to continue its
support for the Resistance; that the bulk of Guatemala's aid to the Resistance
consisted of providing end-user certificates for items purchased from other
countries.
66. In August 1985, Costa Rican President Monge indicated to
U.S. officials that he would be willing to provide assistance to the Resistance
if the United States government would help fund a certain operation in Costa
Rica. The U.S. official's concluded that the operation could be funded if
President Monge would take certain specified actions to assist the
Resistance.
67. In the fall of 1985, Benjamin Piza, a senior Costa Rican
official, agreed to permit the Resistance to construct an airstrip in Santa
Elena in northern Costa Rica. Payments were made to Colonel Montero, an official
of the Costa Rican Civil Guard, for the official's services in guarding the
Santa Elena airstrip.
68. In October 1985, Honduras seized a shipment of
NHAO humanitarian goods in response to reports that Honduras was facilitating
NHAO shipments. The U.S. Ambassador requested that LtCol North travel promptly
to Honduras to brief its senior military leaders on NHAO procedures and plans,
and to assure its leaders about U.S. government handling of aid to the
Resistance.
69. In October 1985, following meetings with Honduran
military officials, Colonel Comee of USSOUTHCOM informed General Galvin (CINC,
USSOUTHCOM) that Honduras was wavering in its support for the Resistance because
U.S. government help had not been fully implemented; Honduran officials were
thinking of signing the Contadora Agreement in light of their conclusion that
the Resistance could not prevail without more U.S. government assistance. The
Honduran officials were particularly angry that the U.S. Embassy there had
recently denied any connection with the Resistance, referring inquiries to
representatives of Honduras. In Comee's view, the U.S. government had to respond
to the concerns of Honduras or lose its support for the Resistance.
70.
In December 1985, individuals within the DoS, CIA, DIA, White House, NSC, and
USSOUTHCom were informed about the refusal of Honduras to permit NHAO flights
into the country. The refusal stemmed from the failure of the U.S. government
and Honduran officials to keep a senior Honduran military official informed of
Resistance activities. The senior military official was concerned, among other
reasons, because there was no local point of contact for coordination between
Honduran government officials, the Resistance, and the United States
Government.
71. In December 1985, CIA reported to Headquarters that LtCol
North would arrive for a meeting with a senior Honduran military official, and
that U.S. Ambassador Ferch wanted LtCol North to know that the military official
was anxious for the meeting. The most significant operational problem arising
from Honduras' refusal to permit use of its airfields was not the restriction on
NHAO flights into Honduras, but the restriction on resupply flights into
Nicaragua, which threatened to force 5,000 Resistance troops to withdraw from
Nicaraguan into Honduras.
72. ln mid-December 1985, LtCol North and
Admiral Poindexter visited Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and
Honduras to urge those countries to provide continued support for the armed
Resistance. Admiral Poindexter assured them that the U.S. Government was
committed to supporting the armed forces in those countries. Poindexter made
clear to a senior Honduran military official that his country's support for the
Resistance -- particularly logistical support -- was essential.
73. In
Costa Rica, Admiral Poindexter met with and was briefed by U.S. and Costa Rican
officials on the progress of the Resistance airfield at Santa Elena.
74.
On December 20, 1985, Admiral Poindexter discussed with President Reagan the
provision of U.S. arms to Honduras.
75. In late December 1985, Ambassador
Ferch met with Honduran President Suazo and a senior U.S. official concerning
the resumption of NHAO flights into Honduras. President Suazo took the request
under advisement.
76. In late December 1985, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State William Walker and Chris Arcos of NHAO met in Honduras with one of its
senior military officials and other officials as a follow-up to the Poindexter
trip in mid-December. The follow-up team also stopped in El Salvador, where they
discussed with the Ambassador the use of Ilopango military airfield as an
alternate transshipment point for NHAO humanitarian assistance.
77. In
January 1986, the American Embassy in Honduras furnished Secretary of State
Shultz and Assistant Secretary Abrams with a statement of U.S. objectives in
Honduras for 1986. The Embassy noted that Honduras had collaborated over a broad
range of security issues -- including support for the Resistance -- during 1985.
As a goal for the coming year, the Embassy listed the encouragement of Honduran
support for the Resistance and pointed out that Honduran cooperation would turn
upon the extent of U.S. government security assurances and military and economic
support. According to the Embassy, Honduras regarded support for the Resistance
primarily as a U.S. government program. The responsibility for ensuring Honduran
support for the Resistance was assigned to the Ambassador, other officers from
other government agencies assigned to the Embassy, and the U.S. Military
Group.
78. In mid-January 1986, LtCol North prepared talking points for a
meeting between Admiral Poindexter, Vice President Bush, and Honduran President
Azcona. North recommended that Admiral Poindexter and Vice President Bush tell
President Azcona of the need for Honduras to work with the U.S. government on
increasing regional involvement with and support for the Resistance. Poindexter
and Bush were also to raise the subject of better U.S. government support for
the states bordering Nicaragua.
79. In mid-January 1986, the State
Department prepared a memorandum for Donald Gregg (the Vice President's national
security advisor) for Vice President Bush's meeting with President Azcona.
According to DoS, one purpose of the meeting was to encourage continued Honduran
support for the Resistance. The memorandum alerted Gregg that Azcona would
insist on receiving clear economic and social benefits from its cooperation with
the United States. Admiral Poindexter would meet privately with President Azcona
to seek a commitment of support for the Resistance by Honduras. DoS suggested
that Vice President Bush inform President Azcona that a strong and active armed
Resistance was essential to maintain pressure on the Sandinistas, and that the
United States government's intention to support the Resistance was clear and
firm.
80. In late January 1986, a U.S. official inquired of DoS, CIA
Headquarters, DIA, U.S. Ambassadors in Tegucigalpa, Managua, San Jose, and
Panama City, and USSOUTHCOM concerning an upcoming approach to President Azcona
about the resumption of NHAO flights into Honduras. The official believed that
Azcona would permit a temporary resumption of flights based on an agreement by
the United States government to open negotiations on increased aid to
Honduras.
81. In late January 1986, the U.S. official was instructed
that, in seeking President Azcona's permission to resume flights and truck
transportation in support of the Resistance into and through Honduras, the
categories of supplies should not be specified because Resistance flights from
Ilopango airfield in El Salvador and Aguacate airfield in Honduras would have
mixed (lethal and non-lethal) loads.
82. In late January 1986, LtCol
North visited Costa Rican government officials and Resistance leaders on the
Southern Front to discuss progress of the Resistance. These meetings and their
purpose were approved by Admiral Poindexter and DCI Casey and known to others in
DoD, CIA, and DoS.
83. On January 30, 1986, U.S. Ambassador Ferch met
with President Azcona to request Honduras' assistance in supplying the
Resistance. The Ambassador sought permission to overfly Honduras when dropping
material to the Resistance; to truck material to the Resistance, and for the
Resistance to position private contractor aircraft at Aguacate, a military
airfield in Honduras, for resupply missions into Nicaragua.
84. On
February 22, 1986, there was a meeting in the office of DoD official Fred Ikle
attended by Nestor Sanchez (DoD), Fiers (CIA), General Gordon, LtCol North, a
representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others with respect to strategy
for the Resistance. Although much of the discussion focused on what would be
done in the event funding were restored, North stated that the past external
support for the Resistance from the private sector had been ruptured because
there was no unity of command and people did not know who to talk to. Ikle
praised the effort of Retired General Singlaub in that regard. North also
indicated that DoD's FOCAL POINT system had not worked: for example, there had
been problems obtaining maps for the Resistance from the Defense Mapping
Agency.
85. In late February 1986, Secretary Shultz, Secretary
Weinberger, Admiral Poindexter, DCI Casey and other senior officials received
intelligence reports that a Salvadoran government official had acknowledged
that, at the request of the United States government, Ilopango military airfield
was being used to help the Resistance as a temporary alternative and supplement
to airfields in Honduras.
86. In late February 1986, a CIA officer
reported to CIA Headquarters concerning the conditions imposed by Honduras for
the resumption of direct resupply flights to the Resistance into and out of that
country. A key condition was that for the trial run there could be no leaks or
publicity. The CIA officer noted that the problem with leaks arose in part from
the involvement of external agencies in Washington, Miami, San Salvador and
Guatemala City.
87. In March 1986, a CIA official notified headquarters
that Honduras had approved a private lethal shipment to the Resistance to arrive
on a certain date. In addition, Honduras had approved shuttle flights to move
lethal materiel for the Resistance from one military airfield in Honduras to
another military airfield. It developed that the same aircraft scheduled to
perform the shuttle flight for lethal materials was scheduled to perform a NHAO
flight at the same time.
88. In mid-March 1986, LtCol North prepared a
memorandum from Admiral Poindexter to President Reagan concerning a photo
opportunity for Benjamin Piza, a senior Costa Rican official. The memorandum
noted that Piza had been instrumental in helping the U.S. organize the Southern
Front. Piza had intervened with another senior Costa Rican official on numerous
occasions and had personally assisted in the development of a logistics support
base for Resistance forces deployed north from Costa Rica. Admiral Poindexter
noted that during his trip to Central America he had met with Piza to discuss
future plans for the Resistance and support for them through Costa Rica. At the
photo opportunity with President Reagan and Piza were (among others) Chief of
Staff Donald Regan, Admiral Poindexter, Joseph Fernandez (CIA's San Jose Chief
of Station (COS)), and LtCol North.
89. On March 20, 1986, the White
House Situation Room was advised that senior Honduran military leaders planned
to ask the United States for permission to control lethal aid sent through that
country to the Resistance in Nicaragua, and that they wanted to receive some
sophisticated weapons given the Resistance that were not already in Honduras'
inventory.
90. On March 22, 1986, Admiral Poindexter advised President
Reagan in a memorandum prepared by North that Elliott Abrams, Gen. Jack Galvin
(CINC, USSOUTHCOM) and a team of experts had just returned from visits with
three Central American leaders and that the delegation had been successful in
obtaining commitments for continued support to the Nicaraguan Resistance. Vice
President Bush and Chief of Staff Regan received copies of the
memorandum.
91. In late March 1986, Elliott Abrams offered Honduran
President Azcona immediate additional security assistance. LtCol North prepared
a memorandum from Admiral Poindexter to President Reagan (with copies to Vice
President Bush and Chief of Staff Regan) describing the results of Abrams'
discussions with Azcona. The details of the enhanced security assistance to
Honduras were worked out between Col. Royer (Chief of the Latin America Division
of DoD's DSAA) and various Honduran military officials. The Honduran army and
navy specifically requested a sophisticated ground-to-air missile on the ground
that the U.S. had already furnished such weapons to the Resistance. The total
cost for the items ultimately agreed upon was approximately 20 million. Among of
the additional assistance to Honduras (in addition to President Reagan, Vice
President Bush, Regan, and Admiral Poindexter) were LtGen Gast (Director of
DSAA), Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Nestor Sanchez.
92. In early May 1986, President
Reagan wrote to Presidents Duarte and Azcona, thanking them for their support
for the Resistance and affirming his commitment to obtain U.S. government
funding for the Resistance. In the letter to President Duarte, President Reagan
announced that he would propose legislation that Duarte had sought extending
U.S. participation in an international trade agreement of benefit to El
Salvador. In the Azcona letter, President Reagan announced that the U.S. was
disbursing ESF funds that Honduras sought. LtCol North had proposed that these
be sent, and Donald Fortier of the NSC staff had forwarded them to President
Reagan. Assistant Secretary of State Abrams, DCI Casey, and Undersecretary Fred
Ikle of DoD concurred in sending the letters.
93. In May 1986, the CIA
reported to NSA, DoS, DIA, the White House, the NSC staff, SouthCom, and U.S.
Embassies at San Jose, Managua, Tegucigalpa, and Panama City about donations
from donors in Latin America and the United States to Resistance forces fighting
on the Southern Front. A Nicaraguan Resistance leader had received funds from
Panamanian Defense Forces General Manuel Noriega.
94. In May 1986, Nestor
Sanchez, DoD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, provided the Secretary of
Defense with a translation of a memorandum to President Reagan from President
Azcona, calling for substantial increases in military aid for the next five
years and increasing coordination between and among the U.S., Honduras' armed
forces, and the leadership of the Resistance regarding UNO/FDN military
operations. The letter articulated conditions for continuing to help the U.S.
maintain all facets of the Resistance, including military.
95. In May
1986, President Azcona indicated to President Reagan that Honduras' continued
support for the Resistance depended upon significant increases in U.S.
government military aid to the Honduran armed forces and the Resistance.
President Azcona noted that his armed forces wanted weapons and ammunition for
use by the Resistance -- including grenades and launchers aboard a ship about to
leave Europe -- transferred to Honduran armed forces to assure the military
success of the Resistance. President Azcona stated that in past months these
matters had been discussed with William Taft of DoD, Abrams, Admiral Poindexter,
and General Galvin.
96. On July 29, 1986, there was a discussion in the
RIG about how the Resistance should best fight the war. Attending were Abrams,
Sanchez, Fiers, LtCol North, General Galvin, LtGen Moellering, and Colonel
Croker. Fiers indicated that UNO/South was in desperate straits, that UNO/North
was not in good shape, and that all funds for resupply were exhausted on July
1.
97. In late August 1986, North reported to Admiral Poindexter that a
representative of Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega had asked North to meet with
him. Noriega's representative proposed that, in exchange for a promise from the
USG to help clean up Noriega's image and a commitment to lift the USG ban on
military sales to the Panamanian defense forces, Noriega would assassinate the
Sandinista leadership for the U.S. government. North had told Noriega's
representative that U.S. law forbade such actions. The representative responded
that Noriega had numerous assets in place in Nicaragua and could accomplish many
essential things, just as Noriega had helped the USG the previous year in
blowing up a Sandinista arsenal.
98. North advised Admiral Poindexter
that the British persons who had run the operation against the arsenal had used
a Panamanian civilian ordnance expert. North noted that Noriega had the
capabilities that he had proffered, and that the cost of any operations could be
borne by Project Democracy.
99. Admiral Poindexter responded that if
Noriega had assets inside Nicaragua, he could be helpful. The USG could not be
involved in assassination, but Panamanian assistance with sabotage would be
another story. Admiral Poindexter recommended that North speak with Noriega
directly.
100. In early September 1986, General Galvin of SouthCom and an
official of the U.S. Military Group met in Tegucigalpa to discuss Honduran
support for the Resistance with a senior Honduran military official. General
Galvin advised the senior Honduran military official that a U.S. military
official would go to Honduras to work with the Resistance. The senior Honduran
military official expressed concern about leaks to the media concerning
arrangements between the U.S. Embassy, the Honduran military, and President
Azcona in supporting the Resistance. General Galvin and the senior Honduran
military official also discussed U.S. cooperation with Honduras in various
military and intelligence areas.
101. In mid-September 1986, LtCol North
notified Admiral Poindexter that Noriega wanted to meet with him in London
within a few days. North had discussed the matter with Assistant Secretary of
State Abrams, who had raised it with Secretary of State Shultz. Shultz thought
that the meeting should proceed. Admiral Poindexter approved.
102. In
mid-September 1986, LtCol North advised Admiral Poindexter that former U.S.
Ambassador Negroponte, General Gorman of SouthCom, senior CIA official Duane
Clarridge, and LtCol North had worked out arrangements for support of the
Resistance with General Bueso-Rosa, a former Honduran military officer who had
recently been convicted of offenses in the U.S. LtCol North suggested that
efforts be made on Bueso-Rosa behalf to deter him from disclosing details of the
covert activities.
103. In late September 1986, LtCol North advised
Admiral Poindexter that Costa Rican Interior Minister Garron had disclosed the
existence of the Santa Elena airstrip. North stated that President Arias of
Costa Rica had breached his understanding with the U.S. government. Assistant
Secretary of State Abrams and Secretary of State Shultz wanted to cancel Arias'
scheduled visit with President Reagan and replace his appointment by scheduling
a meeting with President Cerezo of Guatemala. Admiral Poindexter
agreed.
104. A U.S. official met with President Cerezo of Guatemala in
September 1986. Cerezo told the U.S. official that he intended to pursue U.S.
government goals in Central America, including specific support for the armed
Resistance, but that he would seek additional military aid from the U.S. in
return.
105. President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Shultz, Weinberger,
and Poindexter were informed of the U.S. official's meeting with President
Cerezo. It was reported to these officials that, in return for Guatemalan
support for the Resistance, Cerezo would ask Secretary of State Shultz to triple
military assistance to Guatemala, to double economic assistancs to Guatemala,
and to undertake other forms of support for Guatemala.
106. In late
September 1986, LtCol North reported to Admiral Poindexter on his London meeting
with Noriega. Noriega would try to take immediate actions against the
Sandinistas and offered a list of priorities including an oil refinery, an
airport, and the Puerto Sandino off-load facility.
107. At the end of
September 1986, LtCol North reemphasized to Admiral Poindexter that President
Arias of Costa Rica should not be invited to meet President Reagan in light of
Arias' disclosure of the Santa Elena airstrip. North recommended that Presidents
Duarte and Cerezo be invited to meet President Reagan instead, because El
Salvador and Guatemala had supported the Resistance.
[Back to Iran/contra
page]