We begin
36. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense
(McNamara)/1/
Washington, February 5, 1964.
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 092 Vietnam. Top Secret; Exdis.
According to the Department of State copy of this letter, Mendenhall was
the drafter. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Dear Bob: I have read with a great deal of interest the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Memorandum of January 22, 1964, on Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia,
which you forwarded with your letter of January 28, 1964./2/
/2/ See Document 17.
I share the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in Viet-Nam we
must demonstrate to both the Communist and the non-Communist worlds that
the "wars of national liberation" formula now being pushed so
actively by the Communists will not succeed. The Joint Chiefs have, in
my view, correctly remarked that the focus of the counterinsurgency
battle lies in South Viet-Nam itself, and the war must be fought and won
primarily in the minds of the Vietnamese people. This means that this
war, like other guerrilla wars, is essentially political--an important
fact to bear in mind in determining command and control arrangements in
Viet-Nam.
I also agree with the Joint Chiefs that we must follow an integrated
U. S. approach in Southeast Asia to achieve our policy objectives. We
must determine what the effects will be on the other countries in the
area of any major action we take in or with respect to a given country.
We must also determine with respect to any proposed action what we can
realistically expect to achieve with that action, and balance that
against the political and military risks attendant upon that action
before reaching a decision.
I have noted the list of possible actions which the Joint Chiefs may
wish to consider recommending from a military standpoint as the
situation develops. The Department of State will, of course, always be
prepared to consider promptly, in the light of the factors mentioned
above, any courses of action which the Joint Chiefs and the Department
of Defense propose.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Dean
37. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security
Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 7, 1964.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. III, Memos and Misc. Top Secret.
South Vietnam
General Khanh has discussed with Lodge the composition of his
Government (Saigon's 1510)./2/ It looks
pretty good. General Minh as Chief of State will be a big help both in
South Vietnam and internationally. As the cable points out, it will
leave General Khanh somewhat more free to attend to the substantive
problems of winning the war.
/2/ Dated February 7. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) The White House copy is published in Declassified
Documents, 1975, 215C. Lodge had an earlier discussion with Khanh on
February 5 during which he expressed concern for Khanh's safety and
asked what precautions Khanh was taking against possible coupe. Khanh
dismissed the threat, and assured Lodge that he planned to move quickly
and vigorously in prosecuting the war.
(Telegram 1493 from Saigon, February 5; Department of State, Central
Files, POL 23 VIET S. The White House copy of telegram 1493 is published
in Declassified Documents, 1975, 215A.)
The Vice Prime Minister in charge of Pacification, Mr. Hoan is a Dai
Viet leader. Carl and I met him here once in Washington, and we were not
particularly impressed. I gather he will be in charge of the civilian
side of the struggle. He has, however, I believe, a fairly large
Nationalist following.
Other hopeful signs are Oanh (Carl's friend) as Minister of Finance,
Mau (Diem's old Foreign Minister) back in the same job,/3/
and National Defense under Khiem. The Government as a whole seems to
include almost every geographic and non-Communist political faction. I
am asking State and the Agency to do a more thorough evaluation.
/3/ Tran Ngoc Oanh was Minister of Public Works
and Vu Van Mau did not have a Cabinet post in the Diem government.
[Here follows a summary of developments in Laos.]
On top of this,/4/ we have intelligence
strongly suggesting that a high level meeting between the North
Vietnamese and the Chinese is taking place in a town called Mengtzu near
the North Vietnamese border. There has also been a significant movement
of Chinese interceptor and bomber aircraft into this area.
/4/ Reference is to the worsening situation in
Laos and the possibility of a Pathet Lao military offensive.
These indications plus the situation in South Vietnam suggest to me
that any organizational changes that we make here in Washington should
occur quickly, so that we have a strong team to deal with the trouble
which I sense will be developing in the months of March and April.
Mike
38. Report From the Executive Director-Comptroller of Central
Intelligence (Kirkpatrick) and the Station Chief in Saigon (de Silva) to
the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)/1/
Saigon, February 10, 1964.
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-75. Alternate Proposals. Secret. The source
text is a copy of the report that the CIA sent McNamara
on February 10 under cover of a memorandum explaining that this analysis
was not being formally disseminated because it was a reply to a personal
request from McCone.
1. With regard to the conduct of the war, we must judge that the
situation at this moment must be characterized as one in which the
population at large appears apathetic, without enthusiasm either for the
GVN or the VC sides but responsive to the latter because it fears the
VC. The most important single factor continues to be whether or not the
rural population will be willing to defend itself against the VC and to
support GVN actions against the VC. In this sector, there now seems to
be less conviction and resolution, and a more widespread inclination to
avoid the problems of opposing the VC, and to play both sides in hopes
somehow of getting along peacefully and without personal commitment.
2. Obviously this gradual abrading of the popular will to resistance,
if such is indeed taking place as it appears to be to us here in Saigon,
is of the most fundamental importance, and constitutes a trend which
must be altered and reversed. What is needed in this regard and very
soon are a series of GVN successes in the military sphere which would go
[far] toward implanting and nourishing a popular attitude that the GVN
has the means of bringing security and a sense of ease to the rural
population, and is clearly determined to do so on an everbroadening
front throughout the countryside. Only within some such atmosphere of
hopefulness can the will and the resolve to oppose the VC be
strengthened, and it must be if this war is to be won.
3. The new regime will enjoy stability in direct proportion to the
degree it galvanizes and energizes the government apparatus and in
particular the Vietnamese military establishment in terms of an
aggressive and successful prosecution of the fight. If the present
regime should give an impression of uncertainty, apathy, or
irresoluteness, it would appear logical to assume that its days as a
government would inevitably be numbered, and it would also seem logical
that its successor would be a regime destined to lend itself to
solutions to end the fighting on conditions which we would find highly
undesirable. In short, the present regime can be a stable one if it
takes the initiative and forces it on a government structure and a
population waiting to be led and hopefully still willing to be led in an
anti-VC cause. If the regime falters and appears to be failing in this
regard, there are undoubtedly elements in Vietnam who will be willing to
make their move and seek other solutions.
4. Mr. Kirkpatrick's personal comment is as follows: I agree with the
above but must note that even armed with your pessimistic comments
following your last visit I have been shocked by the number of our (CIA)
people and of the military, even those whose job is always to say we are
winning, who feel that the tide is against us. Admittedly this is based
on a limited number of discussions here and in Danang in three days.
There are ominous indications that the VC are able to mount larger
operations than in the past using bigger arms, including anti-aircraft.
Vietnamese Government reactions are still slow, defensive and
reminiscent of French tactics here a decade ago. There are still really
no fundamental internal security measures of any effectiveness such as
identity cards, block wardens, travel controls, etc. Extensive use by
the VC of the waterways leaves the GVN handcuffed. It is evident that a
major factor in VC victories is their superior intelligence based on
nationwide penetrations and intimidation at all levels. This also is a
factor in their military victories where internal agents turn guns on
defenders. Finally, with the Laos and Cambodia borders open, this entire
pacification effort is like trying to mop the floor before turning off
the faucet.
39. Memorandum From the President's Special Assist3nt for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/
Washington, February 10, 1964.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Memos to the President, Vol. 1. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Notes for your meeting with Senator Mansfield today at 6:00/2/
/2/ The meeting took place from 6:35 p.m. to
7:15 p.m., February 10. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No
record of the meeting has been found.
1. Vietnam
On Vietnam he continues to believe in the de Gaulle approach, and we
don't, though public finger-pointing at de Gaulle is not your line. I
suggest you should say to him that for the present any weakening of our
support of anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam would give the signal
for a wholesale collapse of anti-Communism all over Southeast Asia.
Khanh's government may be our last best chance, and we simply cannot
afford to be the ones who seem to pull the plug on him. For this reason
you might wish to urge Mansfield himself not to express his own doubts
in public, at least for a while. His Vietnamese memoranda are at Tab A./3/
/3/ Document 2 and Foreign Relations,
1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 691-692.
You are acting promptly to reorganize the Washington end of our South
Vietnamese operations and depending on the success of your conversation
with Sullivan, you may wish to tell Mansfield in confidence of your
plans. The draft NSAM is attached at Tab B./4/
/4/ Not attached; for the approved NSAM, see
Document 46.
[Here follow items 2-4 which are unrelated to Vietnam.]
McG. B.
40. Editorial Note
On February 11, 1966, McGeorge Bundy issued National Security Action
Memorandum No. 284, "Official Visits to South Vietnam," which
directed that official visits by high-ranking military and civilian
personnel to South Vietnam be coordinated with the Department of State
through the Chairman of the Committee on Policy and Operations in
Vietnam. NSAM 284 superseded NSAM 217, January 25, 1963, printed in Foreign
Relations, 1961-1963, volume III, page 63.
On January 10, 1964, Roger Hilsman had recommended to the Executive
Secretary of the Department of State, Benjamin Read, that NSAM 217 be
reissued. Hilsman's memorandum to Read reads in part as follows:
"As you know, there has been a constant flow of high-level
visitors to South Viet-Nam during the past couple months. I feel quite
strongly that we must be careful not to overload this circuit. After all
our purpose in Viet-Nam is to get on with the war. To the extent we
divert the Generals as well as our own people from this task, we are not
helping matters. It is clear that the Generals themselves feel we have
been too importunate in the matter of visitors, and I am sure that
Ambassador Lodge shares this view."
Hilsman asked that the Assistant Secretary of State be given
responsibility for coordinating visits to South Vietnam. Read complied,
because the draft of NSAM 284 which he sent Bundy indicated Hilsman as
the coordinator. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-10 VIET S)
The NSAM as issued, however, gave the responsibility to William
Sullivan, the newly-designated Chairman of the Vietnam Committee. For
Sullivan's responsibilities, see Document 46.
41. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House/1/
Washington, February 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, President's
Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, Jan-March, 1964. Secret.
Drafted by Willis C. Armstrong. Approved by the Executive Secretary on
February 27 and by the White House on February 24. The source text is
labeled Part II of a six-topic meeting.
British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas Home was in Washington for an
official visit, February 12-14.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia
PARTICIPANTS
British Side
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
R.A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, the Foreign Office
Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
Sir Timothy Thigh, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet
U.S. Side
The President
The Secretary of State
Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Richard I. Philips, Director, P/ON
Willis C. Armstrong, Director, BNA
The President suggested that the Secretary of State comment on the
situation in Southeast Asia, and the Secretary remarked that good
progress had already been made by representatives of the two governments
in a common approach to Southeast Asian problems. He explained the talks
of February 10 and 11,/2/ and went on to
say that agreement had been reached to have some language in the
communique to cover our understanding on Southeast Asia, particularly on
Viet Nam and Malaysia./3/ Mr. Butler made
the point that Britain supported US efforts in Viet Nam and was quite
prepared to say so in the communique, whereas Britain was anxious to
have a comparable reference to Malaysia in the same paragraph./4/
/2/ These meetings concerned planning for the
Indonesia-Malaysia crisis.
/2/ These meetings concerned planning for the
Ind/3/This understanding was reached at a discussion between U.S. and
U.K. of officials headed by Butler and Rusk, February 12, dealing with
Southeast Asian problems in general.
(Memorandum of a meeting at the White House, February 12, 3 p.m.;
Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2369)
/4/ The joint communique, February 13, is
printed in Department of State Bulletin, pp. 336-337. It did
contain references to British support for U.S. policy in Vietnam and
U.S. support for British policy in Malaysia.
The Secretary reported further that there had been agreement to have
a good thorough NATO discussion next week, with the US talking about
South Viet Nam and Laos and with the UK speaking of Malaysia and
Cambodia. He also noted the intention of the British to consider with
the French what they mean by neutrality in Southeast Asia. Mr. Butler
referred to the message from Couve de Murville explaining that
neutrality for Cambodia was separable and separate from any efforts with
respect to Viet Nam. The Secretary emphasized further that a review with
Mr. Butler in an earlier conversation had indicated that in general the
US and UK were approaching Southeast Asian problems very much in the
same way, should keep in close touch with each other, and should move
forward along various lines to be mutually helpful./5/
/5/ In a private conversation, February 12,
from 11 a.m. to approximately noon, Home gave Johnson similar assurances
although he stated that Great Britain "must help quietly because of
its peacekeeping role under the agreements of 1954." (Memorandum
for the record by Bundy, February 13; Johnson Library, National Security
File, Memos to the President, Vol. 1)
The Prime Minister said to the President that he thought that the
visit of Attorney General Kennedy had been extremely helpful in the
harmonization of views on Indonesia and Malaysia./6/
He again referred to British support for US efforts in South Vietnam.
The President said this was helpful, because there were always questions
in the US as to the extent to which our allies were also committed to
support such efforts. The Secretary commented that the object of the
NATO discussion on Southeast Asia was to alert all the allies to the
problems caused there by Communist forces and to identify their
interests. The Prime Minister added that the message from Couve de
Murville had indicated a willingness to make a public statement on
Cambodia's neutrality, separating it from any question of South Viet
Nam.
/6/ Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
undertook a 13-day mission to the Far East, January
15-27, in which he represented President Johnson in talks with the
leaders of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia concerning the
dispute over Malaysia. Kennedy also conferred with officials in Japan,
Korea, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. For an account of the mission,
see Department of State Bulletin, February 17, 1964, pp. 239-243.
The Prime Minister wondered whether the situation in South Viet Nam
was worse, or whether it was holding. The Secretary of State said the
situation was worse, since there had been a real increase in the
capability of the Vietcong. He noted that the resources, human and
material, exist, but pointed out that the local Vietnamese have not been
sufficiently vigorous. He said we must see what more can be done to help
the Vietnamese to do the job, and that the next several weeks of the dry
season are critical.
[4 lines of source text not declassified] The President
remarked that it was very hard to get a clear picture of the facts in
the Vietnamese situation.
Mr. Bundy said that this meeting of our two countries and others with
other allies could help a good deal. De Gaulle expresses himself, but
does not make any contribution otherwise. The change of government in
Viet Nam and the press release of General de Gaulle/7/
had both tended to damage confidence, and meetings such as the present
one could help restore it. The Secretary remarked that the UK and US
were both using the olive branch and arrows in Southeast Asia, but that
de Gaulle was using only the olive branch, and his efforts did not
improve the situation. The Prime Minister remarked that "none of
these fellows" in Southeast Asia fight very well. The Secretary of
State said that the South Vietnamese had really done quite well, all
things considered. The Prime Minister said he was not happy about the
Malays as fighters, or the Thais. He said that Britain was fortunate to
still have some Gurkhas in the area.
/7/ See Document 27.
42. Paper Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, February 12, 1964.
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 350.05 Southeast Asia. Secret.
Attached to a memorandum of transmittal, February 12, from Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency Carroll to Secretary of Defense
McNamara. SNIE 50-64, "The Situation in Southeast Asia," is
not printed. Johnson Library, National Security File, National
Intelligence Estimate File, 14.3 NVN)
BRIEF
SNIE 50-64, Short-Term Prospects in Southeast Asia
This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the
United States Intelligence Board on 12 February 1964. Significant
judgments of this estimate are as follows:
Certain signs of new North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist military
activities, together with an upsurge of Viet Cong activity in South
Vietnam, recent Viet Cong successes there, and recent Communist advances
in Laos, raise the question whether the situations in South Vietnam and
Laos may be on the verge of collapse. After carefully reviewing the
evidence, we believe:
That the situation in South Vietnam is very serious, and prospects
uncertain. Even with US assistance approximately as it now is, we
believe, unless there is a marked improvement in the effectiveness of
the South Vietnamese government and armed forces, that the South
Vietnamese have at best an even chance of withstanding the insurgency
threat during the next few weeks or months.
That if present trends in Laos are not checked, there will be
continued erosion of non-Communist military and political positions
there. The Laos situation may deteriorate rapidly, and it could take a
turn which would further improve the Viet Cong position in South
Vietnam.
That dramatic new Chinese Communist intervention in Vietnam or Laos
is unlikely. North Vietnam, however, is stepping up its support of the
Pathet Lao, and may do so for the Viet Cong-perhaps with some increase
of Chinese Communist material assistance. The Communist hope in South
Vietnam would be to gain sufficient quick victories before General
Khanh's new government could bring its full military potential to bear,
to undermine the South Vietnamese will to resist, and to induce the US
to consider a negotiated settlement its only feasible option.
That developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia, save in Cambodia, have
thus far had little impact on those in Vietnam and Laos. However, the
outcome of the present war in South Vietnam will have a serious effect
on the future willingness of governments in Southeast Asia to adopt
anti-Communist, rather than neutralist, stances.
43. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow)
to the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, February 13, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot
70 D 199, Southeast Asia. Top Secret; For the Secretary Only. Rusk's
initials appear on the source text.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia
The essential points to be made by the President to a conference of
Congressional leaders, in asking for a Resolution, are these. They would
require coordinated elaboration (as at President Truman's famous
conference on Greece and Turkey in 1947)/2/
among yourself, Secretary McNamara, and General Taylor.
/2/ Apparent reference to a meeting with
congressional leaders, February 27, 1947, described in Harry S. Truman, Memoirs,
vol. II (Garden City, NY, 1956), p. 103.
1. Southeast Asia is a critical area to the United States and to our
world position. The loss of Viet Nam would endanger Southeast Asia.
Thailand would no longer rely on U.S. backing. Laos, Cambodia, and
probably Burma would go to the Communists. Taiwan's morale would
crumble. The Philippines, Korea, and Japan would be insecure. Sukamo
would be confirmed in his semi-pro-Communist stance. Malaya would be
endangered. The Indian subcontinent would be outflanked. The Middle East
and East Africa would be substantially opened up. The credibility of our
European stance under the Johnson Administration would be put in
question; for our commitments to South Viet Nam are no less explicit
than our commitments to Berlin.
2. South Viet Nam is in danger. The internal position in South Viet
Nam created by the systematic operations conducted from North Viet Nam
is precarious. From outside: the 1962 Geneva Accord and the 1954 Accord
are not being respected. North Vietnamese troops are still in Laos;
North Vietnamese arms and men are being introduced into South Viet Nam;
the war is run by a general staff in the north via a complex
communications network; the morale in South Viet Nam (and Southeast
Asia) has been weakened by the failure of the West to stop this
violation of the 1962 Agreement.
3. Although difficult tasks would still be faced in South Viet Nam
and Laos if North Vietnamese compliance with the 1962 Agreement was
enforced, we see no possibility of achieving short-run or long-run
stability in the area until it is enforced. This is not a new judgment.
General Taylor reported to President Kennedy on November 3, 1961:
"While we feel that the program recommended represents those
measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the situation
in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is the final word. Future
needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement we
obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its
conduct to that settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the
irregular war declared on South Vietnam in 1959 with continued
infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of
our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate
the continued guidance, training, and support of a guerrilla war across
an international boundary, while the attacked react only inside their
borders. Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party
attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of
aggression, after the fact of external aggression is clearly
established? It is our view that our government should undertake with
the Vietnamese the measures outlined herein, but should then consider
the broader question beyond."/3/
/3/ Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol.
I, p. 477.
4. We have given the 1962 Agreement a chance to work. The time has
now come for the United States to use every means at its command,
diplomatic and military, to enforce compliance.
5. We believe there is a fair chance that compliance can be enforced
without substantial military engagement if there is a united expression
of determination by the Executive and Congressional branches of the
Government, backed by our people, for these reasons:
a. Ho has an industrial complex to protect: he is no longer a
guerrilla fighter with nothing to lose.
b. Ho does not wish the Chinese in Hanoi.
c. The Chinese Communists are militarily and economically weak but
committed to split from Moscow and anxious to come out in the world.
d. Mao's doctrine has always been: "When the enemy advances,
withdraw; when the enemy falters, attack."
e. Moscow has ample reasons not to engage its forces in Southeast
Asia or elsewhere if U.S. is determined and united.
In short, if our objective is compliance with the 1954 and 1962
Agreements--and not the invasion of North Viet Nam or China--we may be
able to achieve it without major military operations, but only if we are
united, determined, and prepared for any level of escalation.
6. If we do not take this action now, we not only endanger Southeast
Asia, but we encourage the Communists everywhere (including the
Caribbean) to believe that it is accepted by the West as legal to
conduct wars of "National Liberation" across borders, with
resistance possible only from within; and that if guerrilla war
successfully takes hold, the West surrenders. Obviously, at some stage,
we would react; but then we will have to do so with greater violence
from a profoundly weakened Western position.
7. Therefore, we are asking Congressional and national support to
draw the line in the dust at the borders of South Viet Nam. The
essentials of a Congressional Resolution are:
a. To call attention to the continued violation of the 1954 and 1962
Accords;
b. To reaffirm the United States commitment to Southeast Asia under
the Manila Pact;
c. To reaffirm the United States commitment, made by three
Presidents, to the continued independence of the people of South Viet
Nam;
d. To call on the President to use all the means at our command to
enforce compliance with the 1954 and 1962 Accords.
8. At the time of presentation to the Congress of the case for a
Congressional Resolution, we shall be publishing evidence of the
violation of the Geneva Accords.
9. In the wake of a Congressional Resolution, we shall:
--Move additional forces into the area;
--Take a series of diplomatic moves to inform both our Allies and the
various Communist regimes of our intention to impose measured, limited
sanctions on North Viet Nam, if necessary, to enforce compliance.
10. There will be considerable confusion in the Free World, which
will fear a confrontation; and this will be heightened by the
Communists, de Gaulle, Lippmann, etc. The chances of not having to drop
bombs in the North will depend substantially on whether the Executive
Branch and the Congress remain united and resolute. Let us put all other
considerations aside and stay together.
11. If we can make this proposition stick in Southeast Asia, our job
with Castro will be greatly eased and the long-run prospects for a
peaceful world under law enhanced.
44. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow)
to the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, February 14, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot
70 D 199, Vietnam. Secret. Rusk's initials appear on the source text.
SUBJECT
Contingency Planning for Southeast Asia
Governor Harriman, Alexis Johnson, Roger Hilsman, Bill Sullivan and I
will be meeting with you at 4:30 p.m. today./2/
/2/ The meeting began at 4:40 p.m. and lasted
until almost 5:30. Robert Johnson also attended. Johnson Library, Rusk
Appointment Book) No record of the meeting has been found.
The purpose of our meeting will be to report to you the results of
our individual review of the attached report on Southeast Asia prepared
by the Policy Planning Council. A summary of the concept and key issues
examined in this report are at Tab A. I recommend you thumb through the
table of contents (Tab B)/3/ which will
give you an idea of the scope of the paper.
/3/ Not attached to the source text. A copy of
the table of contents and the draft report is in Department of State,
S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam.
I recommend that you give your approval to the following proposals:
1. That the Tuesday Planning Group at its next meeting take on the
job of serving as a steering group to provide general guidance and
direction to the preparation of a contingency plan for the imposition of
measured sanctions against North Viet-Nam. As you know, Governor
Harriman and Alex Johnson are regular members of that group. For these
purposes we would add others as required, including immediately senior
representatives of FE and USIA.
2. That the Planning Group establish a working group under State
Department chairmanship to prepare the necessary studies and plans.
The objective of the next planning stage is not to produce a
recommended policy. It is to produce a complete politico-military
scenario which we can lay before senior officers of the Government so
that they may judge whether and under what circumstances a forward
policy of the kind examined here might prove wise and viable.
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
Tab A
SUMMARY OF CONCEPT AND KEY ISSUES
I. The Concept
The paper is not a plan, but an exposition of issues that would need
to be examined in preparing a plan. It examines a concept designed to
cause North Vietnam (the DRV) (a) to cease its illegal infiltration of
men and arms into South Vietnam, its direction of the war in South
Vietnam and its supporting activities in Laos; and (b) to withdraw its
troops or cadres from both countries and to comply fully with the 1954
and 1962 Geneva Accords.
The concept is based upon the assumption that the imposition of
graduated political, military and, possibly, economic sanctions on the
DRV could cause it to call off the war principally because of its fear
that it would otherwise risk loss of its politically important
industrial development; because of its fear of being driven into the
arms of Communist China; and because of Moscow's, Peiping's and Hanoi's
concern about escalation.
II. Key Issues
1. The question of how to define operational objectives that will
command wide support at home and abroad; provide a reasonably clear-cut
basis for measuring Communist performance and not provide undue
opportunities for Communist delaying tactics and political warfare; and
therefore provide the basis for determining when U.S. pressures should
be continued, when halted. As a related matter, how important and how
feasible are inspection arrangements or other means of insuring
continued DRV compliance?
2. The question of the degree of the U.S. commitment. We must be
prepared to withstand, if necessary, possibly great international
political pressures which might force us to desist before we have
achieved our objective. We must consider how far we are prepared to go
in meeting Communist military responses. We must consider the actions
that we would take in the event of either success or failure.
3. Against the background of the past, how do we develop a convincing
case against the DRV that will command, at a minimum, broad domestic
U.S. support and some international support and at the maximum, broad
international support?
4. How might the crisis be terminated? Are there acceptable turning
off points? Under what circumstances would we be prepared to go to an
international conference and for what purpose?
5. We must consider how far we are prepared to go in providing
additional commitments of support to South Vietnam, Thailand and,
perhaps, the Philippines, and whether, even with such commitments, they
will give us their initial and their continued support.
6. We face broad tactical choices: whether we should move quickly or
slowly in posing and carrying out our threat to the DRV; whether we
should begin on the covert or the overt level and how and when we should
move from one level of action to the other.
7. We need to reexamine organization for making and implementing
policy in the context of an intense and possibly protracted
politico-military crisis to insure responsiveness to top-level control
without neglect of expert advice and local problems.
45. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security
Council Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
Washington, February 14, 1964.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Aides Files, McGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with the President, Vol. 1,
[Part 2]. Secret and Personal. Published in part in Declassified
Documents, 1977, 109B.
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
I wanted to give you some thoughts for your forthcoming trip to
Saigon./2/ I agree that the next four or
five months will be critical in the sense that if a favorable political
and military trend does not develop in that period, we will slowly lose
our position in Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia. Thus we have a
very short time within which to make the changes in our own organization
in the field to produce a coherent effort from the American side.
/2/ The McNamara mission visited South Vietnam
March 8-12.
I have the impression that since last November 1st our own efforts in
support of what we used to call the Strategic Hamlet Program have
deteriorated badly. I refer to that collection of activities which
included the Montagnard program, hamlet militia training, CIDG training,
police training, pig and fertilizer programs, etc.; in short, all of the
mixed civil and military counterinsurgency programs which about a year
ago seemed to be working well.
The two coups obviously have affected the GVN's efforts, but I am
also worried lest our own organization has deteriorated. We have lost [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] a rather large and
extraordinarily successful effort with the Montagnards on the Central
Plateau. Recent reports suggest to me that what we once thought was a
solid program is beginning to fall apart in that region. A [less than
1 line of source text not declassified] memorandum/3/
I have recently read implies that most of the young Vietnamese and
tribal dialect speaking Americans who worked in the hill country have
been pulled off.
/3/ Not found.
I don't know what has happened to Trueheart's rural rehabilitation
committee, which coordinated the AID efforts with the military,
especially in the Delta. I assume it must be functioning under Nes; but
we haven't had any word about it.
I suspect that Army Special forces, [1-1/2 lines of source text
not declassified] have tended to pull their resources away from the
populated regions of the High Plateau in an effort to increase their
activities along the Laotian border. This may have left the VC behind to
attack what we once thought were strong Montagnard hamlets in their
rear.
These are only impressions that I have gathered from reading the
current reporting, which, as you know too well, is voluminous but
uninformative. I have four specific suggestions for you to consider
while you are in Saigon:
1. Minister for Rural Operations. We should have one manager in
Saigon with the responsibility and authority to run that part of the war
which lies between Lodge's diplomatic discourses with the highest level
of the GVN on the one hand, and Harkins' military responsibility to
advise and direct ARVN and conventional U.S. military efforts on the
other. He should have the rank of Minister and be responsible to Lodge
and Harkins. Nes should become Lodge's Minister for Political Affairs
and should perform the traditional functions of DCM in an ordinary
Embassy. The Minister for Operations should be a civilian preferably
with some military background, someone like Hank Byroade. Such a person
would have direct authority over the following parts of the existing
U.S. agencies in Saigon:
(a) The USOM rural rehabilitation organization (i.e., including the
USOM representatives in the various provinces).
(b) All USIS psywar-type operations (leaflet printing, films, etc.).
(c) Those Army Special Forces units who are engaged in training
Vietnamese irregulars who do not leave their home regions (hamlet
militia, SDC, and other local paramilitary organizations as
distinguished from regular ARVN units).
(d) Any vestiges remaining of [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] paramilitary functions.
He should have a call upon MACV, USOM, the Embassy and [less than
1 line of source text not declassified] for support where necessary.
2. You might inquire whether the organization of the ARVN itself is
well suited to the territorial war. Is the division a useful unit on
which to base U.S. and GVN planning and support? Would more
decentralization of tactical command, say to the province or district
level, tend to tailor military operations more closely to local
intelligence and other conditions? I have no expertise at all in such
matters; but I should imagine that General Stilwell and Bob Thompson may
have some useful thoughts. If you are impressed with Thompson, would it
make any sense to associate him more closely with our own efforts-i.e.,
as an informal member of our country team?
3. Wouldn't it be worthwhile discussing with Khanh the possibility of
his instructing ARVN subordinate commanders to take their military
advisors more seriously? Could this be done on a "burden of
proof" basis? If an ARVN unit commander refused to follow U.S.
advice and then failed, he would have the burden of showing
affirmatively that his decision was the correct one. Conversely, if he
followed the advice and failed, he would be given the benefit of any
doubt.
4. The necessity for U.S. liaison with Khanh and his government is
greater than ever before. We had no knowledge of this coup; and unless
we pull up our socks, we will not ever have the opportunity of
dissuading others from starting a new one. The French can be counted
upon to stir up trouble. [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] Lodge has to be persuaded that such people do not
represent a threat to his authority, if he chooses to give them
guidance.
Mike
46. National Security Action Memorandum No. 280/1/
Washington, February 14, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files:
Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 280. Secret.
MEMORANDUM TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator. AID
I have today determined that it is essential to establish in
Washington a small committee for the management of U.S. policy and
operations in South Vietnam. After consultation with the Secretary of
State, I have designated Mr. William Sullivan of the Department of State
to serve as Chairman of this committee, under the direct supervision of
the Secretary of State.
I now request that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the Administrator of the Agency for International
Development nominate to me individuals from their departments and
agencies to serve as members of Mr. Sullivan's committee. The officers
so nominated will be expected to give an absolute priority to their
obligations as members of this committee and as agents for the execution
of approved decisions. On this basis, I have already designated Mr.
Michael Forrestal to serve as the White House representative on this
committee.
Major questions of policy and operations will be subject to my
approval in consultation with heads of departments and agencies as
appropriate. In the execution of approved policy, it is my desire that
Mr. Sullivan's committee shall move energetically, and that department
appeal from Mr. Sullivan's decisions shall be kept to a minimum. He is
being appointed because he commands the confidence not only of myself
and of the Secretary of State, but also of senior officials of all
agencies concerned.
It is my hope and expectation that the establishment of this
committee will permit an energetic, unified and skillful prosecution of
the only war we face at present./2/
/2/ On February 15, at 11:33 a.m., Rusk called
McGeorge Bundy. The transcript of their conversation relating to the
establishment of the Vietnam Committee reads as follows:
"Re the Viet-Nam task force, Sec. said he put a burr under their
tail; told them that their mission is as broad as the problem, top
priority, that we have got to win this war. B. thought it important to
have the other track explored; Sec. said we were moving full speed on
this as an adjunct to the task force." (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D
192, Telephone Conversations)
Lyndon B. Johnson
47. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow)
to the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, February 15, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot
70 D 199, Vietnam. Secret. Copies were sent to Harriman, Sullivan, U.
Alexis Johnson, and Hilsman. Rusk's initials appear on the source text.
SUBJECT
Ho and Mao
The question of Hanoi-Peking relations was raised briefly yesterday./2/
I should like to add a word.
/2/ Apparently at the 4:40 p.m. meeting on
February 14; see footnote 2, Document 44.
I have assumed for some time that, in terms of Bloc relations and
policy towards South Viet-Nam, Ho and Mao were coming closer together,
although not without some debate in the Communist Party in Hanoi of
which there is considerable evidence.
I assume further that Ho and Mao are now operating very closely and,
indeed, engaged in a plan to warn us of escalation should we move north.
Some additional aircraft have been moved to Hainan and into South China,
I believe.
Moreover, in my view, no plan to inflict even limited damage on the
North should proceed without our taking the fullest possible
preparations to face any degree of escalation within enemy capabilities.
The likelihood of escalation will be inversely proportional to their
judgment of our determination and available and relevant military
strength.
But this is a quite different matter from the important point made in
the paper./3/ For centuries all Vietnamese
have had as an objective of policy to keep an arms-length relation to
China. The Vietnamese Communist Party has maintained control over its
own army, secret police, and party apparatus. It maintains that critical
degree of independence now.
/3/ See footnote 3, Document 44.
I do not for one moment believe--nor is there any evidence--that the
North Vietnamese are prepared to forego that kind of independence,
whatever their present relations with Peking.
A substantial war in North Viet-Nam would require the Chinese
Communists to introduce into Hanoi aircraft and, perhaps, troops. No
Vietnamese would view this event without a certain apprehension that the
consequence might be the permanent reduction in their status from junior
partner to Chinese province.
I continue to believe, therefore, that this deep reservation in Hanoi
about relations with China will be one among other constraints on their
conduct in the face of the policy we have been discussing; although, to
repeat, we should not count on anything but a determination and a
capacity to make their present course of action, in violation of solemn
Accords, unprofitable as opposed to any other course of action they
might adopt.
48. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Secretary of State/1/
RFE-11
Washington, February 15, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot
71 D 273, Vietnam. Secret.
SUBJECT
Hanoi Foresees Victory in South Vietnam--But Only After Long
Guerrilla War
In view of increasing speculation concerning the designs of North
Vietnam in the South, we have analyzed a spate of recent statements from
Hanoi which provide an unusually revealing picture of Hanoi's
calculations.
Abstract
A series of authoritative North Vietnamese articles, released on
February 10 and 11, reaffirm Hanoi's belief that protracted political
and military struggle without open North Vietnamese intervention will be
ultimately successful against a militarily superior army. Nevertheless,
Hanoi again evinces concern about how Viet Cong morale will hold up in
the long run and even reveals the existence of considerable Northern
disenchantment about the war in the South. The fullest exposition of
these views is an article in the January issue of the elite journal Hoc
Tap, by Lt. General Nguyen Van Vinh who, as head of the
"reunification" committees of both the party's central
committee and the National Assembly, probably has a major role in the
formulation of Viet Cong policy.
Vinh argues at length against the contention that the conflict
carries serious risk of escalation, a view apparently advanced by Moscow
and perhaps echoed by some North Vietnamese leaders. In so doing, he
warns the United States for the first time that an attack on North
Vietnam would involve conflict with Communist China, but he is notably
less explicit about the Soviet response. Hanoi appears genuinely
concerned that the United States may be considering action against the
North. This in part may explain not only these articles but also the
recent flurry of related political and even military activity.
General Vinh predicts that the United States will remain involved in
South Vietnam "for some years" until forced to withdraw in the
face of heavier and heavier defeats. He is less precise about the
consequences should the United States vastly increase its role, hinting
this might necessitate increased North Vietnamese participation (as in
Laos). The article implicitly rules out an international political
settlement as a feasible course of action, at least under prevailing
conditions. Another statement released the same day categorically
rejects French President de Gaulle's suggestion (although it was
attributed to President Johnson) that North Vietnam might be
neutralized.
[Here follows the text of the 6-page paper.]
49. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of
State/1/
Saigon, February 18, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL 23-9 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no time of
transmission. Received at 10:01 a.m. A note on the White House copy of
this telegram indicates that the President read it. Johnson Library,
National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV) Also published in
Declassified Documents, 1975, 216A.
1574. For Harriman and Hilsman. I have just seen JCS 4893 to MACV/2/
calling for a plan for "an immediate concentrated counterinsurgency
offensive in Long An Province to restore effective GVN control."
This is the most discouraging instruction I have seen since joining our
Vietnamese effort two months ago. It reveals an almost total lack of
comprehension of the character of the Vietnamese problem and of the
present situation here.
/2/ Dated February 14, this cable transmitted
the JCS belief that a counterinsurgency offensive in Long An Province
would be a symbol of "revitalized war effort." The JCS
requested development of a comprehensive plan in coordination with the
Country Team for "earliest possible accomplishment this
purpose." Johnson Library, National Security File. Vietnam Country
File. Vol. IV. Memos and Misc.)
It assumes that:
1. An indigenous Communist insurgency enjoying full external
Communist support can be defeated by such an "offensive" in a
measurable period of time.
2. The GVN has adequate political cohesion and leadership,
centralized control, and local administrative talent and organization to
launch a "concentrated counter-insurgency offensive in Long
An" or anywhere else.
3. The U.S. Mission here has sufficient influence and control over
the GVN to persuade it to do so.
None of these assumptions are true in Viet-Nam today.
I have suggested to MACV that its reply which will to extent possible
receive Country Team coordination include frank statement re utter
impossibility of launching "an immediate concentrated
counter-insurgency offensive" or of achieving quick success even
were such action possible. It is my hope that our reply can convey a
more realistic appreciation of our task than instruction which
engendered it.
Doubtless Ambassador Lodge will have more to say on "quick
victory" approach upon his return. In my opinion we face a long
hard pull with final success probably dependent more on developments
external to Viet Nam than on our counter-insurgency efforts here. On
these U.S. Mission is and will continue to exert maximum effort.
Nes
50. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central
Intelligence Agency (Helms), to the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, February 18, 1964.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV, Memos and Misc. Secret. Signed by
Colby for Helms. Also sent to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Taylor, Hilsman,
Forrestal, Anthis, Sullivan, Carroll, and others. Also published in Declassified
Documents, 1974, 246D. Bundy wrote the following note on the source
text: "President read Feb. 18 and so called meeting of Feb. 20 on
SVN. McGB." For the results of the meeting, see Document 54.
According to a covering note, this was the
third report of a group of CIA officers who went to Vietnam to
cross-check covertly intelligence information provided by the
Vietnamese. The first report, February 14, concluded that while the
Vietnamese had been reporting honestly to their American counterparts
since November 1, 1963, failings in quantity, quality, and training of
Vietnamese personnel and lack of professionalism among Vietnamese
sources made their intelligence product difficult to evaluate. A general
impression gained by the CIA group was that the momentum of the
strategic hamlet program had slowed practically to a halt. Commenting
specifically on Binh Long and Phuoc Thanh Provinces, the report
concluded that security had badly deteriorated there. The second report,
February 14, concentrated on I Corps and concluded that optimism
regarding the security of the area was mistaken and based on superficial
developments. (Both in Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam
Country File, Vol. IV, Memos and Misc.) The accord report is published
in Declassified Documents, 1975, 246C.
A. Tide of insurgency in all four corps areas appears to be going
against GVN. In many provinces team finds VC-controlled areas to
comprise better than 50 or 60 per cent of total area. Some provinces (Phaoc
Thanh, Binh Duong and An Xuyen) report VC-controlled areas as high as 80
per cent. In Tay Ninh Province American and Vietnamese officials agree
VC can attack and enter any village of their choosing, including
provincial capital.
B. National level direction of all programs appears to be weak to
non-existent. This includes ARVN operations, strategic hamlet program.
Chieu Hoi program, civic action program, national police program, hamlet
militia program, etc. What ARVN operations are being conducted appear to
be corps-controlled and corps concepts of action appear to vary even to
the point that different divisions with the same corps have a different
approach to problems.
C. Until 1 Nov coup, strategic hamlet program, while full of faults
weaknesses, etc., had certain momentum and full national direction.
Since coup, program has been viewed more realistically and many of
illusions held jointly by US and Vietnamese have been shattered. Program
at present at virtual standstill, as provincial officials, lacking
direction at national level, grope for local and varying new approaches
to pacification problem. Illustrative of results of current
re-evaluation of strategic hamlet program is case of Hau Nghia, where
province chief states that of 52 hamlets previously reported as
completed, only eight are now considered viable. Province chief
estimates that 75 per cent of Hau Nghia VC-controlled.
D. There is no evidence of any particular GVN appeal to youth or
students and as matter of fact GVN propaganda mechanism in toto is
largely moribund. Dissemination and production of propaganda appear to
be centered entirely in Saigon and is so poorly operative in many
provincial areas that VC were first to inform populace of 30 January
coup. There are no newspapers produced outside of Saigon although VC by
contrast do produce some regular periodicals which appear to be well
read by local populace. (CAS working with GVN in this entire field.)
E. Several province chiefs encountered proved to be of high caliber.
However, due to frequent personnel changes, present incumbents
apprehensive over their tenure and reluctant to exercise initiative.
Particularly in newly created provinces, there is lack of qualified
subordinate personnel.
F. Hamlet militia appear effective mainly in non-critical areas. In
critical areas as a rule hamlet militia have been disarmed by province
chiefs, overrun by VC, or members have on their own initiative fumed in
their arms and resigned. Therefore, in these areas hamlet militia not
significant factor in war, brunt of which being increasingly borne by
self-defense corps.
G. Quality and quantity of VC arms appear to be rapidly increasing.
Presence of Russian-designed carbines, Czech sub machine guns, Chinese
SKZ recoilless weapons and 7.92 heavy machine guns and increased use of
heavy mortars by VC elements have been noted in all corps areas. These
better weapons being distributed down to VC guerrilla units and presence
of homemade and French weapons in hands of VC decreasing. In one recent
case VC left behind in an overrun district headquarters in Quang Tri
French weapons which they had brought with them. Progress in rearming VC
units probably uneven, but in IV Corps it believed process virtually
complete. In number of areas in IV Corps both American and Vietnamese
sources assert that friendly forces now both outgunned and outmanned by
enemy. (This info has been scattered in various MAC/V statistical
reports, but to our knowledge has never been brought home in a clear,
explicit, qualitative statement.)
H. Presence of improved weapons in hands of VC suggests significant
degree of infiltration of new equipment into South Vietnam.
51. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
Defense (McNamara)/1/
JCSM-136-64
Washington, February 18, 1964.
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 092 Vietnam. Top Secret;
Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Vietnam and Southeast Asia
1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
dated 22 January 1964,/2/ subject as above,
which expressed the view that a loss of South Vietnam to the communists
would presage a loss of the remainder of the United States position in
Southeast Asia. It sets forth a number of actions which the United
States should be prepared to take in order to ensure victory. Since
submission of that memorandum, mindful of the need to revitalize the
counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam, which has been interrupted
and slowed by the confusion resulting from recent changes in government,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the situation in South Vietnam
with the view of determining additional actions which can be recommended
for implementation immediately.
/2/ See Document 17.
2. The Government of Vietnam has developed, with the close
collaboration of the US Military Assistance Command, a new National
Pacification Plan/3/ which provides for the
orderly pacification of the insurgency in accordance with a realistic
phasing schedule. From a military planning viewpoint, this program
should correct many of the past deficiencies of the effort, and it
provides for consolidation of secure areas and expansion of them (the
"spreading oil drop"). US military assets in Vietnam will
fully support this plan. What is now required is implementation of
additional actions which will insure an integrated political,
socio-economic, and psychological offensive to support more fully the
military effort. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that
the Country Team be directed to implement the following actions at the
earliest practicable time:
/3/On February 18, the Khanh government
approved the National Pacification Plan which set forth a combined
military, political, and economic offensive against the Viet Cong in two
stages. Phase I envisioned a coordinated military and civilian effort to
clear territory of the Viet Cong, moving successively from secure and
highly populated areas into insecure and less densely populated ones.
The concept became known as "spreading the oil drop." In Phase
II, Vietnamese military forces would destroy the Viet Cong in their
secret military bases and end the insurgency. The first priority of
Phase I was the provinces surrounding Saigon and extending south into
the Delta with an estimated completion date of July 1, 1965. The next
priority was the remainder of the Delta and certain
critical provinces north of Saigon, with a completion date of January 1,
1966. All of Corps I and II, with the exception of VC strongholds
reserved for Phase II, were to be pacified by January 1, 1965. JCS
Historical Division, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
War in Vietnam. 1960-1968, Part 1, chapter 8, pp. 23-24)
a. Induce the GVN (General Khanh) military to accept US advisors at
all levels considered necessary by COMUSMACV. (This is particularly
applicable in the critical provinces where the advisory effort should be
expanded and should reach down to the subsector level.)
b. Intensify the use of herbicides for crop destruction against
identified Viet Cong areas as recommended by the GVN.
c. Improve border control measures:
(1) Direct border surveillance elements to establish intelligence
nets without regard to the existing geographic borders.
(2) Exploit smugglers and the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and other border
minority groups.
(3) Establish denied areas where a "shoot on sight" policy
will be followed.
d. Direct the US civilian agencies involved in Vietnam to assist the
GVN in producing a civilian counterpart package plan to the GVN National
Pacification Plan. (Any area in Vietnam can be temporarily cleared of
Viet Cong, but it is the GVN civil administration which must win the
people and stabilize the area in concert with the military. This plan
should support and revitalize the Vietnamese "New Life Hamlet
Program.")
e. Provide US civilian advisors to all necessary echelons and GVN
agencies to provide civil administration "know-how" until a
GVN corps of administrators can be trained.
f. Encourage early and effective action to implement a realistic land
reform program.
g. Support the GVN in a policy of tax forgiveness for low income
population in areas where the GVN determines that a critical state of
insurgency exists. (In some areas the Viet Cong and GVN both levy taxes
on the peasant population. Relief of the GVN tax would provide a small
monetary relief but, more important, would have psychological value.)
h. Assist the GVN in developing a National Psychological Operations
Plan and conducting psychological operations to insure an intensive
nationwide coordinated propaganda campaign to establish the GVN and
Khanh's "images," create a "cause" which can serve
as a rallying point for the youth/students of Vietnam, and develop the
long term national objectives of a free Vietnam.
i. Intensify efforts to gain the support of US news media
representatives in Vietnam by exploring with them measures that can be
taken to improve this situation.
j. Arrange US sponsored trips to Vietnam by groups of prominent
journalists and editors.
k. Inform all GVN military and civilian officials through various
means, to include their US advisors and counterparts, that the United
States (a) considers it imperative that the present government be
stabilized, (b) would oppose another coup, and (c) that the United
States is prepared to offer all possible assistance in forming a stable
government which will eliminate the necessity for another coup. In this
instance, all US intelligence agencies and advisors must be alert to and
report cases of dissension and plotting in order to prevent such
actions.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the implementation of the
foregoing measures will not be sufficient to exercise a decisive effect
on the campaign against the Viet Cong. They are continuing study of the
actions suggested in the memorandum of 22 January 1964, as well as other
proposals which require further study, and will recommend to you
progressively the execution of such actions considered militarily
required. Among the subjects to be studied as a matter of urgency are
the following:
a. Intensified operations against North Vietnam to include air
bombings of selected targets.
b. Removal of restrictions for air and ground cross-border
operations.
c. Intelligence and reporting.
d. US organizational changes.
e. Increased US Navy participation in shore and river patrol
activities.
f. Introduction of jet aircraft into the Vietnamese Air Force and the
US Air Commando unit.
g. DOD-CIA relationship changes.
h. Reduction of test and evaluation activities.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped
signature.
52. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Vietnam (Nes) to
the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)/1/
Saigon, February 19, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, William Bundy
Files, WPB Special Papers. Secret; Official-Informal. Hilsman sent a
copy of this letter to Forrestal for his information with the following
handwritten note: "Another old Burma hand you have to deal with!!
R.H." On March 5, Green sent this copy to the newly-designated
Assistant Secretary of State for Ear Eastern Affairs, William Bundy,
stating that the letter with its enclosure "presents views you will
be interested in."
Dear Roger: I am sending along to you for what it is worth my
personal views on Where We Stand in Viet-Nam conveyed to Ambassador
Lodge in the enclosed Memorandum. They vary in several important
respects from those held by many high ranking American officials far
more experienced with the Vietnamese scene than I. In defense of the
judgments I have reached, I can only say that I approached VietNam with
little previous knowledge but with an open mind and no vested interest
in past counterinsurgency policies or operations.
My most disillusioning experience has been with the MACV-MAAG
operation which seems to be tailored largely toward providing the U.S.
military establishment, within the framework of World War II
Conventional Doctrine, organization and weapons, a fertile field for the
utilization and promotion of its senior officers rather than as an
instrument to deal with guerrilla war. I have an idea that were you and
I, with our Burma experience, to take over from the nineteen General
officers we have out here, we might put some realism into the military
side of our operations against the VC.
I will have a great deal more to say about our Vietnamese adventure
as time goes on but you may rest assured that I will say it only through
channels, i.e., to you and to Ambassador Lodge.
Sincerely yours,
David
[Enclosure]
Memorandum From the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy (Nes)
to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/2/
Saigon, February 17, 1964.
/2/ Secret.
SUBJECT
Where We Stand in Viet-Nam
The following are my personal views and with particular reference to
the French assessment of the SEA situation as conveyed in Deptel 1232,
Paris Embtel 3907 to Dept., and as seen by the British, Paris Embtel
3873 to Dept./3/
/3/ These telegrams, February 13, 13, and 14,
respectively, described the rationale of the French for their campaign
for neutralism of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM, POL 16 CHICOM, and POL VIET S,
respectively)
1. Although I have only been directly associated with this area for
some two months, my reading of developments over the past year and
recent experiences here lead me to fear that General De Gaulle may be
right in his belief that we are faced with the choice between accepting
the possible collapse of our counter-insurgency efforts here or the
escalation of the conflict toward a direct military confrontation of the
DRV and China by the U.S.
2. Nothing that I have seen or heard thus far in Saigon leads me to
believe that against the background of recent Vietnamese history our
counter-insurgency efforts can win through so long as the Viet Cong is
backed politically and psychologically and to a lesser extent militarily
by Hanoi and Peking.
3. The peasants who form the mass of the South Vietnamese population
are exhausted and sick of 20 years of civil conflict. During this entire
period they have never and are not now receiving either political
leadership or orderly and just administration from the central
authorities of the GVN. They have enjoyed little if any social or
economic betterment.
4. On the other hand, the Viet Cong represents a grass roots movement
which is disciplined, ideologically dedicated, easily identifiable with
the desires of the peasantry and of course ruthless. The fact that the
VC has the full backing of China is perhaps its most powerful asset in
presenting itself as the inevitable winner.
5. I do not see in the present military regime or any conceivable
successor much hope in providing the real political and social
leadership or the just and effective country-wide administration so
essential to the success of our counter-insurgency program.
I think we would be naive in the extreme to believe that any number
or quality of American advisors can succeed in changing within a
reasonable period of time the attitudes and patterns of thinking of
senior Vietnamese military and political officialdom.
6. In developing a large conventional World War II Vietnamese
military establishment organized into four Corps and 9-10 divisions with
other equally sizable supporting units, we may, in fact, have a
Frankenstein on our hands which on the one hand serves little purpose in
dealing effectively with the Viet Cong and on the other provides a
perfect framework for spawning successive coups and so perpetuating the
current political malaise.
7. Against this pessimistic appraisal, I do believe that were the VC
to be totally deprived of all outside support, both material and
psychological, we would be graced with the most important factor of all
in a counter-insurgency effort-namely time. I would estimate very
roughly that so deprived, and assuring continued and massive U.S.
support for any and all anti-communist regimes which might emerge in
Saigon, we might see the VC movement wither away in 5-10 years time.
8. At the same time, if General De Gaulle could be persuaded to
change his view re our willingness to escalate our conflict with the
Communists throughout SEA, I think his sponsorship of neutralization of
South Viet-Nam might also be modified.
9. Finally, should our readiness and willingness to escalate toward a
direct confrontation of Hanoi and Peking become obvious by our overt
actions throughout the area, I think the tendencies toward neutralism
here would rapidly disappear also.
10. In brief, it seems to me that De Gaulle has correctly analyzed
the SEA situation if his assumption is correct that we will do no more
than continue our present counter-insurgency efforts in South VietNam--these
being concentrated on a large team of American military and civilian
advisers working through whatever anti-communist regime exists in Saigon
and in massive economic and military aid programs extended through such
a regime. After two years of the most strenuous efforts by the U.S.
along these lines, De Gaulle quite correctly feels that we have achieved
little more than a precarious stalemate which in the next weeks, should
further coups occur, could disintegrate very rapidly. This is also the
conclusion of SNIE 50-64./4/
/4/ See Document 42.
11. Should this in fact happen, we will be faced either with turning
the SEA ball game over to De Gaulle in the hope that his policy can
salvage something from the wreckage or of rapidly escalating our efforts
toward a final military showdown with China.
Recommendations:
1. That we seize every opportunity to warn Washington that escalation
may be the only alternative to inevitable neutralization, i.e., the loss
of the U.S. political and military position in SEA.
2. That we recommend that De Gaulle be informed in the frankest terms
that we will not leave SEA and that we are ready to face a conflict with
China to preserve our position here.
3. That we urge the acceleration and expansion of OPS Plan 34A-64./5/
/5/ See footnote 2, Document 4.
53. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the
President/1/
Saigon, February 19, 1964--6 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 1583 from Saigon
to the Department of State, where it was received at 7:21 a.m. and
passed to the White House at 8:30 a.m. Telegram 1583 is the source text.
1. In reply to your 1256,/2/ I believe
persistent and patient execution of current civil and military plans
will bring victory-provided external pressures would be about as they
were when I got here last summer. These pressures come from Communist
China, North Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia and France, and I believe they
have been increasing, although I cannot prove it. Effective steps to
lessen, and perhaps eliminate, these pressures would be most helpful.
/2/ In telegram 1256, February 18, from the
President to Ambassador Lodge, Johnson reminded Lodge that it had been 2
weeks since he delivered the President's personal message to Khanh (see
footnote 2, Document 25). The President asked for a report for his own
guidance on any further steps the United States should take to be of
assistance and, in particular, any additional military or economic
assistance Lodge might need to carry out existing or recommended
policies. (Ibid., POL 23-9 VIET S)
2. Believe that within Viet-Nam, U.S. is giving enough economic and
military assistance with one exception: an increase of funds to pay for
the increase in the pay of the Army and of paramilitary forces./3/
/3/ In telegram CAP 64047 from the White House,
February 20, Johnson responded that the request for increase in pay
would be addressed immediately. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
Lodge/4/
/4/ Telegram 1583 bears this typed signature.
54. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, White House/1/
Washington, February 20, 1964, 12:17 p.m.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV, Memos and Misc. Secret. Drafted by
Forrestal. Copies of this memorandum were sent to Rusk, McNamara,
Taylor, McCone, Bell, and Sullivan.
Prepared for this meeting, which lasted 1 hour,
was an agenda, annotated by McGeorge Bundy, which reads as follows:
"1. Situation Briefing (5 minutes); 2.
Intelligence and Reporting, (A) Cooper Activities, (B) French
Activities; 3. Operations, (A) Response to Lodge Message, (B) Policy on
Dependents [Bundy wrote at this point "P[resident] prefers"],
(C) Other Matters; 4. Diplomatic Problems, (A) Cambodia, (B) Laos, (C)
Others; 5. North Viet-Nam, (A) Intelligence [Bundy wrote "increase
efforts"], (B) Propaganda [Bundy wrote "increase"], (C)
Operations; 6. Planning, (A) Johnson Subcommittee [Bundy wrote
"Speed up"], (B) Question of Time Phase." (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
The President met today with the Secretaries of State and Defense,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretary Ball,
Director McCone, and the members of Mr. William Sullivan's committee on
policy and operations in South Vietnam.
After an intelligence briefing on the current situation and a full
discussion of the work of the committee, the President directed the
following actions:
1. Any requests for assistance or other Washington action from
Ambassador Lodge should be given prompt and sympathetic response. Such
staff work as may be required to back up such requests in Washington
should be given the highest priority, so that decisions can be reached
quickly.
2. Contingency planning for pressures against North Vietnam should be
speeded up. Particular attention should be given to shaping such
pressures so as to produce the maximum credible deterrent effect on
Hanoi.
3. For the time being, American dependents in Vietnam should be
encouraged to accept voluntary repatriation. Early next month, the
Secretary of Defense will consult with Ambassador Lodge on whether
dependents should be evacuated and will make appropriate recommendations
to the President and the Secretary of State upon his return.
4. The Department of State will explore in a positive manner the
possibilities opened up by the recent proposals of Prince Sihanouk for a
conference in Phnom Penh on the problem of Cambodian neutrality./2/
/2/ See American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1964, p. 847, footnote 7.
M V Forrestal
55. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the
President/1/
Saigon, February 20, 1964--8 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 1594 from Saigon
which is the source text. A note on the White House
copy of this telegram indicates that the President saw it. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV, Cables)
This is in further reply to your 1256./2/
/2/ See footnote 2, Document 53.
1. I believe various pressures can and should be applied to North
Viet Nam to cause them to cease and desist from their murderous
intrusion into South Viet Nam. I have made detailed recommendations in a
memo dated October 30, 1963,/3/ of which
Under Secretary Harriman has a copy, and to which I believe I referred
briefly to you when you received me on November 24./4/
/3/ Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol.
IV, pp. 656-659. Sullivan sent a copy of Lodge's paper of October 30,
1963, to McNamara on February 24, 1964. (Memorandum from Sullivan to
McNamara, February 24; Department of State, Bundy Files, WPB Special
Papers, I of II, 1963)
/4/ See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963,
vol. IV, p. 635-637.
2. In light of recent terrorism against Americans in Saigon,/5/
I believe North Viet Nam should be told secretly that every terrorist
act against Americans in South Viet Nam will provoke swift retaliation
against North Viet Nam.
/5/ Thus far in February, there had been 15
terrorist attacks against Americans, including bombings of a U.S.
theater and a softball game in which 5 Americans were killed and over
50, including official dependents, were wounded.
3. On the basis of knowledge available to me, I do not think this
will bring on nuclear war with ChiComs or with anyone. It simply puts
U.S. and South Viet Nam on a par with ChiComs and North Viet Nam in the
struggle against the Viet Cong. At present, we let them have a sanctuary
from which they operate against us, whereas we not only have no
sanctuary, but do not operate against them in any significant way.
4. If the above recommendation is adopted, we should consider
announcing just before undertaking it that we are evacuating all U.S.
dependents. Our announcement should make it crystal clear that this step
is being taken because we are cleaning the decks for action and intend
to make things tougher for the V.C. Evacuation should not appear to be a
frightened response due to Viet Cong terrorism.
5. Believe the South Vietnamese expect us to be brave and that there
are big advantages to be gained by not disappointing them.
6. My present policy regarding American dependents is that any
American who wishes to leave Viet Nam and return to the U.S. be allowed
to do so. I reckon that only a few will want to go but that those who
are unhappy here should not be required to stay.
7. In regards U.S. children in Saigon, I am in close touch with
parents' organization whose present attitude is not to close school.
They have question under constant review. General Khanh told me this
morning he hopes to move school very soon to a more secure location.
8. In answering your telegrams, I am most anxious to keep you fully
informed, and at the same time, not give you too much to read. If you
wish my wires to be different in length and format, please advise.
Lodge/6/
/6/ Telegram 1594 bears this typed signature.
56. Message From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam
(Lodge)/1/
Washington, February 22, 1964--5:28 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 1281 to Saigon,
which is the source text. McGeorge Bundy sent a draft of this telegram
and the text of Lodge's message, supra, to Palm Springs, California,
where the President was vacationing. The text of Bundy's covering cable
to the President reads as follows:
"Next two following messages are an
incoming from Lodge on enlarging our effort in North Vietnam and a draft
response for the President. I send these now because of the President's
desire to be very quick and effective in responses to Lodge's messages.
The draft answer is being cleared with Rusk and McNamara, and we can get
it out as soon as we have the President's own comments."
"The memorandum to Harriman which Lodge
refers to [see footnote 3, supra] is sensible but tentative in form, and
does not show strong advocacy of anything different from what we
have been doing. My own notes on the President's November meeting with
Lodge show nothing significant on North Vietnam. We therefore believe
that the draft answer is fully responsive, and we assess the incoming
message as sincere and reasonable, as far as it goes." (Telegram
CAP 64050, February 21; Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam
Country File, Vol. IV)
I appreciated your 1594/2/ which
corresponds to much of my own thinking. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara,
with my approval have already begun preparing specific plans for
pressure against NVN, both in the diplomatic and military fields.
Secretary McNamara will be visiting you early in March to review with
you that subject and other aspects of the counter-insurgency campaign.
Then or very soon thereafter we should make definite decisions.
/2/ Document 55.
I agree that any announcement of the evacuation of dependents must be
made in such a way as to show we are getting tougher, not softer, and
Bob McNamara will take this up with you also. In the meantime, the
policy you have suggested in your paragraph 6 is just what I have
already instructed the Departments to implement.
I value these direct exchanges with you on top policy matters. We
should keep them up./3/
/3/ Telegram 1281 does not bear President
Johnson's signature.
57. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/
Washington, February 21, 1964.
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, Vietnam 092. Top Secret. Attached
to the source text was a covering memorandum from William Bundy to
McNamara, February 21, which reads as follows:
"The attached memorandum, prepared in
response to your request, will obtain JCS views on a number of critical
questions affecting our actions in Vietnam. The answers will also be
helpful to the work of the Sullivan Committee. We have coordinated this
request with the Joint Staff."
SUBJECT
Vietnam
As you are aware, one of the alternatives which is now being reviewed
with respect to the situation in Vietnam is a carefully planned program
designed to exert increasing military pressures upon the government of
North Vietnam, with a view to inducing that government to terminate its
support and encouragement of the insurrection in South Vietnam and
curtail Pathet Lao activities in Laos. The military pressures which
might be applied extend from relatively minor covert activities, which
you are already examining, to open GVN or U.S. air or sea non-nuclear
attacks upon the DRV.
There are a number of military uncertainties which must be resolved,
to the extent possible, before political decisions affecting such
military actions can be taken. Accordingly, I should like to have your
views upon the following matters:
1. The overall capabilities of the DRV and of the Chinese Communists
for military action, with specific reference to:
(a) The types and magnitudes of actions which are possible, taking
into account current Communist logistic capabilities.
(b) The geographic areas within which such actions might be
undertaken.
(c) The time period within which the enemy forces could be brought to
bear.
(d) The enemy capability for concurrent reactions, as for example,
reactions both in Southeast Asia and in Korea and/or Taiwan off-shore
islands.
2. What military actions against North Vietnam, employing air and
naval power, but not ground forces beyond the scale of smallscale raids,
might be:
(a) undertaken by the GVN and within the plausible range of GVN
capabilities
(b) assertedly undertaken by the GVN, even if outside the plausible
range of GVN capabilities;
(c) undertaken by the U.S. without public acknowledgment;
(d) undertaken by the U.S. along with, or after, a public declaration
by the U.S. of an intent to exert military pressure upon the DRV with a
view to forcing a termination of the insurrection in the South?
What targets would be most effective to attack from the standpoint
of:
(a) specific effect on DRV capability against Laos, South Vietnam,
and Thailand;
(b) interdiction of main communication routes between the DRV and
Communist China, plus interdiction of sea communications into North
Vietnam;
(c) more generalized target patterns designed to inflict damage on
key installation in the DRV but to minimize the effect on the civilian
population as a whole?
While the assessment of the impact of possible courses of action on
DRV continued support of operations in South Vietnam and Laos is in
large part an intelligence question that should be addressed by
intelligence authorities as well, I would appreciate the views of the
JCS as to the courses of action under one or more of the above headings
that would in your judgment be most likely to bring about cessation of
DRV support for operations in South Vietnam and Laos and at the same
time be least likely to lead to stepped-up conflict and adverse
reactions in third countries.
3. Assuming that, in response to the attacks upon the DRV, the DRV
and/or the Chicoms undertake large scale troop movements over the border
into one or more of:
(a) South Vietnam
(b) Laos
(c) Thailand or Burma
(d) South Korea
(e) Taiwan
What U.S. effort, air, sea, and land, would be required to contain
such an invasion? If intelligence indicated that such a movement were
contemplated by the enemy, what actions against North Vietnam and
mainland China would be likely to deter such a response?
In each of these circumstances, or any likely combination of them, to
what extent could the U.S. effectively counter such actions through air
and naval responses only (without the use of ground forces other than
those presently deployed) utilizing each of the following means:
(a) conventional ordnance only:
(b) conventional ordnance plus classified non-nuclear munitions. The
degree of increased effectiveness to be expected from the latter should
be specified along with the considerations for and against employment.
[Subparagraphs (c) and (d) (5-1/2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
4. Assuming that the Chicom reaction included air action from
mainland bases (either against SVN or other air bases, or supporting
aircraft carriers) to what extent could this air threat be countered by:
(a) actions against enemy aircraft only, without attacks upon
mainland bases, or
(b) selective attacks upon the Chinese bases and air defenses
utilizing:
(i) Conventional ordnance (plus classified munitions if significantly
more effective)
[Subparagraph (ii) (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
[Subparagraph (c) (2 lines of source text) not declassified]
5. What modifications must be made in existing contingency plans in
order to provide for U.S. reactions which would depend primarily upon
air activities rather than the intervention of substantial U.S. ground
forces?
In view of the broad scope of these questions, I believe that the JCS
will wish to create a special planning unit that can devote itself
exclusively to these problems on a continuing basis. I appreciate that a
detailed response may require a longer time, but believe that we must
have your preliminary judgment on these questions for consideration
prior to our anticipated departure for South Vietnam about 4 March.
Accordingly, I would appreciate it if a preliminary response could be
available for discussion with me not later than Monday, March 2. Our
review at that time will almost certainly uncover additional questions
and refinements that would form the basis for the next phase of the
examination.
Robert S. McNamara
58. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (Harking) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/
Saigon, February 21, 1964--4:15 p.m.
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Vietnam. Top Secret; Eyes
Only. The JCS sent copies of this cable to McNamara, Gilpatric, Anthis,
and William Bundy.
MAC 665. Subj: CAS third appraisal./2/
Ref JCS 734, DTG 182258Z Feb./3/
/2/ Document 50.
/3/ In this telegram, the Joint Chiefs
requested Harkins' views on the third appraisal. (National Archives and
Records Administration. RG 213. ICS Files)
1. Except for the spectacular and eye catching lead sentence, I have
no quarrel with most of the statements contained in the CAS survey team
appraisal. Where the statements are clean-cut, the supporting
information was usually provided by my field personnel and reflected in
reports already sent to Washington by this headquarters. Where the
statements are sweeping, they are based on opinion or an unfortunate
penchant for generalizing from the specific. My detailed comments follow
and are geared to the specific paragraphs of the CAS message.
A. Area vs. People. Since August there has been a steady, gradual
erosion of GVN control of territory, this erosion has become
progressively worse and more noticeable subsequent to 1 Nov 63. In 23
RVN provinces the VC dominate in over 50 percent of the area. Report is
in error where it states Binh Duong is 80 percent VC controlled; degree
of control by VC is 45 percent. However, Phnoc Tuy in which the area is
over 80 percent controlled by the VC is not mentioned in the report. All
this has been reported by MACV. It is still considered here that GVN
control is complete or predominant over 70 percent of the people in the
rural area, while VC control is complete or predominant over 18 Percent.
There is another 3 percent over which neither GVN nor VC have dominance.
Then there are also the 1,687,000 in the major cities which are
definitely under GVN control.
B. National level direction of most, but not all, programs has been
weak since 1 November. It is difficult to have direction without an
effective government. Khanh, however, is meeting now with [regarding?] a
national pacification plan today or by Monday. The effectiveness of
military operations may be low but they do proceed according to the
national plan and are certainly not without direction. It is logical for
the corps to do the derivative planning within assigned areas and to
direct and control the operations of its major subordinate units. The
divisions within a given corps face different problems in terms of
terrain, enemy and population. As regards military civic actions, the
program began to get excellent backing in early January to include
directives to the field and addresses by top members of the MRC. In a
sharp departure from prior practices, twenty million plasters were
allocated to the corps for military civic actions. Officials charged
with administering the Chieu Hoi program are convinced it will become
functional again under General Khanh's leadership.
C. E. F. Concur with contents. In this connection; see US Mission
monthly status reports for December and January respectively; Section V
and Annex X thereto of US Mission quarterly evaluation for period ending
[end?] of December, and pare 6E, MACV headway reports since 8 January./4/
/4/ None found.
D. The experienced Embassy official assigned to monitor and support
youth activities states it is not entirely accurate to say that GVN is
inactive in their appeal to youth since active programs are carried on
by USIS and USOM with the active cooperation of appropriate ministries
of GVN. It is true there are no programs carried on to the vast extent
of the Cong Hoa or Combatant Youth under the Diem regime. As a matter of
fact, GVN propaganda mechanisms are quite active. The statement that
"no newspapers are produced outside of Saigon" is not only
ill-advised, but false. For example, 183 village district newspapers are
operating (of the 200 programmed by USOM). The average circulation per
newspaper is 450 three times weekly. These are widely read as
demonstrated by requests received last week from Kien Giang, Kian Hoa,
and Chaong Thzen for additional paper supplies to increase circulation.
Kien Quoc, a provincial newspaper, is produced in four different
editions weekly for the key provinces of Quang Ngai, Tay Ninh, Binh
Duong and Long An with a provincial circulation of 35,000 each.
Periodicals are numerous; for the population alone, USIS produces Huong
Que (Rural Life-125,000 copies monthly) and Gioi Tu Do (Free
World-150,000 copies monthly) aimed at the student population.
G. The statement "presence of Russian-designed carbines" is
misleading. It is true that originally the carbine was
Russian-designed--20 years ago. However, the weapon in question is
ChiCom PE 53 carbine, which is obsolete in the Chinese Communist army.
No knowledge here of Czech submachine guns. Reference is probably to
ChiCom 7.62 mm modified K-50 submachine guns. ARVN has a habit of
calling this weapon Czech. No information available in this headquarters
regarding VC abandonment of weapons during the incident in Quang Tri; it
is very unlikely this happened, since VC are not that fat in weapons.
The friendly forces are not outmanned & outgunned by the enemy in IV
Corps, although certain VC elements in this area such as the 96th and
306th Battalions are considered well trained, aggressive and competent
units and they have given good accounts of themselves in several
instances. The VC through massing of forces can achieve temporary
numerical superiority in areas of their choosing but overall they cannot
approximate the RVN strength in either manpower or materiel. The
heaviest weapon of the VC is the 81 mm mortar. The VC [have] no 105 or
155 howitzers, no APC's or armored cars, no support aircraft and no
heavy river craft.
H. Concur.
2. As a general comment this message appears to be a combination of
rehashing old information previously reported, plus the reporting of
unevaluated individual observations not necessarily in consonance with
an overall analysis of the situation in a division tactical area. I am
concerned over the disregard of the terms of reference for this group
that is demonstrated by the scope of this report. JCS message 362-64 [?]
January 1964,/5/ indicates that the role of
this group is to "assist in developing techniques to improve [less
than 1 1ine of source text not declassified] intelligence
collection." This example of unilateral reporting on matters
outside their quarter and competency, without the benefit of the advice
of this headquarters and other interested agencies can only be
detrimental to the achievement of a joint, inter-agency intelligence
effort and more important, is likely to introduce misleading, if not
incorrect, information into the national decision making process.
/5/ Not printed. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 218, JCS Files)
We have nothing to hide but do have updated info on many of the
problems covered by the [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] team report, and feel that such reports should be
coordinated before being dispatched.
59. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the
President/1/
Saigon, February 22, 1964--2 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 1606 from Saigon,
which is the source text. Passed to the White House
on receipt at the Department of State.
This is in further reply to your 1256./2/
/2/ See footnote 2, Document 53.
1. In my 1583/3/ I mentioned the
external threats to Viet-Nam and the steps which should be taken
internally. In my 1594/4/ I referred in
detail to steps which should be taken with regard to North Viet-Nam. In
this telegram, I suggest steps to be taken with regard to France.
/3/ Document 53.
/4/Document 55
2. Because French is by all odds the Western language which the
largest number of Vietnamese possess the best and because they have many
personal relationships with individual French people, General de
Gaulle's declaration on neutralism is having a demoralizing effect on
the will to win of both senior and junior officers, and of the
politically conscious population generally which is quite out of
proportion to French power here which is actually quite skimpy. It
starts a line of thought which runs: "It was Laos last year; this
year it will be Cambodia; and next year it will be us." Obviously
such thinking does not make for bravery and for hard fighting. To this
psychological campaign is added the activity of French agents; Gen.
Khanh's statement to me which is yet to be verified that these agents
have conspired with the Viet Cong terrorists during the last week; and
reports that some of the explosives which have been found near the
theater and the stadium in which Americans were wounded and killed were
of French origin. All of this can have a potentially very dangerous
effect on Franco-American relations, and they create a totally false and
dangerous emphasis here in Viet-Nam. I firmly believe that conditions
are fundamentally much worse in North Viet-Nam than they are here. Yet,
due in large part to de Gaulle's public utterances and the work of
French agents, this community is concentrated on itself and its own
fears instead of taking the initiative against an enemy which is having
a very hard time in many ways.
3. I suggest, therefore, that General de Gaulle be told that all men
of good will obviously desire the end of the Viet Cong war and the
creation of a Vietnamese state which is not a satellite, which is free
and independent and which is strong enough to be neutral if it wants to
be. There is no disagreement about the goal, but simply as to how we are
to achieve it. The following questions therefore arise:
a. How can so called "neutralization" be attained if the
aggressor is determined not to be neutralized, as is obviously the case
as regards North Viet-Nam?
b. South Viet-Nam is experiencing a change of government after a
period of deterioration with an inevitable temporarily adverse effect on
the war effort. Obviously, the word "negotiation" makes no
sense when one side is much weaker than the other. Under these
circumstances, there is no negotiation; there is simply an ultimatum and
a capitulation. If France had gone to a "neutralizing"
conference in 1943, for example, it would merely have confirmed the
occupation by the German army. VC activity is not as devastating as was
German occupation, but the comparison is applicable. How then can South
Viet-Nam go respectably to an international conference when she is weak
on the battlefield, and when to go to an international conference under
those conditions is to go to inevitable defeat?
c. How can one avoid the conclusion that a chief of state who talks
about neutrality at such a time is lessening the will to win of the
Viet-Nam army and would thus bring Viet-Nam to a conference weaker than
she is already?
d. In view of the fact General de Gaulle must be aware of the above,
why does he speak of neutralism at the worst possible time from the
standpoint of a truly just solution thus directly helping the Communists
and why does he speak publicly of something which should not be public
at all, but which should be the subject of a very secret declaration to
North Viet-Nam, accompanied by effective pressures of many different
kinds?
4. I suggest this one question be then put to him: "Believing
you to be a man of good will who would not intentionally work to destroy
the RVN or the vital interests of U.S., I, President Johnson, ask you to
make a public statement making it clear that your remarks about
neutralism were not meant to apply to the present time."
Lodge/5/
/5/Telegram 1606 bears this typed signature.
60. Telegram From the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Smith) to the President, at Palm Springs, California/1/
Washington, February 22, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Also sent to Rusk in Palm Springs. The
source text is the copy Smith sent to the Department of State as White
House telegram CAP 64056, February 22. No time of transmission appears
on the original message, but CAP 64056 was received in the Department of
State at 1:49 p.m.
There follows another pair of messages from and to Lodge. The first
is a long and important proposal for dealing with the French./2/
The second is an interim answer/3/ which we
will send as soon as the President approves.
/2/Document 59.
/3/ See below.
This is the trickiest area yet opened in this dialog, and I am
working with Sullivan and Tyler to prepare alternatives for President
and Secretary on their return. Meanwhile, they will probably wish to
discuss the matter together. (Message from Lodge)
(Draft answer to Lodge from the President follows.)
"Your 1606 has been relayed to me in California. Dean Rusk and I
will talk about it here. Let me say at once that we entirely agree with
the purpose of your recommendation and that the problem is simply to
find the right ways and means of getting the French to understand the
damage done by their current position. Ambassador Bohlen has tried
repeatedly on this, but I agree with you that we must leave no stone
unturned in this effort."/4/
/4/The reply as it was approved in slightly
different form reads as follows:
"Your 1606 has been relayed to me in
California. Let me say at once that Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bohlen
have probed the French repeatedly to impress upon them futility and
danger of empty talk of neutralization of South Viet Nam. We will keep
at the French end of it and wish to be informed of any evidence local
French activity cutting across our efforts."
"We must expend every effort and mobilize
every resource to get Viet Nam strong enough to be independent and
feared by any aggressor. We believe that your leadership can make this
the driving zeal of every American working with the Vietnamese and that
a dedicated and united effort on the American side can inspire them and
impress Hanoi with the danger of pursuing its present course."
(Telegram CAP 64058, February 22; Department of State, Central Files,
PER-Taylor, Maxwell)
61. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for
Vietnam (Sullivan) to the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, February 25, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET N. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson
and Rostow.
Mr. Read has asked for my comments on Walt Rostow's paper entitled,
"Habana and Hanoi."/2/ You will
appreciate that I have no competence to make any observations on the
Venezuela-Cuba situation and will therefore address my remarks
exclusively to the corollary problem which we face in Viet Nam.
/2/ Rostow's paper, February 22, dealt
primarily with potential U.S. responses to the discovery of Cuban
weapons in Venezuela. Rostow suggested that after reconnaissance and a
leaflet drop by U.S. aircraft, Venezuelan military aircraft attack a
Cuban target as a reprisal. Rostow then drew a parallel with Vietnam as
follows:
"The same principle might be applied in
North Viet Nam; that is, if our first overt acts of violence in the
north were against targets directly related to North Viet Nam aggression
against the south (for example, the Vinh radio station), we could share
in the warning leaflet drop, ride high-cover and deal with any
escalation, while the South Viet Nam air force would actually attack the
chosen target or targets. Once again, this would dramatize the principle
at work; be consistent with the notion that our objective is to help the
South Vietnamese defend their independence, and that we were merely
protectors of that principle, in conformance with the 1954 treaty; and
make it somewhat easier for Mao to keep out of the act; although, once
again, we cannot go into this without being prepared for
escalation."
Rostow also thought that military action
against Cuba might "carry enough conviction in Hanoi and elsewhere
that the mere massing of our forces in Southeast Asia would, against
that background, be a credible demonstration that we were prepared to
act against the north." (Ibid., S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam)
First, as I know Mr. Rostow agrees, action against North Viet Nam can
never be a substitute for the hard, grubby job of routing out the Viet
Cong in the areas where they have established themselves in the South.
Despite the fact that they have control, direction, and a certain amount
of supply from the North, the Viet Cong, especially in the Delta areas,
have a sustaining strength of their own. Therefore, any action which
might be taken against the North must be designed to bring the problem
in the South within manageable dimensions and not in the vain hope that
it can be eliminated purely by pressure on Hanoi.
Secondly, it seems to me that we have to give explicit and active
attention to the Soviets. If we propose any moves in North Viet Nam, we
should at the same time consider how we can neutralize Soviet reaction.
I feel, without having gone into this in detail, that such
neutralization might require a fairly broad "peace offensive"
erected against the Soviets on matters nearest to the heart, such as
Germany, trade, credits, etc. In other words, if we are going to produce
a reaction from the North Vietnamese and the Chinese, we should at the
same time be actively dangling before the Soviets some reasons for them
to look the other way.
Therefore it would seem to me hardly propitious for us to consider
simultaneous action in North Viet Nam and in Cuba, no matter how
thoroughly we attempt to dissemble either event as being of indigenous
origin. Soviet prestige is very actively engaged in Cuba, not only in
its confrontation with the U.S. but also in its conflict with the
Chinese. Therefore any prospects we might have of deflecting Soviet
attention from a more active policy in North Viet Nam would, in my
opinion, be seriously compromised by engaging the Soviets simultaneously
in the Caribbean.
I believe that if we decide upon more active measures with respect to
both Hanoi and Habana, we should undertake them in separate sequence.
and with very carefully tailored parallel steps in other directions.
W. H. Sullivan
62. Editorial Note
At a news conference on February 29, 1966, President Johnson
announced that William P. Bundy was replacing Roger Hilsman as Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The President also answered
questions on Vietnam. For the complete transcript of the news
conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pages 322-329. Bundy became
Assistant Secretary-designate on March 10 and was approved by the Senate
on March 16.
63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Vietnam/1/
Washington, February 29, 1964--8:43 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy and
Rusk and cleared and initialed by Rusk. Attached to a copy of this
telegram at the Johnson Library is a note from Read to Bundy indicating
that this telegram "is the substance of what the Secretary and the
President agreed to at lunch today." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV)
340. For Ambassador from Secretary. Re your 1601./2/
As result your telegram, we requested Ambassador Bohlen to submit his
advice as to what we might usefully say to DeGaulle and urged that every
effort be made to comply with your request.
/2/This reference is in error and should be to
either telegram 1606, Document 59 or to telegram 1613 from Saigon,
February 24, in which Lodge reported information from a "very
authoritative source that GVN intends to break off relations with France
because they think France is going to recognize Hanoi and break with GVN,
and they want to beat them to it." In telegram 1613, Lodge again
suggested that de Gaulle be convinced to issue a brief public statement
saying that his earlier calls for neutralism in Southeast Asia did not
apply to the present time. A de Gaulle statement of this kind would, in
Lodge's opinion, prevent the potential
break in relations between South Vietnam and France and discourage
neutralist tendencies in South Vietnam which were sapping the war
effort. (Department of State, Central Files, POL FR-VIET S)
Telegram 1601 from Saigon, February 20,
reported on a ceremonial call by Lodge, Felt, and Harkins on General
Minh. (Ibid., POL 15-1 VIET S; published in Declassified Documents,
1975, 216B.
Bohlen has now replied,/3/ stating that
in his view the most effective approach in Paris at present is through
Couve de Murville, and we are now instructing him to conduct such an
approach along the lines you suggest, especially to see whether a public
statement clarifying French policy in Viet-Nam is possible. If this
approach does not succeed, Bohlen suggests that he should come back here
for consultation. President is authorizing Bohlen to approach Couve as
he recommends, and depending on Couve's response we will consider
further aspects of Bohlen's proposal.
/3/ In telegram 4061 from Paris, February 26.
In addition to recommending an approach through Couve de Murville,
Bohlen stated that going through de Gaulle would only produce vague and
ambiguous statements and would convince de Gaulle that he had forced
the United States to throw itself on his mercy. Bohlen also said that de
Gaulle did not have an operational or general plan for a neutralized
Vietnam and might even be considering temporary Communist control of all
Vietnam from which a Yugoslavia-like Vietnam would emerge. (Department
of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Herve Alphand requested to see me today and affirmed (a) France is
not engaged in conspiracy in Southeast Asia against US effort, (b)
France remains solidly anti-communist and this applies to Southeast
Asia, (c) France does not wish to see military effort in South Viet-Nam
fail, (d) There is no understanding between Paris and Peiping regarding
Southeast Asia, (e) France wishes to keep in closest consultation with
US on Southeast Asian matters./4/
/4/The memorandum of conversation of this
meeting, February 28, 3:30 p.m., is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of
Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
Clearly we must evaluate this in light of further discussions with
French, and implications of some of their recent actions and statements.
Let me repeat that we share your sense of urgency about improving
French public position.
Rusk
64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the
United Kingdom/1/
Washington, March 1, 1964--6:30 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted and
approved by Rusk and cleared with Tyler, Green, and Sullivan.
5534. Please pass following message from Secretary to Foreign
Secretary:
"Thank you very much for your message of February 29 about South
Viet-Nam."/2/
/2/ The message asked for clarification of
press stories that the United States was contemplating some form of
offensive policy toward North Vietnam and asked for "some advance
inkling" of U.S. plans and intentions so that the British
Government could concert with the United States on a line to take in
public. (Ibid.)
"Let me say at once that we will keep in closest touch with you
about further developments in that area. The Viet Cong have obviously
attempted to take maximum advantage of changes of government in Saigon
and the dislocations which these changes inevitably produce. Whether
this increased effort on their part can be sustained over any period of
time is not yet clear but there is no doubt that there is a
deterioration of morale and effectiveness on the South Viet-Nam side.
McNamara's visit will attempt to sort out just where the problems are
and what might be done to deal with them."
"As we see it there are three broad alternatives before us in
South Viet-Nam. We could withdraw and leave Southeast Asia to the
communists. We could continue on our present course and do everything
possible to assist the South Viet-Namese to win their own war. We could
escalate the war by positive and direct military pressures on Hanoi. I
can assure you that the second course is the one we greatly prefer. We
cannot adopt the first course, with its calamitous results for the
entire free world, and the third course is obviously one which would be
turned to with the greatest reluctance."
"We are not convinced that the second course has exhausted its
possibilities. We shall do everything we can to make it succeed.
Unfortunately, there is not the sense of solidarity in the free world
which would give this course the greatest chance of success. The
recognition of Peiping by Paris clearly signals to Peiping that their
course of militancy pays dividends. The talk of neutralization is phony,
given the fact that there is not the slightest indication that North
Viet-Nam is interested in breaking away from the communist camp. If
neutralization simply means that the US abandons its support of South
VietNam, then neutralization is a formula for a communist takeover of
Southeast Asia. We have repeatedly said to the other side that if they
want to get American forces out of Southeast Asia the way to do it is to
leave their neighbors alone."
"I should like to put to you the dividends of concentrating very
hard on Laos at this point. If the Geneva Accords of 1962 were to be
fully implemented, the situation in South Viet-Nam would be drastically
improved. In Laos we have a firm and flat commitment from the Soviet
Union as well as solemn commitments from Hanoi and Peiping. Surely on
this even Paris can act with complete solidarity with you and us and
other free world countries. The Viet Minh presence in Laos and the free
use of Laos as an avenue of infiltration into South VietNam are
unacceptable violations of the Accords of 1962. Perhaps you could
stimulate Paris to give forceful and public support to those Accords and
to make it quite clear that all of us in the free world are determined
on performance. I feel that we in Washington are in a position to insist
upon this because, as you will recall, we went a long way to meet Paris
in working out the Accords of 1962 and in accepting and supporting
Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister. I can tell you that we are much
concerned about attitudes expressed by Ambassador Millet who seems to
think that General Phouma is the problem and that Souvanna Phouma ought
to make his peace at any price with the Pathet Lao. This I suppose is
consistent with the view expressed to us since 1961 by Paris that France
will not commit a single soldier to Southeast Asia."
"In any event, the purpose of this message is to let you know
that we shall certainly keep in touch before any new or important
decisions are made about courses of action in Southeast Asia other than
those on which we are now embarked."
Rusk
65. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
Defense (McNamara)/1/
JCSM-168-64
Washington, March 2, 1964.
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 092 Vietnam. Top Secret;
Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Removal of Restrictions for Air and Ground Cross-Border Operations
1. By JCSM-136-64, dated 18 February 1964, subject: "Vietnam and
Southeast Asia (U),"/2/ the Joint
Chiefs of Staff forwarded recommendations for certain steps to be taken
immediately to revitalize the counterinsurgency campaign in South
Vietnam. That memorandum advised that other actions were also under
study, among which was the subject removal of existing restrictions
related to ground and air cross-border operations. This memorandum
contains the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
that subject.
/2/ Document 51.
2. While our available hard intelligence does not reveal the exact
dimensions of the infiltration of men and materials into South Vietnam
from the North, and the true extent to which the Viet Cong and their
North Vietnamese supporters are utilizing sanctuaries in Laos and
Cambodia, there is mounting evidence that these are of such proportions
as to constitute an increasingly important factor in the war. Modern
weapons of Chinese communist origin, including recoilless rifles and
quadruple-mounted heavy machine guns, are appearing in the hands of the
Viet Cong in South Vietnam in increasing numbers, partially offsetting
the tactical advantage we have derived heretofore from the use of air
mobility and armored personnel carriers. Viet Cong military capabilities
are growing significantly in terms of well trained, well armed, and well
directed hard core units, indicating the extent and effectiveness of the
support being provided by Hanoi in terms of arms, equipment, trained
cadre, and operational direction. There is evidence that small Viet Cong
units have used Cambodia as a sanctuary for a considerable period of
time. Additionally, there has occurred recently an incident wherein a
battalion-sized Viet Cong unit, several hundred strong, after making a
devastating attack, withdrew into their inviolable sanctuary in
Cambodia. All our experience in counterinsurgency indicates that when
the insurgents enjoy the advantage of such sanctuaries and support
across international borders, their elimination will be a most
difficult, if not impossible, task.
3. In the face of the serious menace to our ultimate victory
represented by the above, we continue to operate under the limitations
of self-imposed restrictions. These restrictions are outlined in
Appendix A hereto./3/ Their effect is to
deny to ourselves and our South Vietnamese Allies the essential means to
satisfy urgent military requirements for interdiction of infiltration
routes, pursuit, and destruction of enemy forces who take refuge in
their sanctuaries across the borders.
/3/ Not printed.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the time has come to lift
the restrictions which limit the effectiveness of our military
operations. Certain military operations across the borders of Laos and
Cambodia are considered essential to successful prosecution of war.
Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that authority be
sought for the conduct of operations as described in Appendix B hereto/4/
which have been proposed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific. An analysis
of the military benefits to be gained versus the possible risks involved
is also contained in Appendix B.
/4/ In Appendix B, not printed, the JCS
recommended that the South Vietnamese adopt a policy of hot pursuit of
hostile Viet Cong forces into the Demilitarized Zone, Cambodia, and
Laos, and that U.S. advisers be allowed to accompany them; also that the
2d U.S. Air Division be allowed hot pursuit
on the same basis. In addition, the JCS recommended low-level
reconnaissance of Laos and Cambodia by U.S. aircraft, encouragement of
overt operations by South Vietnam against the Viet Cong in Laos (with
U.S. advisers and cooperation with friendly Lao forces), and covert
ground operations into Cambodia.
5. Since the actions considered here represent only one segment of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations in relation to revitalizing
the Vietnamese campaign, it is suggested that this paper be held and
considered in connection with the other papers bearing on the Vietnamese
campaign.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor/5/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/5/ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped
signature.
66. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
Defense (McNamara)/1/
JCSM-174-64
Washington, March 2, 1964.
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Military Plans Against NVN, March
1964. Top Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
1. This memorandum responds to your memorandum, dated 21 February
1964, subject as above./2/ For purposes of
clarity, each question in your memorandum has been repeated and
underlined,/3/ followed by the answer
thereto. The response to the separate portions of your memorandum
follow:
/2/ Document 57.
/3/ Printed here in italic type.
a. The over-all capabilities of the DRV and of the Chinese
Communists for military action, with specific reference to:
(1) The types and magnitudes of actions which are possible, taking
into account current Communist logistic capabilities.
(2) The geographic areas within which such actions might be
undertaken.
(3) The time period within which the enemy forces could be brought
to bear.
(4) The enemy capability for concurrent reactions, as for example,
reactions both in Southeast Asia and in Korea and/or Taiwan offshore
islands.
Answer: Over-all capabilities of the DRV and ChiCom follow:
(a) It is currently estimated that 13 ChiCom infantry divisions, less
heavy artillery and armor, plus nine DRV divisions could be logistically
supported during the dry season (November-May) in initial moves against
Southeast Asian countries. (b) It is currently estimated that the ChiCom
Air Force, by redeploying and operating from airfields in South China,
Hainan, and North Vietnam, could make available about 400 jet fighters
and 125 jet light bombers for operations in Southeast Asia.
(c) The ChiCom naval capabilities include harassing tactics by PT
boats, mining operations, and possibly some submarine activity (four to
six maintained on station).
(d) With regard to logistic support of DRV/ChiCom aggression in
Southeast Asia, the onset of the wet season will bring about a
considerable reduction in the capability to support large-scale
offensive operations. Further study will be necessary to determine
specifics.
(e) The ChiComs have the capability to launch limited ground and/or
air attacks concurrently in widely separated areas such as Southeast
Asia, South Korea, and Taiwan. However, logistic limitations severely
restrict their ability to sustain a major land, sea, and air campaign in
more than one area. By concentrating their efforts in any geographic
area, they could mount a major campaign comprising land, sea, and air
forces as indicated in Appendix C. /4/
/4/ Not printed.
b. What military actions against North Vietnam, employing air and
naval power, but not ground forces beyond the scale of small-scale
raids, might be:
(1) undertaken by the GVN and within the plausible range of GVN
capabilities;
(2) assertedly undertaken by the GVN, even if outside the
plausible range of GVN capabilities;
(3) undertaken by the US without public acknowledgment;
(4) undertaken by the US along with, or after, a public
declaration by the US of an intent to exert military pressure upon the
DRV with a view to forcing a termination of the insurrection in the
South?
Answer: Military pressures can be applied to North Vietnam in
the form of air strikes, amphibious raids, sabotage operations, and a
naval blockade. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) have a very
limited capability to conduct air strikes, amphibious raids, and
sabotage operations in North Vietnam. By the utilization of
nonattributable air support, e.g., Farmgate-type operations, the VNAF
air effort could be intensified and expanded for conducting air strikes
against LOCs, military installations, and industrial targets. With
respect to Farmgate, augmentation with the B-57 jet aircraft, as
recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will greatly enhance its
capability. The introduction of US air and naval elements, even though
not openly acknowledged, would permit further selective destruction of
the above targets. Openly announcing US intentions would provide more
freedom of action for using military force in achieving clearly stated
limited objectives. More detailed information is contained in Appendix
A. 4 Additionally, a scenario (Appendix B) 4 has been developed which
outlines those actions necessary to the accomplishment of a program of
increasing pressures against North Vietnam.
c. What targets would be most effective to attack from the
standpoint of:
(1) specific effect on DRV capability against Laos, South Vietnam,
and Thailand;
(2) interdiction of main communications routes between the DRV and
Communist China, plus interdiction of sea communications into North
Vietnam;
(3) more generalized target patterns designed to inflict damage on
key installations in the DRV but to minimize the effect on the civilian
population as a whole?
Answer: Targets, the destruction of or damage to which would
have the most effect on DRV operations against Laos, South Vietnam, and
Thailand, include airfields, POL storage facilities, bridges, and
military installations. Interdiction attack in Laos and North Vietnam
would assist in reducing support to the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh/Viet
Cong. In addition, sustained interdiction attacks of specified railroad
facilities, roads, and water routes would disrupt ChiCom support of the
DRV. The destruction of selected industrial facilities and power plants
will further reduce DRY's war-supporting capability. Targets have been
selected in terms of key installations, minimizing destruction to the
population as a whole. The treatment of target systems is contained in
Appendix A. Annex to Appendix A lists representative targets by category
and order of attack within category.
d. Assuming that, in response to the attacks upon the DRV, the DRV
and/or the ChiComs undertake large-scale troop movements over the border
into one or more of:
(1) South Vietnam
(2) Laos
(3) Thailand or Burma
(4) South Korea
(5) Taiwan
What US effort, air, sea, and land, would be required to contain
such an invasion? If intelligence indicated that such a movement were
contemplated by the enemy, what actions against North Vietnam and
mainland China would be likely to deter such a response?/5/
/5/ At this point, McNamara wrote the following
note in the margin: "air strikes at 1) ChiCom airfields 2) lines of
supply. Why not assume massive use of US air both B47's & sea based
& land based in SVN."
Answer: The ChiComs/DRV would be unable to undertake
large-scale military actions in more than one area at a time due to
logistic limitations and availability of forces, although military
pressures might be exerted in several areas. US forces required to
counter aggression in each of the areas listed in your memorandum are
set forth in Appendix D./6/ In addition,
certain actions (such as making clear to the DRV and the ChiComs our
limited objectives, alerting and deploying US forces, U.S. Assessment of
the Khanh Government 115 and increasing reconnaissance programs in
pertinent areas) may deter such responses on the part of the DRV and
ChiComs. These actions are treated further in Appendix D.
/6/ Not printed.
e. In each of the circumstances in subparagraph d above, or any
likely combination of them, to what extent could the US effectively
counter such actions through air and naval responses only (without the
use of ground forces other than those presently deployed) under several
alternatives as to weapons employed?
Answer:
(a) In the broad application of land and sea based air power,
nonnuclear attacks may not cause the ChiCom/DRV to cease aggression;
however, nuclear attacks would have a far greater probability of causing
them to desist. Sea power would be most effective in the form of a
blockade, but would require imposition for a considerable time before it
would have a marked effect on ChiCom/DRV aggressive operations. Other
naval actions such as an amphibious feint could be used to supplement
the effect of the blockade. Use of classified conventional munitions in
an air and naval response would tend to increase the effectiveness of
such response on a sortie-by-sortie basis. However, there is relatively
little advantage to the use of classified munitions against hard
targets. An expanded treatment is contained in Appendix D.
(b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasize that in initiating actions
against the DRV there must be a readiness and willingness on the part of
the United States to follow through with appropriate contingency plans
to counter DRV/ChiCom reaction as required. Also listed in Appendix D
are certain related military measures which should be accomplished to
improve the US military readiness posture to execute contingency plans.
The most important of these is the deployment of US air strike and air
defense units to Thailand and South Vietnam as necessary. An attack
carrier strike force is available to move within striking distance of
North Vietnam.
f. Assuming that ChiCom reaction included air action from mainland
bases (either against SVN or other air bases, or supporting aircraft
carriers), to what extent could this air threat be countered by: actions
against enemy aircraft only or selective attacks against Chinese bases
and air defenses utilizing conventional or alternatively low yield
nuclear weapons employed to minimize both collateral damage and fallout?
Answer: With respect to air defense, the air defense
capabilities in Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea are inadequate
to cope with saturation attacks. Accordingly, enemy air should not be
permitted to operate from sanctuaries, but should be attacked at the
sources. However, occasional air attacks on Saigon and similar key
localities must be anticipated. Additional study is required to provide
specific data requested in your memorandum.
g. What modifications must be made in existing contingency plans
in order to provide for US reactions which depend primarily upon air
activities rather than the intervention of substantial US ground forces?
Answer:
(a) CINCPAC operation plans provide for the application of military
power against the DRV and ChiComs. These are:
i. Plan 33--provides for overt employment of US forces in retaliatory
attacks against North Vietnam.
ii. Plan 34-A--provides for RVNAF military operations in North
Vietnam.
iii. Plan 99--provides for overt employment of US forces in military
operations designed to stabilize the situation in Laos and South
Vietnam.
iv. Plan 94--provides for overt operations employing US forces in air
strikes against a ChiCom nuclear production facility.
v. Plan 32--provides for the over-all defense of Southeast Asia./7/
/7/ Regarding OPLAN 34A, see footnote 2,
Document 4. The text of OPLAN 99-64 is in the Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Southeast Asia, Vol. 11, Memos (B),
5/64-6/64. OPLAN 32-64 is ibid., Memos (A), 5/64-6/64. Texts of OPLAN
32-64 and OPLAN 94-64 are in the National Archives and Records
Administration. RG 218, JCS Files.
(b) While CINCPAC has numerous plans which call for substantial US
air effort in conjunction with the intervention of US ground forces,
there are no specific plans based solely on air and naval responses
which apply to all of the situations contained in this paper. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff will direct the preparation of such plans as required.
h. The view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the courses of
action that would most likely bring about cessation of DRV support for
operations in South Vietnam and Laos.
Answer:
(a) US intentions and resolve to extend the war as necessary should
be made clear immediately by overt military actions against the DRV.
(b) Military actions should be part of a coordinated diplomatic,
military, and psychological program directed at deterring the enemy and
preparing the world for extension of the war.
(c) We should prepare military actions, one in the form of a sudden
blow for shock effect, another in the form of ascending order of
severity with increasing US participation; the purpose of both being to
bring about cessation of DRV support of the insurgency.
(d) Initial military preparations should provide for:
i. Overt demonstrations of US intentions through US low level aerial
reconnaissance over Laos and North Vietnam.
ii. Expansion of RVN activities including Farmgate aircraft, into
North Vietnam by: (Outlined in Appendix A.)
1. Air strikes
2. Amphibious raids
3. Sabotage
4. Harassment of shipping and fishing activities.
(e) Preparation should be initiated by the US and GVN for:
i. Increasing the intensity of efforts against the DRV by:
1. Armed reconnaissance along the principal supply routes from DRV to
Laos.
2. Destruction of:
(i) Highway bridges along the principal supply routes from DRV to
Laos.
(ii) Military targets in DRV and Laos which directly support the
insurgency.
(iii) Airfields in DRV which are used for aerial resupply to Laos.
(iv) POL installations and major LOC facilities between China and DRV
in North Vietnam.
(v) Industrial base targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.
3. Mine laying in selected areas.
4. Conducting cross-border operations.
5. Undertaking a maritime blockade of DRV
2. An assessment of enemy reactions to the military actions listed
above indicates that the Chinese communists view Laos and South Vietnam
as DRV problems. It is unlikely that the ChiComs would introduce
organized ground units in significant numbers into the DRV, Laos, or
Cambodia except as part of an over-all campaign against all of Southeast
Asia. They might offer the DRV fighter aircraft, AAA units, and
volunteers. They would assume an increased readiness posture and ChiCom
aircraft might be committed to the defense of North Vietnam. The Soviets
would probably be highly concerned over possible expansion of the
conflict. To the extent that Moscow believed the Hanoi and Peiping
regimes in jeopardy, Sino-Soviet differences would tend to submerge. It
is believed that Moscow would initiate no action which, in the Soviet
judgment, would increase the likelihood of nuclear war. The appraisal of
possible enemy reaction is contained in Appendix C.
3. The foregoing discussion provides the preliminary judgments of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as you have requested; however, they desire to
reaffirm the view expressed by memorandum to you, dated 22 January 1964,/8/
concerning the overriding importance to the security interests of the
United States of preventing the loss of RVN. The North Vietnamese
direction and support of the insurgency in the RVN is one of the
controlling factors in the continuation of the war. Accordingly,
intensified operations are warranted and essential at this time to
convince both the DRV and ChiCom leadership of our resolution to
prevail.
/8/ See Document 17.
4. It is recognized that the program of intensified operations
contemplated herein involves a change in US policy. Nevertheless, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that those actions described in
paragraph 1h above be approved as a basis for discussion and planning
with US and GVN officials in your forthcoming visit to Southeast Asia./9/
In making this recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that
even if success attends our efforts to cause the DRV to desist from
aiding the Viet Cong, the latter can by their own efforts sustain the
insurgency for an indeterminate period at a reduced level.
/9/ At this point, McNamara wrote in the
margin: "OK, fuller use of massive U.S. air power in lieu of US gd
forces."
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
67.Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense/1/
Washington, March 2, 1964.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. No classification marking. In a
covering memorandum, McNamara informed the President that this was the
2-page South Vietnam summary which he had requested.
SUMMARY STATEMENT ON SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The Problem
In Southeast Asia today the Free World is facing an attempt by the
Communists of North Vietnam to subvert and overthrow the non-Communist
government of South Vietnam. North Vietnam has been providing direction,
control, and trained cadres for the 25,000 Viet Cong guerrillas and the
60,000 to 80,000 irregulars engaged in harassment, systematic terror,
and armed attacks on the people of South Vietnam.
I
Our purpose in South Vietnam is to help the Vietnamese maintain their
independence. We are providing the training and the logistic support
which they cannot provide themselves. We will continue to provide that
support as long as it is required. As our training missions are
completed, certain of our troops can be withdrawn. In December 1000 men
came home. This group included, for example, two military police units
whose airport guard duty had been taken over by Vietnamese trained for
that purpose.
3. The Current Situation
In the past four months, there have been three governments in South
Vietnam. Each of them has appointed its own cabinet members, its own
provincial governors, and its own senior military leaders. The Viet Cong
have taken advantage of the confusion resulting from these changes by
raising the level and intensity of their attacks. They have been using
larger forces and more powerful weapons.
This increased activity has had a good deal of success. Strategic
hamlets formerly under government protection have been lost to the Viet
Cong; roads formerly open to free movement have been closed. On the
other hand, Viet Cong fatalities have been high. The unfavorable rate of
3 or 4 Viet Cong killed for every Vietnamese has continued. Although
15,000 to 20,000 Viet Cong have been killed during the past 12 months,
their strength has remained approximately level through receipt of
cadres from North Vietnam and recruits from South Vietnam.
4. Alternative Courses of Action
At least four alternatives are open to us today:
A. We can withdraw from South Vietnam. Without our support the
government will be unable to counter the aid from the North for the Viet
Cong. Vietnam will collapse, and the ripple effect will be felt
throughout Southeast Asia, endangering the independent governments of
Thailand and Malaysia, and extending as far as India on the west,
Indonesia on the south, and the Philippines on the east.
B. We can seek a formula that will "neutralize" South
Vietnam. But any such formula will only lead in the end to the same
result as withdrawing support. We all know the communists' attitude that
"What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable." True
neutralization would have to extend to North Vietnam as well, and this
possibility has been specifically rejected by the North Vietnamese and
Chinese Communist governments.
C. We can send the Marines and other U.S. ground forces against the
sources of the aggression. But if we do, our men may well be bogged down
in a long war against numerically superior North Vietnamese and ChiCom
forces.
D. We can continue our present policy of providing training and
logistical support for the South Vietnam forces. This policy has not
failed. We propose to continue it.
Secretary McNamara's trip to South Vietnam will provide us with an
opportunity to appraise the future prospects for this policy, and the
further alternatives that may be available to us.
68. Memorandum Prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence
(McCone)/1/
Washington, March 3, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Bundy Files,
WPB Special Papers. Secret. There was no designated recipient of this
memorandum indicated on the source text, but a handwritten note by
William Bundy reads: "McCone Draft. Bundy Working."
MEMORANDUM ON VIETNAM
Following my trip to Saigon in late December, 1963, I concluded that
while the problems of accomplishing the U.S. objectives in South Vietnam
are not insurmountable they are indeed formidable and there were more
reasons to be pessimistic about obtaining our objectives than there were
reasons to be optimistic./2/
/2/ See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963,
vol. IV, pp. 735-738.
Since then Khanh's coup has removed Generals Don, Kim, Xuan and Dinh.
This has precipitated a decided change in the situation, necessitating a
reassessment of the outlook.
In making such a reassessment the following areas must be considered:
1. The South Vietnamese Political Situation.
a. General Khanh has demonstrated that he is an able military leader.
He is young (36 years old), relatively inexperienced. He was a
lieutenant in 1954 and void of any political experience. He is unknown
to the people and hence there is no evidence of strong popular support
or great confidence in his leadership on the part of the people. We note
considerable gossip among the people with whom the Station is in contact
indicating lack of confidence in Khanh and his government.
b. General Khanh has appointed General Big Minh as Chief of State and
three Vice Prime Ministers. General Minh is little more than a
figurehead if that and has indicated some residual unhappiness at having
been displaced by Khanh. Of the three Vice Prime Ministers, Nguyen Ton
Hoan is a leader of the Dai Viet Party with a strong political
motivation, but has been out of the country since 1954 until January of
this year. Nguyen Xuan Oanh is a technician in economics and finance. He
has spent most of the past 18 years out of his country and returned only
this year. Do Mau is a general, formerly Chief of the Military Security
Services and attache in Paris, but has little background in the cultural
and social affairs he is supposed to supervise.
c. In addition he has appointed a slate of ministers. These have been
drawn from various political and religious groups and with some
attention to their geographic origin in an attempt to include most
currents of opinion. Due to the lack of experience of the ministers,
however, and their varying backgrounds, we cannot expect the cabinet to
be especially strong. In addition some able men were not selected
because of prior associations with Diem-Nhu, Minh-Don or the French and
some others have not wished to serve because of the uncertainty as to
the future of this government. We are already receiving reports of
planning for new coupe, especially from the political circles of the Dai
Viet party. We conclude that the prospects for a strong government are
not bright.
d. In the provinces and districts there is both confusion and lack of
direction. Some chiefs appointed by Minh have been removed, others do
not know their future. Most are awaiting guidance from the new
government in Saigon. Therefore, there is no strong political direction
at the level of province and district chiefs.
e. As a result of what appears to be a weak and ineffective central
government and a confused situation at the level of provinces and
districts, many essential programs such as the strategic hamlet program
and various civic action programs have come to a virtual halt. This is
giving the VC an opportunity to fill this vacuum with their own
political and military action with the result that many areas have been
lost to the government and there is a growing feeling that the VC may be
the wave of the future.
All of the above leads to the conclusion that the situation is worse
now than it was in December and therefore I am more pessimistic of the
future of the American cause in South Vietnam than my December report
reflects.
2. South Vietnam Military Organization
a. The organization still exists in the proportions built up by
Diem-Nhu and taken over by Minh-Don. However, there is some evidence
that morale is low because of constant changes in leadership at the
senior and intermediate levels. This situation might change as the new
commanders assume control.
The situation is particularly bad within the Security Forces in
Saigon. There have been three different commanders of the Saigon Police
and Security Forces in the last few months. We are receiving reports of
increased VC activities in Saigon itself. Lack of morale in the military
and lack of confidence in Khanh's leadership is causing a new round of
coup plotting and also rumors of plans to assassinate Khanh. Either
might happen. Khanh is being warned of these plans and plots and is said
to be taking precautions. However, his success is dependent upon his
mastering the role of leader of the country and being accepted as such
by officers at all levels, as well as by the civilian, political and
private leadership.
From the above I conclude that the military situation, bad in
December, has worsened and the problem of reversing the trend is
formidable. A continuation of the present nature of GVN and U.S.
military and political actions does not appear to me to be enough to
reverse current trends toward defeat.
4.[sic] Viet Cong Activities
Militarily the Viet Cong situation has improved in the last 90 days.
They have organized 5 additional battalions, their communication network
has been improved, and there are indications that they are organizing
units into regiments. Captured equipment gives evidence that VC's now
have heavier equipment then they possessed a year ago, bazookas,
mortars, anti-aircraft, etc. Much of such heavier equipment is of
Chinese Communist origin but does not reflect any sudden great increase
of direct Chinese Communist support or presence as much of it could come
from DRV inventories. Of the smaller arms, the largest amounts are
American made (most captured but some older items infiltrated). The VC's
also use some equipment which originated in Communist China,
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The VC's appear to have substantial
supplies of arms, perhaps not the most modern, although they still
probably have a serious logistic, maintenance and ammunition problem.
VC leadership seems to be sound; their political action and terrorism
are effective, as evidenced by their ability to persuade whole areas to
abandon the strategic hamlet program and turn in their arms as a price
for pacification.
There is a continuing flow of evidence that VC operations are being
directed from North Vietnam, leadership is being supplied from the north
as well as war materiel and trained cadres. However it is evident that a
very substantial part of the VC organization, strength and support is
indigenous to South Vietnam.
I can only conclude from my observations that both militarily and
politically the VC are gaining at the moment.
5. United States Operations
1. The military operations conducted by MACV follow the pattern of
equipping, training and advising the RVN to get out and fight the war.
The Korean situation was different; American forces fought and inspired
the Koreans to do likewise. In Vietnam we have had limited experience
with this technique but it seems to have been favorable among the
Special Forces. There are many causes for Vietnamese reluctance to rush
out and fight stemming from the long history, some doubt as to the
eventual outcome, many early abuses and the lack of any strong appeal
from the GVN. Whether American participation can overcome this or may
intensify xenophobic feelings about the Whiteman's war is not clear. It
is clear that the present course is not successful.
The various units which were trained for the purpose of defending
their own strategic hamlets should be used in this way, that is, as a
defensive organization and not as offensive units. They are neither
trained nor capable of offensive operations. The concept of the civilian
defense units should be expanded, along the "oil stain"
principle of the Pacification Plans.
Intelligence has been spotty. There has been submersion of bad news
and an overstatement of good news. For the past year we have been
misinformed about conditions in Vietnam. The entire intelligence
apparatus is undergoing review and reorganization. It is essential that
this be completed promptly and that there be a very close liaison
between the J-2 organization, dealing with enemy capabilities, and the
J-3, dealing with RVN capabilities and plans.
I conclude that our military operations in South Vietnam have not
been as successful as we assumed up to last December. I think the whole
concept has to be reviewed. It is the only time in our history that we
have put such a large force into a country for the purpose of telling
others to go out and fight. It is conceivable that we have unwittingly
lifted the responsibility for the success of the battle from the
shoulders of the South Vietnamese onto our own shoulders without
accepting combat responsibility. In other words we may have gone beyond
a MAAG operation, but have not selected the best way to carry out a
combat operation in Vietnamese circumstances.
6. New Courses of Action
In view of the fragile political situation and the deteriorating
military situation, one asks the question, "What should we
do?" The courses of action are these:
1. Immediately develop a program which will remove us from South
Vietnam by negotiating a neutralist "solution". In doing so we
must recognize that such a negotiation would lead to South Vietnam
falling to the Communists. With this, we could expect others in
Southeast Asia to follow "The Domino Theory". Laos would
probably fall quickly. Burma and Cambodia would certainly move closer to
Peiping and we would need considerable treasure, effort and luck to keep
Thailand from slipping away through accommodation or Communist
subversion. On the other hand, this might be inevitable if the situation
in South Vietnam should be even now beyond the point of no return. The
evidence to date, gloomy as it is, does not bear out this prospect as
one cannot say that Khanh and company with new and better U.S. support
of various kinds cannot develop enough dynamism to hold the Viet Cong to
give the GVN and the U.S. time and opportunity to begin turning the
tide. We should also recognize that DRV resources and strength are
limited and that while they will undoubtedly continue their outside
instigation and steady support of the Viet Cong, this prospect is not
one of a sudden escalation of their effort.
2. We can continue as we are now doing, restricting ourselves to
actions of the same type we have been engaged in. This to me does not
seem to be productive. 15,000 or 16,000 Americans have been engaged now
for two years training and directing the South Vietnamese. Likewise the
South Vietnamese are supplied with all of the arms and ammunition they
can use; therefore an increasing quantity of materiel, except in certain
special items, would not be productive. Nonetheless, present trends are
down and will probably remain so if no great changes occur in either GVN
performance or U.S. techniques.
3. We could greatly increase the U.S. military and political
commitment in Vietnam and surrounding areas and take a far greater
direct role in the operations. This would be accomplished by a series
of actions to step up the dynamism and effectiveness of Khanh's
government and its programs. This would require a very direct input into
the political posture of the Khanh government and its machinery at the
national level and a great increase in our counterinsurgency advice and
support at the local levels. As an element of this program we might add
the placing of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam to secure the Saigon
base and strengthen Khanh's government against possible coupe. These
moves might have some negative effects in terms of highlighting the
issue of white-faced intervention but the overall result would appear to
be more positive than negative.
4. We could carry out dramatic operations against North Vietnam,
theoretically non-attributable but actually well identified as coming
from South Vietnam with U.S. support. The consequences of this type of
action must be examined but, more important, we must make a judgment as
to whether action of this type would accomplish the U.S. objectives in
South Vietnam. It seems obvious to me that unless the Khanh government
is strengthened in South Vietnam, then carrying the action into North
Vietnam would not guarantee victory. It might stop the North Vietnamese
supply for a short time. It would not stop the Viet Cong military or
political action. It would not guarantee victory. If, on the other hand,
the Khanh government can be strengthened, then actions against North
Vietnam would be warranted although the cost and risk to the United
States would be great. There would be danger that the war would
escalate, either through large scale DRV operations into South Vietnam
or Laos, Chinese Communist support in these areas, threats of Chinese
Communist air strikes against Saigon or U.S. naval forces, or Soviet
naval convoying of shipping into the DRV. We should of course be
prepared for such contingencies in undertaking any course of extreme
pressures against North Vietnam, although I incline to the view that the
Communist powers would not in fact feel that such extreme reactions were
either necessary or worth the risks involved. I do not think that any
extreme U.S. pressures against the DRV would materially affect
Sino-Soviet relations.
I am inclined to believe that if the political climate in South
Vietnam is proper, then it is worth taking these risks, as the loss of
the game in South Vietnam would have too serious consequences to be
acceptable. On the other hand, if the Khanh government remains fragile,
if the people remain disinterested, and disaffected, and we are
continually confronted with coup plotting and the consequent hazards, if
the resentment of American presence increases, then it appears to me
that carrying the war to North Vietnam would not win the war in South
Vietnam and would cause the United States such serious problems in every
corner of the world that we should not sanction such an effort.
5. There are steps that can be taken to strengthen the Khanh
government. Some of these are:
a. The strategic hamlet program must be revitalized and attacked as
the top priority. Plans exist for the implementation of this program
according to the "oil stain" concept. The regular forces must
establish as their primary duty the reinforcement of the strategic
hamlet program according to these plans and the clearing and holding of
additional areas. The irregular forces must be supported, trained,
advised and inspired by a considerable increase in U.S. Special Forces
and AID support, possibly organized as a separate Peoples' Defense
Authority.
b. A concentrated program of political action and agitation at the
grass roots level must be established using supplied teams to conduct
such agitation, organization and motivation efforts in conjunction
with the strategic hamlet program. Additional information and civic
action efforts must be conducted in support of these teams.
c. Assistance should be obtained from the Chinese Nationalist
Government in a discreet but major scale manner. Detailed
recommendations on this point have been submitted separately./3/
/3/ Apparently a reference to an undated and
unattributed memorandum received in ISA on March 25 on possible Chinese
Nationalist aid to the South Vietnamese in South Vietnam, North Vietnam,
and the South China Sea. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330,
OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 306, 092 Vietnam) When reviewing his papers after
he left office, William Bundy noted on the source text that this idea
was "a bug with McCone."
d. An unofficial political advisor should be appointed to General
Khanh to assist him in his early efforts as Chief of Government.
Personnel having experience along these lines with Macapagal, Sarit, and
others are available within CIA. In addition to the advisor to General
Khanh appropriate advisors should be selected for other key political
leaders.
e. Operations should be conducted against Viet Cong personnel and
facilities across the Lao and Cambodia borders. In order to conduct such
operations reconnaissance both by air and ground will be necessary.
These operations should be conducted on a non-admitted (not necessarily
deniable) basis.
f. The posture of U.S. personnel in Vietnam must be one of aggressive
leadership although they might claim only an "advisory"
mission. Thus the maximum use should be made of U.S. channels,
organization and appeal to the lower ranking Vietnamese, even at the
cost of some noses out of joint at the higher ranks. Our personnel must
share the dangers of the Vietnamese peasants and fighting men and take
full responsibility for stirring them into maximum action against the
Viet Cong in their own protection and for no other purpose. Building
overall loyalty to the Saigon government should be a secondary matter,
to be sought after security is obtained, not as means thereto.
g. In our diplomatic approaches in Southeast Asia, we must establish
the strengthening of the Khanh regime and the morale of the Vietnamese
people as our primary objective. All steps in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand
and Taiwan must be taken in this context. It will be particularly
important to forcefully demonstrate our rejection of the neutralist
solution advocated by the French. This may give us problems in Cambodia
and Laos, but these would be both more manageable and of lesser gravity
than a growth of defeatism their alternatives might inspire in Vietnam.
h. Consideration should be given to the dispatch of a U.S. battle
group to the Saigon area. The ostensible mission of this group would be
to insure the security of the Saigon area as the base for operations
against the Viet Cong. Its real purpose would be the support of the
Khanh government against possible neutralist coupe. There are solid
arguments pro and con on the use of combat troops in this manner.
General Khanh's own approval would have to be obtained and his judgment
might be best on the subject.
5.[sic] With these steps we should be able to strengthen the
Khanh government enough to permit us to decide whether continuance along
that line alone will be adequate to defeat the Viet Cong or whether
these steps must be supplemented by operations against North Vietnam. In
the absence of these steps, operations against North Vietnam would in
any case not likely be worth the cost. With these steps we might be able
to win without attacking North Vietnam but we at least would have
sufficient basis to make such activities profitable.
6. The next few weeks or so are probably critical. We may find that
Khanh and South Vietnam simply don't have it, or just don't want to be
rescued by the U.S. But, if we find instead that there is still some
stretch in the situation, then victory may yet come in time. It would be
long in coming, in the best of circumstances, but we should never forget
that the DRV and Chinese Communists have their own weaknesses, which
could grow in time, and that if the peasant in South Vietnam could be
assured of his physical security for some sustained period he would no
longer actively support the Viet Cong. His support would be accelerated
if he could be convinced that in addition to security he could look
forward to social, economic and political betterment through loyalty to
the GVN.
69. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President/1/
Washington, March 4, 1964.
/1/ Source: Department of State, President's
Reading File: Lot 74 D 164. Secret; No Distribution.
SUGGESTED ITEMS FOR EVENING READING
1. French Policy in Viet-Nam--Chip Bohlen met today with Couve
in Paris and was told that France has had no military or operational
policy in Viet-Nam for the past 9 years and, therefore, is not working
against U.S. interests./2/ Couve made a
personal suggestion, that a "political objective", such as
ultimate mutual withdrawal of U.S. and Viet Cong forces, would promote
our military aims./3/ He was not suggesting
a conference, although admitting that we might have to deal with the
Chinese Communists. Couve did not respond to Bohlen's mention of a
French statement on Viet-Nam but agreed that French official silence
would be desirable.
/2/ As reported in telegrams 4165 and 4173 from
Paris, both March 4. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/3/ When the Embassy in Saigon learned of this
suggestion by Couve de Murville, it cabled the Department of State that
such a proposal revealed a "very fundamental French
misunderstanding of the true nature of the Viet Cong." In telegram
1713, March 9, the Embassy explained that the Viet Cong were
"indigenous communists" many of whom derived from the Viet
Minh cadres who remained in the south after 1954. They had to be
eliminated or won over; they could not be induced to withdraw in 1964
any more effectively than they had been in 1954. The Embassy asked that
this fact be stressed to the French Government and added that, should
South Vietnam learn that the United States was "toying with such an
idea," the effect in Vietnam would be "unfortunate."
(Ibid.) The White House copy is published in Declassified Documents,
1976, 211E.
[Here follow items 2-7 which were unrelated to Vietnam.]
Dean Rusk/4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed
signature.
III. The McNamara-Taylor Mission To
Vietnam and the McNamara Report, March 4-April 3
70. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the President, Washington, March 4, 1964/1/
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor
Papers, T-36-71. Top Secret. Drafted by Taylor.
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
4. He then opened the subject of our coming trip to Saigon and asked
what course I was inclined to recommend at this moment. I told him that,
in general, I felt our program should consist of two main parts; one, an
intensive continuation of the counterinsurgency campaign within South
Vietnam and, second, a progressive program of selective air and naval
attacks against North Vietnam using means beyond those employed in the
past. The other Chiefs expressed themselves generally in accord. They
also were of the opinion that it was unlikely that the ChiComs would
intervene in strength. However, once embarked on the program the US must
carry it to success, cost what may.
5. The President accepted the need for punishing Hanoi without
debate, but pointed to some other practical difficulties, particularly
the political ones with which he was faced. It is quite apparent that he
does not want to lose South Vietnam before next November nor does he
want to get the country into war.
6. The President is impressed with the danger of another coup. He
feels we must make General Khanh "our boy" and proclaim the
fact to all and sundry. He wants to see Khanh in the newspapers with
McNamara and Taylor holding up his arms.
7. He directed a check made on all requests from Harkins for help
since November to see if any have been rejected or significantly
curtailed. He anticipates queries from Congress on this score.
8. He asked that we initiate a State/DOD/CIA/COMUSMACV examination of
the realism of Senator Mansfield's plan for a neutralization of North
and South Vietnam. He expressed indignation over the Saigon article by
Keyes Beech dated 22 February (attached)/2/
which revealed US military thinking on an expansion of the war. He
directed me to talk to Harkins about it./3/
/2/Not attached.
/3/A handwritten note on the margin reads:
"Done, MDT, 13 March '64."
Maxwell D. Taylor/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed
signature.
71. Summary Record of the 523d Meeting of the National Security
Council, White House, Washington, March 5, 1964, 4:30 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, Tab 4. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. An
attached attendance list indicates that 23 persons attended the Vietnam
portion of the meeting.
1. Secretary McNamara's Trip to South Vietnam
Secretary McNamara gave an oral summary of what he intends to
accomplish by visiting South Vietnam. In a report which he will make
upon his return, he will comment on the current strength of the Khanh
government, the outlook for the future, and on alternative courses of
action which might be taken to improve the situation in Vietnam. He said
he would be prepared to make both an oral and a written report.
Mr. Bundy commented that the President was not being asked to make
decisions prior to the return of Secretary McNamara.
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FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
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III. The McNamara-Taylor
Mission To Vietnam and the McNamara Report, March 4-April 3
70. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the President, Washington, March 4, 1964/1/
/1/Source: National Defense University,
Taylor Papers, T-36-71. Top Secret. Drafted by Taylor.
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
4. He then opened the subject of our coming trip to Saigon
and asked what course I was inclined to recommend at this
moment. I told him that, in general, I felt our program should
consist of two main parts; one, an intensive continuation of the
counterinsurgency campaign within South Vietnam and, second, a
progressive program of selective air and naval attacks against
North Vietnam using means beyond those employed in the past. The
other Chiefs expressed themselves generally in accord. They also
were of the opinion that it was unlikely that the ChiComs would
intervene in strength. However, once embarked on the program the
US must carry it to success, cost what may.
5. The President accepted the need for punishing Hanoi
without debate, but pointed to some other practical
difficulties, particularly the political ones with which he was
faced. It is quite apparent that he does not want to lose South
Vietnam before next November nor does he want to get the country
into war.
6. The President is impressed with the danger of another
coup. He feels we must make General Khanh "our boy"
and proclaim the fact to all and sundry. He wants to see Khanh
in the newspapers with McNamara and Taylor holding up his arms.
7. He directed a check made on all requests from Harkins for
help since November to see if any have been rejected or
significantly curtailed. He anticipates queries from Congress on
this score.
8. He asked that we initiate a State/DOD/CIA/COMUSMACV
examination of the realism of Senator Mansfield's plan for a
neutralization of North and South Vietnam. He expressed
indignation over the Saigon article by Keyes Beech dated 22
February (attached)/2/ which
revealed US military thinking on an expansion of the war. He
directed me to talk to Harkins about it./3/
/2/Not attached.
/3/A handwritten note on the margin
reads: "Done, MDT, 13 March '64."
Maxwell D. Taylor/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this
typed signature.
71. Summary Record of the 523d Meeting of the National
Security Council, White House, Washington, March 5, 1964, 4:30
p.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, Tab 4. Secret. Drafted by
Bromley Smith. An attached attendance list indicates that 23
persons attended the Vietnam portion of the meeting.
1. Secretary McNamara's Trip to South Vietnam
Secretary McNamara gave an oral summary of what he intends to
accomplish by visiting South Vietnam. In a report which he will
make upon his return, he will comment on the current strength of
the Khanh government, the outlook for the future, and on
alternative courses of action which might be taken to improve
the situation in Vietnam. He said he would be prepared to make
both an oral and a written report.
Mr. Bundy commented that the President was not being asked to
make decisions prior to the return of Secretary McNamara.
Secretary Rusk said he was taking a sober view, even a
pessimistic view of developments in South Vietnam. Listing the
points of weakness in the situation in Vietnam was a way for us
to concentrate on courses of action to overcome these
weaknesses. Our attention should be concentrated on what we can
do to improve the course we are now on.
The President asked whether it was true that all
recommendations made by Ambassador Lodge had been dealt with
without exception--promptly and generally favorably. Secretary
McNamara replied affirmatively, as did Director Bell and
Director McCone. Secretary Rusk said the only exception was the
proposal which Ambassador Lodge had made with respect to how to
handle de Gaulle's support of the neutralization of Vietnam.
[Here follows item 2 which was unrelated to Vietnam.]
Bromley Smith/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this
typed signature.
72. Letter From the President to the Secretary of Defense
(McNamara)/1/
Washington, March 5, 1964.
/1/Source: Washington National Records
Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 1470. Presidential
Instructions. No classification marking.
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am giving you this personal letter
instead of any more formal instruction, as you leave on your
important mission to Saigon, but I shall be grateful if you will
share it with the senior officers who are going with you.
I will not ask you now to prepare a formal report, but I do
hope that you and your colleagues will work together to bring
back the most careful possible assessment of the situation and
of the best possible courses of action for improving it. Some of
these possibilities have been discussed in a preliminary way
here in recent days, but what we now need is an assessment of
all the possibilities and needs on the spot.
I particularly want your opinions and recommendations to be
framed in the light of your discussions with Ambassador Lodge
and his colleagues, and with the leaders of the Vietnamese
Government. I look to you, as its senior officer, to coordinate
the work of this mission.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
73. Letter From the President to the Secretary of Defense
(McNamara)/1/
Washington, March 5, 1964
/1/Source: Washington National Records
Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Presidential
Instructions. Secret.
Dear Bob: One of the most important things you can do for me
in South Vietnam is to talk privately on my behalf with Cabot
Lodge. I have the highest regard for him as a patriot and a
public servant, and I want him to know at first-hand of my
determination that we in Washington must do everything we can to
back him up as the top American in Vietnam. He is an old friend
of mine from the Senate, and the simplest way of emphasizing my
high opinion of him to you is to say that I recommended him for
your job after the election of 1952.
When we had our first meeting with Ambassador Lodge, on
November 24,2 I told him that I counted on him to take full
charge of our effort there and to press our views as strongly as
possible on the Government. I also told him that we would back
him up in every part of the country team. We have made all the
personnel changes which he has requested, and which it was quite
proper for him to request in his effort to discharge his
responsibilities. You should make it clear that we mean to
continue to be responsive to his needs, and that just as we
count on him to insist on first-class performance out there, we
have taken fairly energetic steps of our own to ensure that the
team in Washington working on Vietnam is as good as we can make
it.
/2/See Foreign Relations,
1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 635-637.
I have asked the Ambassador to make sure that we know of any
new recommendations and proposals which he or his colleagues may
wish to press with us, and on his only specific proposal
relating to our own support of the struggle in Vietnam-the
support for the military pay raise-I believe we have responded
promptly./3/ We are also doing all that we can through
Ambassador Bohlen, and here in Washington with Ambassador
Alphand, to get across to the French the importance of their own
posture in Vietnam, and while Bohlen does not. think we can get
the public statements that Ambassador Lodge wants, we have
pressed him to do everything that he can in this direction.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 53. On
March 9, Forrestal prepared for McGeorge Bundy a memorandum
assessing "the extent to which we have responded to Lodge's
requests." After reviewing the cable traffic since January
1, Forrestal concluded that there were only two major policy
requests from Lodge which were still unresolved: the proposed
statement from de Gaulle clarifying his call for neutralism of
Vietnam, and Lodge's tentative requests for bringing pressure on
North Vietnam. Forrestal explained that the need for
considerable planning and policy decisions at the highest level
were responsible for these requests going partially unanswered.
Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File,
Vol. V, Memos; published in Declassified Documents, 1978,
128C)
McGeorge Bundy passed a copy of
Forrestal's memorandum to the President on March 11 stating that
further action should await McNamara's return and "that I
think we are in slightly better shape on both issues than
Forrestal makes out." (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. II)
As I read the messages from Ambassador Lodge, these are the
specific areas in which he has asked for our support, but I want
you to be sure to tell him that we will rely on him and his
associates to keep us fully and currently apprised of their
needs as they see them. We may not always be able to achieve
what they ask, but we will always try, within the limits of our
resources and capacities.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
74. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to
the Members of the McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam/1/
Washington, March 5, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy
Files, WPB Special Papers. Confidential. Addressed to Bell,
McCone, McNaughton, William Bundy, Sullivan, and Sylvester who,
with the addition of McNamara and Taylor, made up the mission to
South Vietnam. They arrived in Saigon on March 8 and returned to
Washington on March 12.
SUBJECT
McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam
The purpose of our mission is to appraise the current
strength of the SVN government; to review the political and
military trends of the past four months; to estimate the outlook
for the future, assuming no change in current US policies; and
to evaluate alternative courses of action in the event it
appears current policies will not lead to attainment of our
objective.
I do not propose to submit a final written report to the
President immediately following our return. Instead, I shall
prepare a draft memorandum from which another report will be
made. I hope it will be possible for the senior members of the
party to concur in all significant points in the draft
memorandum; in the event we cannot agree, the dissenting views
will be expressed fully as footnotes to the report.
While in SVN, I believe we should minimize both formal and
informal contacts with the press. Please review your plans for
any such discussions with Arthur Sylvester before they take
place and inform him of the substance of the discussions after
the event.
I do not believe it should be necessary for individual
members of the party, while in SVN, to send interim reports to
their Departments or Agencies in Washington. If at any time you
believe such a report is required, please furnish me a copy of
the proposed message.
Robert S. McNamara
75. Memorandum for the Record by Brigadier General W.W.
Stromberg of the Army General Staff/1/
Saigon, March 8, 1964.
/1/Source: National Defense University,
Taylor Papers, T-233-69. Top Secret; US Eyes Only. Stromberg
sent a copy of this memorandum to Lodge, Taylor, McNamara, and
Harkins.
This morning, Sunday, 8 March 1964, I paid a call on General
Duong van Minh. A single soldier stood guard behind the closed
gate. I saw no other security except possibly three civilian
occupants of a white jeep across the street. One of these
assisted me in gaining entrance by speaking in Vietnamese to the
soldier guard who spoke neither English nor French. At his
residence in Saigon, I presented General Minh with a box of
orchids and the red canary which was the personal gift of
General Wheeler. When I explained to him that the gifts were a
token of the high esteem with which he is held in the Pentagon
as a soldier and patriot, he was visibly touched. Tam, his son
was in the house as was General Kim's son whose name I did not
catch. Mrs. Minh joined us for a brief period. She appeared
nervous and sad. I attempted to carry out our discussion in
English as I had assumed General Minh had continued his English
lessons since I had last seen him in 1961, but he quickly
reverted to French.
Initially, we covered events leading up to the overthrow of
the Diem government. He said he regretted terribly to have been
obliged to organize the coup as he had the greatest admiration
for the President. As the internal situation deteriorated and he
saw that Diem was losing the support of the people to ever
greater degrees, General Minh said he constantly attempted to
influence the President to make the necessary reforms and to rid
himself of the influence of his family and other evil people who
surrounded him. Finally, when he-saw that Diem would never
listen, he decided to overthrow him before the Viet Cong did so.
General Minh said he prepared the coup during a period of two
years. For all but three months of this period, General Kim was
his only confidante. They constantly discussed possible
situations, personalities, forces and the risks involved. Three
months before the coup went in, General Minh sent Kim to General
Don to cut the latter in. (Kim is married to Don's sister
Gabrielle.) Don agreed to the coup. One month before the coup,
General Minh asked General Dinh, whose III Corps was essential
to success, to his home. This was the critical moment. There was
some talking around the point on the part of both but finally,
General Dinh suddenly said "Big Brother, our country is in
danger, tell me what to do." General Minh gave him his
instructions. Finally, every key General and agency was brought
into the coup except for General Cao's IV Corps and the Navy.
General Cao was not brought in as he was pet of Diem's. The
Corps Deputy was in on it. Dinh's III Corps was between Cao and
Saigon; and besides, plans had been made to control or destroy
two essential ferries between III and IV Corps areas. General
Khanh, then CG, II Corps was in on the coup but told Minh he
would remain at Pleiku. This way Minh said Khanh could stand
back and go either way depending on how the coup worked out.
General Khiem played an important role. General Minh did not cut
the Navy in as they were too unreliable. He charged General Xuan,
CG of the Quang Trung Training Center outside Saigon to take
care of the Navy whose headquarters was taken with 40 men. Xuan
was also given the job of taking care of the Saigon police; a
cause of worry to Minh. During the last month's preparation for
the coup, Minh was able to reconcile Dinh and Kim.
(After the abortive coup of 11 November 1960, Kim, then
Commandant of the Military Academy at Dalat, had been arrested
by Dinh.) In any case before the 1 November 1963 coup, Kim
forgave Dinh in order that the larger interests of their country
could be served. The final consideration that encouraged all of
them to go ahead with [was] the knowledge of the disenchantment
of the United States with Diem's government and that the
revolutionary government would probably be quickly recognized
and supported. General Minh said it was regrettable that his
junta had been overthrown because if people could have been
patient, he felt they would have pulled the country back on the
road to victory. He said that the situation had been
deteriorating for so long and with such increasing acceleration,
that the situation was bound to continue to deteriorate for a
period under his junta before the effect of their measures could
be felt. He said it was like a dive bomber plunging at a target.
Even after the pilot pulls back on the stick, there is a period
when the plane continues in its original speed and direction. He
said one of the main objectives of the junta was to win back the
support of the people. One of the important considerations here,
for example, was to cease promptly attacks on inhabited areas
where the Viet Cong were reportedly holed up. General Minh said
that ground and air attacks in such situations which resulted in
casualties among the civilians had been causing the government
to lose the support of the people. Minh said that the relatives
and friends of the victims became embittered. Minh said that,
therefore, his junta attempted to get rid of the internal Viet
Cong organization in the villages. Once the Viet Cong lost their
"guides" who prepared their entry into the villages,
the Viet Cong would be afraid to enter. He said maybe Americans
could not understand how the Viet Cong could be driven out of
the villages but that I could be assured the Vietnamese
understood how this could be done. Minh said once the Viet Cong
was separated from the villages, they could be isolated and
destroyed. In the meantime, the infliction of casualties on
innocent people would have ceased and chances of winning back
their support would be increased. He also said that the junta
had been attempting to find effective province and district
chiefs who were natives of the area. Minh said this was
essential as it carried along with it a built in information
system on [of] old family ties and friendships. He said the
junta had been making real progress in this program and cited
these successful operations in point. One was the district of
Cho Cao where the villagers gave information on the Viet Cong
inside the village, disappeared from the village before the
attack and enabled friendly forces to gain a victory without
harming the civilian population. Minh said General Don was on
the spot to verify personally the operation The next operation,
the success of which was due to information provided by the
people was the destruction of a Viet Cong depot on the Canal
Commerciale in the Plaine des Joncs. Don was there also to
verify personally. The last operation Minh mentioned was the
successful ambush set by a friendly battalion of the 21st
Division. The Viet Cong were caught in a canal at Chuong Thien
in the IV Tactical Zone. It was the first time in the history of
the war that friendly forces had been able to set up an ambush
of battalion size. It was made possible by the information
furnished by the local people. He said of course the measures
which make the people want to give information take a long time
to implement. Unfortunately, Khanh and the others were young and
impatient.
Minh said the junta knew about the 30 January coup one hour
before it went off. The other members called Minh and wanted to
take immediate action. Minh, however, said they should do
nothing and see what would happen as to set Vietnamese against
Vietnamese would only play into the Viet Cong hands. Minh said
he is absolutely positive that the charges of neutralist and
plotting with the French are completely false. He said that
although he did not know Kim well before 1959, he had observed
him closely ever since. In fact, he had put him to some severe
tests of his determination and loyalty and Kim has passed them
all. He said that because of his concern over de Gaulle's
philosophy of neutralism, he had convoked key French bankers and
other businessmen of Saigon whom he knew to his office to inform
them how empty and dangerous such a philosophy was. He said
these were all official visits. Kim and Don always participated
in these meetings. Kim was always the most adamant in denouncing
de Gaulle's views to the point where Minh had to remonstrate
with Kim about his violent reaction. Minh then stated that he
had watched all the other members of the junta closely and
worked with them during their three months in power and that all
of them were staunch patriots and only desire to defeat the Viet
Cong.
Minh said so long as these Generals remain under arrest/2/
the Army will be cut by schisms and the war effort will not be
pushed vigorously. He said since the coup many officers have
talked to him about the situation in a way they would talk to no
other officer. They are bitter and frustrated about it. Minh
says he calms them down by telling them to following his example
and wait for them to be freed which he is sure will be done. He
tells them that he, Minh, loves these Generals as much or more
than they do. Minh says the problem stems from the fact that all
of these officers have a host of loyal supporters. Don was CG, I
Corps for five years and the population in I Corps area and the
officers who served there admire and support Don. The same
applies to Dinh, who served as CG of II Corps for two years and
then for two years as CG, III Corps. As for Kim, an
intellectual, Minh said, he had been running the schools. Kim
has a group of supporters among senior officers dating from
Kim's duty as Commandant of the C & GS School. There is also
a large group of young officer supporters dating from the time
he was Commandant of the Military Academy. Xuan has his
supporters stemming from young officers and NCO's who served
under him during his long tenure at the Quang Trung Training
Center.
/2/Generals Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim,
Ton That Dinh, and Mai Huu Xuan were arrested during the January
30 coup.
Minh said that besides the bad morale problem caused by their
unjust imprisonment the Army needs badly the experience of these
officers. He sited as an example the impossibility of the young
and inexperienced Khiem attempting to serve as both Minister of
Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He mentioned
General Duc, recently promoted to CG of IV Corps being both
incompetent and crazy. Minh admitted he arranged for Duc to
return from France after the 1 November coup but now regretted
it. He thought Duc, who had been carrying out a campaign against
the Diem regime from outside the country, would be a useful
patriotic officer. Minh arranged for doctors care for Duc's
crazy tendencies as he believes it comes from some physical
ailment. Moreover, Duc proved to be irritable and constantly
unhappy about everything. Minh said he believes Khanh gave him
the IV Corps job [to] pacify him. As for Khanh, Minh feels that
through inexperience, he is trying to develop a climate for
politics too fast and that this could be dangerous for the
country. However, Khanh believes this makes a good image in the
eyes of the rest of the world. Minh said after all there was no
party system under Diem. Minh mentioned Khanh's willingness to
let the Dai Viet operate, a party formed around 1943 to oppose
the Japanese occupation. He cited General Thieu, Chief of Staff
of the Joint General Staff and a Catholic, who is a member of
the Dai Viet. He says Thieu's brother is Minister of Youth, as I
understand it, and is also in the Dai Viet. Minh said the
Vice-President also of the Dai Viet, Nguyen Ton Hoan, did not
accept that post to remain there indefinitely. He covets the
Presidency. Khanh seems happy to have the Dai Viets (Catholics)
and the Buddhists in a sort of friendly opposition. In the
meantime, try as he may, it will be difficult for Khanh to
regain the support of the people. He is putting more and more of
the old Diem crowd back in power. He is using the same Diem
experts to organize his visit to the countryside and
"spontaneous" demonstrations. These tactics, as for
Diem, only promote counter-propaganda. Counter-propaganda
against the Americans will probably result from
"spontaneous" demonstrations such as the one organized
for Mr. McNamara this morning at the airport.
However, Minh said the number one problem now was to reunify
the Army and carry the war vigorously to the Viet Cong. He said
we can worry about Khanh's political fortunes later. He said the
four generals must be freed and reintegrated into the Army or
the war will not be carried through vigorously because so many
officers throughout the Army will not have their hearts in it.
Minh said Khanh must call these officers in, state there has
been a misunderstanding, offer his apologies and reintegrate
them into the Army.
At this point, I told General Minh that if Khanh refused, and
if he or any other group was thinking of a coup, it would be
disastrous for both our countries and only the Viet Cong would
benefit. Besides, I told him, another coup would just further
deteriorate the morale of the Army and destroy the faith of the
people. I told him that my superiors in Washington were counting
on him to put the interests of his country and his people above
his own and to lend his enormous prestige and popularity to
support the government, restore the morale of the Army, and
prosecute vigorously the war against the Viet Cong.
He thought for a long time and replied he would do everything
in his power to support Khanh. However, he said he would like
Ambassador Lodge, who enjoys tremendous prestige with the
Vietnamese people, Mr. McNamara, and General Taylor to force
Khanh to reintegrate the four generals back into the Army. He
said the Americans have the power to do it and that it was
absolutely essential in order to get the war going again. He
said that the reintegration process must be handled carefully.
If Khanh told them directly Khanh would be dead of old age
before they would accept. If Minh can talk to them (he was
unable to see them up to this point) he can influence them to
accept, as it is a question of prestige and honor. Minh is ready
to give his personal guarantee that the four will bury the
hatchet in the interest of the country. Minh will also handle
their assignments personally, with the concurrence of Khanh, in
order to avoid an embarrassing assignment situation as between
these older, more experienced officers and the new crop of
generals.
Then as concerns the Army, Minh said he would do everything
possible so as to reunify the Army for the government. He said
there was only one man in all of Vietnam who had the possibility
of doing it and that was he, Minh. He stated he wanted to
emphasize the word possibility.
I asked General Minh if he couldn't see any other alternative
to the problem of the four generals, such as, for example,
freedom and retirement with full benefits. He reacted promptly
and vigorously and stated that it wouldn't work and that the
only solution for the good of the country was reintegration. He
said such a solution would not repair the schisms at all, that
the deception of the officer corps would remain.
W. W. Stromberg/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this
typed signature.
76. Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador to France
(Bohlen)/1/
Washington, March 12, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Confidential. Also
published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 211H. Bohlen
was in Washington for consultations. A note on the source text
indicates that the President saw this memorandum and a covering
note. The President met with Bohlen from 6:02 to 6:27 p.m. on
March 12. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of
this meeting has been found.
Ambassador Lodge had asked some time ago that we endeavor to
obtain from General de Gaulle some clarifying statement in
regard to French policy towards Viet-Nam. The Ambassador's
request, as I recall it, was based, at least in part, upon a
desire to restrain the Viet-Namese from breaking with France on
the assumption that France was about to recognize Viet Minh. It
was also dictated by the bad effect France's unclear position
was having on Viet-Namese morale.
We gave this request of Ambassador Lodge the most careful
consideration in Paris and came to the conclusion that any
approach to General de Gaulle on this subject would be
fruitless. We also noted and so reported to Saigon that there
seemed to be no possibility of any French recognition of Hanoi.
I feel very definitely that a request of General de Gaulle to
clarify a statement which he had purposely left ambiguous would
not only not produce the result desired, but also might offer
the General an opportunity to restate his very generalized view
of Viet-Nam; namely, that neutralization and unification, and
similar vague terms were the only possible bases for a solution
there. Furthermore, it would tend, I believe, to convince him
that the United States was urgently in need of some French help
in the Viet-Namese situation. We should always remember that de
Gaulle has stated on a number of occasions directly to American
officials, to President Kennedy in May of 1961, and to me, his
belief that we could not succeed in the course that we are
pursuing. It is also not clear exactly what type of
clarification we desired. For all of these reasons, I thought at
the time, and still do, that any approach to de Gaulle merely
for clarification of French policy would be a very serious
mistake and would most certainly not yield the result desired.
However, if, as I have reported from Paris, we are able,
following Secretary McNamara's visit to devise a course of
action in Viet-Nam with a clear political objective, I believe
then it would be worthwhile my going to see General de Gaulle to
explain this policy and its objective to him and to request the
cooperation of France in its achievement. This, of course, is
dependent upon our ability to work out some form of coherent
policy which I could take to de Gaulle.
On the other hand, if there are considerations of which I am
not aware which would make it important, even with the certainty
of a refusal, to have made an effort with de Gaulle. I am of
course entirely prepared to do it.
C. E. Bohlen
77. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department
of State/1/
Saigon, March 13, 1964--1:11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC.
Taylor described this meeting in Swords and Plowshares, pp.
309-310.
1740. CINCPAC for POLAD. In a conversation yesterday with
Secretary McNamara, General Taylor and I on the US side and
Generals Khanh and Khiem on the GVN side, General Khanh agreed
that actions designed to exert increased pressure on NVN could
be a helpful assist to his effort but would be no substitute for
successful actions in SVN against the VC. General Khanh said
that his "base" in SVN was not strong enough as yet
for overt operations against NVN; however. he would like to
"redouble" covert operations right away.
Lodge
78. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department
of State/1/
Saigon, March 13, 1964--1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, POL 23 VIET S. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC.
1744. CINCPAC for POLAD. Following based on uncleared
memorandum of conversation of final meeting between Secretary
McNamara and party with General Khanh and GVN representatives on
March 12.
General Khanh opened discussion by referring to preliminary
discussions with Secretary McNamara during trip to Hue on March
11 concerning a proposed National Service Act for SVN. Khanh
said his government prepared embark upon program to mobilize all
human and material resources to fight VC. As envisaged by
General Khanh proposed National Service Act would have two major
components: military service and civil defense. Breakdown as
follows:
Military service comprised of: RVNAF (3 years service; actual
strength: 227,000; planned: 251,683). Civil Guard (3-1/2 years;
actual: 90,032; planned: 119,636). SDC & hamlet militia (4
years; actual: 257,960; planned: 422,874). Civil defense
comprised of civil service corps, cadre corps, National Youth,
and political-administration corps.
Khanh noted military service component self-evident and,
response McNamara's question, confirmed that civil defense
component included civil administration corps for work in
countryside. Khanh emphasized that in civil defense sector all
civilians would be included; for example, in Saigon might be
possible assign trained youth to perform some of static police
functions while police were pursuing more important police
duties. This segment also included civic action teams for
hamlets and villages.
Khanh emphasized figures were planning figures only and
designed give idea of number of military and civilians required
and indicate financial implications of plan. Eventual numbers
would be flexible in that they would depend on such factors as
population in a particular area, whether area was actually in
danger of VC attack, and strength of VC in particular area, etc.
McNamara stated that US, and he assumed GVN, would wish to
study strength figures carefully; however, his first impression
was that figure of 422,874 SDC and hamlet militia appeared
unduly large and would be difficult to support. Khanh responded
that in actual practice total numbers may not reach this level.
In fact, number may not exceed 300,000 SDC and hamlet militia
actually deployed against VC. Here again figures were flexible
and would have be refined depending on actual situation in
various areas.
General Taylor noted ascending length of service for Civil
Guard (3-1/2 years) and the SDC/hamlet militia (4 years) over
RVNAF (3 years) and inquired whether it was because the former
groups would be operating close to home. Khanh affirmed this,
noting soldiers in ARVN have to move often and take their
families with them. Now difficult recruit CG and SDC forces for
deployment like ARVN troops. Therefore Khanh felt since they
stay close to home they could be expected serve a slightly
longer period of service.
Khanh then asked General Thieu to explain breakdown under
civil defense sector of proposed National Service Act. Thieu
stated that all men from age 18 through 40 would be required to
participate in the national pacification effort. Most of them,
such as those in civil service corps and cadre corps (those now
in countryside) would serve in same positions they now occupy.
Others, such as national youth group up to age 40, would be
required serve in city and countryside and would be organized
into small groups to assist ARVN and Civil Guard. Category of
political-administration corps would consist of cadres planned
for assignment to villages and hamlets. General Thieu estimated
that 125,000 such cadre would be required. In first instance,
GVN will ask for volunteers; if insufficient volunteers come
forward, the necessary cadres will be drafted. Time spent in
political-administration corps would count against military
service. McNamara stated general approach appeared excellent but
he questioned whether GVN would need 125,000 cadre. McNamara
pointed out this number added to total figures for Civil Guard,
SDC and hamlet militia, constituted an extremely large figure.
If assumed there are approximately 6 million men of draft age in
SVN, ratio of estimated figures to total draft-eligible
population appeared disproportionate. While genera] concept was
excellent it would be desirable to look most closely at planning
figures.
Khanh replied that he intended make maximum effort in first
instance in 8 critical provinces surrounding Saigon, noting that
in certain hamlets now de facto situation exists where people
must defend themselves. However, a National Service Act would
have a very good effect in Saigon and the other urban areas.
McNamara inquired whether upon his return to Washington he
could tell President Johnson that General Khanh's government was
prepared embark on a program of national mobilization of human
and material resources and whether President Johnson in turn
could inform the American people that General Khanh has put SVN
on the national mobilization basis. Khanh replied in the
affirmative and asked for agreement in principle from us to his
proceeding with concept as outlined. McNamara indicated that he
viewed concept favorably and asked Ambassador Lodge for his
views.
Ambassador stated that he favored general concept but thought
that detailed figures should be looked into carefully.
Ambassador also believed that emphasis should be placed first on
8 critical provinces surrounding Saigon. General Khanh expressed
his thanks for agreement in principle.
General Harkins noted that a mobilization law was in fact in
existence but that few people knew about it. He pointed out that
ARVN, CG and SDC were not up to their authorized military
strengths. Khanh said that he realized this but believed it
still desirable to have a new law setting forth a national
service or mobilization program. Harkins stated that MACV and
other elements of US Mission would like to work closely with
Khanh and his chief aides in developing such a law. Khanh
replied this well understood. McNamara said it was agreed on
American side that general concept was a wise one and that we
should proceed on this basis.
Khanh then inquired whether it was desirable to raise CG to
same relative status as ARVN as regards salary, pensions,
survivors benefits, etc. He estimated that total cost would be
in neighborhood of one billion plasters. McNamara thought this
was highly desirable. General Taylor inquired whether this would
involve any change in role or mission of Civil Guard. Khanh
replied in negative stating that it was merely question putting
Civil Guard on comparable basis with ARVN as concerns benefits
he had mentioned. McNamara observed that he felt all agreed in
principle on this.
McNamara inquired how long Khanh estimated it would take to
recruit and train administrative cadre for 8 critical provinces
near Saigon. Khanh estimated approximately one month, in any
event he believed cadres could be in place by end of April.
Khanh said GVN would aim for volunteers for this effort and it
was not necessary to await promulgation of National Service Act.
In response Taylor's question as to how long Khanh
anticipated it would take to draft and promulgate National
Service Law, Khanh observed that GVN was a fairly compact
organization at present and that law could be ready for his
signature in very short time. Taylor pointed to necessity give
due regard to democratic forms in developing and announcing a
National Service Act. Khanh agreed and said that at same time a
major effort was being made to pacify the countryside, he
intended to push for concurrent development of democratic
institutions and forms. McNamara suggested that when Khanh ready
announce a National Service Act that he also re-emphasize
related actions already taken and those planned for the future,
such as those for expansion of national economy, for increased
educational opportunities in hamlets, for increased production
of rice, for marketing of fish, and so forth. McNamara believed
a well publicized announcement of this nature would find ready
response among people and would materially assist Khanh to
obtain and hold support of Vietnamese people. Ambassador Lodge
agreed and added that, despite statement of General de Gaulle to
the effect that we could not win a military war in SVN,
Americans were well aware that war here is an inter-related one
having political, economic, social and psychological aspects.
Memcon being pouched./2/
/2/Not found.
Lodge
79. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/
Washington, March 13, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, Vol. 11.
No classification marking.
You may or may not want these for night reading, but you
should have them available:
At Tab A is McNamara's full draft report/2/
of which you got a brief this morning./3/
/2/Not attached, but see Document 84.
/3/The President met briefly and
individually with McNamara and then McGeorge Bundy between 8:50
and 10 a.m. on March 13. Later in the day from 12:15 to 1:23
p.m., he met with McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, McCone, and McGeorge
Bundy as a group. Apparently the President was briefed on the
draft McNamara report on one, some, or all of these occasions.
Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
At Tab B is his draft White House statement/4/
which both Dean Rusk and I think needs a lot of revision.
/4/Not attached. Reference is to a
draft version of a White House statement of March 17, printed in
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1963-64, vol. 1, pp. 387-388. An undated text of the
proposed White House statement and a copy with handwritten
revisions by McGeorge Bundy are in the Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V.
At Tab C is a fascinating document prepared for possible
publication in Foreign Affairs by Ambassador Lodge./5/
/5/Not attached, but a draft of the
article is attached to a letter from Lodge to Harriman March 3;
ibid.
For the TV show on Vietnam,/6/ I
myself would quietly but firmly spell out the following themes:
/6/For the transcript of the
President's television and radio interview conducted by
representatives of the major broadcast services, March 15, see Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pp. 361-375.
1. Neutralization of the whole area has been repeatedly
denounced by the Communists and is therefore not practicable
now.
2. The right of people to choose their own course is exactly
what we are supporting, and if foreign interference and
subversion should end, the need for our help will end.
3. While the danger of the threat continues, American support
will be firm and strong.
4. Secretary McNamara and a first-rate team have made a most
careful study which has led to constructive suggestions that are
now being reviewed within the Government.
5. We are strong, calm and determined, in a situation which
has danger but also hope.
6. The Ambassador is our top man in the field, and you are
proud of the U.S. unity which has been developed both here and
in Vietnam in the first hundred days.
McG.B.
80. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence
(Cline) to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)/1/
Washington, March 14, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXX, CIA. Secret.
SUBJECT
Recommended Actions for South Vietnam
1. In my memorandum to the DCI, 30 October 1963,/2/ just
before the "Big" Minh coup in Saigon, I argued against
U.S. support for coup plotting on the grounds that: "If a
coup succeeds it will result in the kind of dislocation and
confusion characteristic of post-coup South Korea and the
Dominican Republic." This phenomenon is exactly what we
have been witnessing in South Vietnam in the last four months.
My arguments, which went for naught, in favor of bolstering the
shaky Diem regime are even more compelling toward support of the
Khanh regime. It is probably our last chance to halt the spiral
of confusion of purpose and defeatism that may destroy our
position in Southeast Asia.
/2/Not found.
2. The simple question raised in the McNamara report/3/
is whether, with ample U.S. support of counterinsurgency efforts
in South Vietnam, the recent trend toward Viet Cong victory can
be reversed, and substantial, sustained progress made toward
stabilization. I believe the odds are 6 to 5 against this
favorable trend setting in within the next 3 to 4 months, as
concluded by McNamara, so long as North Vietnamese political,
military and logistic support are freely available to the Viet
Cong. Furthermore, I think the loss of virtually all U.S.
prestige and influence in Southeast Asia is likely if a
favorable trend does not set in in South Vietnam soon.
Consequently, it seems to me too great a gamble for the United
States to rely solely on the measures recommended for South
Vietnam during the next 3 to 4 months. Instead, I recommend that
the measures recommended by McNamara be supplemented as soon as
operationally feasible by adopting steps 1 through 3 of
"Possible Later Actions" plus all four actions
suggested in your footnote to the conclusion (p. 14) of the
report. Personally, I would also recommend the
"rejected" course of action of furnishing a U.S.
combat unit (perhaps a battalion landing team) to insure the
security of U.S. personnel and-implicitly-the Khanh regime's
control of the Saigon area.
/3/Document 84.
Ray S. Cline/4/
/4/At the bottom of the source text,
Cline added a postscript on Cambodia, but acknowledged that it
went "beyond the scope of the measures intended to save
South Vietnam."
81. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/
Washington, March 14, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, Vol. II.
No classification marking. Although there is no indication on
the source text, this memorandum was presumably prepared in
anticipation of the interview with the President by broadcast
media representatives on March 15. See footnote 6, Document 79.
BROAD QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON VIETNAM
1. Why is South Vietnam important to us?
First, it is a key element in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia
in turn is an area whose size and importance are plain to
see-almost 250 million people and a land and sea area stretching
from China to Australia, and from the Philippines to India.
Second, we have a commitment there in honor and in national
interest. Ten years ago President Eisenhower rightly decided to
support the new government of South Vietnam and we have
continued that support ever since in good times and in bad.
Indeed the language of that first commitment reminds me very
much of the language we still use (Eisenhower letter to Diem
attached at Tab A )/2/ It speaks of
our assistance against subversion and aggression. It speaks of
the need for effective performance and reform in Vietnam. It
speaks of the need to respond to the aspirations of the people
of Vietnam themselves.
/2/Letter dated October 25, 1954; Foreign
Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 2166-2167.
In recent months the danger and difficulty in Vietnam have
increased, but this is no time to quit, and it is no time for
discouragement.
2. What are the prospects now?
I am working right this week end with Secretary Rusk,
Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on this problem, and I can
tell you that while there have been troubles and difficulties in
recent months out there, we are going to keep right on with our
basic present program and purpose. I am proud of the improvement
in the coordination of the American effort both here and in
Saigon, and we expect to take further measures to strengthen our
support for the free people of South Vietnam.
I am particularly encouraged by reports from the Ambassador
and from Secretary McNamara on the quality of the present
leadership of South Vietnam. I have had an encouraging personal
message from General Khanh, and we are very hopeful that his
government will be able to take the strong and effective
measures which are needed on every front out there.
I am sure the Vietnamese people will respond to this kind of
leadership because it is quite foreign to the traditions of the
area to give in to pressures which are directed from Peking.
(Some deliberate connection of the Communists with China may be
helpful in Saigon.)
3. Can this be ended by 1965?
1965 has never been anything more for us than a target for
the completion of certain specific forms of technical training
and assistance. A struggle of this kind needs patience and
determination. We and our friends in Vietnam entirely agree that
as time goes on the responsibility for effective work in all
fields should be carried more and more by the Vietnamese
themselves. No one who is working effectively against Communism
need be worried about American determination and persistence. We
mean to keep at it out there.
McG. B./3/
3/Printed from a copy that bears these
typed initials.
82. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
/1/Source: Washington National Records
Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Vietnam 381. Top Secret.
A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw this
memorandum on April 2.
JCSM-222-64
Washington, March 14, 1964.
SUBJECT
Draft Memorandum for the President, Subject: "South
Vietnam"/2/
/2/Reference is to a March 13 draft of
Document 84.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the subject
memorandum and concur with the recommendations subject to the
following comments:/3/
/3/Within the JCS, Commandant of the
Marine Corps General Greene and Chief of Staff of the Air Force
General LeMay were critical of McNamara's draft report. Greene
wrote that the 12 recommendations "offer little more than a
continuation of present programs of action in Vietnam," and
reiterated the view that if the United States was to stay and
win in Vietnam, then that objective should be pursued with the
full concentrated power of the United States. Greene stated,
"half measures won't win in South Vietnam."
General LeMay agreed with McNamara's
recommendations to support and stabilize the Khanh government,
but took exception with the view that the "military tools
of the GVN/US effort" were sound and adequate. LeMay felt
that to do the job in Vietnam, the Viet Cong had to be attacked
in their Cambodian sanctuaries and North Vietnam's supply and
reinforcement lines through Laos could not be left unmolested.
General Greene's comments are in JCS 2343/346-1, March 17, and
General LeMay's are in CSAFM-263-64 to JCS, March 14; both in
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files,
JMF 9155.3/3100 (13 Mar 64), as quoted in Historical Division,
Joint Secretariat, JCS, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War
in Vietnam, 1960-1968, Part 1, Chapter 9, pp. 18 and 19)
a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that the
recommended program in itself will be sufficient to turn the
tide against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam without positive
action being taken against the Hanoi Government at an early
date. They have in mind the conduct of the kind of program
designed to bring about cessation of DRV support for operations
in South Vietnam and Laos outlined in JCSM-174-64, subject:
"Vietnam," dated 2 March 1964./4/
Such a program would not only deter the aggressive actions of
the DRV but would be a source of encouragement to South Vietnam
which should significantly facilitate the counterinsurgency
program in that country. To increase our readiness for such
actions, the US Government should establish at once the
political and military bases in the United States and South
Vietnam for offensive actions against the North and across the
Laotian and Cambodian borders, including measures for the
control of contraband traffic on the Mekong.
/4/Document 66.
b. In view of the current attitude of the Sihanouk Government
in Cambodia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend authorizing now
hot pursuit into that country.
c. With regard to the reaction times contained in
recommendation 12 of the subject memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider that the time of reaction for border control and
retaliatory actions against North Vietnam should be reduced to
24 hours and the time for the initiation of the program of
"graduated overt military pressures" reduced to 72
hours. These times are considered feasible as soon as an aerial
mining capability has been established in the VNAF.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/
Washington, March 15, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security Files, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. II.
Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
This memorandum is designed to help to clarify the issues
that are likely to be before you at 10 A.M. Monday./2/
As I see it, the problem of our next steps with respect to
Vietnam falls into four parts:
/2/From 10:12 to approximately 11:15
a.m. on March 16, the President met with McNamara, Ball, Taylor,
and McGeorge Bundy in an informal meeting to discuss the
McNamara report. No record of the meeting has been found. For
the approved report, see Document 84.
1. Action in South Vietnam itself.
2. Action relating to Cambodia and Laos.
3. Action against North Vietnam.
4. Relations with France.
Following are my comments on each item.
1. Action in South Vietnam itself.
I think we have agreement all around on Item 1, which remains
the most important of the lot. Bob McNamara assured me today
that his twelve recommendations fully cover everything Lodge is
asking for within South Vietnam, and then some. He further
assures me that Lodge himself spoke of six crucial needs for
action in Vietnam, and that all six are more than covered within
his recommendations.
2. Action relating to Cambodia and Laos.
The McNamara report is so drafted as to leave you leeway in
these two areas. It would authorize hot pursuit and ground
operations over the Laotian line, but it is noncommittal about
operations across the Cambodian border. McCone and Lodge would
like to go further, especially with respect to Cambodia, and I
find that Dean Rusk is also strongly inclined to move in this
direction if the right combination of political and practical
steps can be devised. I think there is room here for you to move
in a direction which is at once useful to South Vietnam and
effective as a response to the Ambassador's own desires. We will
not have final plans on this tomorrow morning, but I think the
field is a productive one and that a good resolution can be
found. I think it is particularly desirable that we should have
Lodge work on the practical process of this matter with Khanh
directly.
3. Action against North Vietnam.
On this one we have agreement between McNamara and Khanh, at
least for the present, that overt action against North Vietnam
is undesirable. There is also agreement that the covert program
should be intensified. As a practical matter, McNamara believes
that this program will not amount to very much, and I agree with
him, but I believe it essential that we authorize Lodge to
strengthen it in any way that he can work out with Khanh. The
one specific Lodge request which is still outstanding in this
area is his proposal of late February that we warn the North
Vietnamese of direct retaliation in response to any terrorist
attack on Americans. McNamara tells me that the concern over the
lives of Americans had been greatly reduced by the time of his
visit last week, and that therefore this is not now a live
issue. But at the end of the current deliberations, you will
wish to go back to Lodge again.
4. Relations with France.
It is now agreed that Bohlen should go to work directly with
General de Gaulle, as soon as possible after the General's
return from Mexico. This will not be for about another ten days.
The Department will be drafting a detailed instruction to Bohlen
this week, and Dean Rusk's current intent is to let Ambassador
Lodge and Ambassador Bohlen both comment on this instruction
before it is made final. This seems to us the best we can do to
keep all parties in line.
There are other questions which need to be discussed tomorrow
morning, like the shape of the White House statement to follow
the more formal meeting on Tuesday. For internal Pentagon
reasons, McNamara is very eager to put out a substantial account
of the current situation in terms which are acceptable to his
military colleagues. I myself doubt that this should be done at
the White House level, and we will have alternative statements
for your consideration in the morning.
McG.B.
84. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to
the President/1/
Washington, March 16, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Secret. Also
printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp.
499-510 and published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 148A.
On March 16, Bromley Smith sent a slightly revised version of
this memorandum to the National Security Council for
consideration at a March 17 meeting. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V)
A March 2 preliminary draft of this
memorandum was prepared by William Bundy over the weekend of
February 29-March 1, designed, in Bundy's words, as an
"overall vehicle for thought and also designed by Secretary
McNamara to serve as a possible framework for his report upon
his return." Bundy's covering memorandum and the draft are
ibid., Vol IV. They are published in Declassified Documents,
1975, 157A. On March 4, an abbreviated version of the draft
was sent to those officials attending the March 5 NSC meeting
(see Document 71). This March 4 draft is in Department of State,
Bundy Files, WPB Special Papers. An undated White House copy of
the abbreviated March 4 draft, received for filing on March 6,
is published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 146D.
Two additional drafts of the full
memorandum, March 5 and March 13, are in the Johnson Library,
National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Important
differences between these drafts and the final memorandum as
submitted to the President are noted in footnotes below.
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
This report addresses two questions:/2/
/2/The introduction highlighting the
two questions to be addressed appeared in the March 13 draft. In
previous drafts, the report was introduced as an analysis of
problems in Vietnam, possible courses of action, and pro and
cons of a program of military action against North Vietnam.
1. What is the present situation in Vietnam? (What is the
trend of the counterinsurgency program, how stable is the Khanh
government, and what is the effectiveness of our current policy
of assisting the South Vietnamese Government by economic aid,
military training and logistical support?)
2. How can we improve that situation? (What are the plans and
prospects of the Khanh government and what more should they be
doing, and what more should the U.S. be doing under present or
revised policy, in South Vietnam or against North Vietnam?)
To answer the questions, the report will review: I. U.S.
Objectives in South Vietnam; II. Present U.S. Policy in South
Vietnam; III. The Present Situation; IV. Alternative Present
Courses of Action; V. Possible Later Actions; VI. Other Actions
Considered But Rejected; and VII. Recommendations.
I. U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam
We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not
require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a
Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept
outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This
assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic
and social measures but also police and military help to root
out and control insurgent elements.
Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost
all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist
dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to
Communism so as to remove effective U.S. and anti-Communist
influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of forces not
now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so (Indonesia
taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our
help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the Philippines
would become shaky, and the threat to India to the west,
Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and
Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased.
All of these consequences would probably have been true even
if the U.S. had not since 1954, and especially since 1961,
become so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. However, that fact
accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in
Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam
conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a
nation meet a Communist "war of liberation."
Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high.
They are increased by domestic factors.
II. Present U.S. Policy in South Vietnam
We are now trying to help South Vietnam defeat the Viet Cong,
supported from the North, by means short of the unqualified use
of U.S. combat forces.3 We are not acting against North Vietnam
except by a very modest "covert" program operated by
South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalists)-a program so
limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect. In
Laos, we are still working largely within the framework of the
1962 Geneva Accords. In Cambodia we are still seeking to keep
Sihanouk from abandoning whatever neutrality he may still have
and fulfilling his threat of reaching an accommodation with
Hanoi and Peking. As a consequence of these policies, we and the
GVN have had to condone the extensive use of Cambodian and
Laotian territory by the Viet Cong, both as a sanctuary and as
infiltration routes.
3 The adjective "unqualified" referring to use of
combat troops first appeared in the March 13 draft. The last two
sentences of section 11 were also added to the March 13 draft.
III. The Present Situation in South Vietnam
The key elements in the present situation are as follows:
A. The military tools and concepts of the GVN/US effort are
generally sound and adequate.4 Substantially more can be done in
the effective employment of military forces and in the economic
and civic action areas. These improvements may require some
selective increases in the U.S. presence, but it does not appear
likely that major equipment replacement and additions in U.S.
personnel are indicated under current policy.
4 Mr. McCone emphasizes that the GVN/US program can never be
considered completely satisfactory so long as it permits the
Viet Cong a sanctuary in Cambodia and a continuing uninterrupted
and unmolested source of supply and reinforcement from NVN
through Laos. [Footnote in the source text that first appeared
in the March 13 draft.]
B. The U.S. policy of reducing existing personnel where South
Vietnamese are in a position to assume the functions is still
sound. Its application will not lead to any major reductions in
the near future, but adherence to this policy as such has a
sound effect in portraying to the U.S. and the world that we
continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese
must win and take ultimate responsibility for. Substantial
reductions in the numbers of U.S. military training personnel
should be possible before the end of 1965. However, the U.S.
should continue to reiterate that it will provide all the
assistance and advice required to do the job regardless of how
long it takes.
C. The situation has unquestionably been growing worse, at
least since September:
1. In terms of government control of the countryside, about
40% of the territory is under Viet Cong control or predominant
influence./5/ In 22 of the 43
provinces, the Viet Cong control 50% or more of the land area,
including 80% of Phuoc Tuy; 90% of Binh Duong; 75% of Hau Nghia;
90% of Long An; 90% of Kien Tuong; 90% of Dinh Tuong; 90% of
Kien Hoar and 85% of An Xuyen.
/5/In the March 5 draft the figure was
30 percent.
2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of
apathy and indifference, and there are some signs of frustration/6/
within the U.S. contingent:
/6/In the March 5 draft "declining
morale" was used rather than "frustration."
a. The ARVN and paramilitary desertion rates, and
particularly the latter, are high and increasing.
b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting
energetically and effectively.
c. The morale of the hamlet militia and of the Self Defense
Corps, on which the security of the hamlets depends, is poor and
falling.
3. In the last 90 days the weakening of the government's
position has been particularly noticeable. For example:
a. In Quang Nam province, in the I Corps, the militia in 17
hamlets turned in their weapons.
b. In Binh Duong province (III Corps) the hamlet militia were
disarmed because of suspected disloyalty.
c. In Binh Dinh province, in the II Corps, 75 hamlets were
severely damaged by the Viet Cong (in contrast, during the
twelve months ending June 30, 1963, attacks on strategic hamlets
were few and none was overrun).
d. In Quang Ngai province, at the northern edge of the II
Corps, there were 413 strategic hamlets under government control
a year ago. Of that number, 335 have been damaged to varying
degrees or fallen into disrepair, and only 275 remain under
government control.
e. Security throughout the IV Corps has deteriorated badly.
The Viet Cong control virtually all facets of peasant life in
the southernmost provinces and the government troops there are
reduced to defending the administrative centers. Except in An
Giang province (dominated by the Hoa Hao religious sect) armed
escort is required for almost all movement in both the southern
and northern areas of the IV Corps.
4. The political control structure extending from Saigon down
into the hamlets disappeared following the November coup. Of the
41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1, 35 have been
replaced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in three
months; one province had four). Scores of lesser officials were
replaced. Almost all major military commands have changed hands
twice since the November coup. The faith of the peasants has
been shaken by the disruptions in experienced leadership and the
loss of physical security. In many areas, power vacuums have
developed causing confusion among the people and a rising rate
of rural disorders.
5. North Vietnamese support, always significant, has been
increasing:
a. Communications between Hanoi and the Viet Cong (see
classified annex)./7/
/7/Not found.
b. Since July 1, 1963, the following items of equipment, not
previously encountered in South Vietnam, have been captured from
the Viet Cong:
ChiCom 75 mm, recoilless rifles.
ChiCom heavy machine guns. U.S. .50 caliber heavy machine
guns on Chicom mounts.
In addition, it is clear that the Viet Cong are using Chinese
90 mm rocket launchers and mortars.
c. The Viet Cong are importing large quantities of munitions
and chemicals for the production of explosives: Approximately
50,000 pounds of explosive-producing chemicals destined for the
Viet Cong have been intercepted in the 12 months ending March
1964. On December 24, five tons of ammunition, of which one and
one-half tons were 75 mm recoilless rifle ammunition, was
captured at the Dinh Tuong Viet Cong arsenal. Ninety percent was
of ChiCom manufacture.
D. The greatest weakness in the present situation is the
uncertain viability of the Khanh government. Khanh himself is a
very able man within his experience, but he does not yet have
wide political appeal and his control of the Army itself is
uncertain (he has the serious problem of the jailed generals)./8/
After two coupe, as was mentioned above, there has been a
sharp drop in morale and organization, and Khanh has not yet
been able to build these up satisfactorily. There is a constant
threat of assassination or of another coup, which would drop
morale and organization nearly to zero./9/
Whether or not French nationals are actively encouraging such a
coup, de Gaulle's position and the continuing pessimism and
anti-Americanism of the French community in South Vietnam
provide constant fuel to neutralist sentiment and the coup
possibility. If a coup is set underway, the odds of our
detecting and preventing it in the tactical sense are not high./10/
/8/The observation in the parenthesis
was added to the March 13 draft.
/9/Mr. McCone does not believe the
dangers of another coup (except as a result of a possible
assassination) at this time are as serious as he believes this
paragraph implies. [Footnote in the source text that first
appeared in the March 13 draft.1
/10/In the March 5 draft, a section IV,
"The Situation in North Vietnam and Communist China,"
followed this paragraph. The section concluded that "the
Viet Cong operation has been a North Vietnamese show from the
beginning and almost certainly remains so," and maintained
that Hanoi did not need help from China nor did it want it.
While leaning toward Peking rather than Moscow, North Vietnam
wanted to win the war in the south "by
itself." The section highlighted North Vietnam's
vulnerabilities: agriculture, a weak industrial base, and
dependence on outside sources for POL. The conclusion was that
the North Vietnamese feared U.S. action and "serious
pressure could affect Hanoi's determination or at least lead
them to throttle back." The assessment concluded that the
Soviet Union was presently unwilling to help North Vietnam and
that China, despite its encouragement,
was unwilling to commit itself to offering significant help.
E. On the positive side, we have found many reasons for
encouragement in the performance of the Khanh government to
date. Although its top layer is thin,/11/
it is highly responsive to U.S. advice, and with a good grasp of
the basic elements of rooting out the Viet Cong. Opposition
groups are fragmentary, and Khanh has brought in at least token
representation from many key groups hitherto left out. He is
keenly aware of the danger of assassination or coup and is
taking resourceful steps to minimize these risks. All told,
these evidences of energy, comprehension, and decision add up to
a sufficiently strong chance of Khanh's really taking hold in
the next few months for us to devote all possible energy and
resources to his support.
/11/In the March 13 draft, at this
point was the phrase "it is more able than under any
previous regime," with a footnote in the source text that
reads as follows:
"Mr. McCone, while encouraged by
Khanh's evident ability, does not believe that we have had
enough experience with the members of Khanh's government to be
able to make this judgment."
IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action
A. Negotiate on the Basis of "Neutralization"
While de Gaulle has not been clear on what he means by this
and is probably deliberately keeping it vague as he did in
working toward an Algerian settlement-he clearly means not only
a South Vietnam that would not be a Western base or part of an
alliance structure (both of which we could accept) but also
withdrawal of all external military assistance and specifically
total U.S. withdrawal. To negotiate on this basis-indeed without
specifically rejecting it would simply mean a Communist
take-over in South Vietnam. Only the U.S. presence after 1954
held the South together under far more favorable circumstances,
and enabled Diem to refuse to go through with the 1954 provision
calling for nationwide "free" elections in 1956. Even
talking about a U.S. withdrawal would undermine any chance of
keeping a non-Communist government in South Vietnam, and the rug
would probably be pulled before the negotiations had gone far.12
12 The March 5 draft contained an extensive discussion of
"just what kind of a solution we might be prepared to
accept at some point through the path of negotiation." This
section suggested refining thinking on possible acceptable
points to be included in future negotiations. Essentially, the
1954 Geneva Accords would provide the framework of the U.S.
position with the following exceptions: 1) Removal of
restrictions on external military assistance; 2) Establishment
of an effective guarantee of South Vietnam's borders with a
police mechanism more effective than the ICC; 3) An equivalent
guarantee of Cambodia's borders and a rewriting of the 1962 Laos
accords; and 4) Removal of the 1954 provision for "free
elections" in all of Vietnam. The discussion held that
neutralization of North Vietnam was unattainable, but could be
considered for tactical reasons. It concluded that "the
guts of what we are after is that North Vietnam should renew its
understanding not to interfere in the South, and that this
undertaking should be subject to really effective control this
time."
B. Initiate GVN and U.S. Military Actions Against North
Vietnam/13/
/13/From this point, the March 5 draft
differs both organizationally and substantively from the March
13 draft and final memorandum. The reorganization reflects the
results of the McNamara Mission. Hereafter only differences
between the March 13 draft and the final resort will be noted.
We have given serious thought to all the implications and
ways of carrying out direct military action against North
Vietnam in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in
South Vietnam. (The analysis of overt U.S. action is attached as
Annex A.)/14/ In summary, the
actions break down into three categories:
/14/Not found.
1. Border Control Actions. For example:
a. An expansion of current authority for Laotian overflights
to permit low-level reconnaissance by aircraft when such flights
are required to supplement the currently approved U-2 flights.
b. Vietnamese cross-border ground penetrations into Laos,
without the presence of U.S. advisors or re-supply by U.S.
aircraft.
c. Expansion of the patrols into Laos to include use of U.S.
advisors and re-supply by U.S. aircraft.
d. Hot pursuit of VC forces moving across the Cambodian
border and destruction of VC bases on the Vietnam/Cambodian
line.
e. Air and ground strikes against selected targets in Laos by
South Vietnam forces.
2. Retaliatory Actions. For example:
a. Overt high and/or low level reconnaissance flights by U.S.
or Farmgate aircraft over North Vietnam to assist in locating
and identifying the sources of external aid to the Viet Cong.
b. Retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids on a
tit-for-tat basis by the GVN against NVN targets (communication
centers, training camps, infiltration routes, etc.).
c. Aerial mining by the GVN aircraft (possibly with U.S.
assistance) of the major NVN ports.
3. Graduated Overt Military Pressure by GVN and U.S. Forces.
This program would go beyond reacting on a tit-for-tat basis.
It would include air attacks against military and possibly
industrial targets. The program would utilize the combined
resources of the GVN Air Force and the U.S. Farmgate Squadron,
with the latter reinforced by three squadrons of B-57s presently
in Japan. Before this program could be implemented it would be
necessary to provide some additional air defense for South
Vietnam and to ready U.S. forces in the Pacific for possible
escalation.
The analysis of the more serious of these military actions
(from 2(b) upward) revealed the extremely delicate nature of
such operations, both from the military and political
standpoints. There would be the problem of marshalling the case
to justify such action, the problem of Communist escalation, and
the problem of dealing with the pressures for premature or
"stacked" negotiations. We would have to calculate the
effect of such military actions against a specified political
objective. That objective, while being cast in terms of
eliminating North Vietnamese control and direction of the
insurgency, would in practical terms be directed toward
collapsing the morale and the self-assurance of the Viet Cong
cadres now operating in South Vietnam and bolstering the morale
of the Khanh regime. We could not, of course, be sure that our
objective could be achieved by any means within the practical
range of our options. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly,
unless and until the Khanh government has established its
position and preferably is making significant progress in the
South, an overt extension of operations into the North carries
the risk of being mounted from an extremely weak base which
might at any moment collapse and leave the posture of political
confrontation worsened rather than improved.
The other side of the argument is that the young Khanh
government needs the reinforcement of some significant successes
against the North and without them the in-country program, even
with the expansion discussed in Section C below, may not be
sufficient to stem the tide.
On balance, except to the extent suggested in Section V
below, I recommend against initiation at this time of overt GVN
and/or U.S. military actions against North Vietnam.
C. Initiate Measures to Improve the Situation in South
Vietnam
There were and are sound reasons for the limits imposed by
present policy-the South Vietnamese must win their own fight;
U.S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN actions against
the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In
any case, it is vital that we continue to take every reasonable
measure to assure success in South Vietnam. The policy choice is
not an "either/or" between this course of action and
possible pressures against the North; the former is essential
without regard to our decision with respect to the latter. The
latter can, at best, only reinforce the former.
The following are the actions we believe can be taken in
order to improve the situation both in the immediate future and
over a longer term period. To emphasize that a new phase has
begun, the measures to be taken by the Khanh government should
be described by some term such as "South Vietnam's Program
for National Mobilization."
Basic U.S. Posture
1. The U.S. at all levels must continue to make it
emphatically clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance
and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency
under control.
2. The U.S. at all levels should continue to make it clear
that we fully support the Khanh government and are totally
opposed to any further coupe. The ambassador should instruct all
elements, including the military advisors, to report
intelligence information of possible coups promptly, with the
decision to be made by the ambassador whether to report such
information to Khanh. However, we must recognize that our
chances would not be great of detecting and preventing a coup
that had major military backing.
3. We should support fully the Pacification Plan now
announced by Khanh (described in Annex B),/15/
and particularly the basic theory now fully accepted both on the
Vietnamese and U.S. sides-of concentrating on the more secure
areas and working out from these through military operations to
provide security, followed by necessary civil and economic
actions to make the presence of the government felt and to
provide economic improvements. This so-called "oil
spot" theory is excellent, and its acceptance is a major
step forward. However, it is necessary to push hard to get
specific instructions out to the provinces, so that there is
real unity of effort at all levels. A related matter is to
stabilize the assignment of province chiefs and senior
commanders and clarify their responsibilities and relationships.
/15/Not found, but see footnote 3,
Document 51.
Many of the actions described in succeeding paragraphs fit
right into the framework of the Plan as announced by Khanh.
Wherever possible, we should tie our urging of such actions to
Khanh's own formulation of them, so that he will be carrying out
a Vietnamese plan and not one imposed by the U.S.
Civil and Military Mobilization
4. To put the whole nation on a war footing--to obtain the
manpower for these efforts described below and to remedy present
inequities and inadequacies in the use of manpower--a new
National Mobilization Plan (to include a National Service Law)
should be urgently developed by the Country Team in
collaboration with the Khanh government. The present structure
of decrees, dating from the Diem government, is haphazard and
produces substantial injustices. The new Program for National
Mobilization would both greatly increase the effectiveness of
the war effort and be a strong visible sign of the government's
determination and will. Full attention should be given to the
way it is presented so that it appears as a remedy for past
injustices; and not as a repressive or totalitarian act.
5. The strength of the Armed Forces (regular plus
paramilitary) must be increased by at least 50,000 men. About
15,000 of these are required to fill the regular Armed Forces (ARVN)
to their present authorized strength. Another 5,000 would fill
the existing paramilitary forces to authorized strengths. The
balance of 30,000 men is required to increase the strength of
the paramilitary forces, in whatever form these may be organized
(see paragraph 7 below). (All of the foregoing strength figures
are illustrative and subject to review, which review I have
directed General Harkins to make in consultation with General
Khanh.)
6. A Civil Administrative Corps is urgently required to work
in the provincial capitals, the district towns, the villages,
and the hamlets. "Hamlet civic action teams" of five
men each are now beginning to be trained, on a small scale, to
go into hamlets after they have been cleared, start the
rehabilitation process, and train hamlet leaders to carry on.
School teachers and health technicians are now assigned to some
hamlets, many more are needed, and those on the job need to be
retrained to higher competence. Many other types of technicians
(e.g., agricultural workers) are needed, in varying numbers.
Taking into account the fact that many hamlets are not now
secure, and that adequate training is required, the initial goal
during 1964 should be at least 7,500 additional persons; the
ultimate target, at least 40,000 men for the 8,000 hamlets, in
2500 villages and 43 provinces. The administrators would come
largely from the areas in which they serve and would be paid by
the national government. The U.S. should work with the GVN
urgently to devise the necessary recruiting plans, training
facilities, financing methods, and organizational arrangements,
and should furnish training personnel at once, under the
auspices of the AID Mission. Further, maximum effort should be
made to make use of the available trained personnel by
assignment to provincial and village administration where
needed.
Improved Military Forces
7. The paramilitary forces are now understrength and lacking
in effectiveness. They must be improved and reorganized.
Specifically:
a. What remains of the present hamlet militia (and related
forces of a part-time nature for hamlet defense) should be
consolidated with the Self Defense Corps into a single force
compensated by the national government.
b. Pay and collateral benefits must be substantially improved
at once. A reasonable course of action would be to raise the pay
scale of the Civil Guard approximately to that of the regular
Armed Forces, and to raise the pay scale of a reorganized Self
Defense Corps approximately to the present level of the Civil
Guard. In addition, measures should be taken to improve the
housing and allowances of the families of both forces, so that
they can live decently in areas near where the forces are
operating.
c. Strength should be maintained and expanded by
conscription, effectively enforced, and by more centrally
directed recruitment policies.
d. Additional U.S. personnel should be assigned to the
training of all these paramilitary forces.
e. The National Police require special consideration. Their
strength in the provinces should be substantially increased and
consideration should be given to including them as part of an
overall "Popular Defense Force". In expanding and
improving the police, the AID Mission should make special
arrangements to draw on the advice of the present British
training mission under Brigadier Thompson because of its
experience in Malaya. (Mr. Bell has instructed Mr. Brent, the
USOM Chief, to accomplish this.)
8. An offensive Guerrilla force should be created to operate
along the border and in areas where VC control is dominant. Such
a force could be organized around present Ranger Companies and
ARVN Special Forces and provided with special training and
advice by U.S. Special Forces. The force should carry the fight
to the VC on their own basis in advance of clear-and-hold
operations on the conventional pattern.
Additional Military Equipment for the GVN
9. The Vietnamese Air Force should be strengthened at once by
the substitution of 25 A-1H aircraft for the present 25 T-28s.
The A-1H aircraft has a much greater bomb load and slightly
better speed.16
16 Concurrently, the effectiveness of the USAF's Farmgate
operation will be increased by assignment of A-1E aircraft in
replacement of B-26s and T-28s. Furthermore, in another
important area, we are strengthening the U.S. intelligence and
reporting system. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. Although there are no major equipment deficiencies in
other forces, we should act at once to replace the present M-114
armored personnel carriers by 63 M-113s and to provide
additional river boats. Additional lesser deficiencies should
also be met at an estimated cost of approximately $10 million.
Economic Actions
11. The approved, but unannounced, Fertilizer Program should
be particularly stressed and expanded and publicly announced.
Its target of 85,000 tons for the present planting season
(April-June) should probably be doubled for the next season and
trebled the following season, both to provide immediate and
direct benefits to peasants in secure areas and to improve the
rice crops and export earnings. Estimates are that an additional
ton of fertilizer costing around $70 can, if properly applied,
produce additional yield of an equivalent two tons of rice,
which might be sold for $110 per ton. Thus, the potential export
improvement alone could be on the order of $20 million from this
year's 85,000 ton input.
US and GVN Costs of the Above Actions
The above actions will involve a limited increase in U.S.
personnel and in direct Defense Department costs. More
significantly, they involve significant increase in Military
Assistance Program costs and in the budget of the GVN itself,
with the latter requiring additional US economic aid. The
estimates of additional annual costs are as follows:
|
Action
|
GVN Budget Costs
|
Cost to U.S.
|
| |
|
|
|
a. Raise military and paramilitary numbers and pay
scales
|
5-6 billion piastres
|
$30-40 million/17/
|
| |
|
|
|
b. Enlarge civil administrative cadre
|
250 million piastres (1st year)
|
$1,500,000 (first year)
|
| |
|
|
|
c. Furnish additional military equipment
|
|
$20 million (one time)
|
/17/Increases in GVN budget
expenditures do not automatically require equal increases in
U.S. economic aid. As a rough approximation, subject to later
refinement, an increase of 5-6 billion piastres of GVN budget
expenditures might require an increase of $30-40 million worth
of imports financed through U.S. economic aid. Some of the
imports undoubtedly could be obtained under P.L. 480. [Footnote
in the source text.]
Conclusion
If the Khanh government can stay in power and the above
actions can be carried out rapidly, it is my judgment that the
situation in South Vietnam can be significantly improved in the
next four to six months./18/ The
present deterioration may continue for a part of this period,
but I believe it can be levelled out and some improvement will
become visible during the period. I therefore believe that this
course of action should be urgently pursued while we prepare
such additional actions as may be necessary for success.
/18/In the March 13 draft, the time
frame for improvement was "the next three to four
months" and an extensive crossed-out footnote reads as
follows:
"Mr. McCone believes that the
situation in South Vietnam is so serious that it calls for more
immediate and positive action than I have proposed. His reasons
are: '(1) General Minh is discontented and his attitude will be
a drag on Khanh's efforts to activate the military and civilian
establishments. (2) Khanh's three Vice Premiers cannot give him
the solid help that he needs because two of them, Hoan (an
important political figure in Dai Viet Party) and Oanh (a
capable economist and professor) have been out of the country
for ten years or more and are therefore out of touch, and
General Mau is known to be an affable but not a strong figure.
General Khiem (Minister of Defense) is not particularly impressive.
Parenthetically, it is reported to me that Generals Khiem, Mau
and Thieu (Khanh's Chief of Staff) are the trio who conceived
the January 30th coup. (3) I have received so many reports that
the ARVN, from field grade officers down, lack the motivation
and will and/or techniques to confront the enemy that I cannot
but accept this as probable truth. This is also present among
the middle and lower level civil officials. (4) The morale of
the people in the hamlets and villages and countryside is
reported as very low. (5) The irregular forces, i.e., Civil
Guard and Self Defense Corps, are ineffective and the Hamlet
Militia have virtually disintegrated. (6) The Viet Cong
situation is improving militarily, organizationally, and in
their political power over the people of the countryside.'"
"He concurs in the actions
outlined in the previous pages and in Sections V and V11 below,
but states that they are 'too little too late.' In addition he
would: (1) Have General Khanh meet immediately with Sihanouk for
the purpose of developing a joint South Vietnam-Cambodia program
to clear the Cambodian border. And, if there is no successful
meeting, General Khanh with U.S. assistance would stop all
traffic on the Mekong River into and from Cambodia, and would
implement immediately 'border control' item (b) on page
5 above (i.e., Vietnamese patrols, with appropriate U.S. aerial
resupply, into Laotian territory). (3) Have Khanh negotiate with
Chiang Kai-shek for the movement of two or possibly three
divisions into the southern tip of the Delta in order to give
impetus and support to the hard-pressed ARVN effort in that
area. (4) Implement immediately 'retaliatory' item (a) on page 6
above (i.e., overt U.S. air reconnaissance over North Vietnam).
He recommends that the overflights be over populous areas for
psychological in addition to intelligence purposes."
V. Possible Later Actions
If the Khanh government takes hold vigorously-inspiring
confidence, whether or not noteworthy progress has been made-or
if we get hard information of significantly stepped-up VC arms
supply from the North, we may wish to mount new and significant
pressures against North Vietnam. We should start preparations
for such a capability now. (See Annex C for an analysis of the
situation in North Vietnam and Communist China.)/19/
Specifically, we should develop a capability to initiate within
72 hours the "Border Control"/20/
and "Retaliatory Actions" referred to on pages 5 and
6, and we should achieve a capability to initiate with 30 days'
notice the program of "Graduated Overt Military
Pressure." The reasoning behind this program of
preparations for initiating action against North Vietnam is
rooted in the fact that, even with progress in the pacification
plan, the Vietnamese Government and the population in the South
will still have to face the prospect of a very lengthy campaign
based on a war-weary nation and operating against Viet Cong
cadres who retain a great measure of motivation and assurance.
/19/Not found
/20/Authority should be granted
immediately for covert Vietnamese operations into Laos, for the
purposes of border control and of "hot pursuit" into
Laos. Decision on "hot pursuit" into Cambodia should
await further study of our relations with that country.
[Footnote in the source text.]
In this connection, General Khanh stated that his primary
concern is to establish a firm base in the South. He favors
continuation of covert activities against North Vietnam, but
until such time as "rear area security" has been
established, he does not wish to engage in overt operations
against the North.
In order to accelerate the realization of pacification and
particularly in order to denigrate the morale of the Viet Cong
forces, it may be necessary at some time in the future to put
demonstrable retaliatory pressure on the North. Such a course of
action might proceed according to the scenario outlined in Annex
D.
VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected
We have considered the following actions, but rejected them
for the time being except to the extent indicated below:
1. Return of Dependents. We recommend that the present policy
be continued of permitting dependents to return home on a
voluntary basis, but not ordering them to do so. The security
situation in Saigon appears to have improved significantly, and
ordering dependents home would now, in the universal judgment of
our senior people in Saigon, have a serious impact on South
Vietnamese morale. It would also raise a serious question
whether tours of duty for AID personnel would not have to be
shortened. Thus, unless there are further serious incidents, or
unless we were taking more drastic measures generally we believe
compulsory return should not be undertaken.
2. Furnishing a U.S. Combat Unit to Secure the Saigon Area.
It is the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon,
with which we concur, that this action would now have serious
adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken.
3. U.S. Taking Over Command. It has been suggested that the
U.S. move from its present advisory role to a role that would
amount in practice to effective command. Again, the judgment of
all senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, is that the
possible military advantages of such action would be far
outweighed by its adverse psychological impact. It would cut
across the whole basic picture of the Vietnamese winning their
own war and lay us wide open to hostile propaganda both within
South Vietnam and outside. Moreover, the present responsiveness
of the GVN to our advice-although it has not yet reduced
military reaction time-makes it less urgent. At the same time,
MACV is steadily taking actions to bring U.S. and GVN operating
staffs closer together at all levels, including joint operating
rooms at key command levels.
VII. Recommendations/21/
/21/The March 13 draft contains a
crossed-out footnote that reads as follows:
"Mr. McCone believes that these
recommendations, in which he concurs without reservation, are
inadequate to meet the `very serious situation confronting us in
Vietnam and recommends the additional actions stated in the
footnote to the Conclusions to Section IV of this Report for the
reasons there stated.'"
I recommend that you instruct the appropriate agencies of the
U.S. Government:
1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish
assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes
to bring the insurgency under control.
2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh
government and are opposed to any further coupe.
3. To support a Program for National Mobilization (including
a national service law) to put South Vietnam on a war footing.
4. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces
(regular plus paramilitary) by at least 50,000 men.
5. To assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged
Civil Administrative Corps for work at province, district and
hamlet levels.
6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the
paramilitary forces and to increase their compensation.
7. To assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla
force.
8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-1H aircraft in
exchange for the present T-28s.
9. To provide the Vietnamese Army additional M-113 armored
personnel carriers (withdrawing the M-114s there), additional
river boats, and approximately $5-10 million of other additional
material.
10. To announce publicly the Fertilizer Program and to expand
it with a view within two years to trebling/22/
the amount of fertilizer made available.
/22/In the March 13 draft, the amount
of fertilizer to be made available reads "doubled."
11. To authorize continued high-level U.S. overflights of
South Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit"
and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for
the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into
Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized
only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the
Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with
Cambodia.
12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours'
notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian
"Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in
paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliatory Actions"
against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on 30 days'
notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military
Pressure" against North Vietnam.
Robert S. McNamara
85. Message From the President to the Ambassador in
Vietnam (Lodge)/1/
Washington, March 17, 1964--9:28 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted in
the White House and approved by Rusk. Transmitted as telegram
1454 to Saigon, which is the source text.
1. I have now personally reviewed your cables 1754 through
1757/2/ and have considered them
with Secretaries of State and Defense. I am delighted to find
that we have a very high measure of agreement.
/2/In these telegrams from Saigon,
March 15, Lodge commented on the March 13 draft of the McNamara
report. Lodge thought that the situation in South Vietnam had
been growing worse since May, not September, 1963. He took
exception to the view that U.S. officials in Vietnam were any
more "frustrated" than was normal "in the tropics
dealing with orientals," and noted that CIA "old
hands" reported some improvement in the lower Delta. Lodge
thought that most former province chiefs were incompetent, did
not consider the jailed Generals a threat to Khanh's control of
the army, and blamed the poor showing
of South Vietnam in reacting to the Viet Cong's challenge on the
Diem government's policies and legacy. As for McCone's views,
Lodge doubted that a meeting between Sihanouk and Khanh would
accomplish much, and he considered stopping traffic on the
Mekong bound for Cambodia and hot pursuit of Viet Cong into
Cambodia as justifiable because Cambodia was no longer a
"bona fide neutral." Lodge opposed the idea
of Chinese Nationalist troops in Vietnam, although he thought
they and the South Koreans might serve as advisers. He opposed
recommendation 12 of the McNamara report, recommended his idea
of a "diplomatic carrot-and-stick approach backed by covert
military means" in dealing with North Vietnam, and reserved
judgment on overt U.S. military action against the North. (All
ibid., POL 27 VIET S, except telegram 1756 which is POL 32
CAMBODIA-VIET S)
2. Your comments on various sections of McNamara report/3/
make good sense to all of us, and report has been revised to
meet most of your points. Revised version as approved today in
National Security Council follows by air.
/3/Supra.
3. We have also shortened and amended the White House
statement/4/ to reconcile it with
your comments. Different people seem to view the past
differently, but there is no point in letting such differences
worry us as we go forward.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 86.
4. Specifically with respect to the comments in your 1757
your whole-hearted support of first eleven recommendations
covers our most important efforts which are still in South
Vietnam. On your additional comments, I have reached the
following conclusions:
(1) I think additional actions against Laos and Cambodia
should be intensively examined. We have agreed that cross-border
ground penetrations should be initiated into Laos along any
lines which can be worked out by Khanh and Phoumi with
Souvanna's endorsement, and I will authorize low-level
reconnaissance there wherever the present high-level flights
indicate that such reconnaissance may be needed.
The questions of further U.S. participation and of air and
ground strikes against Laos raise tough diplomatic issues and I
have asked Rusk and McNamara to concert a further
recommendation. My first thought is that it is important to seek
support from Souvanna Phouma and to build a stronger case before
we take action which might have only limited military effect and
could trigger wider Communist action in Laos.
On Cambodia we find ourselves hard put to keep abreast of the
rapid changes Sihanouk introduces into the scene./5/
Our impression is that bilateral GVN-RKG talks may now be in
progress and State has sent you some thoughts on those
prospects./6/ However, in the event
of further deterioration, I would expect to authorize hot
pursuit.
/5/Sihanouk rejected a proposal for a
quadripartite conference on Cambodia, rejected bilateral talks
with South Vietnam on frontier differences, and sent a mission
to Hanoi to discuss South Vietnamese border matters.
/6/Apparent reference to telegram 1452
to Saigon, March 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 8
CAMB)
On overt high- or low-level reconnaissance over North
Vietnam, we are not ready to make a decision now. I have asked
that political and diplomatic preparations be made to lay a
basis for such reconnaissance if it seems necessary or desirable
after a few weeks, for military or political reasons, or both.
(2) As I read your comments on John McCone's points, the main
items are those discussed above on Laos and Cambodia. We agree
that Mekong traffic is a trump card, and State has already sent
you a message on this question./7/
/7/Not further identified.
We agree that large-scale Chinese Nationalist incursion would
be a mistake, but high quality advisers are different matter and
we will send further thoughts on that.
(3) I have ordered a review of your paper of October 30./8/
My own inclination is to favor such pressures, short of overt
military action.
/8/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963,
vol. v, pp. 656-659.
(4) Like you, I reserve judgment on such overt U.S. measures
against North Vietnam. Question of direct retaliation for
attacks on Americans is more complex. As I understand it from
McNamara mission, these attacks are not an immediate present
threat, but you are authorized to prepare contingency
recommendation for specific tit-for-tat actions in the event
attacks on Americans are renewed.
Your cable does not mention it, but Bob McNamara has reported
your concern about the effectiveness of our representations to
the French. I have discussed this matter with Bohlen and we now
plan that he will raise these matters with General de Gaulle
personally when latter returns from Caribbean. Department is
drafting instructions and will circulate them for your comment
before they are final./9/ Meanwhile
we may wish to consider whether at some point it would be
fruitful for you to go to Paris yourself to explain the
realities of the situation to the General. In the light of your
wartime connection with France, this possibility seems to me to
have real merit./10/
/9/See footnote 3, Document 92.
/10/Telegram 1454 does not bear
President Johnson's signature.
86. Summary Record of the 524th Meeting of the National
Security Council, Washington, March 17, 1964, Noon/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam.
Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. A full attendance list for
this meeting is ibid.
REPORT OF SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S TRIP TO VIETNAM
In response to a request from the President, Mr. McCone
reported that there was nothing new out of Vietnam this morning
worthy of mention. Secretary Rusk said that we had preliminary
information about what might become an important new
development, i.e., that Sihanouk of Cambodia is turning away
from North Vietnam and is prepared to work out an understanding
with South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk presented the recommendations on pages 17 and
18 of Secretary McNamara's report on Vietnam (attached)./2/
He said that no one could guarantee that the proposed program
would ensure success, but that if the situation in South Vietnam
continued to deteriorate, the proposed recommendations provided
for readying forces which could be used if it were decided later
to take the war to North Vietnam.
/2/Document 84
Secretary McNamara said he had no additional comments to make
but asked General Taylor to present the military actions
discussed in the report. General Taylor began by commenting that
highlevel overflights of North Vietnam are now possible, but if
we required low-level reconnaissance, we will have to use U.S.
planes overtly. General Taylor then covered the sections of the
report, including border control actions, retaliatory actions,
and the graduated overt military pressure program. He said that
the kinds of military actions he described would produce strong
reactions in Cambodia and in North Vietnam including, as a final
act, asking the Chinese Communists to come to their support.
Risk of escalation would be greatest if we undertook the overt
military pressure program, and before doing so, we would want to
improve the readiness of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific.
General Taylor said the Chiefs support the McNamara report.
They favor readying forces now which would be required if it
were decided later to take further military action than that
recommended in the report. The Chiefs also want to examine the
possibility of reducing from 72 to 24 hours the prior notice
required to undertake actions against North Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara said that each Department and Agency
concurs with the recommendations which fall in its area of
responsibility. Ambassador Lodge agrees with all the
recommendations except for his views on the need for overt
reconnaissance of Cambodia. Mr. McGeorge Bundy pointed out that
Ambassador Lodge's recommendation on Cambodian reconnaissance
has been overtaken by events. No decision on this matter can be
taken until we have further information about the conversations
which are taking place between Khanh and the Cambodians.
The President said it was his understanding that Ambassador
Lodge approved all the recommendations in the report except the
one which has been overtaken by events and which he can be told
lies in the area of unfinished business. The President then
asked Secretary McNamara to summarize all twelve of his
recommendations.
Secretary McNamara said as to cost, the program proposed
would involve an expenditure of between $50 million and $60
million by the South Vietnamese, but that the actual cost to us
would be approximately $30 million. Some of the cost will be
covered by PL 480 funds and the remainder will come from
reallocation of funds to meet the new plans. No supplemental
budget request will be necessary.
Secretary McNamara covered very briefly all twelve
recommendations. He agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should
study the proposal to reduce the 72-hour notice proposal
contained in Recommendation 12. He agreed that this time should
be reduced if it is possible to do so without resulting in the
maldeployment of our forces in the Pacific.
The President asked Secretary McNamara if his program would
reverse the current trend in South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara
replied that if we carry out energetically the proposals he has
made, Khanh can stem the tide in South Vietnam, and within four
to six months, improve the situation there.
The President summarized the alternatives to the recommended
course of action, i.e., putting in more U.S. forces, pulling out
of the area, or neutralizing the area. He said the course we are
following is the only realistic alternative. It will have the
maximum effectiveness with the minimum loss.
General Taylor said the Chiefs believed the proposed program
was acceptable, but it may not be sufficient to save the
situation in Vietnam. He commented that the Chiefs' interest in
military action against North Vietnam was based on their belief
that action against North Vietnam might be necessary to make
effective the program recommended by Secretary McNamara.
Secretary McNamara commented that Khanh had told him that he
opposed taking the war to North Vietnam now because he felt that
the South Vietnamese need a more secure base in the South before
undertaking expanded military action.
The President said the McNamara proposals did not foreclose
action later if the situation did not improve as we expected. He
asked whether anyone present had any objections. Hearing none,
he said the recommendations were approved.
The President, accompanied by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara,
USIA Director Rowan, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, went to his office
where a draft press statement was revised and later issued.
(Copy attached)/3/
/3/The final statement is printed in
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1963-64, pp. 387-388. Attached to a Department of State
copy of the McNamara report of March 16 was a draft of this
statement with handwritten revisions. (Department of State,
S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meetings, 3/17/64)
Bromley Smith/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this
typed signature.
87. National Security Action Memorandum No. 288/1/
Washington, March 17, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, NSAMs. Secret
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
SUBJECT
Implementation of South Vietnam Programs
1. The report of Secretary McNamara dated March 16, 1964 was
considered and approved by the President in a meeting of the
National Security Council on March 17. All agencies concerned
are directed to proceed energetically with the execution of the
recommendations of that report.
2. The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense, has designated the Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to coordinate the
execution of the recommendations in the report.
McGeorge Bundy
88. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the
Secretary of State and the Director of the United States
Information Agency (Rowan), Washington, March 17, 1964, 5:15
p.m./1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk
Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification
marking. Transcribed by Carolyn J. Proctor of Secretary Rusk's
staff.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. ROWAN
R said in terms of our broadcast into North Vietnam, we are
confused as to whether we should play up North Vietnam as tool
of Chinese or that they are caught between Moscow and Peking.
Sec said he would think the theme should be their leaders are
leading them into an unnecessary and fratricidal struggle with
their brothers and this is eating up their own resources and
threatening them with unnecessary dangers. Sec said he would
think R should draw the line between Hanoi leadership and their
own people; and then the Chinese business; Sec said not to get
into the Moscow-Peking aspect.
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Vietnam.]
89. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National
Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 18, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
I have read Bill Smith's two memoranda on Vietnam/2/
with great interest. These support in appropriate cautious
language some of the things which I have been hearing myself. It
may be worthwhile for all of us if I commit to paper some
additional evidence in support of Bill Smith's worries.
/2/In March 17 memoranda to Bundy,
William Y. Smith of the NSC Staff reported
"undercurrents" of pessimism within the Department of
Defense over the situation in South Vietnam. The belief was that
there was no alternative to Khnah, yet he did not have the
ability to rally the army. Furthermore, Smith reported that some
feared that the Johnson administration was not taking forthright
action because of the upcoming Presidential
campaign. In his second memorandum, Smith drew an analogy
between the missile gap issue in the 1960 campaign and Vietnam
in 1964. Smith suggested that the Johnson administration should
avoid the mistakes made by Eisenhower in 1960 by briefing
opposition candidates on Vietnam and by making sure that the
administration spoke with one voice. (Ibid.)
Before Sullivan left for Saigon, he attended a meeting of the
JCS with Secretary McNamara and General Taylor. Sullivan
reported to me that he was impressed by the vehemence of opinion
in the JCS for strong overt U.S. action against the North.
Admiral McDonald was particularly outspoken, but the other
Chiefs appeared to support his views.
General Anthis (who is Krulak's successor) told me after a
rather wet working dinner at Ray Cline's office that he felt if
we couldn't "make the high jumps in South Vietnam, then we
should pole-vault into the North".
After the mission's return from Saigon, Sullivan tells me
that McNamara's report was very strenuously criticized by some
officers in MACV and some of his own team. Yesterday a
correspondent from Time Magazine (Cook) told me he was convinced
that the decision not to attack the North was made because
President Johnson did not wish to face a domestic political
crisis before the election. He said that his Pentagon sources
were convinced that the correct decision in Vietnam was avoided
for this reason. I told him this was hogwash and could not come
from responsible officials and certainly not anyone who was
associated with the top-level team representing all interested
agencies who accompanied the Secretary.
So I agree with Bill Smith that there may be a problem
developing here, but I don't think it is quite like the missile
gap issue in 1960. The difficulty then apparently was that the
Eisenhower Administration felt it could not safely disclose
enough of the facts to permit a reasonable explanation of the
Government's position. I don't think quite the same problem
exists with respect to our policies in Southeast Asia today. The
question of whether or not overt U.S. forces should be used
against the North depends upon an assessment of factors which
are, in most instances, currently discussed in the press.
Against the history of the Bay of Pigs and the October Cuban
crisis, the advantage in political debate, I think, lies with
the Administration. Prudence and caution are really more popular
stances, I believe, than loud demands for war. The thing to
avoid is too flat an impression that we have stopped thinking
about all the possibilities.
I agree with Bill Smith that responsible officials in the
Government should be encouraged to speak quite frankly about our
current estimates of the position in South Vietnam and the
rationale supporting McNamara's recommendations. In speaking
about the North, it should be emphasized that the situation is
constantly being reviewed by Defense and State to see if further
actions need be taken.
Actually, I am somewhat more worried by those who argue for a
bugout in Southeast Asia than I am by the adherents of Rostow.
Mike
90. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/
Washington, March 18, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. No classification
marking.
Attached are two parting memoranda from Roger Hilsman to Dean
Rusk which are worth your attention when you have a chance to
read them. With exceptions, I think they are a good and clear
assessment of the basic view of the matter which this Government
has had right along. Roger is a better analyst than
administrator, and this is the sort of thing he has done best.
His specific proposal that we put some troops in Thailand is
more attractive to State Department and White House staff than
to the Pentagon, because its object is political and not
military. I think you may hear more of this proposal in coming
weeks.
McG. B.
Attachment
Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State/2/
Washington, March 14, 1964.
/2/Secret. The letter was not attached
to the covering memorandum from Bundy to the President. Hilsman
sent copies of this letter and the attached memorandum to
McNamara, McCone, Harriman, William and McGeorge Bundy, and
Forrestal.
Dear Mr. Secretary: As I leave Government service and the
post of Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, I
thought it might be useful for me to set down my thoughts on the
persistent and stubborn problem of Southeast Asia, which has
plagued us for the past decade.
Although our ability to control the course of events in
Southeast Asia is inherently limited, I think the root of our
present troubles there--in South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and
even Thailand--lies primarily in the gnawing doubts of both the
Southeast Asians and the Communists as to our ultimate
intentions in the region.
Since the fall of Dienbienphu, all Asians have wondered about
our determination to fight in Southeast Asia, should fighting
become necessary. Given the facts of life in a nuclear world,
they are not impressed with the totality of our power even
though the strategic balance tips heavily in our favor. Both
free and Communist Asians scrutinize our actions and words for
signs of U.S. determination to use appropriate force, tailored
to the essentially limited political objectives we seek in this
part of the world-that is, free and independent nations rather
than bastions of anti-Communism. But of such determination they
seem to feel they have seen few signs. The alacrity with which
the Communists fell into line after we introduced troops into
Thailand following the fall of Nam Tha illustrates the
effectiveness of such moves as well as the fact that the
Communists continue to worry that we might well fight if they
push us too hard.
It seems to me that these doubts about our ultimate
intentions are fundamental and recurrent wherever you look in
Southeast Asia. We all say that Sihanouk is misbehaving because
he feels that we are losing in South Viet-Nam. But even Sihanouk
understands the extent of American power, and what he means by
his statement that Communism is the wave of the future is most
probably that he feels the United States is not prepared to do
what is necessary to preserve Southeast Asia as a whole.
Generosity, maturity, and restraint have not worked with
Sihanouk. But so far it must seem to him that we are acting from
weakness, and he might respond quite differently if he thought
we were acting from strength.
In Laos, the Communists have pursued a two-track policy. They
scratch away at the neutralist and conservative positions with
one hand, pausing on each occasion to assess our reaction. With
the other hand, they continue to toy with talks about a
Government of National Union and implementation of the Geneva
Accords. Quite clearly, they are keeping both lines open-ready
to go ahead with implementing the Geneva Accords if and when
they finally become convinced that we are both able and
determined to permit them no other honorable alternative, and
ready to nibble our position away completely if we appear
indecisive.
The Thais, with infinite patience, are merely waiting.
Although their indecision shows occasionally in reminiscences
about their past successes in balancing off the rivalries of
Great Powers, most Thais are prepared to be stubborn: they will
match what they think is vigor with vigor and what they think is
indecisiveness with indecisiveness.
The South Vietnamese are equally concerned. DeGaulle,
Lippmann, and Mansfield have set the neutralist hares running
with self-fulfilling prophecies that dishearten those who wish
to fight and encourage coup-plotting among both the true
neutralists and the simple opportunists. But what gives these
lofty, unrealistic thoughts of a peaceful neutralist Asia their
credibility is, again, fundamental doubts about our ultimate
intentions.
A corollary to the preceding analysis is that we have so far
failed as a Government to mesh fully the many different
instrumentalities of foreign policy and thus to obtain full
benefit from mutually reinforcing actions. This is true
throughout Southeast Asia, but especially in South Viet-Nam. It
applies to all instrumentalities of foreign policy equally, but
it can best be summed up by Clausewitz's dictum that war is
politics pursued by other means. We must learn better how to
tailor our military might, aid, etc., to political purposes and,
most important, to orchestrate military power more neatly with
diplomacy and politics.
If we can successfully convince our friends and allies as
well as the Communists and those, such as de Gaulle and
Sihanouk, who tend to serve the Communists' purposes, that we
are determined to take whatever measures are necessary in
Southeast Asia to protect those who oppose the Communists and to
maintain our power and influence in the area, we will have
established an atmosphere in which our problems in Laos,
Viet-Nam and Cambodia may be amenable to solution. In such an
atmosphere, the Communist side must inevitably be more cautious
as it contemplates the possibility that we might escalate
hostility to a level unacceptable to them. It is not necessary
that they be certain of what we will do; but we must give them
reason to assume that we are prepared to go as far as necessary
to defeat their plans and achieve our objectives.
I believe, therefore, that we must urgently begin to
strengthen our overall military posture in Southeast Asia in
ways which will make it clear that we are single-mindedly
improving our capability to take whatever military steps may be
necessary to halt Communist aggression in the area. Because
Thailand, a loyal friend and ally, is the keystone of our
position in Southeast Asia, we should begin by introducing
substantial U.S. ground and air forces into that country in
order (1) to imply clearly that we are prepared to introduce
U.S. ground forces into Laos if necessary, and (2) to guarantee
that, whatever else happens, Thailand itself will not be left to
the mercy of Communist aggression. This step, in which some of
our SEATO allies should be willing to join, must be accompanied
by a diplomatic offensive designed (1) to reassure our friends
as to our determination, and (2) to warn the Communist side that
they are indeed playing a "deeply dangerous game."
I scarcely need add that I do not envisage this U.S. buildup
of a military presence in Thailand as susceptible to
dismantlement in the short term. No matter what we do, our
problems in Southeast Asia are not going to vanish overnight and
we must be prepared to maintain a strong military posture in the
area quite indefinitely. (I believe the Thais will gratefully
accept and fully cooperate with such a determined U.S. approach
to the mutual threat; as I say, all that really bothers them is
doubt as to our intention to remain in the area.)
At the same time, we should keep clear in our own minds an
important distinction between means and objectives in Southeast
Asia. A strong military posture in Thailand is an instrument,
not an objective. Its purpose will be served once Thailand and
its neighbors have the wherewithal to maintain their own freedom
and independence whether through new collective security
arrangements or a gradual receding of the Communist threat.
Meanwhile, the strengthening of our position in Thailand,
together with our flat assertions of determination to take
whatever steps the situation in the area requires and our clear
commitment to a victory in the guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam,
would, in my view, make all of the problems we face in the area
more susceptible to effective treatment.
By way of conclusion, I would say that we have not yet lost
the struggle for Southeast Asia, and I see no reason for
despair. But I believe we must focus on the essentials of the
problems confronting us and pursue an integrated and coordinated
policy toward the area as a whole if we are to come out on top.
We must take action that will make it clear to friend and foe
alike that we mean to fulfill our responsibilities in Southeast
Asia.
I am attaching a separate summary of my views on the
situation we face in South Viet-Nam.
Sincerely,
Roger Hilsman
Attachment
Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State/3/
Washington, March 14, 1964
/3/Secret.
SUBJECT
South Viet-Nam
In my judgment, the strategic concept that was developed for
South Viet-Nam remains basically sound. If we can ever manage to
have it implemented fully and with vigor, the result will be
victory.
The concept is based on the assumption that villagers in
Southeast Asia are fumed inward on themselves and have little or
no sense of identification with either the national government
or Communist ideology--that the villagers are isolated
physically, politically and psychologically. In such
circumstances, it is not at all difficult to develop a guerrilla
movement. In Burma during World War II, about 150 Americans
created a guerrilla force of 30,000, and did it with white
faces. It is hardly surprising that the Viet Cong could do
equally well or better in South Viet-Nam.
A corollary to this assumption is that the villagers'
greatest desire is security and that, if the villagers are given
security, some simple progress towards a better life, and--most
important of all--a sense that the government cares about them
and their future, they will respond with loyalty.
The recent USIA survey of Long An/4/
gives some evidence of the validity of this assumption. 1,250
families were interviewed in Long An, which is among the worst
of the Delta provinces. The results were as follows: In insecure
villages, 75 percent of the people expressed an attitude towards
the Viet Cong and the government that was essentially "a
plague on both their houses", and 25 percent of the people
were silent. In relatively secure villages--those which could be
penetrated by large Viet Cong groups but not by small
patrols--50 percent of the people took a "plague on both
their houses" point of view, and 50 percent were mildly
pro-government. In very secure villages, which had also received
some benefits, such as a school or a well, the people were 100
percent pro-government and expressed a determination to fight
the Viet Cong.
/4/Not further identified.
On the basis of such an apparently valid assumption, the
strategic concept calls for primary emphasis on giving security
to the villagers. The tactics are the so-called oil-blot
approach, starting with a secure area and extending it slowly,
making sure no Viet Cong pockets are left behind, and using
police units to winkle out the Viet Cong agents in each
particular village.
This calls for the use of military forces in a different way
from that of orthodox, conventional war. Rather than chasing
Viet Cong, the military must put primary emphasis on
clear-and-hold operations and on rapid reinforcement of villages
under attack. It is also important, of course, to keep the Viet
Cong regular units off balance by conventional offensive
operations, but these should be secondary to the major task of
extending security.
All this requires careful coordination of military
operations, police efforts and rural development towards the
primary objectives: the extension of security over the
heavily-populated regions of the Delta, the cutting off of Viet
Cong sources of supplies and especially recruits, and their
dispersion into the jungles and mountains where they can be worn
down by attrition, starvation and more conventional military
means.
At the heart of the strategic concept are two basic
principles:
The first is that of the oil blot. In the past, the GVN
sought to blanket the whole country with so-called strategic
hamlets which in many cases involved nothing more than
wire-enclosed villages doused with political propaganda, with
the Viet Cong agents left in place. The result was to blanket
the Delta with little Dienbienphus--indefensible, inadequately
armed hamlets far from reinforcements, that lacked both
government benefits and police facilities to winkle out
Communist sympathizers, with Viet Cong pockets left behind. In
effect these were storage places of arms for the Viet Cong which
could be seized at any time. After November 1st, the military
began to demobilize some of these vulnerable villages and
outposts, and a race developed between the government and the
Viet Cong. The race may have ended in a tie, but the result is
that the Viet Cong now have much better weapons and greater
stocks of ammunition than they ever had before.
The second basic principle is that the way to fight a
guerrilla is to adopt the tactics of the guerrilla--night
ambushes, small patrols, and so on. In spite of all our
pressures, this has never been done in Viet-Nam. Instead, the
emphasis has been on large operations, artillery and air
bombardments, and the use of cumbersome battalion-sized units
which telegraph their movements to the Viet Cong.
As to the question of operations against North Viet-Nam, I
would suggest that such operations may at a certain stage be a
useful supplement to an effective counterinsurgency program, but
that they would not be an effective substitute for such a
program.
My own preference would be to continue the covert, or at
least deniable, operations along the general lines we have been
following for some months with the objective, since these are
only pinpricks, not of forcing North Viet-Nam to its knees but
of keeping the threat of eventual destruction alive in Hanoi's
mind. Then after we had made sufficient progress in the Delta so
that all concerned began to realize that the Viet Cong were
losing the support of the population, and that their ability to
continue the war depended solely on North Vietnamese support, I
think we should indicate as much privately to the North
Vietnamese and follow this by selected attacks on their
infiltration bases and training camps.
In my judgment, significant action against North Viet-Nam
that is taken before we have demonstrated success in our
counterinsurgency program will be interpreted by the Communists
as an act of desperation, and will, therefore, not be effective
in persuading the North Vietnamese to cease and desist. What is
worse, I think that premature action will so alarm our friends
and allies and a significant segment of domestic opinion that
the pressures for neutralization will become formidable.
In sum, I believe that we can win in Viet-Nam with a number
of provisos.
The first proviso is that we do not over-militarize the
war--that we concentrate not on killing Viet Cong and the
conventional means of warfare, but on an effective program for
extending the areas of security gradually, systematically, and
thoroughly. This will require better teamwork in Saigon than we
have had in the past and considerably more emphasis on
clear-and-hold operations and on police work than we ourselves
have given to the Vietnamese.
The problems of getting effective teamwork is troublesome.
Ideally, what we need is what the British had in Malaya--a
Gerald Templer/5/ who has absolute
authority to hire and fire anyone in any agency or department
and through whom all reporting and all orders are transmitted.
/5/General Sir Gerald W.R. Templer,
British Commander in Chief, Eastern Command, 1950-1951, and High
Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, 1952-1954.
My second proviso is that there be political stability in
Saigon. The talk of neutralization is clearly very dangerous. It
tends to be in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy-talk
about neutralization disheartens those who must fully and
vigorously implement the strategic concept and encourages those
who are plotting for a neutralist coup.
I think we can counter such dangers most effectively by the
proposals in my letter to you of March 14 dealing with the whole
of Southeast Asia; if necessary, however, we might also station
a Marine battalion in Saigon. Publicly, we could explain this as
a move to protect American dependents; privately, we could pass
the word in Viet-Nam that we wanted no more coups./6/
/6/McGeorge Bundy wrote the following
marginal note: "No one in Saigon agrees."
To reiterate, I think that we have made the necessary and
fundamental policy decisions on the over-all strategic concept.
What remains is to implement this concept vigorously and with
effective coordination.
91. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the
President/1/
Saigon, March 19, 1964--3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram
1776 from Saigon, which is the source text. Passed to the White
House on receipt in the Department of State.
1. Thank you for your 1454./2/ I
will carry out the program with maximum energy.
/2/Document 85.
2. It seems appropriate to comment further on two matters:
first, the proposal to put pressure on North Vietnam, as
referred to in your pare 4, subparagraph 3, so that they will
cease their aggression; and, second, the imaginative and
interesting suggestion, which deserves careful analysis, that I
see General de Gaulle.
3. As regards pressure on NVN, I submit the following:
4. US problem in any underdeveloped country is how to apply
our power. The Communists, confident that we will not use our
missiles, are trying to take over the people in the
underdeveloped countries right under our noses. It is as though
we had a tremendous warship capable of dominating the seas, but
were facing a problem in the middle of the desert. In such a
situation our power seems useless.
5. Last autumn the US did face the problem of how to apply
our power in South Vietnam. President Kennedy, very properly I
thought, wanted to bring about some fundamental changes in the
behavior of the GVN. But we seemed to be up against a blank
wall. There seemed to be no way we could use our great power
which would not either damage the war effort or bring on an
economic panic with widespread unemployment and starvation.
6. Yet, finally, much thought and study in Washington and in
the Embassy discovered ways to apply US power. We hammered away
at one place and then at another and, after awhile, there was a
crack in the blank wall. The beginning of a change in Diem's
attitude was becoming apparent when the Nov 1 coup came. A
description of these methods is in my 949, Nov 6./3/
/3/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963,
vol. V, pp. 575-578.
7. Now we face the problem of how to apply our power to NVN,
and we seem also to be up against a blank wall. Yet we seem to
be quite sure of two things: (a) one single saturation raid on
NVN could destroy the fruits of eight years' fighting against
the French and of ten years backbreaking labor since 1954; and
(b) while there would be some sort of ChiCom reaction, the above
raid would not bring on nuclear war or a real world war.
8. If NVN thought that the US had the will to use just what
we have out here in Southeast Asia (the 7th Fleet, US Air Force
units, etc.), they would see that they cannot afford a Viet Cong
victory in SVN. The price would be too high.
9. The problem is how to persuade NVN, and a corollary is how
to apply our power in relatively limited doses so as to give
them a sample of how really dangerous we are. Some overt
reconnaissance flights might be useful as an initial step.
10. What we can do to them should also be linked to what we
can do for them-in terms of rice and removing whatever US
personnel we intend to remove anyway.
11. I recommend that the same kind of intensive study be now
given to the above in Washington that was given last fall to
applying sanctions to Diem. I am confident that good results
would be obtained and that some things which look pretty strong
today would start falling apart.
12. As regards de Gaulle, I look forward to chance to
comment, which you mentioned in your last paragraph, on
instructions to Ambassador Bohlen. Paris seems honestly to
believe that 1964 is 1954, which leads them into still other
dangerous errors.
13. As regards my going to Paris to explain realities to the
General, the following can be said in favor:
14. A life-time of association with the French, the wartime
connection of which you spoke, and more recent contacts in 1960
and in 1961, at which time I located the headquarters of the
Atlantic Institute in Paris, above all, the fact that I would be
visiting him as your representative should bring about a change
in attitude, if anything can.
15. On the negative side is the reaction in the GVN.
Prolonged reflection convinces me that GVN, from General Khanh
on down, would be filled with apprehension and that, given their
mentality, nothing could convince them that I was not going to
Paris to sell them down the river. As US representative, I am
extremely prominent here, and a trip by me to Paris to see de
Gaulle, at this time, would be a body blow to morale and would,
with one hand, destroy what we are trying to do with the passage
of time.
Lodge/4/
/4/Telegram 1776 bears this typed
signature.
92. Message From the President to the Ambassador in
Vietnam (Lodge)/1/
Washington, March 20, 1964--5:58 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. The message was drafted
in the White House and approved by Rusk. Transmitted as telegram
1484 to Saigon, which is the source text.
1. We have studied your 1776/2/
and I am asking State to have Bill Bundy make sure that you get
our latest planning documents on ways of applying pressure and
power against the North. I understand that some of this was
discussed with you by McNamara mission in Saigon, but as plans
are refined it would be helpful to have your detailed comments.
As we agreed in our previous messages to each other, judgment is
reserved for the present on overt military action in view of the
consensus from Saigon conversations of McNamara mission with
General Khanh and you on judgment that movement against the
North at the present would be premature. We here share General
Khanh's judgment that the immediate and essential task is to
strengthen the southern base. For this reason our planning for
action against the North is on a contingency basis at present,
and immediate problem in this area is to develop the strongest
possible military and political base for possible later action.
There is additional international reason for avoiding immediate
overt action in that we expect a showdown between the Chinese
and Soviet Communist parties soon and action against the North
will be more practicable after than before a showdown. But if at
any time you feel that more immediate action is urgent, I count
on you to let me know specifically the reasons for such action,
together with your recommendations for its size and shape.
/2/Supra.
2. On dealing with de Gaulle, I continue to think it may be
valuable for you to go to Paris after Bohlen has made his first
try. (State is sending you draft instruction to Bohlen, which I
have not yet reviewed, for your comment.)/3/
It ought to be possible to explain in Saigon that your mission
is precisely for the purpose of knocking down the idea of
neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head, and on this
point I think that nothing is more important than to stop
neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can. I have
made this point myself to Mansfield and Lippmann and I expect to
use every public opportunity to restate our position firmly. You
may want to convey our concern on this point to General Khanh
and get his ideas on the best possible joint program to stop
such talk in Saigon, in Washington, and in Paris. I imagine that
you have kept General Khanh abreast of our efforts in Paris.
After we see the results of the Bohlen approach you might wish
to sound him out on Paris visit by you./4/
/3/Telegram 1487 to Saigon, March 20.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S). For the
instructions sent to Paris, see Document 96.
/4/Telegram 1484 does not bear
President Johnson's signature.
93. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the
President/1/
Saigon, March 23, 1964--1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET-S. Top Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram
1803 from Saigon, which is the source text. Passed to the White
House on receipt in the Department of State.
Your 1484./2/
/2/Document 92.
I will of course be glad to comment on whatever you send me
regarding pressure on the North.
2. I continue to agree that overt U.S. action should be
withheld until after Viet-Nam and U.S. covert steps have been
tried-and tried as part of an essentially diplomatic pressure
move. I do not think that such a move, including the Viet-Nam
and U.S. covert activities involved, is premature. If such an
effort could be successfully carried out, it would obviously
greatly discourage the VC and help General Khanh strengthen his
southern base. In fact it might very much hasten the end of the
war here. I have noted with interest your expectation of a
showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties and
agree that this is a major element to be considered in any such
diplomatic effort.
3. U.S. Mission (Country Team) will hear a report, pursuant
to instruction in your 1454,/3/
paragraph 4, subparagraph 4 on "tit for tat" methods
at the regular meeting this week./4/
/3/Document 85.
/4/According to telegram 1828 from
Saigon, from Lodge to the President, March 25, a committee of
CIA and military representatives from the Embassy reached the
preliminary conclusion that for a program of
"tit-for-tat" overt military actions against North
Vietnam, aerial bombardment and aerial mine-laying were the
preferred methods of counteraction. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. As regards de Gaulle, I will of course be glad to carry
out your instructions to the best of my ability, should you
decide you want me to go. I am commenting on proposed
instruction to Ambassador Bohlen in separate telegram./5/
I like your reasoning regarding knocking down the idea of
neutralism and will discuss with General Khanh.
/5/Document 94.
Lodge/6/
/6/Telegram 1803 bears this typed
signature.
94. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department
of State/1/
Saigon, March 23, 1964--4 p.m
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis.
1806. For the Secretary from Lodge. Regarding your priority
1487,/2/ I recommend that the
fourth unnumbered paragraph in instruction to Bohlen make it
clear that what we want from de Gaulle is a statement that he
does not favor his "neutralization" at the present
time. We are not asking him to drop his idea for all eternity.
What we want is a statement saying that he does not think it
applies now.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 92. The
fourth unnumbered paragraph reads as follows:
"What we actually want from de Gaulle is a public
statement, prior to SEATO meeting, that the idea of
'neutralization' does not relate to the attitudes or policies of
the Government of Vietnam or its friends in the face of the
current communist aggression."
Perhaps the following line of argument may be helpful to
Ambassador Bohlen for his own information and use as he deems
opportune. It seeks to refute some of the misconceptions which
have been put out in Paris, and also seeks to deal with the
circumstances which are particularly vivid in Saigon. The
argument runs as follows:
1. France and the U.S. are headed for a collision as regards
VietNam. This is not due to a fundamental difference of
interests but to a misunderstanding, which it is the business of
diplomacy to straighten out. As one who rejoices in French
strength, I am worried that so many highly placed Vietnamese
sincerely believe that General de Gaulle wishes the destruction
of the Republic of Viet-Nam; that French agents are trying to
incite the assassination of the Chief of State; and that French
agents have worked with the Viet Cong in the recent terrorism
against Americans. I have on every occasion made it clear that I
think these rumors are fantastic and impossible to substantiate
and have often tried to persuade the Chief of State not to break
off relations with France. But much more than my efforts is
needed.
2. Also on February 20 the VC, in an official communication,
said it "approves particularly President de Gaulle's
proposal to establish a regime of neutrality in South
Viet-Nam".
3. For these reasons, a statement by General de Gaulle
himself to the effect that his idea of "neutralism"
was not meant to apply at the present time would have a very
constructive effect.
4. Beyond the helpful effect which it would have, it is also
clearly justified by the situation in Viet-Nam and for the
following reasons:
a. The situation here is not hopeless at all. 1964 is not
1954. Vietnamese military are definitely on the track for the
first time since the deterioration began in April of '63. The
brave are being rewarded; the cowards are being relieved. In
order to enable the GVN to hold an area once it has been
cleared, the U.S. is helping strengthen the militia and create a
corps of civil administrators. A National Service Law will soon
be in effect.
b. Also, contrary to what is often said in Europe, the
Americans and Vietnamese are not seeking an exclusively military
solution of the problem. Indeed we agree that an exclusively
military solution of the problem would be impossible. Hand in
hand with the attempt of the military to bring about order is a
social revolution in which the U.S. is taking an active part and
which also aims to bring education, health, economic well-being,
land ownership, to the ordinary people. The U.S. agrees
emphatically that this struggle cannot be won exclusively by
military methods.
5. It should be emphasized that the U.S. is not, as is being
said in Europe, trying to do with "16,000 men what France
did not do with 200,000 men". The U.S. effort is totally
different; it has entirely distinct aims; it is not nearly as
extensive and has not nearly as ambitious a goal as did the
French aims in the early 1950's.
6. The statement often made in Europe that "while the
U.S. has its strategic interests in Viet-Nam, the French have
their cultural and economic interests" is profoundly
misleading. Actually, the strategic interest in the
American-Vietnamese effort in Viet-Nam is directly to the
advantage of the French doctor, the French schoolteacher, and
the French businessman in Viet-Nam, just as their presence here
helps Viet-Nam and thus helps U.S. interests here. American and
French interests should not be put in contra-distinction with
each other as they are mutually consistent.
7. The Communists realize that the American-Vietnamese effort
is actually getting off the ground, which is why they are
intensifying their neutralist talk. In the language of the Viet
Cong, "neutralism" is the same thing as Communist
victory. We realize that it is a coincidence, but it is a most
unfortunate coincidence that General de Gaulle's phrase
"neutralism" is the identical phrase used by the
Communists.
8. France has an influence in Viet-Nam way beyond what it
contributes in the way of men, weapons and money. This is
because French is still the Western language which is possessed
by the largest number of Vietnamese (although the younger
generation is trying hard to get away from French and to learn
English). But at the present, the so-called people who count in
Viet-Nam read French newspapers; in particular, they read the
background news stories which the Agence France Presse gets from
the Quai d'Orsay. Some are impressed by it and others are
infuriated by it, and altogether no good purpose is served. If
what is desired is the eventual neutralization of Indo-China or
of Viet-Nam, the way not to do it is to create the furor which
these statements out of Paris create. General de Gaulle is thus
a very influential figure in Viet-Nam and, unwittingly, in a way
which is defeating his own stated purpose.
9. A de Gaulle statement stating that he did not favor
"neutralism" now would go far to correct the present
bad situation, and at the same time, to promote a good result.
10. Such a statement not only does not foreclose a unified
and neutral Indo-China at some future date; it would actually
greatly facilitate such a result.
11. If a neutral Indo-China, or even a neutral Viet-Nam, were
attempted at the present time, it would be foredoomed to
failure. Since South Viet-Nam is not strong enough to bargain on
an equal basis with North Viet-Nam, the holding of the
conference would end the will to win in South Viet-Nam, and the
net result would be to turn South Viet-Nam over to the North. By
no stretch of the imagination can this be considered neutralism.
12. If so-called "neutralism" had been applied to
France at any time between 1940 and 1944, the German Army would
have remained in occupation in France. In fact, the initial
German occupation before the collapse of the Vichy government
was virtually the same kind of neutralism with regard to France
which some appear to advocate today with regard to Viet-Nam.
Those of us who have always wanted a strong France and are glad
that France is strong today would have opposed
"neutralism" for a France occupied by an hostile army
in the '40's, just as we oppose "neutralism" for a
Viet-Nam, which, though not occupied in the same sense, is under
hostile attack in the '60's. And, one might add, just as we
oppose "neutralism" for Berlin./3/
/3/In telegram 1510 to Saigon, March
24, Rusk thanked Lodge for his suggestions, which were being
repeated verbatim to Ambassador Bohlen. He also noted: "The
President has incorporated your suggested phrasing into
paragraph four of his instructions to Bohlen and those
instructions are being sent to Paris today." Department of
State. Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Lodge
95. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special
Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan) to the Special Assistant in the
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Thompson)/1/
Washington, March 23, 1964.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Thomson
Papers, Southeast Asia, Vietnam, McNamara's Speech, 3/26/64.
Confidential. Rusk took this memorandum to a luncheon meeting
with the President, McGeorge Bundy, and McNamara at the White
House on March 24, where the McNamara speech was approved
substantially as originally drafted. No record of the luncheon
meeting has been found. (Memorandum from Read to Rusk;
Department of State, President's Reading File: Lot 74 D 164)
SUBJECT
Comments on Proposed McNamara Speech/2/
/2/The speech was given on March 26 at
the James Forrestal Memorial Awards Dinner of the National
Security Industrial Association in Washington. For text. see
Department of State Bulletin, April 13, 1964, pp.
562-570.
I think the general tone and thrust of this speech is
excellent but I detect one truly major problem toward the end of
it. In the section "A Program to Meet Our Objectives"
there is a listing of the options which President Johnson had
before him prior to the McNamara visit. The manner in which the
second option--"A Big War"--is treated leaves our
reaction to this speech [option?] deliberately
inconclusive.
I know that this is a useful device in maintaining a certain
degree of uncertainty in the North. It is also valuable for
dealing with the LeMays and the Rostows. However, that is not
the audience which this particular speech is intended to
address.
The basic purpose of the speech is to obtain broad support
and particularly to state objectives which will be endorsed by
the Mansfields and the Lippmanns. More pointedly, it is intended
to separate the Mansfields from the Morses.
A second objective is to set forward our policy with
precision in a way which will induce General de Gaulle similarly
to define French policy. Indeed, we are telling de Gaulle that
the McNamara speech will make our policy "precise".
Therefore, deliberately to leave an area of imprecision in
order to attain a commendable objective with respect to the
North would be defeating the major purposes and the major
addresses of the speech.
I would, therefore, recommend that the entire section
concerning options be rewritten so that the only course of
action which is described and discarded is the
"neutralization" course. The speech could then remain
silent on the question of the "Big War"./2/
/2/At this point, Sullivan added the
following handwritten note: "I have discussed this with
McNaughton, who says that McNamara does want to retain the
`options.' However these particular arguments have not been
presented to him. WHS"
There are attached also certain suggestions by Joe Mendenhall
for revision of the sections on pages four and five in the
interest of clear historical accuracy./3/
/3/Attached but not printed.
96. Message From the President to the Ambassador in France
(Bohlen)/1/
Washington, March 24, 1964--6:42 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The message was
drafted in the White House; discussed and revised at a 1 p.m.
luncheon meeting among the President, Rusk, McNamara, and
McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Transmitted as telegram
4793 to Paris, which is the source text. Also published in
Declassified Documents, 1978, 296A. A draft with McGeorge
Bundy's handwritten revisions is in the Johnson Library,
National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI, Cables
and Memos.
As agreed [in] recent consultations Washington, you should
seek early appointment with de Gaulle for frank discussion
Vietnam. You should indicate that you will have message from me
for the General, draft text of which appended this instruction.
In presenting this message, you should stress our
determination to assure that communist-directed aggression will
not succeed in overthrowing independent states in Southeast Asia
and our willingness take necessary measures to implement that
determination.
You should point out that in Vietnam, we have come to this
determination after having thoroughly examined and rejected
arguments for disengagement or for political negotiation
starting from current circumstances. You should draw upon March
17 White House statement/2/
following National Security Council action on McNamara report/3/
to describe nature our current commitment and action which we
pursuing jointly with Khanh Government.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 79.
/3/Document 84.
What we actually want from de Gaulle is a public statement,
prior to SEATO meeting,/4/ that the
idea of "neutralization" does not apply to the
attitudes or policies of the Government of Vietnam or its
friends in the face of the current communist aggression. We want
him to state that he does not favor "neutralization"
of this sort at the present time. We are not asking him to drop
his idea for all eternity. What we want is a statement that he
does not think it applies now. French spokesmen like Couve and
Baumel have repeatedly said in private that a US pullout now
would be disastrous and that we must keep up our end in South
Viet-Nam. What we need is some parallel expression from the
General./5/
/4/The ninth Ministerial Meeting of the
SEATO Council, Manila, April 13-15.
/5/The last sentence of this paragraph
was added to the draft by McGeorge Bundy: see footnote 1 above.
We leave to your discretion whatever action you feel
appropriate to develop the forum or the manner in which such a
statement might be delivered. You will have noted from other
messages that the Vietnamese Foreign Minister expects to be in
Paris in the near future; and it might be opportune for the
statement to appear in the form of a joint French-Vietnamese
communique on that occasion.
You may use whatever argument or persuasion you deem most
effective in the presentation of this demarche. But you should
make it clear that we expect France, as an ally, to adopt an
attitude of cooperation rather than obstruction in this critical
area of United States interest. I would welcome any comments or
suggestions you may have on the text of my message to de Gaulle
and will consider them urgently with Secretary Rusk.
Secretary Rusk has sent an advance copy of this instruction
to Ambassador Lodge, who made constructive suggestions which
have been incorporated into the message as you have received it.
The full text of his cable presenting additional argumentation
for your demarche is being repeated to Paris./6/
/6/Document 94. On March 23, Lodge
informed the President that he had told Khanh about the proposed
demarche to de Gaulle and that Khanh was "extremely
positive" about the idea of having a public statement by de
Gaulle on record. (Telegram 1811 from Saigon; Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) After a night's reflection,
Lodge informed the President that such a de Gaulle statement
could pave the way for a new Vietnamese-French relationship and
allow Khanh to drop his plan to break diplomatic relations with
Paris. (Telegram 1817 from Saigon, March 24; ibid.)
Message to de Gaulle
The most immediate and the most complex problem of foreign
policy which faces the United States today is centered in
Southeast Asia. The type of subversive aggression which is being
conducted against independent states and innocent populations in
that part of the world poses a dangerous threat to the prospects
for the stable evolution of developing nations everywhere. The
Republic of Vietnam is, at the present time, the principal
target of this aggression. As you know, it is the policy of my
Government to furnish assistance and support to the Republic of
Vietnam for as long as it is required to bring this aggression
and terrorism under control.
Our objective in the pursuit of this policy is to assist in
the establishment, throughout Southeast Asia, of independent
states, secure from their neighbors, and each with an
opportunity to determine its own policies, both foreign and
domestic.
It is understandable, in the larger perspectives of history,
and, given the political and economic circumstances, that these
states might eventually choose an international posture which
could be described as neutral. In this sense, neutralization
might be held out as a long term objective to which these states
could aspire.
However, all our reports from the area show that current
public discussion of this objective has left a twofold
impression: First, that the present victims of aggression should
adopt an attitude of neutrality towards it; and second, that
these same victims should be required not to accept external
assistance to meet that aggression. It seems clear to us that
these two courses would amount to a prescription for disaster.
Ambassador Lodge has informed me that in Vietnam today, there
is a widespread impression that France endorses such courses.
This impression has stirred up a sharp reaction among many
elements in Vietnam, a reaction which has been moderated only by
our own diplomatic efforts. At the same time in private
conversations leading representatives of France have made it
clear that France does not believe US help can safely be ended
now, and that France does not believe in letting the Communists
take over South Viet-Nam./7/
/7/The last sentence of the paragraph
was added by McGeorge Bundy.
I believe it is important that all erroneous public
impressions concerning the policies of nations which have an
interest in the future of Southeast Asia be eliminated so that
the problems of that area can be seen and dealt with as lucidly
as possible. I have directed that the policy of the United
States be set forth with precision; and senior members of my
Government will do this in the course of the next few days.
It would be most helpful to our common cause if the real
policy of France could also be clarified publicly in the minds
of those who may feel disturbed by implications which have been
read into its most recent expression. It would be particularly
useful if such clarification should be made prior to the Manila
meeting of the SEATO Council.
With these thoughts in mind, I have asked Ambassador Bohlen
to discuss these matters with you and to report your views./8/
/8/Telegram 4793 does not bear
President Johnson's signature.
97. Message From the Ambassador in France (Bohlen) to the
President/1/
Paris, March 25, 1964--5 p.m.
/1/Source:
Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 4486 from Paris, which
is the source text. Passed to the White House on receipt in the
Department of State.
We were informed this morning/2/
by the Quai d'Orsay at about same time that Deptel 4793/3/
arrived that Khanh had taken up with French Charge a demand for
a statement from de Gaulle about French position on neutrality (Embtel
4481)./4/ Since Khanh seems to have
jumped the gun on us and in effect asked for what I was trying
to obtain I wonder if we should not wait a day or so and assess
French reaction before my seeking an interview with de Gaulle.
However, on assumption that I will go through with this
interview I would like to submit for your consideration the
following suggestions in regard to the text of your message to
de Gaulle. I assume this was designed to be presented in writing
and we can of course add suitable salutation and closing.
/2/March 23.
/3/Document 96
/4/Khanh made this demand to Perruche
on March 23, suggesting that the statement should make clear
that even if future neutrality were desirable for Vietnam, the
current struggle against the Viet Cong was the correct course.
Should France do this, Khanh suggested that Vietnam could then
remove economic restrictions on French imports and name a new
Ambassador to Paris. Khanh added that the need for such a
statement was both important and urgent; he had to have an
answer by April 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1
FR-VIET S)
I would suggest dropping paragraph four which as written
seems to be our interpretation of French position. It is
somewhat strong and I fear might produce an unnecessarily
adverse reaction from de Gaulle. I would also eliminate last
sentence of paragraph five since I think it extremely unwise to
even hint to de Gaulle that "leading representatives of
France" making statements about French policy which de
Gaulle himself has initiated and which might lead him to the
view that his position was being undercut by these
"representatives".
In place therefore of paragraphs four and five I would
substitute the following:
"The difficulty is that the term neutralization is being
understood by certain people in Vietnam as having immediate
application and not as a long-term objective. These people
consider that any advocacy of neutrality at the present time
really is a pseudonym for eventual Communist take-over. This
impression has stirred up sharp reaction among many elements in
Vietnam, a reaction which we have done our best to moderate
through our own diplomatic efforts".
The Quai also informed us of a conversation that you had with
Alphand (I assume during Defferre's visit). I would appreciate
anything that you could let us have on this conversation./5/
/5/From 4:43 to 4:50 p.m., March 24,
the President met with Gaston Defferre, Mayor of Marseilles.
(Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of this
meeting has been found.
I shall not request an interview with de Gaulle until I hear
further from you./6/
/6/Rusk called William Bundy on March
25 at 2:33 p.m., to discuss this cable. The transcript of their
telephone conversation reads in part as follows:
"The Sec asked him if he had seen
Bohlen's message and Bundy said he had. Sec said it was bad that
Khanh went roaring in. Bundy said we should have warned Bohlen
Bundy said we were in an awful box, and said he was inclined to
agree that Bohlen should put off his call to De Gaulle for a day
or two. Sec said it would be very unwise to go roaring in. Sec
said perhaps he had better in effect say that he had been
informed about Khanh's action and
that we think it would be very unwise for Khanh to go on down
this road. We have been urging maximum restraint on him in this
matter. We were concerned by the known fact that neutralization
would create problems in Vietnam and go on from there. Sec said
we should do something as a consequence of what Khanh has said
rather than a parallel move. Bundy asked if we should let the
French know we were coming, so to speak, and Sec said no but to
go because Khanh did this and try to get the thing in order. Sec
said it was a rough one and that this rather guarantees that we
would fail with De Gaulle. Sec thought maybe we should wait a
couple of days. Bundy said we were not under specific gun and
Monday they agreed would be OK." (Department of State, Rusk
Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
Bohlen/7/
/7/Telegram 4486 bears this typed
signature.
98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in France/1/
Washington, March 25, 1964--7:02 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in the
White House, cleared by William Bundy and Rusk, and approved by
Sullivan. Repeated to Saigon.
4818. For Ambassador.
1. The President has reviewed your 4486/2/
and agrees with you that you should wait a day or so to assess
French reaction before seeking interview with de Gaulle. He
nevertheless believes that you should seek this interview
without fail within the 'next week, adjusting your presentation
to the situation as it then appears, and making the strongest
possible argument to the General for a public clarification of
the position of France.
/2/Document 97.
2. The President does not wish any formal message from
himself to be presented at this time, in the light of Khanh's
threatening démarche. Instead you should draw on the draft
message in our 4793/3/ as
appropriate, making clear that these are Presidential views as
well as those of the USG in general. You should present these
views as an expansion upon the brief remarks which the President
made informally to Alphand.
/3/Document 96.
3. We do not fully share your argument that General should go
uninformed of what his Foreign Minister and others are saying
officially to us, and believe it should be helpful to say that
the policy of France as stated to us in diplomatic channels has
only to be clarified publicly in order to become much more
helpful to the common cause on the scene.
4. President's short meeting with Alphand took place on
request of latter before Defferre meeting./4/
On South East Asia, exchange was very brief. President said that
as he understood it, France did not wish American forces pulled
out and did not believe in this kind of neutralism which would
lead to takeover of south by Communists. If this were indeed
French position, President said, it would be helpful to have it
publicly clarified. Alphand said he would report this view and
contrive to indicate some personal sympathy with it without
actually committing himself.
/4/See footnote 5, Document 97. No
record of the Alphand-Johnson meeting has been found.
Rusk
99. Memorandum for the Record of the White House Daily
Staff Meeting, Washington, March 30, 1964, 8 a.m./1/
/1/Source: National Defense University,
Taylor Papers. T-217-69. Secret: Eyes Only. Drafted by William
Y. Smith.
1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting.
2. Vietnam. The entire meeting was spent in a long discussion
of our problems in Vietnam. Forrestal had sent Bundy the latest
Sit Rep on Vietnam, with the comment that he was not sure our
military operations in the field were in consonance with our
political objectives./2/ Bundy said
he had found the Forrestal memorandum very interesting, and
asked why the military seemed to have the impression that napalm
solves everything, and why they spent so much time chasing the
enemy. In fact, he said, the enemy was not as readily
identifiable as those operations made him sound. He asked if I
had followed these matters closely, and I replied I had not,
with respect to day to day operations.
/2/It was the weekly report from USMACV
dated 23 May. [Footnote in the source text in Smith's hand.
Forrestal's covering memorandum has not been found.]
Bundy then asked Cooper what he thought, and he responded
that he was very concerned because we only had two or three
months left to really get things moving, and it did not look
like the field operations were going as they should. I then
interjected that I could see some disadvantages and difficulties
in using napalm and in chasing the enemy, but wondered what
alternatives the other people really had in mind.
My question lead to two different kinds of responses, one
from Forrestal and Bundy, and the second from Cooper. Forrestal
referred to a book by a Frenchman, Modern Warfare, by Roger
Trinquier,/3/ which he said was a
report on the French experiences in Southeast Asia and Algeria.
According to Forrestal, you can see from this book that we are
making the same mistakes the French did, and are forgetting to
profit by their lessons. The only specific concerning Vietnam he
mentioned was that unless something changes, when the rainy
season sets in, RVN morale will drop so far that the army may
not be able to be salvaged. Cooper, on the other hand, said that
we needed some "dramatic victories" to bolster the
Vietnamese people. After the meeting I asked Cooper how he could
reconcile dramatic victories with no identifiable enemy. He said
he was not quite sure, but that we should be able to make raids
on political and military command posts and bring back some Viet
Cong alive. He thought the military could think of other
possibilities. Both Cooper's and Forrestal's comments had one
thing in common: neither was sure that the present military
staffs in Saigon were capable of moving fast enough to solve
these problems.
/3/Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare:
A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York: Praeger,
1964).
Bundy again commented that the basic problem was that the
military thought of the war in Vietnam too much in terms of
regular conventional warfare with an identifiable enemy and
specific military objectives. In fact the problem was quite
different. The result of this type of military thinking was that
all the Chiefs except General Taylor wanted to go north. He
asked that Forrestal recast his comments in his weekend
memorandum,/4/ raising questions on
the course of operations in Vietnam in terms that Bundy could
send to Secretary McNamara. Bundy would tell McNamara that these
questions had been raised, and Bundy felt they should be
discussed with the President. Forrestal replied that the
instances he cited did not really make a strong enough case
since McNamara could cite some other "Krulak
statistics" to show the other side. Bundy said then that he
and Cooper should get together to draft such a memorandum. After
the meeting I talked with Cooper and Forrestal, at Forrestal's
suggestion, to see what assistance I can be in these
conversations. Forrestal said that his basic point was that the
operations the military consider important, such as the search
and clear, are not the type of actions that will be most
effective in achieving US objectives. He realizes that this is
more an attitude of mind than anything else, but believes that
it should be dealt with somehow. He is clearly groping, in a
constructive way.
/4/Apparent reference to the covering
memorandum by Forrestal; see footnote 2 above.
The military weren't the only ones in trouble this morning.
The new AID man in Saigon is not considered the best possible
choice. Forrestal thinks Bell's approach is to treat the Vietnam
situation as any other bureaucratic problem. In reality,
however, special treatment is called for. Bell wants to send a
man named Van Dyke to Saigon, a good, capable, conservative
administrator. The White House evidently is pushing Amory. Komer
suggested another alternative, a Jim Killen. Bundy will see if
the issue is still open.
The upshot of this discussion was that there may soon be some
White House initiative to look more closely into the types of
military operations being conducted in Vietnam. More important,
however, to me it demonstrated the frustration of certain
elements of the civilian side of the government over progress in
Vietnam. If the military are frustrated and want to go north,
the civilians are equally frustrated and want to do something
more-they didn't know what-in the south. The basic point is that
everyone is increasingly frustrated, and this is not good.
[Here follows discussion of subjects unrelated to Vietnam.]
7. Vietnam War Game./5/ I asked
Bundy if the Vietnam war game next week would help deal with any
of the problems with which he was concerned. He said it would
not, since it properly would be dealing with higher levels of
escalation. Having had no other comment from him, I take this as
his concurrence of the scenario I gave him Friday./6/
/5/Reference is to a political-military
game, code-named Sigma 1-64, sponsored by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and organized by the Joint Wargames Agency
of the JCS. The game took place from April 6 to 9 and had as
participants most of the senior officials in the Johnson
administration. The focus was the insurgency in South Vietnam
and ways to combat it. The report of the war game is in the
Johnson Library, National Security File, Agencies' File, JCS War
Games. William Sullivan, in Obbligato, pp. 178-182, describes
this war game in detail, but misdates it as occurring in the
spring of 1963, not 1964.
/6/March 27. The scenario for Sigma
1-64 is not printed. (Ibid.)
WYC
100. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National
Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 30, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Luncheons with the President, McGeorge Bundy,
Vol. I, Part 2. Secret.
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
Apropos of our discussion this morning,/2/
my thinking is as follows:
/2/See Document 99.
Although we have paid a lot of attention to the personnel and
organization of the new government in Saigon, we have done very
little to improve our own organization there. It is a full five
months since the November 1st coup and two months since General
Khanh's coup. Most of the experts seem to be agreed that this
dry season is critical in reversing the declining trend in the
war we have been observing during the past year. Unfortunately,
we have now let more than half that season go by without having
shaken ourselves down in Saigon.
The warning indicators are still flashing. The MACV report/3/
which I have shown you over the week-end does not by itself
prove that we have a military staff in Saigon inadequate for the
job. All one can say (and this only at the risk of violent
reaction from the uniformed side of the Pentagon) is that such a
report which places such emphasis on military activities so
similar to those which failed the French, suggests a lack of
understanding of what the war is about.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 99.
It is extremely difficult, and probably irresponsible for
civilians to second-guess military field commanders; and it is
even more difficult for them to propose new tactics. Beyond
recommending that Roger Trinquier's book/4/
be made required reading, there is not much we can do from here.
So, what it comes down to is that we simply must get out to
Saigon our most imaginative military commanders and civilian
administrators. This we simply have not done.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 99.
Both Bill Bundy and Bill Sullivan spoke to McNamara about
this problem in Honolulu on their way to Saigon. The best Bob
could offer was that he would consider relieving General Harkins
no sooner than April 15 and not later than June 30. I spoke to
Bob myself before the Forrestal Award Dinner, and he then told
me that he plans to move Harkins when Lodge leaves. Bob thinks
that Lodge will inevitably succumb to temptation in the month of
June, resign, and return here for the convention. His reasons
for not wanting to move Harkins now are:
a. We can't afford a change in the American organization
until the Khanh Government is settled down.
b. Khanh and Harkins get along very well.
c. General Westmoreland has not been there long enough yet to
be able to take over.
Sullivan believes, and I agree with him, that these three
reasons merely cover Bob's fundamental problem, which is that
Max Taylor and the Chiefs will not agree to a change at this
time. Sullivan is also somewhat concerned about Westmoreland. He
thinks he is an able, flexible officer, but extremely ambitious
and anxious to take over the complete direction of the war from
the Ambassador. Sullivan is worried that unless Westmoreland
gets into the habit of working for a powerful figure, he will
tend to dominate any new ambassador we send out, if and when
Lodge returns. For this reason Sullivan thinks it is important
that there be an overlap and that any new ambassador be a
particularly powerful figure.
Our record on the civilian side is not any better. You know
the problems we have had finding an AID Director. On top of
that, there is still no civilian in Saigon who is acting as
Chief of Staff for the war in the countryside. The original
theory was that Dave Nes, the DCM, would do this. But I am still
doubtful whether he can do this job at all, and certainly not
within the time we have left. Dave has not had experience in an
insurgency situation and, like most senior Foreign Service
Officers, is bound to devote more of his time to the diplomatic
and housekeeping problems of the Embassy and the vast American
community in Saigon. For some months I have felt that another
man at Nes's level was required-a man who would be Lodee's Chief
of Staff for coordinating all U.S. activities, military and
civilian, in support of the war in the field. The ideal I have
in mind is someone like Desmond Fitzgerald, and there are
probably some other people like him in the CIA and perhaps in
the DOD. I attach a memorandum I wrote to Bob McNamara before he
went out on his trip, a copy of which I have sent to John
McCone; but so far I have gotten absolutely nowhere with it./5/
5/Not found
I had a long talk with Dave Bell about his new Mission
Director, during the course of which he exposed his own theory
that since the AID Agency did not actually have full
responsibility for the effort against the Viet Cong, he did not
see how an AID official could take over the whole job. I had
been trying to convince him of the importance of getting a man
like [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. I
think that Dave may be right; but the result as of the moment is
that there is no one in the AID Mission in Saigon, and no
prospects for finding anyone who can even do a first-class job
in running the AID part of the Strategic Hamlet Program.
Finally we must face the likelihood that Lodge might leave
and start looking for a new ambassador. This is going to be an
immensely difficult job, since we need a man with somewhat
inconsistent qualities. He has to be prestigious enough to
retain civilian control of the total U.S. effort, and at the
same time he has to know enough about the theory of
counterinsurgency at least to be able to encourage the useful
actions of the military and discourage the self-defeating ones.
What I really would like to see the President do would be to
appoint you and Bob as a committee of two to produce the top
level personnel and effect the changes in Saigon. You could both
call on the two departments, the Agency and the AID people, for
nominations and suggestions; but somehow there must be a place
where the brutal decisions are taken and made to stick.
Chet Cooper is completely right. This is a Greek tragedy, and
the curtain is slowly descending.
MVF
101. Memorandum From the Director, Far East Region, Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs (Blouin) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (McNaughton)/1/
I-35397/64
Washington, March 30, 1964.
/1/Source: Washington National Records
Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 092 Vietnam. Top
Secret.
SUBJECT
Status of Actions Approved in NSAM No. 288/2/
/2/Document 87.
This is a summary of actions taken to implement the approved
recommendations of the McNamara report./3/
/3/Document 84.
1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish
assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes
to bring the insurgency under control.
The White House statement of 17 March 64/4/
included the statement that "It will remain the policy of
the United States to furnish assistance and support to South
Vietnam for as long as it is required to bring Communist
aggression and terrorism under control." Same point was
made in Secretary McNamara's 26 Mar 64 speech./5/
/4/See footnote 4, Document 79.
/5/See Document 95.
2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh
government and are opposed to any further coupe.
All Saigon agencies advised 18 Mar 64 that procedures should
be established to bring coup plotting to the attention of the
Ambassador for his evaluation and decision as to action (Deptel
1463)./6/ [7-1/2 lines of source
text not declassified]
/6/Not printed. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 7 US/MCNAMARA)
3. To support a Program for National Mobilization (including
a national service law) to put South Vietnam on a war footing.
Embassy, Saigon was requested 20 Mar 64 (Deptel 1490)/7/
to report the current status of GVN plans and CT views with
regard to adoption of a National Service Act. Embassy reported
25 Mar 64 (Embtel 1829)/8/ that as
of that time GVN seems to favor institution of a civil defense
organization to supplement present regular and paramilitary
forces, rather than implementation of a national mobilization
plan. An interagency committee, chaired by J-1, MACV, will
continue to study the problem. The GVN has been notified that
the US wishes to have an opportunity to comment on any proposed
plan at an early stage of development.
/7/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 23 VIET S)
/8/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 7
US/MCNAMARA)
4. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces
(regular plus paramilitary) by at least 50,000 men.
Embassy advised 23 Mar 64 (Deptel 1505)/9/
among other things that General Khanh's concept for employment
of forces must be refined before any firm determination is made
as to the breakdown of the "at least 50,000 men"
increase; that it is essential that an early determination be
made as to the responsibility of the military and paramilitary
(including police); that it is essential that RVNAF carry the
war to the guerrillas in their base areas. Embassy was advised
to refine the concept for implementing recommendations 4, 6, and
7 and to submit requirements for forces (including US
personnel), MAP, and AID funding.
/9/Not printed. (Ibid.)
General Harkins reported 25 Mar 64/10/
that MACV, in conjunction with all other interested agencies in
Saigon, was progressing well with required planning. Mission
approval for the program is to be sought soon and presentation
to the GVN made as soon thereafter as possible. Mr. Brent is
exploring financial aspects with Vice Prime Minister Oanh.
/10/Not further identified.
5. To assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged
Civil Administrative Corps for work at province, district and
hamlet levels.
On 21 Mar 64 (Embtel [Deptel] 1492)/11/
the Embassy was requested to submit estimates of US and GVN
personnel requirements; cost; and training schedules. Embassy
was asked whether Michigan State or third country personnel
would be useful.
/11/Not printed. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 23 VIET S)
There has been no response from Saigon and no further action
generated in Washington./12/
/12/First session of special civil
administration training course for district chiefs from four
provinces began 30 Mar 64. The course will be repeated once a
month until all of the 237 district chiefs have a chance to
attend. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the
paramilitary forces and to increase their compensation.
See summary under Recommendation #4 above.
7. To assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla
force.
See summary under Recommendation #4 above.
8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-1H aircraft in
exchange for the present T-28s.
On 22 March 64, CINCPAC advised the JCS that he has approved
a plan for delivery of 16 A-1H's (from units in the Pacific) in
Vietnam on or about 1 May and 9 from the USS Midway by 15 May./13/
These aircraft constituting the third VNAF squadron will be
located at Bien Hoa. A Navy unit of 4 support officers, 8
instructor pilots, and 150 men will arrive on or about 1 May.
Its mission is to train the VN pilots and maintenance people
until they can assume full responsibility (estimated three-six
months). ODMA is handling funding.
/13/CINCPAC telegram 220026Z, March 22.
Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File,
Vol. VI)
9. To provide the Vietnamese Army additional M-113 armored
personnel carriers (withdrawing the M-114s there), additional
river boats, and approximately $5-10 million of other additional
material.
COMUSMACV has requested shipment of 63 M-113's in three
increments with the first increment to arrive in Vietnam on or
about 15 Apr 64 and the last before 1 June 64./14/
This schedule was approved by the Department of the Army on 26
Mar 64. The disposition of the M-114's that are being withdrawn
is being worked out by the Department of the Army. ODMA will
determine the price and funding data for the exchange as soon as
the final disposition is decided. There is no resultant delay.
/14/Not further identified.
On 22 March 1964, CINCPAC listed his additional FY 64
requirements for Vietnam./15/ They
are 30 M-113's, 84 cupolas for M-113's, TACS, 54 AN/ARC-55 and
93 AN/ARC-45 radios, 17 loudspeaker systems, 5 30-ton cranes,
transportation for CG, conversion of an LSM to a hospital ship
and 500 backpack sprays. Total cost of this list is $2.65
million. CINCPAC was advised by ODMA on 25 March 1964 that these
additional requirements were approved for funding and was
requested to provide programming data. CINCPAC also proposed
additional items that would increase the FY 65 MAP from $150.8
to $174.6 million. ODMA will respond to this request later.
/15/CINCPAC telegram 22002Z, March 22.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File,
Vol. VI)
10. To announce publicly the Fertilizer Program and to expand
it with a view within two years to trebling the amount of
fertilizer made available.
The Embassy was requested 25 Mar 64 (Deptel 1523)/16/
to draft a public announcement for the Ambassador's and GVN
concurrence, after which appropriate announcement is to be made
in Saigon. Embassy was advised that the release should probably
be deferred until week of 30 Mar to permit resolution of
fertilizer procurement problems. USOM has advised AID that
commercial suppliers in Vietnam can meet the requirement.
/16/Not printed. (Department of State,
Central Files, AID (US) VIET S)
11. To authorize continued high-level U.S. overflights of
South Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit"
and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for
the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into
Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized
only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the
Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with
Cambodia.
A draft telegram of guidelines to Saigon was considered by
DOD 30 March 64. Its main provisions are to authorize the
following:
(1) Establishment of covert five-man GVN military liaison
team with Laotian forces at Savannakhet.
(2) Authorization of hot pursuit.
(3) Authorization of intelligence collection operations and
commando and sabotage raids by VN forces in the region south of
Tchepone.
(4) Operations of not to exceed battalion size for relief and
support of friendly Lao forces in border regions.
(5) Limited covert encadrement of FAR units in territory
adjacent Lao Vol Bn 33.
(6) Resupply opns. (See Vientiane #1067)/17/
/17/Paragraph (6) was handwritten. In
telegram 1067, March 30, the Embassy in Vientiane recommended
against approaching Souvanna Phouma on the question of resupply
of covert South Vietnamese troops in Laos because of his
fundamental opposition to Laos becoming involved in
"someone else's war." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours
notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian
"Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in
paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliatory Actions"
against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on 30 days'
notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military
Pressure" against North Vietnam.
The JCS recommended 30 Mar 64 (JCSM-272-64)/18/
that authority be granted to deploy 48 B-57's and 1081 personnel
from Japan to Clark Air Force Base, beginning 1 Apr 64 and at
the rate of 4 aircraft every three days. If necessary, movement
can be completed in 4 days.
/18/Not printed. (Washington National
Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 452.1
Vietnam)
On 30 Mar 64 the JCS approved dispatch of planning guidance
to CINCPAC that requests submission of an outline plan to the
JCS by 8 May emphasizing the application of air and naval power
against the DRV and Communist China. The objective of the
operations would be to cause cessation of any large scale
aggression undertaken by the CHICOM's, possibly assisted by the
DRV, in response to US/GVN military pressures against the DRV. A
series of other planning messages have been sent by the JCS to
CINCPAC. The JCS were requested on 25 Mar to brief selected
representatives of the Department of State as early as possible
on the concepts of our plans for phased actions.
On 26 March Mr. Forrestal sent Mr. Rowen a memorandum
entitled, "Political Scenario in support of pressures on
the North."/19/ Mr. Rowen has
added material to this memorandum and prepared a new script on
28 March./20/ Copies have been sent
to Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Forrestal.
/19/Apparent reference to the first
draft of Document 102.
/20/See footnote 2, Document 102.
F. J. Blouin
Rear Admiral, USN
102. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National
Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 31, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI, Cables and Memos.
Top Secret. This covering memorandum is also published in Declassified
Documents, 1984, 002725.
SUBJECT
Political Scenario in Support of Pressures on the North
I attach the latest version of my political scenario for
pressures on the North./2/ Bill
Sullivan and Henry Rowen from McNaughton's office participated.
I discussed it at luncheon today with Sullivan, McNaughton and
Bill Bundy. We agreed it could go to General Taylor as a draft
with no official standing. This means it will probably be taken
up at the JCS meeting tomorrow.
/2/On March 30, Forrestal sent McGeorge
Bundy a copy of what he described as "a very rough draft of
a political scenario for pressures against North Vietnam."
Forrestal stated that he did the original "off the top of
my head" and that Henry Rowen of ISA had "tinkered
with it, but not brutally enough." The March 28 draft
scenario and the covering memorandum from Forrestal to Bundy are
in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country
File, Vol. VI, Cables and Memos.
This draft does two major violences to JCS thinking. Instead
of proceeding immediately to direct U.S. involvement (which some
of the Chiefs favor) it introduces a second phase of overt SVN
action with U.S. covert support. All us civilians are agreed
that this is the stage we should really plan for, keeping the
possibility of direct U.S. action as a contingency reserved
against the possibility of major escalation.
The other probable shortfall from the JCS point of view is
the memorandum's failure to concentrate on intensified border
operations against Laos and Cambodia and U.S. low-level
reconnaissance over these two countries, plus North Vietnam.
Again the civilians are agreed that these actions would only
attract a strong international protest against the U.S., without
providing us with significant leverage against the North.
Finally, I am worried that too much preoccupation with a
military-political scenario will detract from our regular
efforts in South Vietnam, which, as you and I know, need
considerable improvement. More specifically, it is hard to
imagine a more dangerous course than embarking upon the attached
scenario without having made the changes in "policy and
personnel" in our own organization in Saigon.
Please let me know urgently if any of the steps I am taking
seem impolitic to you.
Mike
[Attachment]
POLITICAL SCENARIO IN SUPPORT OF PRESSURES ON
THE
NORTH (THIRD DRAFT)/3/
/3/Top Secret.
This paper does not describe in detail the nature or order of
specific military actions which are being devised by JCS. It is
assumed, however, that there are three major categories of such
actions, with perhaps some overlap between the categories:
a. Covert SVN action against the North (with US covert
support).
b. Overt SVN action against the North (with US covert
support) including:
Aerial mining
VNAF attacks on selected DRV targets possibly including Farmgate
c. Overt joint SVN and US action including:
Warning and preparatory actions
US aerial reconnaissance activities
Sizeable build up of US forces
Naval displays and large scale overflights
Destructive activities
Naval control measures ("selective" or total
blockade, possibly including mining operations)
Naval bombardment
Air attacks on selected DRV targets.
What follows are some suggestions for political moves to set
the stage and to develop support both at home and abroad for
each category of action.
I. Political steps during the period from the present to
the time when US and GVN decide on overt SVN actions against the
North.
We are in this period now, and it is assumed that actions in
Category (a) will be continued and augmented. During this period
it is necessary for both the GVN and the US to make clear in
each country and to the world the nature of the underlying facts
and rationale which support the GVN's efforts against the VC and
our support of these efforts. There should be produced by
speeches, articles, interviews and other methods, a consistent
historical picture of SVN since World War II, a general
description of North Vietnamese involvement in events since 1959
and a more detailed description of the desired state of affairs
in Southeast Asia after control of the insurgency from North.
Secretary McNamara's speech on March 26/4/
is an excellent start on such a program. Among the specific
steps which should be prepared to follow McNamara's speech are:
/4/See Document 95.
1. An article by Ambassador Lodge should appear within the
next two weeks (a draft has already been prepared by Lodge,
commented on here, and is being resumed to him for final
revision)./5/
/5/The major substantive revision of
the draft Lodge article suggested by William Bundy and Rusk in
telegram 1543 to Saigon, March 27, was their desire that Lodge
identify North Vietnam as the "primary aggressor"
against South Vietnam rather than emphasizing China's role.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
2. Another speech by General Khanh on war aims. In such a
speech General Khanh should describe the specific programs and
measures which his government intends to pursue in order to
bring a better life to the villages of Vietnam. General Khanh
has already made a strong start in his speech of March 9th./6/
Subsequent speeches laying out specific programs in support of
these aims should also be made by General Khanh and other
members of his government. The Department of State should
prepare a brochure of significant excerpts from General Khanh's
speeches for informal dissemination to interested experts in
this country.
/6/A summary and analysis of the speech
are in telegrams 1711 and 1729 from Saigon, March 8 and 11.
(Ibid.)
3. Material for friendly Senators and Congressmen should be
prepared on the subject of neutralism, US objectives in
Southeast Asia as a whole, new programs and reforms undertaken
by the GVN, and a general description of NVN direction and
control of the VC.
4. In addition to the above, a modest program aimed at
increasing public awareness of the US interest and involvement
in Vietnam should be carried out. Additional material along the
lines of the recently issued AID poster/7/
should be developed and distributed. Public service
advertisements in magazines, newspapers and radio/television
should be encouraged.
/7/Not further identified.
5. Another diplomatic exchange with the British, and one with
our principal allies to make sure that they understand our view
of the war in South Vietnam and the importance of North
Vietnamese involvement. We did something like this recently when
Lord Home and Butler were in Washington,/8/
and Bohlen is currently probing the French on the subject of
"neutralization." Another effort should be made three
or four weeks from now, perhaps by sending an emissary to London
and Paris to report on progress made in SVN. At that time North
Atlantic Council should also be given a presentation of the US
view
/8/Reference is to the official visit
of February 12-14; see Document 41.
II. Steps to be taken after decision to begin actions in
Category (b): (i.e. Overt actions by SVN against the North).
Although the decision to initiate these actions will have to
be taken at the highest level of the US Government, it must be
remembered that political initiatives should surface in Saigon
and not in Washington, so as to maintain the credibility of the
sovereignty of the GVN. The nature of some operations that might
be carried out in this phase (e.g., Farmgate) will make it
difficult to deny US involvement. Some specific and political
moves are listed below:
1. McNamara should make another trip to Saigon. His object
should be to secure General Khanh's agreement to begin overt SVN
action against the North. Publicly, his trip will be explained
as the next in a logical series but particular emphasis will be
placed on his on-the-spot review of the problems posed by
increasing evidence of North Vietnamese involvement. McNamara
reports to the President on his return.
2. McNamara carries with him to Saigon some suggestions for
another major speech by General Khanh. This speech gives details
on NVN activity against the South and contains a demand that
Hanoi cease. The speech also describes the future of Indo-China
if Hanoi would cooperate. It foresees a period of two
independent but separate Vietnams, gradually increasing peaceful
contacts with each other followed by eventual reunification on a
satisfactory basis.
3. President consults with limited number of Congressional
leaders and discloses that the US has been asked by General
Khanh to help the GVN bring pressures on the North for the
purpose of convincing Hanoi to cease its insurgency in the
South. He [1 line of source text not declassified] informs them
that USG intends to give SVN covert support in these operations.
4. Speech by General Khanh.
5. Shortly thereafter, public release of Jorden White Paper/9/
detailing NVN involvement.
/9/Published by the Department of State
in February 1965, as Aggression From the North: The Record of
North Vietnam's Campaign To Conquer South Vietnam.
[Numbered paragraph 6 (1-1/2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
7. Offer reassurances to SVN and Thailand (and possibly Laos)
of US protection and assistance in the event of NVN retaliation
by air or by stepped-up insurgency. Request permission of
Philippines and Thailand to stage and deploy US forces to those
countries.
8. US commences unannounced air defense capability for Saigon
and takes first overt military movements to prepare for possible
escalation (such as fleet movement to provide whatever cover JCS
deems necessary for air operations against North). Some care
should be taken, however, to avoid public appearance that US is
involved in GVN action.
9. GVN begins training Vietnamese pilots for B-57's.
10. US evacuates dependents from Saigon.
11. GVN takes first action against North (probably Farmgate
harbor minings of important ports).
12. Immediately thereafter Khanh makes second speech calling
on North to cease insurgency and making public the military
action which has been taken.
13. US uses third country, i.e., Canada, UK or France to
transmit message to Hanoi that while US deplores need for these
actions, it understands their necessity and supports them in
principle. US also indicates particular interest in that part of
Khanh's speech offering food to the North and wonders if
negotiations between North and South might be useful. Some
communication to ChiComs might also be appropriate. No approach
should be made to USSR at this time.
14. President consults broader group of Congressional leaders
and describes the gravity of situation, making full disclosure
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] evidence of
NVN involvement with VC, and emphasizes need to support Khanh in
his initiative. President does not ask for action by Congress.
He also gives background briefing, [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] to selected group of public
opinion leaders (editors, publishers and columnists). He might
also consider briefing Republican candidate.
15. On the assumption that no change occurs in NVN attitude
and behavior, Khanh makes speech immediately after appropriate
VC incident, i.e., cutting of rail line, killing of US personnel
or destruction of POL dump; announces need to inflict
appropriate type of damage on NVN. Khanh deplores necessity for
taking such action and situation which makes it necessary for
SVN to send military force to North, instead of food and
medicine.
16. First targeted attack occurs as promptly as possible. Use
of Farmgate aircraft may lead to public disclosure of US
participation, either through loss of the aircraft by way of
enemy anti-aircraft capability or materiel failure or through
disclosures made by correspondents in SVN. Means of minimizing
this possibility through improvements in SVN capabilities or
through use of sheepdipped US pilots should be investigated.
17. Other overt SVN actions against North are taken
accompanied by a series of SVN announcements and a call by Khanh
for a GVN-DRV meeting at Hue and cessation of VC attacks.
Propagandize North, by radio and leaflet, warning of the
consequences and [of] continued aggression. Khanh stresses that
these are not reprisals against civilians. Stresses GVN carrying
out "just actions" in reply to "acts of
terror."
Farmgate-type actions should probably continue until some
evidence of a favorable North Vietnamese reaction appears. We
should consider at some stage precisely what we would expect
them to do and inform them of this decision. We should probably
not consider moving to the next phase of overt US pressures
unless the ChiComs intervene or the DRV begins a full-scale
assault on the South. It is important that all the possibilities
of SVN overt pressures covertly supported by us be played out to
the full.
III. US decides on direct US action against NVN.
The move from the previous categories of action to this one
can be made either suddenly or slowly, depending upon the array
of military actions from which we choose. In other words, we
could proceed slowly and logically from covert to overt support
of SVN sponsored actions or we might decide to move quickly and
dramatically if international pressures had reached a dangerous
point or if we wish to lend support to four-power conference in
Geneva. The specific political steps listed below could be
adjusted to either course.
1. If we have not already done so the establishment of EXCOM
arrangements at this point is essential.
2. The Department of State brings SEATO allies up to date on
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] evidence of
VC involvement. Though formal SEATO action will not be possible
because of the probable positions of France and the UK, the US
case might be based in part upon the US SEATO commitment. The
North Atlantic Council should be informed.
3. Second conference between President and legislative
leaders in which the President discloses full details [less than
1 line of source text not declassified], reviews histories of
attacks against US installations and personnel in SVN and states
arguments for necessity for retaliation directly against the
North, and asks Congressional support and possibly a
Congressional resolution.
4. Public speech by President setting forth US policy and
explaining necessity for direct action against North. US direct
action takes place in accordance with JCS plan and simultaneous
deployment of US forces to offset possible escalation.
5. Assurances given to SVN, Laos and Thailand on US
protection, already evident through US military deployment,
against possible DRV and ChiCom retaliation.
6. Convey to North our demands which need to be satisfied in
order to stop our action, expanding on points in Presidential
speech. Make clear limited intentions and determinations. State
actions we want taken by North and fact that compliance will
have to be visible to us. Possibly identify some specific VC
units we want to see comply with our demands.
7. As a supplement to what was said in the President's
speech, state privately to the Soviets and ChiComs our
objectives and warn the Soviets and ChiComs against support of
the North either directly or by way of arms and logistics (SAM,
interceptors, trucks, POL).
8. Conference begins in Geneva and US action continues unless
visible cessation of NVN action in South occurs. Note: The
possibility should be considered of making the.initial US action
strong, so as to permit some time to pass before second action
is needed. If, as it should be, our measure of compliance is a
reduction in the insurgency, rather than DRV promises, it is
possible that military pressures might have to be continued over
a period of several months and perhaps even longer. We will have
to be prepared to deal with the international pressures which
might build up during this period.
The following are some of the questions with which we must be
prepared to deal at a conference and upon which we must prepare
a position:
Our overt goal.
Geneva Accords brought up to date?
Better ICC?
Cessation of logistic support?
Reduction of VC insurgency?
The problem of dealing with the VC.
Will there be an amnesty
Will we insist that the GVN be free to hunt down the holdouts?
Provisions for reimposing military pressures.
US military presence in GVN?
Controls on indigenous forces?
GVN-DRV diplomatic and other contacts.
North-South trade?
Treatment of Laos and Cambodia.
9. Conference reaches acceptable settlement or US actions
continue and increase.
103. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National
Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, April 1, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI, Cables and Memos.
Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Presidential Luncheon on Thursday, April 2/2/
/2/The luncheon meeting took place from
12:35 to 2:54 p.m., April 2. (Ibid.. President's Daily Diary) No
record of the meeting has been found.
Here is a list of matters which I think you can profitably
raise at the luncheon tomorrow.
1. Replacement for Ambassador Lodge brought about by his
possible resignation after the Oregon primary.
2. Reassignment of General Harkins and reorganization of MACV.
(I have submitted a memorandum to you on this subject.)/3/
/3/Document 100.
3. Follow-up action with respect to Chantrea (I have
submitted a memorandum to you.)/4/
/4/The Chantrea incident occurred on
March 19 when South Vietnamese troops accompanied by two
American advisers entered Cambodia in hot pursuit of people
fleeing and believed to be Viet Cong. The Vietnamese Air Force
directed napalm and machinegun fire on the village of Chantrea
and a U.S. helicopter penetrated Cambodia. MACV reported that
U.S. personnel did not fire on the fleeing civilians nor did
they direct Vietnamese fire, but they were deficient in
determining their geographical position. (Memorandum from
Forrestal to the President, March 21; Johnson Library, White
House Confidential File, CO 312 Vietnam) In a memorandum to
McGeorge Bundy, April 1, Forrestal suggested ways to assure that
this type of incident did not happen again. (Ibid., National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI, Cables and Memos)
4. Discussion of tactical problem of clear-and-sweep plus air
strikes, versus clear-and-hold operations. (I would only raise
this in an elliptical fashion if the chance occurs during the
discussion of Harkins or Chantrea.)
5. Cross border operations between Laos and Cambodia.
Although the JCS raised this question this afternoon, they were
surprisingly mild. General Taylor, however, was not present, and
he may suggest early action. Sihanouk having just made another
turn-about, and Souvanna being in one of his periodical states
of jelly--this is not the time to press against either of these
countries. This is particularly true if we have any hope of
laying a political base for direct pressure against the North.
It is going to be difficult enough to lay such a base without
also having to face the screams of the rest of the world that we
are beating on two small and supposedly neutral countries.
6. Political scenario and military planning for pressures
against the North. General Taylor has the political scenario
which I developed/5/ and he may
have read it. The Joint Chiefs got an oral description this
afternoon and seemed receptive. However, they will only be
getting the actual copies tonight. Judging from Goodpaster's
comments, Taylor seems wedded to the idea of moving from
reconnaissance and cross border operations against Laos and
Cambodia, and low-level reconnaissance over all contiguous
countries through retaliatory actions by both US and SVN forces
to full scale air strikes against the North. But we really do
not know what his position actually is. The next step in this
planning should be to have the JCS designate one or two senior
officers to fill in the military part of the scenario.
/5/See attachment, Document 102.
Mike
104. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National
Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, April 1, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI, Cables and Memos.
Top Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1984,
002725.
SUBJECT
Laos/Vietnam--Cross Border Operations
I enclose a draft telegram to Saigon and Vientiane, which it
is proposed be sent today to the field./2/
/2/Attached but not printed was a draft
of telegram 1630 to Saigon, also sent to Vientiane as telegram
836, April 7. In substance the draft and the cable as sent were
similar and they provided proposed guidelines for the types of
operations in Laos by South Vietnamese forces for which the
United States was prepared to provide financial and materiel
support. The principal difference between the draft and cable
was that the latter had an introduction that indicated that the
guidelines were tentative and subject to comment by Ambassador
Unger in Laos. (Department of State. Central Files. POL 27 VIET
S)
To send this telegram without Averell's approval is just
asking for trouble in my book. Sullivan tells me that he
believes that the Governor would not object to the substance;
but he admits that he has never shown anything quite like this
cable to Averell. I am going to urge as strongly as I can that
they not dispatch this cable until Averell's return on Friday./3/
/3/April 3.
On the substance, I think this is an ill-conceived plan,
which could well cut the ground out from Unger in Vientiane.
Souvanna has been increasingly nervous about his relations with
Phoumi and has been making real gestures in the direction of
leaving Vientiane with the neutral faction and returning to the
Plain of Jars. He is also about to leave for Peiping and Hanoi.
The possibility that an overenthusiastic MACV might order a raid
into Laos without Unger's knowing about it could, in my opinion,
really upset the applecart. Sullivan thinks that the concept of
"hot pursuit" and the fact that the border regions are
generally uninhabited will, in effect, result in there being no
action taken under these instructions. How he can think this so
soon after the Chantrea incident puzzles me. I think at the very
least we must give Unger a veto on the planned operations,
subject to being overridden here in Washington./4/
We can keep our fingers crossed on the "hot pursuit"
activities.
/4/In telegrams 1116 and 1119 from
Vientiane, April 10 and 11, Unger responded to telegram 836 to
Vientiane and the guidelines for cross-border operations in Laos
by stating that such activities would jeopardize the U.S. policy
of Lao neutrality and would be opposed by Souvanna Phouma. In
most areas of Laos, the presence of South Vietnamese troops
would destroy existing U.S.-Lao cooperation in combating North
Vietnamese presence in Laos. (Both Department of State. Central
Files. POL 27 VIET S)
I am going to talk to your brother
about this to get his reaction. I know that the working-level of
the State Department feels more concerned about this than I do.
Mike
105. Message From the Ambassador in France (Bohlen) to the
President/1/
Paris, April 2, 1964--8 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. III.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Transmitted as telegram 4615 from
Paris, which is the source text. Passed to the White House on
receipt in the Department of State. The Department of State also
summarized this telegram as an item for the President's evening
reading, April 2. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 64 D 164,
President's Evening Reading File. 1964)
I spent approximately forty-five minutes this afternoon
endeavoring to persuade General de Gaulle to make a statement
which would clarify French policy on neutrality as a long-term
policy and policy applicable in the actual situation of warfare
in Vietnam. De Gaulle told me frankly that he did not think he
could make any such statement since he believed in the policy of
neutrality even under present conditions. The most I could get
him to do was to say that if "he returned" to the
subject he would state that France was against anything that
would lead to the Communist takeover but he said he would
probably add that this was the reason why they favored the
policy of neutrality.
I began the conversation by outlining in detail your message
(Deptel 4793)/2/ I then outlined
the four possible courses of action which the US could follow:
1) withdrawal, which we had rejected; 2) enlargement of the war,
which we did not seek; 3) a continuance of the present course of
action and to assist the Government of Vietnam; and 4) we had
even considered the policy of neutrality but had rejected it
because of total inapplicability to warfare such as existed in
Vietnam.
/2/Document 96.
I mentioned that in effect current US policy was that of
number 3, to continue our assistance to the Vietnamese
Government with certain variations dictated by circumstances
emphasizing that this assistance would involve political as well
as military factors. I also told him that in the opinion of
Secretary McNamara General Khanh had made an excellent
impression upon the Americans there. He seemed to be
intelligent, able, energetic, and with a clear understanding of
the necessities of the situation.
I then asked General de Gaulle if he had any comments to make
in regard to what I had told him. General de Gaulle said that
France did not agree with the US in its analysis of the
situation in that it did not consider that there was any real
government in Vietnam. He pointed out that Diem, who had had a
real government, had lost the support of his people and had been
"eliminated". He was succeeded by someone whose name
he could not remember (presumably Big Minh), and now they had
"this Khanh". He said the war in essence was the same
one that the French had been fighting since the end of World War
II; that the Vietnamese had no taste for this war and that the
anti-Communist forces in Vietnam were not up to the task.
I interrupted him to tell him this was quite contrary to our
analysis of the situation. We felt it was quite different, one
was a colonial war which came out as colonial wars always do and
the other was a war against aggression directed and maintained
from without. I said that I assumed that France did not wish to
see the Communists take over Vietnam nor for this reason did
they wish to see the US withdraw under present circumstances. De
Gaulle agreed with these two statements and said they were
correct. I then said that I thought France could assist the
Vietnamese Government in this difficult task if it were possible
to find a formulation of words which, without denying the
validity of an eventual policy of neutrality, could state that
neutrality is obviously not applicable under present conditions
and that the first task in Vietnam is military stabilization.
De Gaulle at this point asked what would be our policy if and
when a military stabilization--which he doubted--was achieved. I
told him that then we could certainly have no objection to a
consideration of neutrality if the military situation was
stabilized to the point where the government really controlled
its own territory and if it was the desire of the government. I
pointed out that the US had in effect agreed to the
neutralization of Laos and Cambodia but not Vietnam where
circumstances were entirely different.
De Gaulle then said it was his considered judgment that the
US could not possibly succeed in the course that we were on. He
felt we would merely repeat the experience the French had
earlier; that the Vietnamese had no stomach for the war; that in
his opinion the quicker we came out for neutralization in
Vietnam, possibly through the mechanism of a Geneva-type
conference including the Chinese, the better it would be. He
said it was conceivable that the situation might not get much
worse but saw no prospect of it getting better. He said it was
either this neutralization as an announced policy or a
willingness of the US to really carry the war to the North and
if necessary against China.
I interrupted to ask him if the French would be in favor of
our extending the war. He said no, that France would not wish to
see this but at least it was a clear and definite policy.
De Gaulle then in a rather reminiscent mood mentioned that
the US and France had never coordinated their policies towards
Southeast Asia, referring to the period during the war when we
seemed to be working against France in Indochina. I told him
that while this may have had some truth towards the end of the
war it was not true since I was in the Embassy here (1949-1951)
when we shifted over to full assistance to the French in order
to help them win the war. I also reminded him that at one point
in 1954 we had given serious consideration to the atomic bomb in
order to help relieve the situation in Dien Bien Phu. I took
advantage of the opening and said that if we could get now some
moral assistance from the French Government we would be
satisfied and repeated arguments in favor of clarifying
statement in regard to neutrality as a long-term and not an
immediate policy. De Gaulle countered by saying in effect he
considered that the neutrality policy offered the only way out
to the US other than to engage in a major hostility against
North Vietnam and China.
He said that he felt that any military stabilization would
only come about with Chinese consent and that with Chinese
consent there could be genuine neutrality. He also mentioned
that once China had decided in favor of neutrality he felt some
time in the future the two parts of Vietnam would then come
together.
I countered this by telling him our experience with
Communists had shown that neutrality was a policy which the
Communists would adopt only if they were avoiding something
worse, mentioning in this connection the case of Laos.
I asked de Gaulle what form of pressure or inducement could
be used on the Chinese for them to accept neutrality when
according to his statement they were on the winning side. De
Gaulle shrugged his shoulders and said this would have to be
seen, mentioning parenthetically that this was one of the
reasons why they had recognized China when they did in order to
be in a position to ascertain Chinese views.
With further reference to his statement that we had never
concerted our policies in this area I told him that I was sure
the US would be more than anxious to concert with France in the
present situation in Southeast Asia and if he could find it
possible to make the declaration that I had referred to this
would rapidly lead to a close consultation in regard to Vietnam.
De Gaulle said flatly it was too late for any such concerting
and repeated his view that the sooner the US went for
neutralization in Vietnam the better off they would be.
He then said that the most he could do at the present time
would be that if he reverted to the subject to say that France
was against the Communization of Vietnam and it was for this
reason that they were in favor of neutralization.
Since it was apparent that no further argumentation would be
of any avail with de Gaulle I terminated the conversation with
the statement that there would be a considerable degree of
disappointment in Washington over his position on this matter
and that I feared a good opportunity had been lost to really
work closely together with France on a specific situation.
Comment:
I think that the above narrative speaks for itself. De Gaulle
was courteous and affable throughout and did not appear to be
irritated by my rather frank and direct comments, but showed no
sign whatsoever of changing his attitude. It seems to me that
what this adds up to is his firm belief that the course we are
on, i.e., supporting the Vietnamese Government, is one that will
only end in failure and that the best policy for the US was to
opt for an immediate policy of neutralization. The only other
alternative he could see would be one in which the US would
enlarge the war by an attack on North Vietnam and probably
China.
It was not clear to me to what extent De Gaulle was operating
on genuine conviction or whether past failure and humiliation in
Vietnam played a large part in determining his current attitude.
I shall merely tell press that I had not seen General de
Gaulle since January and was just having a "tour d'horizon".
I will send a further analytical message and a few more minor
details tomorrow./3/
/3/Document 106.
Bohlen/4/
/4/Telegram 4615 bears this typed
signature.
106. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department
of State/1/
Paris, April 3, 1964--noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis.
4621. For Secretary from Ambassador. The following are some
sidelights of the conversation with de Gaulle which I did not
consider of sufficient importance to put into the main telegram
to the President (Embtel 4615)./2/
One very noticeable feature was his obvious contemptuous dislike
of the Vietnamese and their government. At one point after he
had complained about the attitude towards France of successive
Vietnamese governments, beginning with Diem and with particular
reference to the Khanh government, I told him that I thought the
statement that we were seeking would be a great step in the
direction of improved Franco-Vietnamese relations, mentioning in
this connection that while we had known about Khanh's démarche
to the French Chargé in Saigon/3/
we had not suggested it.
/2/Document 105.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 97.
De Gaulle in answer said flatly that the attitude of any
Vietnamese Government towards France was a matter of complete
and utter indifference. He also throughout the conversation made
disparaging references to the fighting ability, morale and
general character of the Vietnamese people. Some time ago Pinay
in private conversation with me had mentioned that while he was
in the government he too had been struck by de Gaulle's basic
dislike of Vietnam and his unwillingness to hear any rational
analysis of the situation there.
De Gaulle a number of times during the conversation referred
to the fact that the request I was making did not render
France's task more easy. When I inquired as to exactly what he
meant he made a vague reference to his previous statements at
his press conferences about France's views on the situation in
the Orient. I surmise that what he had in mind is the general
plan he had for the recognition of Communist China.
One thing that can be said in regard to this conversation is
that it indeed "clarified" French policy in regard to
Vietnam. De Gaulle was explicit in his statement that he felt
that neutralization was the only course which the U.S. could
follow and "the sooner the better" unless we were
prepared to carry military operations to the North against
Vietminh and against China.
You will recall that Couve de Murville made a similar
statement to me about a month ago (Embtel 3968)/4/
in regard to the possibility of extension of hostilities. I did
not gather however from de Gaulle that he really seriously was
recommending this course of action but merely that it was
pointed out as clear and definite policy, presumably, to
contrast with the uncertainties of our present course.
/4/Dated February 25. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
I can assure you that I used every argument that I could
think of but avoided any threats or implied threats as to the
future effect on relations with the U.S. since I was convinced
that these would merely complicate matters without producing the
slightest change in de Gaulle's attitude.
My impression was that de Gaulle will probably say nothing on
the subject of Vietnam for some time to come while he watches to
see whether we are able with the Vietnamese to bring about an
improvement in the situation or whether as he anticipates we
will be headed towards a bigger crisis later on. I would
certainly recommend against any further approach to de Gaulle on
this subject and that we make every effort to keep the actual
contents of this talk confidential.
I don't quite know how this problem will be handled in Saigon
since Lodge apparently had already informed Khanh of my proposed
talk. I would suggest that a sanitized version of this
conversation be transmitted to Khanh but I feel that anything
like a full account of de Gaulle's views should not be given to
Vietnam.
You will undoubtedly wish to discuss this matter further with
Couve de Murville in Manila/5/ but
I would think with the realization in the back of your mind that
Couve has no authority to make de Gaulle's policy.
/5/See Document 113.
Bohlen
107. Summary Record of the 526th Meeting of the National
Security Council, Washington, April 3, 1964, 2 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1. Top Secret. Drafted by
Bromley Smith.
The President opened the meeting with the Congressional
Leaders by saying that his purpose was to bring them up to date
on recent developments. Various Council members would report on
current situations. He first called on Secretary Rusk for a
summary of developments in Brazil.
[Here follow Rusk's briefing on Brazil and subsequent
discussion.]
The President then turned to a discussion of our policy
toward Vietnam. He referred to his meeting with Ambassador Lodge/2/
in which he told the Ambassador that he was to carry out a
unified policy. The President mentioned that he had made
personnel changes in USIA and CIA which the Ambassador
suggested. He said there were alternative policies for Vietnam
but that the Administration had chosen one following a National
Security Council discussion of Secretary McNamara's report/3/
which he made upon his return from his fourth trip to Vietnam.
The President said he wanted the Congressional Leaders to know
the policy of the Administration. He was not asking those
present to commit themselves on the policy. His purpose was to
be certain that those present knew exactly what we are trying to
do in Vietnam. He then called on Secretary McNamara.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963,
vol. iv, pp. 635-637.
/3/Document 84.
Secretary McNamara apologized for the absence of General
Taylor who he said was indisposed and obliged to remain at his
quarters. He then described how the situation in Vietnam had
grown worse, especially since last September. The Viet Cong
controls 40% of the territory but a lesser percentage of the
total population. The people of Vietnam were becoming apathetic
toward the war. This had the effect in the military of
increasing the desertion rate. Many fortified hamlets had been
overrun or disbanded-some civil guards had turned in the weapons
with which they were supposed to defend these hamlets. The
security in many areas was less than it had been. The political
structure in the hamlets and villages had almost disappeared.
Frequent changes of hamlet leaders and village chieftains had
produced a vacuum into which the Viet Cong had moved. The
changes of local leaders caused by the changes of the central
government in Saigon had contributed to local disorganization in
village and provincial governmental life. In addition, the Viet
Cong was receiving larger weapons primarily from Communist
China.
Secretary McNamara then summarized the various policy
alternatives for Vietnam:
a. We could withdraw entirely and allow the area to be taken
by the Communists.
b. We could agree to a neutralization of the area which, in
effect, would mean permitting it to fall into Communist hands.
c. We could broaden the military campaign by taking the war
to other areas, such as North Vietnam. This alternative we had
seriously considered.
d. We could make the present program of assistance more
effective. This is the course we have chosen to follow.
Secretary McNamara then spelled out the military action
categories which were contained in his report but which were not
recommended to the President for approval. He said that General
Khanh did not favor broadening the military action at present
because he felt that first priority should be given to solving
the problems of security in South Vietnam.
Secretary M | |