• Roorda offers a complex interpretation of the Good Neighbor Policy and the impact that the US had on Trujillo’s Dominican Republic and vice versa. His focus is not simply on the “high” diplomacy that occurs between elites. Instead Roorda attempts to integrate many other important variables that influence diplomacy between two countries (i.e. what I term informal diplomacy). Roorda describes the tension between professional diplomats and the military establishment by using traditional sources (military and state department papers) as well as newer types of sources that exemplify the ”cultural” differences between the two groups (see chapter on Gold Braid and Striped Pants). Another important aspect of this analysis is that Roorda shows that the Dominican Republic did have an impact on diplomatic policy (Agency). By using Dominican sources Roorda effectively shows that Trujillo and the DR were not merely passive players in a diplomatic game controlled by a hegemonic North America, but instead had a important influence and received a great deal from their relationship with the US.
• One important contribution that this book makes is that it highlight the “conundrum” that policymakers face when it comes to formulating the types of relationships the US should have with dictators, especially in an ideologically driven bi-polar world. Interestingly, this type of policy was something I attributed strictly to the Cold War era (“authoritarian communism” vs. “liberal democracy”) and Roorda convincingly shows that even before the Cold War this type of policy had a major impact on US foreign policy.
• But in this “bi-polar” world, Roorda points out that the third player (in this case Trujillo) has an important and influential impact on the direction that US policy takes. Did the idea of dictators maintaining “common enemies” in the Caribbean during WW2 provide a model for the Cold War when it came to other dictators including the apartheid leaders of South Africa, the Shah of Iran, etc?
• How important is the informal diplomacy (personal relationships, lobbyist, etc) that Roorda describes? Can this model be applied to other cases? I think it can! Cuba and Iran may be two examples. Perhaps even Israel.

Introduction

• The Good Neighbor Policy (GNP) meant having to accept regimes anti-ethical to the principles of peace and democracy.

• GNP demonstrated to a generation of Caribbean dictators that as long as they maintained common enemies they could run amok.

• This episode sheds light on how democratic states deal with authoritarian states.

• Also, this episode sheds light on the degree of control (or lack thereof) that the US could exert over these “allies.”

• Lastly, describes the centrality of Trujillo to the diplomacy of the period and the disagreements that many had over what exactly was Trujillo’s role.

• Trujillo recognized that “conceding” to US hegemony in the Caribbean would allow him to acquire much more out of the relationship.

• These authoritarian regimes were essential to US war policy.

• The role of military culture in influencing US-Trujillo relationship.

Chapter 1 – Dominican History, the United States in the Caribbean, and the Origins of the Good Neighbor Policy

• Importance of the canal in the formulation of policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean.

• DR as a creditor nation to Euros. Leads to US intervention in the DR customs houses. US would control DR customs throughout the period analyzed in the book.

• Wilsonian intervention. Wilson asking for control over budget, public works, and Armed Forces.

• Uses the term progressive imperialism to describe Wilsonian projects in LA.

• Wislonian intervention à Marines play important role and train a Dominican “National Guard” of which Trujillo was a product.

• The Marines and Guardia Nacional have a close relationship.

• GNP to encourage trade, counteract Euro influence, and keep the peace.

• Nationalism and Wilson.

• GNP developed in the “paradox” between friendship and domination over neighboring countries.

Chapter 2 – The Dominican Revolution of 1930 and the Policy of Nonintervention

• Minster Curtis asks of battleship assistance at the outbreak of civil war, however, new policy of non-intervention doesn’t allow for this. Interesting dynamic.

• Development of regions armed forces + US policy of non-intervention = rise of authoritarian regimes à Guatemala, Honduras, Cuba, etc.

• GNP foundations found in Harding/Coolidge/Hoover administrations.

• In DR Trujillo did an effective job of consolidating control over the military.

• Military nationalism.

• In coming to power Trujillo is demonstrating political “genius” that he would exhibit throughout his term as murderous dictator.

• Stimson Doctrine lets Americans know that the US govt may not come to their defense in every situation.

• Trujillo’s rise to power creates tension that would remain throughout years between US diplomats and American marines.

• The Dominican Revolution was a test of non-intervention and diplomats in the field (Curtis) were in fact calling for US intervention. But the US did not intervene.

• Very early on it’s clear what kind of regime Trujillo was going to create.

• Issue of recognition à anarchy vs. bullying à recognition of de facto regimes à STABILITY!!!

• Stimson criteria for recognition (All 3 are a subgroup of STABILITY):

  • 1. Govt must have control of administrative machinery

  • 2. No active resistance to their rule

  • 3. Ability to fulfill foreign obligations.

• Trujillo creates an administration imbued with symbolism, nationalism, and extravagance.

• Trujillo’s ability to deal with hurricane gained him the respect of many.

• There was certainly a recognition within the US of what Trujillo was all about. Stimson unwilling to send a military commission to train DR military b/c he recognized that Trujillo would use this to further maintain his power.

• Question of how to “walk the line between interference and advocacy.”

• By the 30s there was an ambivalence about playing the role of policemen in the Caribbean.

Chapter 3 – The Bankrupt Neighbor Policy: Depression Diplomacy and the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council

• Depression forced already indebted LA countries to the brink of collapse.

• Smoot-Hawley and debt problems are reasons Hoover’s GNP policy was not more successful or more widely recognized.

• Hoover hand off approach to Wall Street interest and debtors.

• When he came to power Trujillo had to deal with the problem of limited revenues and a customs house controlled by the US.

• Drago Doctrine against using force to collect debts.

• Need to walk a political tightrope between American creditors who wanted the govt to collect their $ and safeguard against intervening and alienating LA countries.

• Hoover would not offer any help to Trujillo although they quietly orchestrated a default on DR debt.

• Emergency Law of 1931 as political smokescreen to deal with American bondholders.

• By attempting to appease everyone Hoover/Stimson alienated everyone.

• FDR administration. Foreign Bondholders Protection Council (FBPC) created to take the heat off of the administration. It created a buffer between administration and contentious issues. “A ‘waiver’ of government responsibility”

• Trujillo and Joseph E. Davies à Trujillo learns “lobbying.” Expends funds and makes friends in order to influence diplomacy. Retail diplomacy à Enter new dynamic into diplomacy (military, professional diplomats, and now lobbyist and other high officials friendly to Trujillo).

• Welles and Schoenfield vs. Trujillo and Davies.

• FBPC used to reinforce GNP of non-intervention

• We must keep in mind that in all these debates Trujillo did receive benefits!!!

• Emerging pattern which shows us the different cultures in which these different diplomatic institutions are based. State vs. military (I don’t believe there was a defense dept yet).

• Issue of receiverships. Somewhat problematic.

• Trujillo emerged as the most disruptive element in diplomatic relationship

Chapter 4 – What Will the Neighbors Think? Dictatorship and Diplomacy in the Public Eye

• GNP à cooperation, friendship, and reciprocity.

• Trujillo policy oriented towards manipulation of public impressions.

• Trujillo’s consolidation of power.

• Public impression of Trujillo that is getting through to the US à Repressive dictator. Attacking upper class DR’s.

• Trujillo administration à Personal political ideology.

• The cult of Trujilloism had an impact no tonly on DR’s, but also on many Americans.

• Effective repression of political discourse domestically. But he was also effective in controlling what DR’s heard from abroad. He was able to manipulate perceptions of himself even though many were criticizing him both at home an abroad.

• Role of the American Colony in the DR.

• The March of Time exposing the repressiveness of Trujillo regime to Americans.

• March of Dime films exposed the paradox of non-intervention, i.e. GNP was supposed to allow for the emergence and flowering of democracy, but instead was protecting dictatorships.

• Joseph E. Davies and the “Dominican Lobby” à bar anti-trujillo info from the mails.

• Columbus lighthouse and George Washington Drive. Roorda argues that such symbols were ways that Trujillo attempted to manipulate public impressions of him. Interesting!

• While Trujillo was careful not to go against US policy (Roorda uses the term “mimicry”) he was very much an independent leader. Again, he was politically astute and knew how to manipulate various situations.

• GNP meant different things to Trujillo and FDR.

• Mussolini and Trujillo. Roorda does show that the US was keeping this issue at arms length. However, I have trouble, intuitively, with the the idea that the US would have allowed the Fascist Mussolini to send his Navy to the DR. In my mind this was more likely a bluff on the US part.

• Trujillo supposedly learned, from this experience, that the US relationship with dictators had its limits.

• The importance of reciprocity in these relationships.

Chapter 5 – Genocide Next Door: The Haitian Massacre of 1937 and the Sosua Jewish Refugee Settlement

• Haitian massacre.

• Stable military leaders important for cultivating US commercial and strategic interest.

• Difficulty of controlling dictators.

• DR nationalism emphasized Hispanic culture demonized African culture à Haiti.

• Obviously, the massacre was creating problems for US govt. Especially, as the US sought to build and reinforce “Fortress America.”

• Haiti à Diplomatically isolated.

• FDR used the GNP to try and push for collective mitigation of conflicts, while Trujillo emphasized other side of GNP that called for national sovereignty.

• Trujillo, the “miniature Hitler.”

• In the case of the Haitian Massacre, GNP meant not protesting the genocide of the Haitian “miserable proletariat.”

• Trujillo then pursues a policy in which he allows for increase civil liberties in an attempt to moderate himself in the eye’s of the world. But he never actually expressed any remorse.

• US armed services continue to praise Trujillo’s maintenance of stability.

• Jewish refugees as way to shore up his “soiled reputation.” --? Trujillo hopes to ingratiate himself to FDR. Trujillo received a great deal of praise for this. However, the Sosua settlement never really works out the way Trujillo had led others to believe. That said, it was still a diplomatic and political success for Trujillo.

• The Haitian massacre shed light on two unattractive truths of American policy:

  • 1. Reliance on murderous dictators to ensure stability.

  • 2. Trujillo and FDR’s ability to turn Haiti affair and Sosua into diplomatic victories demonstrate the “racial” and “ethnic” parameters within which they were working. (Haiti had always been an isolated black nation in a Latin American world and as far as Jews were concerned, the US wasn’t inclined towards letting Jewish refugees in).

Chapter 6 – Gold Braid and Striped Pants: The Culture of Foreign Relations in the Dominican Republic

• Cultural forms of diplomacy shared between the DR and the US.

• Diplomatic culture (striped pants) versus military culture (gold braids) influences diplomacy.

• This chapter is interesting in that its an attempt to move away from traditional diplomatic history and focus on individual relationships and again, it emphasizing the importance of “retail” diplomacy.

• Trujillo and the military.

• US military respected Trujillo’s maintenance of stability while US diplomats were repulsed by Trujillo’s authoritarianism.

• Diplomacy of extravagant symbolism.

• To repeat myself yet again… Trujillo knew how to manipulate US diplomats for his own political gain.

• Emphasizes the importance of the first lady to this informal diplomacy.

• Roorda emphasizes things like the style of dress, extravagant parties, etc.

• “ad hoc diplomacy” / diplomacy of “personal relationships” / “cocktail culture”

Chapter 7 – Fortress America, Fortaleza Trujillo: The Hull-Trujillo Treaty and the Second World War

• Policy in the 30s was to strengthen defenses of Western hemisphere.

• Trujillo at times made it look like he was willing to have closer ties with the Third Reich (“flirtations” with fascist states) which invigorated the FDR administrations attempt to create closer relationships with the DR. However, Trujillo was careful not to totally provoke the US.

• Increasing attempt to deal with issues (lingering problems) regarding US control of DR customs and debt management.

• Roorda details the decline of the FBPC and argues that this symbolizes a movement away from protecting private interest towards emphasizing a unified hemispheric front.

• Feeling that giving economic assistance to LA is the best way to secure fortress America.

• Trujillo-Hull Treaty of 1940 finally brought an end to US control of Dominican customs. Day celebrated as a national holiday. End of the FBPC.

• US control of Customs was one contradiction of FDRs GNP and that contradiction had finally been removed.

• During the wartime period Trujillo built up his military (especially an airforce) leading to destabilization of the Caribbean area. Trujillo accomplished w/o US help, which had moved towards a policy against helping LA southerners.

• But in the end it was fascism and then later communism that determined American policy and acceptance of dictators in LA.

• Tension between the advantages that dictators offer (see pg 229) and the moral and ethical problems they pose.

Chapter 8 –The Good Neighbor Policy and Dictatorship

• America’s anti-dictatorial stance lasted for only a few years, i.e., the Cold War.

• After the war Trujillo became increasingly brutal and also increasingly solidified his control over the country.

• Control image abroad by increasing violence against his critics.

• Trujillo militarism was a menace to his neighbors, especially Haiti.

• Again, GNP meant different things to the US and the DR.

Roorda, Eric Paul. 1998. The dictator next door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 

 

Notes and Questions by Dave Pier 
 

Questions: 
 

1. Roorda says that the influence of official US diplomats is usually overestimated by historians. Other coalitions—from business, the military, etc.—act independently, with equal or surpassing effectiveness. Was this especially the case in the D.R. under Trujillo? Was this particular U.S. diplomatic corps especially ineffectual/divided, and/or this military especially strong? How was the balance of power between business, the military, state power, etc. tipped by a particular historical context? What political advantages do military occupiers have generally anywhere in the world?  
 

2. Do we chalk up the lax U.S. diplomatic response to the massacre of Haitians to Good Neighborliness (unwillingness to interfere), the U.S.’s racist myopia, the Haitian government’s timidity, all or none of the above? 
 

3. To what extent are/were the Western hemisphere “neighborhood” and “Fortress America” purely empty and adaptable signifiers? Could one argue (perhaps following Rodgers) that the more substantial ‘neighborhood’ especially at this time was the trans-North-Atlantic one?  
 

4. Rodgers writes that U.S. progressives imitated European institutions out of sincere—if naive—admiration and envy. Roorda describes another, characteristically post-colonial, over-effusive kind of imitation of the institutions of one dominant nation by another submissive one. Did Trujillo effectively play the eager, obsequious ‘servant’ to the U.S.? How much did the surface appearances Trujillo worked hard to cultivate really change minds? Did he cause anyone other than his military cronies to view him in a truly favorable light?

5. Would Roorda be able to make his case less convincingly had he not had access to Dominican government documents? 

 

Intro 

Dictatorship defining problem of 20th century. Mass media made it “impossible to ignore.” (2) Also “difficult to discern who really spoke and acted for the United States.” (2) 
 

Trujillo (Henceforth ‘T.’) was not “a pliable client of the United States” (3) U.S. did not have a unified policy. Multiple actors.  
 

20’s: Backlash against “costly military involvement.” But hard to justify non-intervention when former US interventionism had caused present problems. (4) 
 

30’s: ‘Fortress America’ vs. European and Asian fascism.  
 

Chapter 1: “Dominican History, the U.S. in the Caribbean, and the Origins of the Good Neighbor Policy” 
 

Columbus lands. Island: ‘Hispaniola’. Briefly a center of Spanish colonization, then the Indians die/are killed off. Better pickings elsewhere for Spain. French move in. Saint Domingue and Santo Domingo. French import lots of slaves. 1790 Haitian revolution. Obstructs U.S. commerce. US backs independence of Eastern colonies. Samaná Bay considered a strategic asset. (11) 
 

U.S. takes authoritarian control of D.R. 1911-1916. Presidents hand-picked. Government revenues controlled. (16). 1916 Wilson sends in Marines. Marine occupation for 19 years (16). “Progressive imperialism”: public works,etc. also US buys up 80% of the sugar land. (17). Harding elected, critical of occupation. Hughes-Peynado plan turns power over to American-trained D.R. police.  
 

TRUJILLO

Trujillo not upper class. Marine-trained and –loved. Charged with rape and extortion. (21) 
 

ORIGINS OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

Failure of gunboat, dollar diplomacy (22). Try another tack.

• non-intervention
• promotion of shared interests
• inter-American friendship

Notion of pan_American neighborhood has deep American intellectual roots. (23) 

CHAPTER 2:”The Dominican Revolution of 1930 and the Policy of Non-Intervention.” 

Vasquez ruling D.R. since 1924. Kept extending his term. Acquiesced to Trujillo’s military demands. Trujillo stages mock-revolution and coup. US minister Curtis unable to summon a US gunboat to stop it. US non-intervention policy also produced dictators in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Cuba, Nicaragua. 

Diplomats Curtis and Cabot disliked Trujillo because 1 they figured him for a dictator, 2 because he’d fooled them into thinking he was supportive of Vasquez, 3 because he was lower-class and dark-skinned. (43) 

RECOGNITION POLICY: De facto gov’ts recognized 1. if in firm control 2. if willing and able to pay debts. Diplomats disliked T. Business interests wanted stability and wouldn’t mind T. Marines and Navy liked T. The first friendly visit by a gunboat. San Zénon hurricane: diplomats blocked US help, marines wanted to do more. US attitudes polarized. 

 

CHAPTER 3: The Bankrupt Neighbor Policy: Depression Diplomacy and the Foreign Bondholders’ Protective Council. 
 

Old Latin American-US debts: often “akin to extortion” (63). Hoover State Response: no pressure/no aid. Convention of 1924: US intervention authorized if D.R. defaults. US lenders thought this would work in their favor. Dominican Emergency Law of 1931: provisional moratorium on payments (66) This was encouraged behind the scenes by US diplomats. Trujillo wanted more than a moratorium: he wanted a big loan. (68) Took the reprieve he was allotted and spent it on an air force and luxuries (71)  
 

FBPC – a private group set up by the US gov’t (75) so that the US gov’t wouldn’t have to take and be associated with a hard-line stance. Loans are a business problem, not a state problem (81) FBPC and T. reach an agreement. US/DR relationship warms up. Convention of 1924 revived. US installs a “fully empowered customs receivership” – a sore thumb for Trujillo and Good Neighborliness. The pros for T.: no mention of dictatorship; money, prestige; he “learned that U.S. officials responded with alacrity when he mixed his threats of unilateral action with testimonials of cooperation.” (86) This is a major theme. 

 

CHAPTER 4: “What will the neighbors think? Dictatorship and diplomacy in the public eye.” 

“Good neighbor” as a nebulous and adaptable slogan for Roosevelt. “From the perspective of Dominican interests, the Good Neighbor policy was mainly rhetoric and symbolism.” (89) 
 

T.’s death squads roll. Censorship, and at the same time encouragement of access by foreigners. Never a hermit kingdom. Political Exiles (Ureña, Michelena) form an interventionist bloc in the US. Welles does not support them but does not support T. either. March of Time attacks T. T. responds angrily. Radio City Music Hall pulls the short after one showing. (107) 
 

Another contingent: the American colony. T. courts and bribes. (112) 
 

INFRASTRUCTURE SYMBOLS: Columbus lighthouse. Columbus remains. Columbus as a symbol of inter-Americanism. (117) George Washington symbols: invoked sovereignty. “symbolic trinity of Dominican foreign relations—Columbus, Washington, and Trujillo.” (118) 
 

Trujillo mimicked U.S. “diplomatic and political projects.” Bhaba – post-colonial style appropriation of signifiers. (118). A “too-effusive imitation of inter-Americanism” (120) 
 

1935, T. jails Mussolini’s consul and gets into trouble. Gets out of it. 
 

CHAPTER 5: Genocide 
 

At least 12,000 killed in Haiti. (127) Where does this # come from? Does not match # in Roorda’s footnote. Estimating number who died later from starvation and disease? (132)Massacre in October 1937. Haitian victims were migrant workers near permeable eastern border. In this area, creole spoken, different currency, African religions. (129T. pays a pittance to Haiti. US response lax. Haiti fears attack. Roosevelt convenes meeting w/ Mexico, DR, and Cuba. 
 

T. concedes “Anti-War pledge”. Agrees to arbitration, but doesn’t follow through. Agrees not to seek reelection, but continues to rule behind a puppet. Roosevelt sees portrays results as a triumph of diplomacy. T. Agrees to accept 100,000 Jewish refugees. Ends up accepting a few hundred only. ) Similar offer from Haiti turned down. Explanation? T. seeks to replace Haitians with whites (Jews or Puerto Ricans)  
 

“two unattractive truths about US foreign relations:”

1. goals of stability and cooperation meant ignoring reprehensible actions by dictators. (146)

2. racial and ethnic slants. Anti-black, anti-Semitic. (147) 

 

CHAPTER 6: “The Culture of Foreign Relations in the Dominican Republic” 
 

“two cultural spheres”: military and diplomatic. (149) Alliances—“relations”—formed based on cultural affinities, not necessarily along lines of nationality. Trujillo liked military and they liked him. Liked the uniforms and parades. Ship commanders liked his refurbished ports. SURFACES. Trujillo wanted to create a “culture of the soldier” (187). This meant “cocktail culture.” (188). DR had liquor during prohibition. 
 

T. appropriated symbols of colonialism to control the former colonists (191) 
 

Diplomats who were high-class thought Trujillo was low-class. Made more of his skin tone. T. self-conscious about skin-- wore whitening makeup (177) T. used diplomats for symbolic purposes every chance he got. 
 

US Military acts on its own accord. Sees diplomats as unable to understand Realpolitik. Roosevelt worked to create a professional, expanded foreign service.  
 

Gunboats make friendly stops. A threatening symbol transformed for the Good Neighbor Policy.  
 

1940 – T. offers full support – a “blank check” – for war effort.  
 

CHAPTER 7: Fortress America, Fortaleza Trujillo: The Hull-Trujillo Treaty and the Second World War. 
 

D.R. strategically placed on the path to the Panama Canal. During war, Good Neighbor Policy turns into an active alliance. Weapons start to flow from US. Lend-Lease Act. Weapons accumulation intensifies post-War. Brief cooling of relations between US and DR, stanching of flow of weapons, as new US diplomats come into power, Roosevelt dies, Good Neighbor in limbo. Military aid resumes in 1947. 
 

T. flirts with Axis powers even as he courts US (204). Ideologically more like a Fascist than otherwise. 
 

FBPC lost its role. T. wrests control of the “purse strings (194) August 1940: U.S. Receivership of Dominican Customs dismantled. Hull-Trujillo Treaty praised as exemplar of Good Neighborliness (212)  
 

CHAPTER 8: The Good Neighbor Policy and Dictatorship 
 

“basic dilemma: “the repression and militarism of authoritarian systems make them morally repugnant to deal with, while refusing to deal with such governments seldom serves U.S. commercial or strategic interests.” (232) 
 

How was T. able to achieve his stature when US diplomats opposed him? Answer: diplomats are only a part of the “complicated equation” (234) Plus diplomats “surrendered the field” by not pressing a case against dictatorship. (240) 
 

The personal and the political overlap. Actors make decisions based on their personal impressions, not on political imperatives. (236). “relations” is “the aggregate of these interpersonal interactions.” 
 

There is “the enduring notion that order among non-white people can be maintained only by strong discipline.” (241)