Michael Williams

Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941-1945. 

 

Study Questions: 

• The meaning of “power” and “culture” and the interactions between the two are central to this book. Power is the most concrete and easiest to define in terms of military strength, geopolitics, and realism. Stalin defined “power” nicely when he said, “The Pope? How many divisions has he got?” But how much influence does the Pope have despite his feeble military strength? Culture, economics, etc, represent this soft power. Did this affect US-Japanese relations in the 30s and 40s?
• Does considering “culture” contribute new information to the historiography on WWII that traditionally focused on power?
• Can the influence of culture be measured in order to come to any meaningful conclusion? Even the very concept of culture can be vague. Iriye does not discuss specific cultural practices, and only references public opinion. So how does he connect culture with power politics?
• More importantly, should culture be considered a primary factor in foreign policy decisions or a secondary one that contributes to power-based realism? For specific events, such as the Emperor issue during peace negotiations, culture played a major role and must be studied. This does not necessarily mean that culture can help explain US, Chinese, and Soviet relations during the same time period.
• Realists say international relations will often be decided by power or economic motives. The Japanese needed to invade the Philippines because the islands had military utility and access to resources. Culture can help explain how they ruled the nation. The Japanese treated the Filipinos differently than the Chinese because the pro-American local culture made rebellion more likely. But how does this differ from strictly power-based analysis? Japan would have invaded the islands (military and economic value) and would have worked to prevent a guerrilla war (a measurable military action). Culture might, if anything, play a refining role to help smooth over a “power” thesis.

Iriye disagrees with the power-based analysis and attempts to show that culture is important factor in policies. Was he able to convincingly show how culture was as influential as power in causing the war as well as the means and ending of it?

• Does Iriye overemphasize the role of Japanese diplomats and civilians? Part of his thesis is a search for lost opportunities to come to peace before August of 1945. Does this possibly taint his argument? The military’s positions seem to be secondary at times given that it wielded the most power over Japan.
• US and Japanese diplomats had similar views of the world. What was the cause of this? Interestingly, Iriye never directly answers this.

Ch1. The End to Uncertainty: 

A. Japanese foreign policy 
 

• Cold war of the 1930s with the US.
• There was a breakdown in the Wilsonian international order in the early 1930s. This lead to “uncertainty” as all nations tried to readjust to the new situation.
• Japan responded through Pan-Asian imperialism as both a cultural and power based solution.

1. Power-based imperialism centered on gaining land and resources in China and Southern Asia. Intention on creating a Japanese regional bloc.
2. Cultural conflicts between different Western and Japanese ideologies.

• Unresolved debates within Japan lead to an incoherent foreign policy.
• Japan forms the Axis with Germany and Italy. The goal was to divide the European powers and reduce interference in the creation of an Asian empire. This resulted in Japan tying its success to nations and events in Europe beyond its control.
• Attempts to maintain status quo trade relations with US and neutrality with the USSR.

B. US foreign policy 
 

• Based on international trade and mutual dependency. Tried to bring Japan back into the old pre-war system. Cultural belief in self-determination was in conflict with Japanese and British Empires. In terms of policy and goals, the US and Japan were much closer than it first appeared. There were shared economic factors and past cooperation between the two nations.
• Reactive policies similar to Japan. The US had no proactive agenda and only sought to prevent Japan or others from becoming too imperialist. The oil embargo was enacted after continued Japanese aggression. This forced Japan to decide whether or not to go to war.
• Unclear stance on China
• Atlantic Conference – Called on Japan to restore pre-war Wilsonian internationalism.
• War

Ch 2. Abortive New Order: 

• Both nations became united after the war began, but neither had clear goals for the future.
• The military became the decision maker in Japan.
• Japanese occupation of China showed the gap between the rhetoric of Pan-Asianism and the actual imperial exploitation.
• Japan did not change strategies in China – continued to wage war against Chinese Nationalists and Communists.
• Asian culture – How much appeal did Pan-Asianism have?
• The US countered with anti-imperialism messages and intended on making China into a major regional power yet had no actual policies to carry any of these things out.
• US diplomats began internal debates on the future of Japan: Would the entire society have to be reformed, or would simply removing the militarism and restoring ante-bellum relations work?
• Both nations relied on public opinion to shape and carry out war objectives.

1. In order to conquer Southeast Asia, Japan used cultural propaganda to win the public over to spartan virtues and suppress Western liberalism. Japanese culture had to support the power-based imperial goals.

2. American public opinion concentrated on eliminating the Japanese threat while some favored self-determination and expansion of democracy. Neither viewpoint favored imperialism.

3. Culture and public opinion determined the meaning of power for each nation. Depending on one’s culture, power might be represented in a land-based empire or not.

• Japan had no in-depth plans to administer parts of the Japanese Empire, so the military largely acted through the pre-existing Western structures by replacing the Dutch, French, and British.(Is this a fair description? The Japanese were often worse than the Western imperialists – e.g. “The Rape of Nanking” – this may have been a result of a more militarist culture).
• Both the US and Japan were most concerned with stability rather than revolutionizing the region.
• Russia played the role of a potential power balancer. At the start of the war, Japan was faced with the decision to “go north” into Siberia and fight the Russians or “go south” towards the Western colonies in Southeast Asia to secure resources. The decision to fight the British and Americans meant that Russia, despite neutrality in Asia, was a key player.

Ch 3. Redefining War Aims: 
 

• US counteroffensive forced Japan to define what Pan-Asian reality would be. They needed allies to halt the offensive.
• Role of China: Japan wanted the puppet government in Nanking to become more independent and declare war on the US. Was only partially able to do this and the Japanese military continued to control occupied China. Explored possibilities of ending the war in China in order to concentrate in the war against the US. Amounted to nothing.
• Southeast Asia: Burma and Philippines were to be granted independence by Japan. Other territories would be absorbed by Japan.
• Culture played a role in defining which nations would be given independence. The Philippines had already been promised independence by the Americans, and its people were mostly Catholic and pro-American. The Japanese feared an uprising if it acted too imperialist and forced the Filipinos to fight the Americans.
• Coprosperity plans – Similarities with the US/UK Atlantic Charter
• State Department began to plan the rebuilding of post-war Asia in 1943.
• The US plans grew from a mix of power and culture. Interdependence and self-determination after a period of trusteeship for most Asian nations. Some wanted a strong China to serve as a power balance against Soviet expansion. But since China was in a civil war, which faction would the US side with? Communist & Nationalist ideology determined possible interaction with the US and Soviets.
• Cultural ties with Great Britain prevented the US from taking too strong of an anti-imperialist stance

Ch 4. Japanese-American Rapprochement: 

 

• US planned for a Wilsonian internationalism following the war with Japan being reintegrated into the system.
• Russia promised to declare war on Japan.
• US support for the Chinese Nationalists was tempered by concerns over competence and stability. China’s failure to stop a Japanese offensive late in the war only renewed such fears.
• Japan used propaganda to tell its people that victory would mean subjugation to American imperialists. This would also make it more difficult to surrender later on.
• As the US captured islands close enough to Japan to enable bombings, Prime Minister Tojo was forced to resign. Politicians still refused to consider peace despite the poor military situation. Tojo was replaced by General Koiso. The new cabinet desired to win a major battle then work for a peace treaty or truce that would have more favorable conditions and might leave parts of the empire intact.
• War plans. Unilateral US action to minimize British and Soviet power in the region. This was a result of both power and culture. Power because the US feared Soviet encroachment in the region. Culture because of American’s anti-imperialist sentiment.
• The role of culture in post-war planning.

The Emperor remained a prominent issue despite it having no “power”. Culturally, the Japanese wanted to retain the emperor, and the State Department realized that treating him harshly would be too costly. Instead, planning for peace would involve purging the militaristic culture from Japan, and restoring the moderates and liberals.  

Ch 5. Making of Post-War Asia:

• Victory in Europe was in the near future, but the US, UK, and USSR alliance was becoming shaky. The US/UK feared Soviet expansion and strength. This encouraged the Japanese to believe that the Allies would split apart after Germany was defeated. Culturally and ideologically the US and UK were close, and they only used power-balancing with Russia against Germany. The Japanese were correct that the US and Russia would not remain allies for long, but they badly misjudged the timing of the split.
• US begins planning the invasion of Japan.
• Japan viewed Russia as a mediator for a conditional peace treaty. They had no progress on that issue.
• The US began to gradually end military cooperation with the Nationalists of China.
• Yalta Agreement between Allies. Reduced China’s role. Set up trustee systems and gave Russia more land and control in Northern Asia. The US would run the occupation of Japan.
• In terms of power, Japan was defeated by early spring of 1945. Terms of surrender were decided largely for cultural reasons. The State Department was mainly concerned with defeating Japan and were willing to negotiate terms (the unconditional surrender was just figurative). The US public wanted the emperor removed and interpreted unconditional surrender literally.
• The Japanese faced a more complicated situation – diplomats and civilians, the military, and the public had different conditions on when peace would become honorable.
• Prime Minister Koiso favored peace in early ’45 but was removed in favor of pro-war military leaders. War continued. Japanese diplomats like Togo favored the return to Wilsonian internationalism but could not convince the military.
• After Germany fell, the US became wary of Soviet land grabs in Eastern Europe and feared that the Russians would do the same in Asia. Analyzed alternative ways to end the war with minimal Russian help – namely with the atomic bomb.
• The Russians are coming! The rush to unilaterally end the war was seen as a power struggle over the post-war environment.
• Civilians on both sides desired for a surrender that would recognize the Emperor. Only miscommunication and inaction by the Japanese military slowed the process. Japan should have surrendered in July rather than August after the nuclear bombings. This was the biggest of the lost opportunities.

Ch 6. Conclusions: 

 

• Potsdam declaration: US goal was to demilitarize and democratize Japan. This was an example of culture influencing power in terms war and surrender objectives.
• Japan failed to surrender before the use of atomic weapons. This initiated the new concept of nuclear war that changed the way wars would be fought.
• Reconstructed Japan returned to economic internationalism that resembled the old system of the 1920s.

Iriye’s conclusion is that the US and Japan had similar economic and cultural goals in Asia. The war resulted from a power struggle, not over what to do, but who would do it.