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SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v.
LOPEZ
certiorari to the
united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
No.
93-1260. Argued
November 8, 1994 -- Decided
April 26, 1995
After respondent, then a 12th grade
student, carried a concealed handgun into his high school, he was charged
with violating the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, which forbids "any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows . . .
is a school zone,"
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A). The District Court denied his motion to
dismiss the indictment, concluding that §922(q) is a constitutional
exercise of Congress' power to regulate activities in and affecting
commerce. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that, in light of what
it characterized as insufficient congressional findings and legislative
history, §922(q) is invalid as beyond Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause.
Held: The Act exceeds Congress'
Commerce Clause authority. First, although this Court has upheld a wide
variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce, the possession of a gun in a
local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through
repetition elsewhere, have such a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly those terms are defined. Nor is it an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot,
therefore, be sustained under the Court's cases upholding regulations of
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce. Second, §922(q) contains no jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case by case inquiry, that the firearms
possession in question has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce.
Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication
that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no
requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to
interstate commerce. To uphold the Government's contention that §922(q) is
justified because firearms possession in a local school zone does indeed
substantially affect interstate commerce would require this Court to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional Commerce Clause authority to a general police power of the
sort held only by the States.
----
Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990, Congress made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone."
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The Act neither
regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the
possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. We hold that
the Act exceeds the authority of Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States . . . ." U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3.
On March 10, 1992, respondent, who
was then a 12th grade student, arrived at Edison High School in San
Antonio, Texas, carrying a concealed .38 caliber handgun and five bullets.
Acting upon an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted respondent,
who admitted that he was carrying the weapon. He was arrested and charged
under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. next day, the
state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged respondent by
complaint with violating the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990.
. . .
On appeal, respondent challenged
his conviction based on his claim that §922(q) exceeded Congress' power to
legislate under the Commerce Clause . . .
We start with first principles. The
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See U. S.
Const., Art. I, §8. As James Madison wrote, "[t]he powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."
This constitutionally mandated division of authority "was adopted by the
Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties." Gregory
v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Just as
the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any
one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."
Ibid.
The Constitution delegates to
Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U. S. Const., Art. I, §8,
cl. 3. The Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, first defined the nature
of Congress' commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
189-190 (1824):
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that
intercourse."
The commerce power "is the power to
regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Id.,
at 196. The Gibbons Court, however, acknowledged that limitations
on the commerce power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce
Clause.
. . .
[1930s Supreme Court cases]
Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in an
era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously
defined authority of Congress under that Clause. In part, this was a
recognition of the great changes that had occurred in the way business was
carried on in this country. Enterprises that had once been local or at
most regional in nature had become national in scope. But the doctrinal
change also reflected a view that earlier Commerce Clause cases
artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.
But even these modern era
precedents which have expanded congressional power under the Commerce
Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits . . .
Consistent with this structure, we
have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the use of
the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce.
Within this final category,
admittedly, our case law has not been clear whether an activity must
"affect" or "substantially affect" interstate commerce in order to be
within Congress' power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause. Compare
Preseault v. ICC,
494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990), with Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27
(the Court has never declared that "Congress may use a relatively trivial
impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or
private activities"). We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our
case law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the
regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce.
We now turn to consider the power
of Congress, in the light of this framework, to enact §922(q). The first
two categories of authority may be quickly disposed of: §922(q) is not a
regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an
attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through
the channels of commerce; nor can §922(q) be justified as a regulation by
which Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate
commerce or a thing in interstate commerce. Thus, if §922(q) is to be
sustained, it must be under the third category as a regulation of an
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
. . .
Even Wickard, which is
perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the
possession of a gun in a school zone does not. Roscoe Filburn operated a
small farm in Ohio, on which, in the year involved, he raised 23 acres of
wheat. It was his practice to sow winter wheat in the fall, and after
harvesting it in July to sell a portion of the crop, to feed part of it to
poultry and livestock on the farm, to use some in making flour for home
consumption, and to keep the remainder for seeding future crops. The
Secretary of Agriculture assessed a penalty against him under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 because he harvested about 12 acres
more wheat than his allotment under the Act permitted. The Act was
designed to regulate the volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign
commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages, and concomitant
fluctuation in wheat prices, which had previously obtained.
.. . Section 922(q) is a
criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained
under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or
are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
. . .
The Government's essential
contention, in fine, is that we may determine here that §922(q) is
valid because possession of a firearm in a local school zone does indeed
substantially affect interstate commerce. Brief for United States 17. The
Government argues that possession of a firearm in a school zone may result
in violent crime and that violent crime can be expected to affect the
functioning of the national economy in two ways. First, the costs of
violent crime are substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance,
those costs are spread throughout the population. Second, violent crime
reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the
country that are perceived to be unsafe. The Government also argues that
the presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to the
educational process by threatening the learning environment. A handicapped
educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive citizenry.
That, in turn, would have an adverse effect on the Nation's economic well
being. As a result, the Government argues that Congress could rationally
have concluded that §922(q) substantially affects interstate commerce.
We pause to consider the
implications of the Government's arguments. The Government admits, under
its "costs of crime" reasoning, that Congress could regulate not only all
violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,
regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce. Similarly,
under the Government's "national productivity" reasoning, Congress could
regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic
productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage,
divorce, and child custody), for example. Under the theories that the
Government presents in support of §922(q), it is difficult to perceive any
limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign.
Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed
to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate.
Although Justice Breyer argues that
acceptance of the Government's rationales would not authorize a general
federal police power, he is unable to identify any activity that the
States may regulate but Congress may not. Justice Breyer posits that there
might be some limitations on Congress' commerce power such as family law
or certain aspects of education. These suggested limitations, when viewed
in light of the dissent's expansive analysis, are devoid of substance.
Justice Breyer focuses, for the
most part, on the threat that firearm possession in and near schools poses
to the educational process and the potential economic consequences flowing
from that threat. Post, at 5-9. Specifically, the dissent reasons
that (1) gun related violence is a serious problem; (2) that problem, in
turn, has an adverse effect on classroom learning; and (3) that adverse
effect on classroom learning, in turn, represents a substantial threat to
trade and commerce. Post, at 9. This analysis would be equally
applicable, if not more so, to subjects such as family law and direct
regulation of education.
For instance, if Congress can,
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, regulate activities that adversely
affect the learning environment, then, a fortiori, it also can
regulate the educational process directly. Congress could determine that a
school's curriculum has a-significant" effect on the extent of classroom
learning. As a result, Congress could mandate a federal curriculum for
local elementary and secondary schools because what is taught in local
schools has a significant "effect on classroom learning," cf. post,
at 9, and that, in turn, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Justice Breyer rejects our reading
of precedent and argues that "Congress . . . could rationally conclude
that schools fall on the commercial side of the line." Again, Justice
Breyer's rationale lacks any real limits because, depending on the level
of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial. Under the
dissent's rationale, Congress could just as easily look at child rearing
as "fall[ing] on the commercial side of the line" because it provides a
"valuable service--namely, to equip [children] with the skills they need
to survive in life and, more specifically, in the workplace." Ibid.
We do not doubt that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce and also affect the educational process. That
authority, though broad, does not include the authority to regulate each
and every aspect of local schools.
. . . The possession of a gun
in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might,
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate
commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no
indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is
no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to
interstate commerce.
To uphold the Government's
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a
manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down
that road, giving great deference to congressional action. The broad
language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would
require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does
not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. This
we are unwilling to do.
----
Justice
Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and
Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The issue in this case is whether
the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to enact a statute that makes it a
crime to possess a gun in, or near, a school.
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). In my view, the statute
falls well within the scope of the commerce power as this Court has
understood that power over the last half century.
In reaching this conclusion, I
apply three basic principles of Commerce Clause interpretation. First, the
power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several States," U. S. Const.,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, encompasses the power to regulate local activities
insofar as they significantly affect interstate commerce . . . Second, in
determining whether a local activity will likely have a significant effect
upon interstate commerce, a court must consider, not the effect of an
individual act (a single instance of gun possession), but rather the
cumulative effect of all similar instances (i.e., the effect of all
guns possessed in or near schools) . . . Third, the Constitution requires
us to judge the connection between a regulated activity and interstate
commerce, not directly, but at one remove. Courts must give Congress a
degree of leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual
connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce--both
because the Constitution delegates the commerce power directly to Congress
and because the determination requires an empirical judgment of a kind
that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with accuracy.
. . . Applying these
principles to the case at hand, we must ask whether Congress could have
had a rational basis for finding a significant (or substantial)
connection between gun related school violence and interstate commerce.
Or, to put the question in the language of the explicit finding
that Congress made when it amended this law in 1994: Could Congress
rationally have found that "violent crime in school zones," through its
effect on the "quality of education," significantly (or substantially)
affects "interstate" or "foreign commerce"? 18 U. S. C. A. §§922(q)(1)(F),
(G) (Nov. 1994 Supp.). As long as one views the commerce connection, not
as a "technical legal conception," but as "a practical one," the answer to
this question must be yes. Numerous reports and studies--generated both
inside and outside government--make clear that Congress could reasonably
have found the empirical connection that its law, implicitly or
explicitly, asserts.
For one thing, reports, hearings,
and other readily available literature make clear that the problem of guns
in and around schools is widespread and extremely serious. These materials
report, for example, that four percent of American high school students
(and six percent of inner city high school students) carry a gun to school
at least occasionally; that 12 percent of urban high school students have
had guns fired at them, ibid.; that 20 percent of those students
have been threatened with guns; and that, in any 6 month period,
several hundred thousand schoolchildren are victims of violent crimes in
or near their schools. And, they report that this widespread violence in
schools throughout the Nation significantly interferes with the quality of
education in those schools. Based on reports such as these, Congress
obviously could have thought that guns and learning are mutually
exclusive. And, Congress could therefore have found a substantial
educational problem--teachers unable to teach, students unable to
learn--and concluded that guns near schools contribute substantially to
the size and scope of that problem.
Having found that guns in schools
significantly undermine the quality of education in our Nation's
classrooms, Congress could also have found, given the effect of education
upon interstate and foreign commerce, that gun related violence in and
around schools is a commercial, as well as a human, problem. Education,
although far more than a matter of economics, has long been inextricably
intertwined with the Nation's economy . . . In recent years the link
between secondary education and business has strengthened, becoming both
more direct and more important. Scholars on the subject report that
technological changes and innovations in management techniques have
altered the nature of the workplace so that more jobs now demand greater
educational skills.
Increasing global competition also
has made primary and secondary education economically more important . . .
Finally, there is evidence that, today more than ever, many firms base
their location decisions upon the presence, or absence, of a work force
with a basic education . . .
The economic links I have just
sketched seem fairly obvious. Why then is it not equally obvious, in light
of those links, that a widespread, serious, and substantial physical
threat to teaching and learning also substantially threatens the
commerce to which that teaching and learning is inextricably tied? That is
to say, guns in the hands of six percent of inner city high school
students and gun related violence throughout a city's schools must
threaten the trade and commerce that those schools support. The only
question, then, is whether the latter threat is (to use the majority's
terminology) "substantial." And, the evidence of (1) the extent of
the gun related violence problem, (2) the extent of the resulting
negative effect on classroom learning, and (3) the extent of the
consequent negative commercial effects, see supra, at 6-9, when
taken together, indicate a threat to trade and commerce that is
"substantial." At the very least, Congress could rationally have concluded
that the links are "substantial."
To hold this statute constitutional
is not to "obliterate" the "distinction of what is national and what is
local," nor is it to hold that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal
Government to "regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens," to regulate "marriage,
divorce, and child custody," or to regulate any and all aspects of
education. For one thing, this statute is aimed at curbing a particularly
acute threat to the educational process--the possession (and use) of life
threatening firearms in, or near, the classroom. The empirical evidence
that I have discussed above unmistakably documents the special way in
which guns and education are incompatible. This Court has previously
recognized the singularly disruptive potential on interstate commerce that
acts of violence may have. For another thing, the immediacy of the
connection between education and the national economic well being is
documented by scholars and accepted by society at large in a way and to a
degree that may not hold true for other social institutions. It must
surely be the rare case, then, that a statute strikes at conduct that
(when considered in the abstract) seems so removed from commerce, but
which (practically speaking) has so significant an impact upon commerce.
In sum, a holding that the
particular statute before us falls within the commerce power would not
expand the scope of that Clause. Rather, it simply would apply
pre-existing law to changing economic circumstances , , ,
More importantly, if a distinction
between commercial and noncommercial activities is to be made, this is not
the case in which to make it. The majority clearly cannot intend such a
distinction to focus narrowly on an act of gun possession standing by
itself, for such a reading could not be reconciled with either the civil
rights cases--in each of those cases the specific transaction (the race
based exclusion, the use of force) was not itself "commercial." And, if
the majority instead means to distinguish generally among broad categories
of activities, differentiating what is educational from what is
commercial, then, as a practical matter, the line becomes almost
impossible to draw. Schools that teach reading, writing, mathematics, and
related basic skills serve both social and commercial purposes, and
one cannot easily separate the one from the other. American industry
itself has been, and is again, involved in teaching. See supra, at
6, 9. When, and to what extent, does its involvement make education
commercial? Does the number of vocational classes that train students
directly for jobs make a difference? Does it matter if the school is
public or private, nonprofit or profit seeking? Does it matter if a city
or State adopts a voucher plan that pays private firms to run a school?
Even if one were to ignore these practical questions, why should there be
a theoretical distinction between education, when it significantly
benefits commerce, and environmental pollution, when it causes economic
harm?
Regardless, if there is a
principled distinction that could work both here and in future cases,
Congress (even in the absence of vocational classes, industry involvement,
and private management) could rationally conclude that schools fall on the
commercial side of the line. In 1990, the year Congress enacted the
statute before us, primary and secondary schools spent $230 billion--that
is, nearly a quarter of a trillion dollars--which accounts for a
significant portion of our $5.5 trillion Gross Domestic Product for that
year. The business of schooling requires expenditure of these funds on
student transportation, food and custodial services, books, and teachers'
salaries. And, these expenditures enable schools to provide a valuable
service--namely, to equip students with the skills they need to survive in
life and, more specifically, in the workplace. Certainly, Congress has
often analyzed school expenditure as if it were a commercial investment,
closely analyzing whether schools are efficient, whether they justify the
significant resources they spend, and whether they can be restructured to
achieve greater returns. Why could Congress, for Commerce Clause purposes,
not consider schools as roughly analogous to commercial investments from
which the Nation derives the benefit of an educated work force?
In sum, to find this legislation
within the scope of the Commerce Clause would permit "Congress . . . to
act in terms of economic . . . realities" . . . Upholding this legislation
would do no more than simply recognize that Congress had a "rational
basis" for finding a significant connection between guns in or near
schools and (through their effect on education) the interstate and foreign
commerce they threaten. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals. Respectfully, I dissent. |