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IN SEARCH OF PROGRESSIVISM

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No one needs to be told that the concept of "progressivism" fell into trouble in the 1970s. For decades the notion that the political and intellectual ferment of the Roosevelt and Wilson years cohered into an entity called progressivism was one of the central organizing principles of American history.¹ How that coherence should be defined was a matter of starkly divided opinion; but the term itself was as crucial a part of the historiographical scaffolding as "republicanism" or "Jacksonian democracy." The search for progressivism — undertaken with implicit confidence that the expedition would reveal some typical progressive profile, coherent political agenda, or, at least, definable ethos — helped attract more historical talent to the first two decades of the twentieth century than to any other period of modern America. Yet the 1970s had barely begun when Peter Filene attacked the whole notion of a coherent progressive movement as a semantic and conceptual muddle, and declared it dead and buried.²

Those who shared Filene's doubts did not win the easy victory Filene had envisioned. Progressivism shuffled through the 1970s as a corpse that would not lie down. Few historians seriously tried to get along without the term "progressivism" or "progressive movement." For every historian who, like Jack Kirby, declared outright that the covering term "progressivism" "cannot withstand rigorous definition," there were others ready to try their hand at the task.³ But it was impossible to miss the mounting undertone of apology behind the efforts at definition, the increasingly elaborate qualifications attached to lists of shared "progressive" goals and values, the occasional candid admission that the conflicting interpretations of progressivism could not be made to add up, and the suggestions that the traditional questions had been played out, if not in some way misconceived.

The nervous tick was particularly conspicuous in that litmus test of historiographical moods: the undergraduate survey text. By the mid 1970s, many undergraduates were being warned at the outset that they would find the Progressive era "confusing." "The concept of progressivism turns out to be curiously elusive," they were cautioned. The movement "may never be fully understood," they were told, before being shuttled off to the obligatory chapters on Roosevelt and Wilson and the unenviable task of demonstrating

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their triumph over professional disagreement and confusion on their final exams. But there was nothing in these candid asides that professional historians did not know full well. The "babble of disagreement" over the meaning of progressivism, as David Kennedy put it in 1975, was acute and troubling. Yet by the end of the decade there were signs that beneath the definitional wrangling historians had been striking out in significantly new directions—away from the debate over the essence of progressivism, so brilliantly started by Richard Hofstadter's generation, and toward questions of context. Much of the best writing of the 1970s inquired less about the progressives themselves than about their surroundings; less about the internal coherence of the progressive "movement" than about the structures of politics, power, and ideas within which the era's welter of tongues and efforts and "reforms" took place. The answers were important and wide-ranging: some pointed to critical changes in the rules of the political game; some emphasized revolutions in power and organization; others hinted at new ways of comprehending the era's rhetoric and social thought. Set beside these gains, the 1970s failure to agree on the characteristics of progressivism may turn out not really to matter.

Of these developments, one of the most significant has been the emergence of a pluralistic reading of progressive politics, in which the fundamental fact of the era is not reform in any traditional sense of the term, but the explosion of scores of aggressive, politically active pressure groups into the space left by the recession of traditional political loyalties. The first intimations of this account of the period came in Filene's "obituary" of 1970 and a companion essay by John D. Buenker in 1969. Both historians began by insisting that the progressive movement was not, in the strict sense of the term, a "movement" at all. Those whom historians had labeled progressives shared no common party or organization. They were rent by deep disagreements over anti-trust policy, women's suffrage, direct democracy, and any number of other specific issues. Finally, Buenker argued, the Procrustean exercise of trying to stretch those who called themselves progressives over a single ideological frame, far from revealing a common ethos, had either produced a list of ideas "so general as to be held by practically everyone or so ambiguous, and even contradictory, as to foreclose the possibility that members of the same movement could hold them simultaneously." Only by discarding the mistaken assumption of a coherent reform movement could one see the progressives' world for what it really was: an era of shifting, ideologically fluid, issue-focused coalitions, all competing for the reshaping of American society.

The more devastating the attack, the fiercer the resistance, and the unconvinced were quick to point out that no one had really claimed that pro-
gessivism was a "movement" in the narrow sense of the term that Filene and Buenker employed. That progressive politics was coalition politics, prone to internal fissures, was a commonplace. For a good many historians, in fact, the progressives had made most sense when divided in two. By the end of the 1970s one could take one's pick of nearly a dozen dichotomies: "social" reformers vs. "structural" reformers (Holli), western democratic Bryanites vs. eastern elitist Rooseveltians (Hackney), "social justice" progressives vs. "social order" progressives (Church and Sedlak), consumer conscious "insurgents" vs. job conscious "modernizers" (Thelen), or in Buenker's case, heedless of his own theoretical advice, new-stock, urban liberals vs. old-stock, patrician reformers.

If Buenker and Filene meant to imply, however, that the rage for bifurcation had not really helped resolve the problem of coherence, they were surely right. Though the ideological checklists looked considerably less muddled when sliced in two, that clarity was purchased at the cost of finding any sizable number of self-professed progressives who did not draw their ideas from both sides of all such divisions. The post facto dichotomies touched deep moral nerves in the historians who employed them. But what usually amounted to routing the false progressive ideas out of genuine "progressivism" did not succeed in making it clear why a "democratic" progressive like Charles Beard should have cozied up so closely to the "structural reformers" of the Bureau of Municipal Research; why an "insurgent" like Robert La Follette should have thrown in his lot with a social gospeler turned efficiency expert like John R. Commons; why an archetypical "social justice" progressive like Jane Addams and an archetypical "corporate liberal" like George W. Perkins should have landed in the same political camp in 1912; or why, in short, the air was so full of what Robert Wiebe shrewdly described as "strange theoretical combinations." What Buenker and Filene proposed was to accept these apparent anomalies as characteristic: to split the progressive movement not in two but into dozens of pieces, bound only by the rules of competitive, pluralistic politics.

But why then did so many issue-oriented groups demanding so many novel changes burst on the scene at once? That, clearly, was the critical question, and Buenker could only appeal to the big, driving forces of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration, all of which had been around for an embarrassingly long time before the turn-of-the-century explosion of pressure groups they were said to have triggered. It was here that the political scientists entered the argument, and the key book was Walter Dean Burnham's *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (1970). What impressed Burnham about the Progressive era was that it coincided with what appeared to be a seismic shift in American electoral behavior: not a party realignment
of the sort familiar to the nineteenth century, but a critical weakening of all party loyalties and a massive decline in voting itself.¹² Why, given the heated political atmosphere of the Progressive years, Americans chose that moment to begin their long twentieth-century slide toward political inactivity has now become a matter of intense debate among political scientists and political historians. Some of the withdrawal from politics was, of course, deliberately contrived in the form of tighter registration laws and, in the South, outright disfranchisement of black and many poor white voters. But the rest now seems closely related to the failure of the political parties to bring their partisans to the polls in the numbers characteristic of the late nineteenth century. Whether the parties weakened because of new ballot laws which made ticket splitting easier, because the party realignment of the 1890s left more and more states without meaningful electoral contests, the direct primary system shattered the power base of the old-style party managers, new mass circulation newspapers eclipsed the old party sheets as primary information sources, or because the issues of the Progressive era simply did not touch deep popular nerves—no one really knows.¹³ But as party loyalties eroded, the parties could no longer sustain their former role as the single most important channel through which Americans tried to affect the policies of governments.

The result was to spring open the political arena to extra-party pressure groups of all sorts: manufacturers' organizations, labor lobbies, civic leagues, trade associations, women's clubs, professional associations, and issue-oriented lobbies, all trying directly to shape policy. This was the context within which maverick politicians could vault into office and "reform" (and "antireform") coalitions of all sorts could blossom. Progressive politics—fragmented, fluid, and issue-focused—was, in short, part of a major, lasting shift in the rules of the political game.

Such a scheme is easier to sketch in broad strokes than to work out in detail, but its promise is already apparent in Richard L. McCormick's fine study of New York politics, From Realignment to Reform (1981).¹⁴ By looking most closely not at the reformers but at the old-time bosses, McCormick demonstrates how their hold was shaken by the assaults of mugwump, anti-party crusaders, by muckracking, and by the unsettling rise of new zero-sum issues not resolvable by the parties' traditional method of distributing favors all around—how, in sum, one form of politics gave way to another. What happened in New York is not likely to be precisely duplicated elsewhere.¹⁵ Neither McCormick nor anyone else has yet described how the new extra-party techniques of lobbying and coalition building exactly worked, how quickly or how thoroughly they supplanted the old party channels, or how and by whom the new-style legislative contests were most often won. The causes of party disaffection remain, even in McCormick's hands, dauntingly
complex and interdependent, and no one has yet tried to write a historical sociology of party disengagement. But at the least the discernment that the voters drawn to progressive issues formed a slimmed-down electorate of highly specific loyalties, always in flux, promises a major gain over the old wrangle about the identity of the “typical” progressive.\(^{16}\)

The recovery of the particular political fluidity of the Progressive years also promises to reopen the question David Thelen raised at the beginning of the 1970s as to how the reform coalitions came together: how techniques and grievances were passed from one issue group to another, how channels of communication were established and supported, how new methods of mobilizing public opinion were invented and employed—muckracking, the celebrity picket line, the forcing of an official witness-calling investigation, the launching of a referendum campaign, or the puffing of fads like city planning or commission government.\(^{17}\) To insist that reform efforts come in clusters precisely because of this sort of interlocking of techniques and activists is not to deflate the progressives’ moral fervor. Like all reformers, those of the Progressive era were made piece by piece, as unease and anger were channeled into vocabularies and techniques that were always in motion.

What is at hand, however, is not simply a new set of questions. In the work of McCormick, Burnham, and Buenker one senses the beginning of a major new synthesis which will situate the progressives in the context of a much bigger phenomenon: the rise of modern, weak-party, issue-focused politics.

For other historians writing in the 1970s the central fact of the Progressive era was not its political fluidity at all; rather it was its unprecedentedly tight organization of social and economic power. Thus Filene had barely proclaimed the death of any simple understanding of the era when Louis Galambos swept the period’s fragments together into what seemed to him and to others a fundamental revolution in social organization: the eclipse of the local, informal group as the basic frame of American life, and its replacement by vastly bigger, bureaucratically structured formal organizations, among them the big business corporation and its putative adversary, the active, regulatory, progressive state.\(^{18}\)

Galambos’s essay was in large part a gloss on Robert Wiebe’s immensely influential *The Search for Order* (1967), in which Wiebe had laid particular stress on the connections between “progressivism” and the surrounding organizational (or, as he called it, bureaucratic) revolution. In a nation rushing pell-mell out of its crisis-ridden villages toward new bureaucratic organizations and social values, none ran faster or worked harder than the progressives to rationalize and organize what they saw as their chaotic surroundings. Scratch the moralistic veneer off progressivism, Wiebe argued,
particularly after 1910, and what you found was a movement of organization men caught up in dreams of social efficiency, systematization, and scientifically adjusted harmony. Progressivism was not "the complaint of the unorganized against the consequences of organization," as Hofstadter had had it. It was, in Wiebe's telling, precisely the reverse.19

If Wiebe's analysis gained its effect by deliberately simplifying the progressives' ideas, he did brilliantly illustrate the parallel between one of the strains in progressive social thought and one of the central social transformations of the twentieth century. When it came to asking how the values of social efficiency burst into political life, however, the answers of the "organizational" historians tended to lead toward a series of knots and tangles. Wiebe himself had posited a "new middle class" as the prime carriers of the novel bureaucratic values, a somewhat formless group organized, it appeared, around a core of professionally conscious doctors, lawyers, social workers, educators, and engineers, all in the throes of professional organization at the turn of the century. The study of their professionalization turned into one of the boom enterprises of the 1970s, and some of the results seemed to confirm Wiebe's hunch that the drive to rationalize the professions and the progressives' drive to rationalize society were part and parcel of the same process. Professional architects and engineers remapped cities in the Progressive years; professionally conscious educators revamped education; doctors reached out to put chaotic systems of sewage and water supply in order.20

But professional goals and bureaucratic social visions, historians also found, were by no means identical. If the "professions" had any trait in common, it seemed not to be a political ethos but a common desire for job control. Professionally conscious lawyers, for example, if Jerold Auerbach is right, worked far harder to drive the "disrespectable," night school educated elements out of their ranks than to straighten out legislation. Doctors, only a fraction of whom entered the field of public medicine, found the progressive state most useful as a guarantor of their private monopoly. Professionalization and the search for a rationalized social order it now seems clear, was no tightly organized expedition.21

Other historians who tried to pin down the source of the new bureaucratic values turned to more abstract and more impersonal schemes. The most sophisticated and wide-ranging of all the "organizational" syntheses came from Samuel P. Hays. As Hays described it, the context of progressive politics began with a massive growth in "technical systems" (large-scale organizations dependent on mastery of large inputs of data: payrolls, oil reserves, truancy records, whatever); in occupational specialization, and in communications networks and "functional organizations" binding those specialists together; and in the scientific and bureaucratic values suited to the
new organizational systems. Together these processes hastened the growth of “cosmopolitan” forces as opposed to “local” ones. And that, in turn, generated the essential dynamic of progressive politics, the flow of decision making upward, from ward bosses to city managers, townships to counties, school teachers to superintendents.22

To describe Hays’s scheme in this way is to simplify it drastically, but it is not to parody its peculiar bloodlessness. In a famous essay in 1964 on the origins of urban “reform,” Hays wrote of the capture of urban politics by a self-conscious, upper class elite.23 Returning to that question ten years later, he described something resembling the workings of a giant accordion: an urban system opening up in the nineteenth century, as physical expansion produced a dispersal of power into urban wards and brought middling class men into political office; and then squeezing closed again after 1900, as new forms of communication recentralized the city, as functional relations multiplied, and the “cosmopolitans” were swept back in. The second scheme, being vaster, may also be truer than the first. But like most big functionalist theories, in which everything is linked to everything else, it is all but impossible to imagine what a definitive scheme of proof might look like. Moreover, for those who persisted in asking what human intentions drove the great social engine, other than those bound up in the fashionable incantation “modernization,” Hays’s answers, still more than Wiebe’s, seemed vexingly obscure.24

This causal impasse may explain why the most widely read “organizational” histories in the 1970s came not from students of Hays or Wiebe but from scholars on the Left. The explanatory engine closest at hand, after all, was the big business corporation. No other “technical systems” approached the size or complexity of the new corporate entities being put together at the turn of the century. Nowhere else were the concepts of efficiency, rationality, and predictability being more carefully worked out or embedded more quickly in organizational forms—certainly not in the universities, with their load of archaic customs, or in such entrepreneurial strongholds as the law or medicine.25 If organization and organizational values were what the Progressive era was all about, here was surely a good place to look.

The most influential book on the Left in this regard was James Weinstein’s The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State (1968), though it took some time for it to emerge from Gabriel Kolko’s shadow. Weinstein’s concern was much bigger and subtler than Kolko’s preoccupation with the federal regulatory process.26 It was how, in the face of a major crisis of legitimacy, the leaders of corporate capitalism had managed to capture dissent itself. What others called “progressivism,” and Weinstein called “corporate liberalism,” was at bottom, he argued, a series of measures designed to draw the teeth of rank-
and-file militancy and middle class resentment—an abandonment of the cut-throat ethics of entrepreneurial capitalism for new ideals of social harmony and new schemes of business-government capitalism which would insure a social order safe for the new corporate phase of capitalism. Insofar as progressives dreamed of social efficiency, Weinstein suggested, they attested to a brilliantly successful capture of ideas and policies by the most powerful organizations around.27

This welding of the rationalizing side of progressive ideas and actions to a precise economic base had a very strong appeal in the 1970s. Certainly historians looking for the business-public policy connections characteristic of the corporate liberal state did not have far to look. They were evident in some measure or another in the framing of virtually all industrial and economic legislation as business leaders exchanged the tactics of resistance for the tactics of cooptation. From new strongholds in the philanthropic foundations and public policy groups, corporation-tied figures played a prominent role in the redesign of medicine, the restructuring of cities, and the investigation and interpretation of industrial unrest.28 The best books in this vein focused on education, and there, as David Tyack, David F. Noble, Joel Spring, and others demonstrated, the influence of businessmen, although not unopposed, was massive.29

All of these studies were hotly debated in the 1970s, but it would be a mistake to dismiss them as merely reflections of the political crosscurrents of the decade.30 That businessmen in crucial parts of the economy did shift from an ideology of competition to one of stability and (where their vital interests were not at stake) cooperation is unmistakable. That they tried hard on every level to rationalize their economic environment—by internal administrative reforms, by efforts to stabilize markets, and attempts to seize control of their regulators—is just as clear.31 So is the fact that businessmen tried to impose the organizational model of the corporation on everything from schools to timberlands, an effort to which those who called themselves progressives often gave enthusiastic support.32 And finally, given the work of a new generation of labor historians, there is no doubt that all this was done, not in Hofstadter’s relatively genial period of “sustained and general prosperity,” but against a backdrop of acute labor crisis.33

But how much of the game did the corporations win? More than enough to keep them going as the dominant force in economic life but, as other historians working in the 1970s showed, not enough to amount to an unqualified victory. The record of workmen’s compensation legislation, one of the central social issues of the Progressive era, now reveals a tangle of competing interests and varied compromises.34 The same is true of business regulation. In a crucial progressive state like Wisconsin, for example, the railroads suc-
ceeded in regulating the commission designed to govern them, but they were unable to stave off a corporate income tax which, if Elliot Brownlee is right, soaked the corporations for the benefit of Wisconsin's farmers. As Robert Cuff has shown, the wartime linchpin of the business-progressive complex, the War Industries Board, likewise fell considerably short of the hopes the corporate liberals had for it. The balance sheet for the Progressive era as a whole, however, is still only roughly drawn. The period remains ripe for more enterprises like Carl V. Harris's fine study of Birmingham, Alabama, which—holding in abeyance preconceived notions of victors and losers—tries to ask which social and economic groups won precisely what from the era's politics.

Equally needed is a far less schematic understanding of the relations between progressive social thought and the ideas flowing out of the corporation boardrooms and industrial laboratories in the Progressive years. One of the reasons for the rising appeal to the concept of cultural "hegemony" by historians on the Left is a recognition that far too much of the case for the corporations' capture of progressive social ideals rests simply on a functionalist sense of the "fit" between progressive policies and what seem in hindsight to have been the needs of corporate capitalism. Yet virtually all cultural systems, even starkly divided ones, "function" in hindsight. Until the tissue of connections between the corporations, the bureaus, the professional schools and universities, and the progressive publicists has been much more fully explored, "hegemony" promises to mystify quite as thoroughly as the term "modernization."

Still, were the organizational historians to adopt less schematic notions of ideas and social outcomes, there seems no reason why the 1970s concern with organizational structures, the big business corporation, and with pluralistic politics could not be brought together to the advantage of them all. In the newly fluid, issue-focused political contests of the Progressive era, the better organized players—the professional lobbies, the well-disciplined interest groups, and, above all, the corporations—held massive advantages. The ideological commitments at stake for pluralists, functionalists, and Marxists alike may not bode well for such a commonsensical view of the era, but by the end of the 1970s the evidence for it was everywhere at hand.

Where in this contested terrain, however, was "progressivism" to be found? What ideational glue allowed some of the coalition builders to recognize each other in the new sea of competing interest groups—as they clearly did—and to adopt, somewhat late in the day, in late 1910 and early 1911, the common label "progressive"?

If progressivism qualifies as an "ism" at all, surely it is as a system of shared
ideas; yet nowhere in the 1970s was the historiographical discord greater than when it came to describing progressive social thought. Progressives could be found who admired the efficiency of the big corporation and who detested the trusts, who lauded the "people" and who yearned for an electorate confined to white and educated voters, who spoke the language of social engineering and the language of moralistic uplift, or (to make matters worse) did all these things at once. The enterprise of extracting a stable list of core progressive values from the welter of things progressives said and wrote continued through the 1970s. But as the lists grew longer and more convoluted without growing any more coherent, at least one careful historian was driven to conclude that what characterized the progressive mind was its "muddle-minded" jumble of oppositions.

The obstacles in the way of getting progressive social thought straight have little to do with insufficient evidence; progressives shared an inordinate faith in the word, as Otis Graham pointed out long ago, and they preached and wrote with consuming zeal. One of the results, however, was a rhetoric thick with straw men and partisan exaggerations which can be safely read only with a sense of context and contest as strong as the progressives' own. "Social justice" is a case in point—a powerful Rooseveltian slogan in 1912 which, in the absence of anyone willing to defend "social injustice," worked its magic in large part through its half-buried innuendoes and its expansive indistinctness. The progressives' appeal to "the people" is a more complicated example of the phenomenon; but one of the reasons for the triumph of that particularly elastic phrase (as opposed to the term "democracy," for example) was that it allowed those who sincerely believed in a government serving the needs of "the people" to camouflage from voters the acute distrust many of those same persons harbored of political egalitarianism. Above all, when the progressives exaggerated, they were prone to exaggerate their triumph over what they belittled as the drift and pessimism of their predecessors, counting on their audiences not to inquire too closely into the relationship between the frenetically active, progress-imbued nineteenth century and the progressives' deliberate caricature of it. Yet in the lists of the characteristic ideological ingredients of progressivism compiled in the 1970s one could still find the terms optimism, activism, democracy, and social justice—too often with only a thin sense of the traps surrounding each of them. Like all partisans, the progressive publicists used words less to clarify a political philosophy than to build a political constituency. What their slogans meant lay not only in what they said but in what these slogans were designed to accomplish.

The trouble with comprehending "progressivism" as a list of beliefs is a deeper one, however, than the presence of some misleading or exaggerated
elements on many such lists. The deeper problem stems from the attempt to capture the progressives within a static ideological frame. If the contradictory lists prove anything it is that those who called themselves progressives did not share a common creed or a string of common values, however ingeniously or vaguely defined. Rather what they seem to have possessed was an ability to draw on three distinct clusters of ideas—three distinct social languages—to articulate their discontents and their social visions. To put rough but serviceable labels on those three languages of discontent, the first was the rhetoric of antimonopolism, the second was an emphasis on social bonds and the social nature of human beings, and the third was the language of social efficiency.

These three did not add up to a coherent ideology we can call "progressivism." All three tended to focus that discontent on arbitrary, unregulated individual power—enough so to make the trust, the political boss, and the sweatshop terms of enormous bearing. But on a deeper level the three languages—full of mutual contradictions—did not add up at all. They had distinctly different historical roots, and they rose into currency and fell into disuse at distinctly different times. We can best imagine those who called themselves progressives as drawing from each of them—some more from one, some more from another—without undue concern for philosophical consistency. Together they formed not an ideology but the surroundings of available rhetoric and ideas—akin to the surrounding structures of politics and power—within which progressives launched their crusades, recruited their partisans, and did their work.

Of these languages, antimonopolism was the oldest, the most peculiarly American, and, through the first decade of the century, the strongest of the three. When Tom Johnson took on the streetcar franchises, when Frederic Howe plumped for municipal ownership of natural monopolies, when the muckrakers flayed the trusts, there was nothing essentially new in the grievances they dramatized or the language they employed. The disproportionately large number of single taxers in the early progressive crusades was clue enough that this line of attack on "privilege" and "unnatural" concentration of wealth ran back through the Populists, through Henry George, and on at least to Andrew Jackson. But this understanding of economics and politics in terms of graft, monopoly, privilege, and invisible government had almost always before been the property of outsiders: workers, farmers, Democrats, Populists. What was new in the Progressive years was that the language of antimonopolism suddenly gained the acceptance of insiders: the readers of slick magazines and respectable journals, middle class family men, and reasonably proper Republicans. William A. White caught the point in 1905. "It is funny how we have all found the octopus," he mused, when less than a
decade earlier, backed up against the wall by Populism, his like had denied that animal’s very existence. 45

The reasons for that middle class discovery of the octopus have not yet all been sorted out. One of them surely goes back to the fact that there was almost nothing in the reigning conceptions of political economy to prepare middle class Americans for the sudden, turn-of-the-century ascendancy of finance capitalism, except to decry the agglomerations of the financiers as “unnatural” and conspiratorial. Still closer to home, another part of the answer may be the expansion of private streetcar, gas, and electric networks which, by the end of the century, had begun to give urban dwellers the experience of vulnerability to monopoly that had once been the peculiar possession of the railroad-captive farmers. 46 Yet another thread, of the sort most recently worked by Jackson Lears, may lead back to a kind of fin de siècle ennui and a rapidly rising need for the sort of sensation that the muckrakers provided. 47 All these strands, as Richard L. McCormick has reemphasized, were powerfully concentrated in the exposures of 1905–1908 and in the anti-railroad and anticorruption campaigns those investigations let loose. 48 A decade later the antimonopoly cry had devolved on outsiders once more, leaving the muckrakers suspended without an outlet. But one of the characteristics of the Progressive years was that, for a moment, the language of antimonopolism was able to focus and impel the energies of a broader cross-section of Americans than had felt its force for generations.

The second cluster of ideas from which the progressives drew—the language of social bonds—was more specific to the Progressive years, and at the same time much less peculiarly American. To call it, in Thomas Haskell’s terms, the discovery of “interdependence” runs a risk of misunderstanding. That human beings live in a web of social relations has never been open to doubt. Much of the thrust of academic social thought in the nineteenth century had, in fact, consisted of a finer and finer elaboration of what the term “society” meant. Still the most common explanations most Americans gave to political, economic, and social questions at the end of the century were couched in terms of largely autonomous individuals: poverty and success were said to hinge on character; the economy was essentially a straight sum of individual calculations; governance was a matter of good men and official honesty. Part of what occurred in the Progressive era was a concerted assault on all these assumptions, and, in some measure, an assault on the idea of individualism itself. That was what the era’s “revolt against formalism” was all about: not a revolt against formal categories of thought, for progressive intellectuals were full of them, but against a particular set of formal fictions traceable to Smith, Locke, and Mill—the autonomous economic man, the autonomous possessor of property rights, the autonomous man of character. In its place, many of the progressives seized on a rhetoric of social cohesion. 49
Like the language of antimonopolyism, the language of social bonds focused its users’ anger on the irresponsible, antisocial act; but it directed its users’ longings not to honesty but to a consciously contrived harmony. The yearning to purge society of what now seemed its individualistic excesses took several forms. In social terms it took the form of a new interest in the social and physical environment, the discovery of new forms of social sinning and corresponding new measures of social control, and a vivid, nervous concern with social cohesion. In economic terms it took the form of a newly intense sympathy with what now seemed the innocent casualties of industrialism (women and child workers, the victims of industrial accidents, the involuntarily unemployed), and a keen desire for industrial peace and cooperation. In educational terms it took the form of schooling in teamwork, cooperation, and vocational responsibilities. In political terms it took the form of talk of the social organism and the common good. In philosophical terms it took the form of a virtual dissolution of the boundaries between self and society. Men were but “plastic lumps of human dough” to be pressed into shape on the great “social kneadingboard,” E. A. Ross maintained. John Dewey’s one-time student, Charles H. Cooley put the point still more insistently: “the notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion.” 50

Statements of this sort pushed the concern with social bonds to the extreme, and disguised a critical disagreement over how “society” ought to be conceived. At the one extreme were those like Croly and Roosevelt for whom the lines of social connection always ran toward the nation, the state, and the social whole. At the other extreme were those who, like Jane Addams, talked habitually of the bonds of family, community, and neighborhood. That unresolved debate helped make the state the object of so many of the progressives’ hopes and at the same time the focus of so much of their uneasiness. But it would be a mistake to assume that all the concern with social cohesion lay on the Rooseveltian side of the campaign-exaggerated division between the advocates of New Nationalism and New Freedom. When Wilson himself, his 1912 speeches splayed between the need to bring out Democratic voters through traditional Democratic and antimonopoly appeals and the political theories Wilson had tried to inculcate in Princeton students, came to confess the “image of liberty” he had in mind, it was that of “a great engine,” its elements “so assembled and united and accommodated that there is no friction, but a united power in all the parts.” 51

Where did such an acute consciousness of society come from? Some of it, perhaps, derived from the memories of persons who had made the trek from tightly-knit villages to anomic cities. 52 Some of it, certainly, came from the 1890s’ brutal demonstration of what unmediated interdependence was really all about in the world of industrial capitalism. 53 But the language of social bonds was an international language, not fully explainable by experiences
endemic to the United States. Perhaps the most significant clue to its origin is that, of the three social languages on which the progressives drew, this was the one most tightly attached to the churches and the university lecture halls. Its roots stretched toward Germany and, still more importantly, toward the social gospel. When progressives talked of society and solidarity the rhetoric they drew upon was, above all, the rhetoric of a socialized Protestantism, though how that transatlantic reconstruction of Protestantism took place remains at the moment a very large and very open question.

The last of the three clusters of ideas to arrive—so very different in outward form from the other two—was the one we associate with efficiency, rationalization, and social engineering. Some of the progressives never stom-ached the new bureaucratic language of budgets, human costs, and system, nor felt comfortable translating social sins into the new-fangled language of social waste. For others, however, the language of social efficiency offered a way of putting the progressives' common sense of social disorder into words and remedies free of the embarrassing pieties and philosophical conundrums that hovered around the competing language of social bonds. Like Charles Beard or John R. Commons they were ready to put their Ruskins and their Christian Sociology on the shelf in exchange for the stripped down language of social science—and for the new occupational niches available for social scientific experts.

Like the rhetoric of social bonds, the rhetoric of social efficiency was a transatlantic language. Large pieces of it could be picked up in the scientific laboratories through which a good number of the progressives moved. Other pieces, as Neil Harris has argued, were embedded in the increasingly specialized and technical ways in which people everywhere went about acquiring their everyday knowledge. But clearly it was the merger of the prestige of science with the prestige of the well-organized business firm and factory that gave the metaphor of system its tremendous twentieth-century potency—and it was presumably for this reason that that metaphor flour-ished more exuberantly in the United States, along with industrial capitalism itself, than anywhere else.

It is not yet clear through what channels the language of social efficiency worked its way out of the laboratories and factories and into political discourse—there to make it possible for many self-professed progressives to slide back and forth between criticism of business-made chaos and schemes to reorganize government on business lines. Nor is it clear how fast the process proceeded. But the dates most often pointed to cluster right in the middle of the Progressive era: 1910, the year scientific management went public; 1908, the year Arthur Bentley's The Process of Government swept all grand theorizing about politics aside as obsolete; or 1909, the first big year of the city com-
mission boom. Similarly, in the small but critical realm of formal academic thought the crucial intellectual transition takes place not at either end of the period but within it. As late as 1905, the "state," society grandly conceived, and philosophical idealism held preeminent place. By 1915 they were all being brushed into the corners by a new concern with governmental technique and political behavior, by the precise behavioristic curiosities of a new breed of sociologist, and by antiphilosophical scientism. If these hints are correct, the language of efficiency was clearly no more typically "progressive" than the other two social languages upon which progressives drew. It came late on the scene, and it endured long after the Progressive era itself was over.59

What made progressive social thought distinct and volatile, if this reading is correct, was not its intellectual coherence but the presence of all three of these languages at once. If we imagine the progressives, like most of the rest of us, largely as users rather than shapers of ideas, this was the constellation of live, accessible ways of looking at society within which they worked, from which they drew their energies and their sense of social ills, and within which they found their solutions. It did not give those who called themselves progressives an intellectual system, but it gave them a set of tools which worked well enough to have a powerful impact on their times. To think of progressive social thought in this way is to emphasize the active, dynamic aspect of ideas. It is also to admit, finally, that progressivism as an ideology is nowhere to be found.

Whether historians in the 1980s will call off the search for that great, overarching thing called "progressivism" is hard to predict. Certainly historians working in the 1970s manifestly failed to find it. In recompense they found out a vast amount about the world in which the progressives lived and the structures of social and political power shifting so rapidly around them. To acknowledge that these are the questions that matter and to abandon the hunt for the essence of the noise and tumult of that era may not be, as Filene's first critics feared, to lose the whole enterprise of historical comprehension. It may be to find it.

1. A historical sketch of the term "progressivism" has yet to be written. The label "progressive," which Woodrow Wilson was still explaining as a "new term" in January 1911, came into vogue during the 1910 electoral campaigns. The phrase "progressive movement" was a product of 1912. But the modern label "progressivism," launched in 1912 as an antonym to Toryism and socialism, was never a common term of self-identification, and did not come into widespread use until picked up, sometime after the fact, by journalists and historians.


27. James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). Ellis Hawley has tried to claim the term “corporate liberalism” for a social-political order in which the key public policy decisions are made by private, voluntary business associations. The structure Hawley describes may, indeed, flow from the ideology of “corporate liberalism.” But the proper name for what Hawley describes is a liberal form of “corporatism,” and the invitation to confusion seems gratuitous. Ellis W. Hawley, “The Discovery and Study of a ‘Corporate Liberalism’,” Business History Review 52 (1978): 309–20.


42. That tension, particularly acute in the South, is elaborated in Kirby, Darkness at the Dawning; Bruce Clayton, The Savage Ideal: Intolerance and Intellectual Leadership in the South, 1890–1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); and John Dittmer, Black Georgia in the Progressive Era, 1900–1920 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977).

43. Herbert Croly and Walter Lippmann were by no means unique among the progressives in working the theme of a late nineteenth-century America held in thrall by Herbert Spencer and the creed of laissez-faire. For the limits of the caricature, see Robert C. Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979); and Morton Keller, Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).


46. Thelen, New Citizenship, chs. 11–12.


53. Thelen, New Citizenship.


58. For an effort to document the rising prestige of business in the Progressive years, despite the outcry against the trusts and the railroads, see Louis Galambos, The Public Image of Big Business in America, 1880–1940: A Quantitative Study in Social Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

59. Wiebe made most of these same points in a series of qualifications which were all but swamped in the inquiries his work precipitated: The Search for Order, ch. 6.