MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
June 13, 1966, Decided
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In each of these cases the defendant while in police custody was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which
he was cut off from the outside world. None of the defendants was given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation
process. In all four cases the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them signed statements as well, which were admitted at their trials. All
defendants were convicted and all convictions, except in No. 584, were affirmed on appeal. Held:
1. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Pp. 444-491.
(a) The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation as it exists today is inherently intimidating and works to undermine the privilege
against self-incrimination. Unless adequate preventive measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice. Pp. 445-458.
(b) The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and expansive historical development, is the essential mainstay of our adversary system
and guarantees to the individual the "right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will," during a period of
custodial interrogation as well as in the courts or during the course of other official investigations. Pp. 458-465.
(c) The decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, stressed the need for protective devices to make the process of police interrogation conform to
the dictates of the privilege. Pp. 465-466.
(d) In the absence of other effective measures the following procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege must be observed: The person in
custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court;
he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent,
a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Pp. 467-473.
(e) If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease; if he states that he wants an
attorney, the questioning must cease until an attorney is present. Pp. 473-474.
(f) Where an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. P. 475.
(g) Where the individual answers some questions during incustody interrogation he has not waived his privilege and may invoke his right to remain silent
thereafter. Pp. 475-476.
(h) The warnings required and the waiver needed are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement,
inculpatory or exculpatory, made by a defendant. Pp. 476-477.
2. The limitations on the interrogation process required for the protection of the individual's constitutional rights should not cause an undue interference
with a proper system of law enforcement, as demonstrated by the procedures of the FBI and the safeguards afforded in other jurisdictions. Pp.
3. In each of these cases the statements were obtained under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Pp. 491-499.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe
consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from
an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement
officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively
advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused
him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took
him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the
police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him.
At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally
This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in
assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions. 1 A wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing its ramifications and
underpinnings. 2 Police and prosecutor have speculated on its range and desirability. 3 We granted certiorari in these cases, 382 U.S. 924, 925, 937, in
order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to
give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.
We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long
recognized and applied in other settings. We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and
we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution -- that "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself," and that "the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel" -- rights which were put in jeopardy in
that case through official overbearing. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the
words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured "for ages to come, and . . . designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can
approach it," Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 387 (1821).
Over 70 years ago, our predecessors on this Court eloquently stated:
"The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused
persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of
additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not uncommon even in England. While the admissions
or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be
asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial
character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal
contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan
minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular
seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But,
however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system
impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person
a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability
of a constitutional enactment." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-597 (1896).
In stating the obligation of the judiciary to apply these constitutional rights, this Court declared in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910):
". . . our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application
as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless
formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed
against narrow and restrictive construction."
This was the spirit in which we delineated, in meaningful language, the manner in which the constitutional rights of the individual could be enforced
against overzealous police practices. It was necessary in Escobedo, as here, to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not become but
a "form of words," Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), in the hands of government officials. And it is in this spirit,
consistent with our role as judges, that we adhere to the principles of Escobedo today.
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 4 As for the procedural safeguards to be
employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual
is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In each, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting
attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights
at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them, signed statements as well which
were admitted at their trials. They all thus share salient features -- incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,
resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.
An understanding of the nature and setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential to our decisions today. The difficulty in depicting what transpires at
such interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they have largely taken place incommunicado. From extensive factual studies undertaken in
the early 1930's, including the famous Wickersham Report to Congress by a Presidential Commission, it is clear that police violence and the "third
degree" flourished at that time. 5 In a series of cases decided by this Court long after these studies, the police resorted to physical brutality -- beating,
hanging, whipping -- and to sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions. 6 The Commission on Civil Rights in
1961 found much evidence to indicate that "some policemen still resort to physical force to obtain confessions," 1961 Comm'n on Civil Rights Rep.,
Justice, pt. 5, 17. The use of physical brutality and violence is not, unfortunately, relegated to the past or to any part of the country. Only recently in Kings
County, New York, the police brutally beat, kicked and placed lighted cigarette butts on the back of a potential witness under interrogation for the purpose
of securing a statement incriminating a third party. People v. Portelli, 15 N. Y. 2d 235, 205 N. E. 2d 857, 257 N. Y. S. 2d 931 (1965). 7
The examples given above are undoubtedly the exception now, but they are sufficiently widespread to be the object of concern. Unless a proper limitation
upon custodial interrogation is achieved -- such as these decisions will advance -- there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be
eradicated in the foreseeable future. The conclusion of the Wickersham Commission Report, made over 30 years ago, is still pertinent:
"To the contention that the third degree is necessary to get the facts, the reporters aptly reply in the language of the present Lord Chancellor of England
(Lord Sankey): 'It is not admissible to do a great right by doing a little wrong. . . . It is not sufficient to do justice by obtaining a proper result by
irregular or improper means.' Not only does the use of the third degree involve a flagrant violation of law by the officers of the law, but it involves also
the dangers of false confessions, and it tends to make police and prosecutors less zealous in the search for objective evidence. As the New York
prosecutor quoted in the report said, 'It is a short cut and makes the police lazy and unenterprising.' Or, as another official quoted remarked: 'If you use
your fists, you are not so likely to use your wits.' We agree with the conclusion expressed in the report, that 'The third degree brutalizes the police,
hardens the prisoner against society, and lowers the esteem in which the administration of justice is held by the public.'" IV National Commission on
Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 5 (1931).
Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. As we have stated before, "Since
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not
the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy
results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms. A valuable source of information
about present police practices, however, may be found in various police manuals and texts which document procedures employed with success in the
past, and which recommend various other effective tactics. 8 These texts are used by law enforcement agencies themselves as guides. 9 It should be
noted that these texts professedly present the most enlightened and effective means presently used to obtain statements through custodial interrogation.
By considering these texts and other data, it is possible to describe procedures observed and noted around the country.
The officers are told by the manuals that the "principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy -- being alone with the
person under interrogation." 10 The efficacy of this tactic has been explained as follows:
"If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be
deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and
more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their
presence lending moral support. In his own office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces
of the law." 11
To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the manuals instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and from
outward appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact. The interrogator should
direct his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than court failure by asking the subject whether he did it. Like other
men, perhaps the subject has had a bad family life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited desire for women. The officers
are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, 12 to cast blame on the victim or on society. 13 These tactics are designed to put the
subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already -- that he is guilty. Explanations to the
contrary are dismissed and discouraged.
The texts thus stress that the major qualities an interrogator should possess are patience and perseverance. One writer describes the efficacy of these
characteristics in this manner:
"In the preceding paragraphs emphasis has been placed on kindness and stratagems. The investigator will, however, encounter many situations where
the sheer weight of his personality will be the deciding factor. Where emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no avail, he must rely on an
oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence. He must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no prospect of surcease. He must
dominate his subject and overwhelm him with his inexorable will to obtain the truth. He should interrogate for a spell of several hours pausing only for
the subject's necessities in acknowledgment of the need to avoid a charge of duress that can be technically substantiated. In a serious case, the
interrogation may continue for days, with the required intervals for food and sleep, but with no respite from the atmosphere of domination. It is possible
in this way to induce the subject to talk without resorting to duress or coercion. The method should be used only when the guilt of the subject appears
highly probable." 14
The manuals suggest that the suspect be offered legal excuses for his actions in order to obtain an initial admission of guilt. Where there is a suspected
revenge-killing, for example, the interrogator may say:
"Joe, you probably didn't go out looking for this fellow with the purpose of shooting him. My guess is, however, that you expected something from him
and that's why you carried a gun -- for your own protection. You knew him for what he was, no good. Then when you met him he probably started
using foul, abusive language and he gave some indication that he was about to pull a gun on you, and that's when you had to act to save your own life.
That's about it, isn't it, Joe?" 15
Having then obtained the admission of shooting, the interrogator is advised to refer to circumstantial evidence which negates the self-defense
explanation. This should enable him to secure the entire story. One text notes that "Even if he fails to do so, the inconsistency between the subject's
original denial of the shooting and his present admission of at least doing the shooting will serve to deprive him of a self-defense 'out' at the time of trial."
When the techniques described above prove unavailing, the texts recommend they be alternated with a show of some hostility. One ploy often used has
been termed the "friendly-unfriendly" or the "Mutt and Jeff" act: ". . . In this technique, two agents are employed. Mutt, the relentless investigator, who
knows the subject is guilty and is not going to waste any time. He's sent a dozen men away for this crime and he's going to send the subject away for the
full term. Jeff, on the other hand, is obviously a kindhearted man. He has a family himself. He has a brother who was involved in a little scrape like this. He
disapproves of Mutt and his tactics and will arrange to get him off the case if the subject will cooperate. He can't hold Mutt off for very long. The subject
would be wise to make a quick decision. The technique is applied by having both investigators present while Mutt acts out his role. Jeff may stand by
quietly and demur at some of Mutt's tactics. When Jeff makes his plea for cooperation, Mutt is not present in the room." 17
The interrogators sometimes are instructed to induce a confession out of trickery. The technique here is quite effective in crimes which require
identification or which run in series. In the identification situation, the interrogator may take a break in his questioning to place the subject among a group
of men in a line-up. "The witness or complainant (previously coached, if necessary) studies the line-up and confidently points out the subject as the guilty
party." 18 Then the questioning resumes "as though there were now no doubt about the guilt of the subject." A variation on this technique is called the
"The accused is placed in a line-up, but this time he is identified by several fictitious witnesses or victims who associated him with different offenses. It is
expected that the subject will become desperate and confess to the offense under investigation in order to escape from the false accusations." 19
The manuals also contain instructions for police on how to handle the individual who refuses to discuss the matter entirely, or who asks for an attorney or
relatives. The examiner is to concede him the right to remain silent. "This usually has a very undermining effect. First of all, he is disappointed in his
expectation of an unfavorable reaction on the part of the interrogator. Secondly, a concession of this right to remain silent impresses the subject with the
apparent fairness of his interrogator." 20 After this psychological conditioning, however, the officer is told to point out the incriminating significance of the
suspect's refusal to talk:
"Joe, you have a right to remain silent. That's your privilege and I'm the last person in the world who'll try to take it away from you. If that's the way you
want to leave this, O. K. But let me ask you this. Suppose you were in my shoes and I were in yours and you called me in to ask me about this and I
told you, 'I don't want to answer any of your questions.' You'd think I had something to hide, and you'd probably be right in thinking that. That's exactly
what I'll have to think about you, and so will everybody else. So let's sit here and talk this whole thing over." 21
Few will persist in their initial refusal to talk, it is said, if this monologue is employed correctly.
In the event that the subject wishes to speak to a relative or an attorney, the following advice is tendered:
"The interrogator should respond by suggesting that the subject first tell the truth to the interrogator himself rather than get anyone else involved in the
matter. If the request is for an attorney, the interrogator may suggest that the subject save himself or his family the expense of any such professional
service, particularly if he is innocent of the offense under investigation. The interrogator may also add, 'Joe, I'm only looking for the truth, and if you're
telling the truth, that's it. You can handle this by yourself.'" 22
From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In
essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his
guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times
relentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must "patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which
the desired objective may be attained." 23 When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems
such as giving false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about himself or his
surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
Even without employing brutality, the "third degree" or the specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll
on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals. 24 This fact may be illustrated simply by referring to three confession cases decided by
this Court in the Term immediately preceding our Escobedo decision. In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), the defendant was a 19-year-old heroin
addict, described as a "near mental defective," id., at 307-310. The defendant in Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963), was a woman who confessed to
the arresting officer after being importuned to "cooperate" in order to prevent her children from being taken by relief authorities. This Court as in those
cases reversed the conviction of a defendant in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), whose persistent request during his interrogation was to
phone his wife or attorney. 25 In other settings, these individuals might have exercised their constitutional rights. In the incommunicado police-dominated
atmosphere, they succumbed.
In the cases before us today, given this background, we concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring. In No.
759, Miranda v. Arizona, the police arrested the defendant and took him to a special interrogation room where they secured a confession. In No. 760,
Vignera v. New York, the defendant made oral admissions to the police after interrogation in the afternoon, and then signed an inculpatory statement upon
being questioned by an assistant district attorney later the same evening. In No. 761, Westover v. United States, the defendant was handed over to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation by local authorities after they had detained and interrogated him for a lengthy period, both at night and the following
morning. After some two hours of questioning, the federal officers had obtained signed statements from the defendant. Lastly, in No. 584, California v.
Stewart, the local police held the defendant five days in the station and interrogated him on nine separate occasions before they secured his inculpatory
In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to
protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. In each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example, in Miranda,
where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed individual with pronounced sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the defendant was
an indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school in the sixth grade. To be sure, the records do not evince overt physical coercion or patent
psychological ploys. The fact remains that in none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the
interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice.
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This
atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. 26 The current
practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most cherished principles -- that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained
from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.
From the foregoing, we can readily perceive an intimate connection between the privilege against self-incrimination and police custodial questioning. It is
fitting to turn to history and precedent underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause to determine its applicability in this situation.
We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources from which it came and the fervor with which
it was defended. Its roots go back into ancient times. 27 Perhaps the critical historical event shedding light on its origins and evolution was the trial of one
John Lilburn, a vocal anti-Stuart Leveller, who was made to take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637. The oath would have bound him to answer to all
questions posed to him on any subject. The Trial of John Lilburn and John Wharton, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637). He resisted the oath and declaimed the
"Another fundamental right I then contended for, was, that no man's conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed, to answer to questions
concerning himself in matters criminal, or pretended to be so." Haller & Davies, The Leveller Tracts 1647-1653, p. 454 (1944).
On account of the Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolished the inquisitorial Court of Star Chamber and went further in giving him generous reparation. The lofty
principles to which Lilburn had appealed during his trial gained popular acceptance in England. 28 These sentiments worked their way over to the
Colonies and were implanted after great struggle into the Bill of Rights. 29 Those who framed our Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ever aware of
subtle encroachments on individual liberty. They knew that "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). The privilege was elevated to constitutional status and
has always been "as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892). We cannot depart
from this noble heritage.
Thus we may view the historical development of the privilege as one which groped for the proper scope of governmental power over the citizen. As a
"noble principle often transcends its origins," the privilege has come rightfully to be recognized in part as an individual's substantive right, a "right to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 579, 581-582
(Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). We have recently noted that the privilege against self-incrimination -- the essential mainstay of our
adversary system -- is founded on a complex of values, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57, n. 5 (1964); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406,
414-415, n. 12 (1966). All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government
-- state or federal -- must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the government "to
shoulder the entire load," 8 Wigmore, Evidence 317 (McNaughton rev. 1961), to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system
of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather
than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-238 (1940). In sum, the privilege is
fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
The question in these cases is whether the privilege is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation. In this Court, the privilege has
consistently been accorded a liberal construction. Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 81 (1965); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951);
Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 72-73 (1920); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892). We are satisfied that all the principles embodied
in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar
surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater
than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery. 30
This question, in fact, could have been taken as settled in federal courts almost 70 years ago, when, in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897),
this Court held:
"In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is
controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment . . . commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
In Bram, the Court reviewed the British and American history and case law and set down the Fifth Amendment standard for compulsion which we
"Much of the confusion which has resulted from the effort to deduce from the adjudged cases what would be a sufficient quantum of proof to show that
a confession was or was not voluntary, has arisen from a misconception of the subject to which the proof must address itself. The rule is not that in
order to render a statement admissible the proof must be adequate to establish that the particular communications contained in a statement were
voluntarily made, but it must be sufficient to establish that the making of the statement was voluntary; that is to say, that from the causes, which the law
treats as legally sufficient to engender in the mind of the accused hope or fear in respect to the crime charged, the accused was not involuntarily impelled
to make a statement, when but for the improper influences he would have remained silent. . . ." 168 U.S., at 549. And see, id., at 542.
The Court has adhered to this reasoning. In 1924, Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote for a unanimous Court in reversing a conviction resting on a compelled
confession, Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1. He stated:
"In the federal courts, the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat.
A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made. A confession may have been given voluntarily, although it was made to
police officers, while in custody, and in answer to an examination conducted by them. But a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded
whatever may have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise. Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532." 266 U.S., at 14-15.
In addition to the expansive historical development of the privilege and the sound policies which have nurtured its evolution, judicial precedent thus clearly
establishes its application to incommunicado interrogation. In fact, the Government concedes this point as well established in No. 761, Westover v.
United States, stating: "We have no doubt . . . that it is possible for a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to be violated during in-custody questioning by a
law-enforcement officer." 31
Because of the adoption by Congress of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and this Court's effectuation of that Rule in McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), we have had little occasion in the past quarter century to reach the
constitutional issues in dealing with federal interrogations. These supervisory rules, requiring production of an arrested person before a commissioner
"without unnecessary delay" and excluding evidence obtained in default of that statutory obligation, were nonetheless responsive to the same
considerations of Fifth Amendment policy that unavoidably face us now as to the States. In McNabb, 318 U.S., at 343-344, and in Mallory, 354 U.S., at
455-456, we recognized both the dangers of interrogation and the appropriateness of prophylaxis stemming from the very fact of interrogation itself. 32
Our decision in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), necessitates an examination of the scope of the privilege in state cases as well. In Malloy, we
squarely held the privilege applicable to the States, and held that the substantive standards underlying the privilege applied with full force to state court
proceedings. There, as in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), we applied the existing Fifth
Amendment standards to the case before us. Aside from the holding itself, the reasoning in Malloy made clear what had already become apparent -- that
the substantive and procedural safeguards surrounding admissibility of confessions in state cases had become exceedingly exacting, reflecting all the
policies embedded in the privilege, 378 U.S., at 7-8. 33 The voluntariness doctrine in the state cases, as Malloy indicates, encompasses all interrogation
practices which are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice. 34 The implications of this
proposition were elaborated in our decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, decided one week after Malloy applied the privilege to the States.
Our holding there stressed the fact that the police had not advised the defendant of his constitutional privilege to remain silent at the outset of the
interrogation, and we drew attention to that fact at several points in the decision, 378 U.S., at 483, 485, 491. This was no isolated factor, but an essential
ingredient in our decision. The entire thrust of police interrogation there, as in all the cases today, was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as
to impair his capacity for rational judgment. The abdication of the constitutional privilege -- the choice on his part to speak to the police -- was not made
knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of his rights; the compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation, and not an
independent decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak.
A different phase of the Escobedo decision was significant in its attention to the absence of counsel during the questioning. There, as in the cases today,
we sought a protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the interrogation. In Escobedo, however, the police did not relieve the defendant of
the anxieties which they had created in the interrogation rooms. Rather, they denied his request for the assistance of counsel, 378 U.S., at 481, 488, 491.
35 This heightened his dilemma, and made his later statements the product of this compulsion. Cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
The denial of the defendant's request for his attorney thus undermined his ability to exercise the privilege -- to remain silent if he chose or to speak
without any intimidation, blatant or subtle. The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would be the adequate protective device necessary
to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the
government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.
It was in this manner that Escobedo explicated another facet of the pre-trial privilege, noted in many of the Court's prior decisions: the protection of rights
at trial. 36 That counsel is present when statements are taken from an individual during interrogation obviously enhances the integrity of the fact-finding
processes in court. The presence of an attorney, and the warnings delivered to the individual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling
circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogation process. Without the protections flowing
from adequate warnings and the rights of counsel, "all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any other
witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been
obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (HARLAN, J., dissenting). Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in
all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that
without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of
his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of
their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the
inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will
handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to
remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it -- the threshold requirement for an intelligent
decision as to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the
interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury.
37 Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it.
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability
of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.
Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities,
can never be more than speculation; 38 a warning is a clearcut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at
the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that
point in time.
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court.
This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness
of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve
to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system -- that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely
in his interest.
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his
interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under
the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the
interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those who
most require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves
claim that the admonishment of the right to remain silent without more "will benefit only the recidivist and the professional." Brief for the National District
Attorneys Association as amicus curiae, p. 14. Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret
interrogation process. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, n. 5. Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends
not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators,
the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is
reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the
accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial. See Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433, 443-448 (1958) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).
An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a
lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the
warnings we here delineate have been given. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who
most needs counsel. As the California Supreme Court has aptly put it:
"Finally, we must recognize that the imposition of the requirement for the request would discriminate against the defendant who does not know his
rights. The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant who most needs counsel. We cannot penalize a defendant who, not
understanding his constitutional rights, does not make the formal request and by such failure demonstrates his helplessness. To require the request
would be to favor the defendant whose sophistication or status had fortuitously prompted him to make it." People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 351,
398 P. 2d 361, 369-370, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 177-178 (1965) (Tobriner, J.).
In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962), we stated: "It is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be
furnished counsel does not depend on a request." This proposition applies with equal force in the context of providing counsel to protect an accused's
Fifth Amendment privilege in the face of interrogation. 39 Although the role of counsel at trial differs from the role during interrogation, the differences are
not relevant to the question whether a request is a prerequisite.
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that
anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that
the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the
accused was aware of this right.
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his
request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. The financial ability of the individual has no relationship to the
scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in
order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent as well as the affluent. In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those who can retain an
attorney, our decisions today would be of little significance. The cases before us as well as the vast majority of confession cases with which we have
dealt in the past involve those unable to retain counsel. 40 While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have the obligation
not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice. 41 Denial of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while allowing an
attorney to those who can afford one would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation at trial and on appeal struck down in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to
consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the
right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one.
The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent -- the person most often subjected to
interrogation -- the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. 42 As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and of the general right
to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it. 43
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. 44 At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any
statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has
been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual
must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an
attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a "station house lawyer" present at all times to advise prisoners. It
does mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot
afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period
of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege so long as
they do not question him during that time.
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),
and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under
which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado
interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a
waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession
was in fact eventually obtained. A statement we made in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962), is applicable here:
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."
See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). Moreover, where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the
privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a
statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made
a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion
of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege. Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course,
show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege. The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to
the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements
which amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to
incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn
between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory." If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course,
never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial
or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any
meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement. In Escobedo itself, the
defendant fully intended his accusation of another as the slayer to be exculpatory as to himself.
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first
subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is at this point that
our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in some countries.
Under the system of warnings we delineate today or under any other system which may be devised and found effective, the safeguards to be erected
about the privilege must come into play at this point.
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492. When
an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation
may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of
citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they
may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily
In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in
law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental
import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but
whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a
crime, 47 or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not
barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is
subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and
unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously
honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After
such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against him. 48
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for interrogation outweighs the privilege. This argument is not unfamiliar to this Court.
See, e. g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240-241 (1940). The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has
prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged. As Mr. Justice Brandeis once observed:
"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means . . . would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face." Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion). 49
In this connection, one of our country's distinguished jurists has pointed out: "The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods
it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law." 50
If the individual desires to exercise his privilege, he has the right to do so. This is not for the authorities to decide. An attorney may advise his client not to
talk to police until he has had an opportunity to investigate the case, or he may wish to be present with his client during any police questioning. In doing so
an attorney is merely exercising the good professional judgment he has been taught. This is not cause for considering the attorney a menace to law
enforcement. He is merely carrying out what he is sworn to do under his oath -- to protect to the extent of his ability the rights of his client. In fulfilling this
responsibility the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of criminal justice under our Constitution.
In announcing these principles, we are not unmindful of the burdens which law enforcement officials must bear, often under trying circumstances. We
also fully recognize the obligation of all citizens to aid in enforcing the criminal laws. This Court, while protecting individual rights, has always given ample
latitude to law enforcement agencies in the legitimate exercise of their duties. The limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not
constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement. As we have noted, our decision does not in any way preclude police from
carrying out their traditional investigatory functions. Although confessions may play an important role in some convictions, the cases before us present
graphic examples of the overstatement of the "need" for confessions. In each case authorities conducted interrogations ranging up to five days in duration
despite the presence, through standard investigating practices, of considerable evidence against each defendant. 51 Further examples are chronicled in
our prior cases. See, e. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518-519 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401, 402 (1945). 52
It is also urged that an unfettered right to detention for interrogation should be allowed because it will often redound to the benefit of the person
questioned. When police inquiry determines that there is no reason to believe that the person has committed any crime, it is said, he will be released
without need for further formal procedures. The person who has committed no offense, however, will be better able to clear himself after warnings with
counsel present than without. It can be assumed that in such circumstances a lawyer would advise his client to talk freely to police in order to clear
Custodial interrogation, by contrast, does not necessarily afford the innocent an opportunity to clear themselves. A serious consequence of the present
practice of the interrogation alleged to be beneficial for the innocent is that many arrests "for investigation" subject large numbers of innocent persons to
detention and interrogation. In one of the cases before us, No. 584, California v. Stewart, police held four persons, who were in the defendant's house at
the time of the arrest, in jail for five days until defendant confessed. At that time they were finally released. Police stated that there was "no evidence to
connect them with any crime." Available statistics on the extent of this practice where it is condoned indicate that these four are far from alone in being
subjected to arrest, prolonged detention, and interrogation without the requisite probable cause. 53
Over the years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an exemplary record of effective law enforcement while advising any suspect or
arrested person, at the outset of an interview, that he is not required to make a statement, that any statement may be used against him in court, that the
individual may obtain the services of an attorney of his own choice and, more recently, that he has a right to free counsel if he is unable to pay. 54 A letter
received from the Solicitor General in response to a question from the Bench makes it clear that the present pattern of warnings and respect for the
rights of the individual followed as a practice by the FBI is consistent with the procedure which we delineate today. It states:
"At the oral argument of the above cause, Mr. Justice Fortas asked whether I could provide certain information as to the practices followed by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. I have directed these questions to the attention of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and am submitting
herewith a statement of the questions and of the answers which we have received.
''TH'(1) When an individual is interviewed by agents of the Bureau, what warning is given to him?
"'The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing
and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in the
Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 935.
"'After passage of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, which provides free counsel for Federal defendants unable to pay, we added to our instructions to
Special Agents the requirement that any person who is under arrest for an offense under FBI jurisdiction, or whose arrest is contemplated following the
interview, must also be advised of his right to free counsel if he is unable to pay, and the fact that such counsel will be assigned by the Judge. At the
same time, we broadened the right to counsel warning to read counsel of his own choice, or anyone else with whom he might wish to speak.
"'(2) When is the warning given?
"'The FBI warning is given to a suspect at the very outset of the interview, as shown in the Westover case, cited above. The warning may be given to a
person arrested as soon as practicable after the arrest, as shown in the Jackson case, also cited above, and in U.S. v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844
(1964), cert. den. 379 U.S. 933, but in any event it must precede the interview with the person for a confession or admission of his own guilt.
"'(3) What is the Bureau's practice in the event that (a) the individual requests counsel and (b) counsel appears?
"'When the person who has been warned of his right to counsel decides that he wishes to consult with counsel before making a statement, the interview
is terminated at that point, Shultz v. U.S., 351 F.2d 287 (1965). It may be continued, however, as to all matters other than the person's own guilt or
innocence. If he is indecisive in his request for counsel, there may be some question on whether he did or did not waive counsel. Situations of this kind
must necessarily be left to the judgment of the interviewing Agent. For example, in Hiram v. U.S., 354 F.2d 4 (1965), the Agent's conclusion that the
person arrested had waived his right to counsel was upheld by the courts.
"'A person being interviewed and desiring to consult counsel by telephone must be permitted to do so, as shown in Caldwell v. U.S., 351 F.2d 459
(1965). When counsel appears in person, he is permitted to confer with his client in private.
"'(4) What is the Bureau's practice if the individual requests counsel, but cannot afford to retain an attorney?
"'If any person being interviewed after warning of counsel decides that he wishes to consult with counsel before proceeding further the interview is
terminated, as shown above. FBI Agents do not pass judgment on the ability of the person to pay for counsel. They do, however, advise those who
have been arrested for an offense under FBI jurisdiction, or whose arrest is contemplated following the interview, of a right to free counsel if they are
unable to pay, and the availability of such counsel from the Judge.'" 55
The practice of the FBI can readily be emulated by state and local enforcement agencies. The argument that the FBI deals with different crimes than are
dealt with by state authorities does not mitigate the significance of the FBI experience. 56
The experience in some other countries also suggests that the danger to law enforcement in curbs on interrogation is overplayed. The English procedure
since 1912 under the Judges' Rules is significant. As recently strengthened, the Rules require that a cautionary warning be given an accused by a police
officer as soon as he has evidence that affords reasonable grounds for suspicion; they also require that any statement made be given by the accused
without questioning by police. 57 The right of the individual to consult with an attorney during this period is expressly recognized. 58
The safeguards present under Scottish law may be even greater than in England. Scottish judicial decisions bar use in evidence of most confessions
obtained through police interrogation. 59 In India, confessions made to police not in the presence of a magistrate have been excluded by rule of evidence
since 1872, at a time when it operated under British law. 60 Identical provisions appear in the Evidence Ordinance of Ceylon, enacted in 1895. 61
Similarly, in our country the Uniform Code of Military Justice has long provided that no suspect may be interrogated without first being warned of his right
not to make a statement and that any statement he makes may be used against him. 62 Denial of the right to consult counsel during interrogation has
also been proscribed by military tribunals. 63 There appears to have been no marked detrimental effect on criminal law enforcement in these jurisdictions
as a result of these rules. Conditions of law enforcement in our country are sufficiently similar to permit reference to this experience as assurance that
lawlessness will not result from warning an individual of his rights or allowing him to exercise them. Moreover, it is consistent with our legal system that
we give at least as much protection to these rights as is given in the jurisdictions described. We deal in our country with rights grounded in a specific
requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, whereas other jurisdictions arrived at their conclusions on the basis of principles of justice not so
specifically defined. 64
It is also urged upon us that we withhold decision on this issue until state legislative bodies and advisory groups have had an opportunity to deal with
these problems by rule making. 65 We have already pointed out that the Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the
privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so
long as they are fully as effective as those described above in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity
to exercise it. In any event, however, the issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the courts. The admissibility of a
statement in the face of a claim that it was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights is an issue the resolution of which has long since
been undertaken by this Court. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). Judicial solutions to problems of constitutional dimension have evolved decade by
decade. As courts have been presented with the need to enforce constitutional rights, they have found means of doing so. That was our responsibility
when Escobedo was before us and it is our responsibility today. Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or
legislation which would abrogate them.
Because of the nature of the problem and because of its recurrent significance in numerous cases, we have to this point discussed the relationship of
the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation without specific concentration on the facts of the cases before us. We turn now to these facts to
consider the application to these cases of the constitutional principles discussed above. In each instance, we have concluded that statements were
obtained from the defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege.
No. 759. Miranda v. Arizona.
On March 13, 1963, petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there identified by the
complaining witness. The police then took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" of the detective bureau. There he was questioned by two police officers. The
officers admitted at trial that Miranda was not advised that he had a right to have an attorney present. 66 Two hours later, the officers emerged from the
interrogation room with a written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made
voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and "with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against
At his trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection of defense counsel, and the officers testified to the prior oral
confession made by Miranda during the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years'
imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda's constitutional rights were
not violated in obtaining the confession and affirmed the conviction. 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P. 2d 721. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized heavily the
fact that Miranda did not specifically request counsel.
We reverse. From the testimony of the officers and by the admission of respondent, it is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to
consult with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected
in any other manner. Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in
clause stating that he had "full knowledge" of his "legal rights" does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional
rights. Cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 512-513 (1963); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS).
No. 760. Vignera v. New York.
Petitioner, Michael Vignera, was picked up by New York police on October 14, 1960, in connection with the robbery three days earlier of a Brooklyn dress
shop. They took him to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan. Sometime thereafter he was taken to the 66th Detective Squad. There a
detective questioned Vignera with respect to the robbery. Vignera orally admitted the robbery to the detective. The detective was asked on
cross-examination at trial by defense counsel whether Vignera was warned of his right to counsel before being interrogated. The prosecution objected to
the question and the trial judge sustained the objection. Thus, the defense was precluded from making any showing that warnings had not been given.
While at the 66th Detective Squad, Vignera was identified by the store owner and a saleslady as the man who robbed the dress shop. At about 3 p. m. he
was formally arrested. The police then transported him to still another station, the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, "for detention." At 11 p. m. Vignera was
questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and Vignera's answers. This verbatim
account of these proceedings contains no statement of any warnings given by the assistant district attorney. At Vignera's trial on a charge of first degree
robbery, the detective testified as to the oral confession. The transcription of the statement taken was also introduced in evidence. At the conclusion of
the testimony, the trial judge charged the jury in part as follows:
"The law doesn't say that the confession is void or invalidated because the police officer didn't advise the defendant as to his rights. Did you hear what I
said? I am telling you what the law of the State of New York is."
Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery. He was subsequently adjudged a third-felony offender and sentenced to 30 to 60 years' imprisonment.
68 The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division, Second Department, 21 App. Div. 2d 752, 252 N. Y. S. 2d 19, and by the Court
of Appeals, also without opinion, 15 N. Y. 2d 970, 207 N. E. 2d 527, 259 N. Y. S. 2d 857, remittitur amended, 16 N. Y. 2d 614, 209 N. E. 2d 110, 261 N. Y.
S. 2d 65. In argument to the Court of Appeals, the State contended that Vignera had no constitutional right to be advised of his right to counsel or his
privilege against self-incrimination.
We reverse. The foregoing indicates that Vignera was not warned of any of his rights before the questioning by the detective and by the assistant district
attorney. No other steps were taken to protect these rights. Thus he was not effectively apprised of his Fifth Amendment privilege or of his right to have
counsel present and his statements are inadmissible.
No. 761. Westover v. United States.
At approximately 9:45 p. m. on March 20, 1963, petitioner, Carl Calvin Westover, was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas
City robberies. A report was also received from the FBI that he was wanted on a felony charge in California. The local authorities took him to a police
station and placed him in a line-up on the local charges, and at about 11:45 p.m. he was booked. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night
of his arrest. He denied any knowledge of criminal activities. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Shortly before
noon they informed the FBI that they were through interrogating Westover and that the FBI could proceed to interrogate him. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that Westover was ever given any warning as to his rights by local police. At noon, three special agents of the FBI continued the
interrogation in a private interview room of the Kansas City Police Department, this time with respect to the robbery of a savings and loan association and
a bank in Sacramento, California. After two or two and one-half hours, Westover signed separate confessions to each of these two robberies which had
been prepared by one of the agents during the interrogation. At trial one of the agents testified, and a paragraph on each of the statements states, that the
agents advised Westover that he did not have to make a statement, that any statement he made could be used against him, and that he had the right to
see an attorney.
Westover was tried by a jury in federal court and convicted of the California robberies. His statements were introduced at trial. He was sentenced to 15
years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 342 F.2d 684.
We reverse. On the facts of this case we cannot find that Westover knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and his right to consult
with counsel prior to the time he made the statement. 69 At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover, he had been in custody for over 14
hours and had been interrogated at length during that period. The FBI interrogation began immediately upon the conclusion of the interrogation by Kansas
City police and was conducted in local police headquarters. Although the two law enforcement authorities are legally distinct and the crimes for which
they interrogated Westover were different, the impact on him was that of a continuous period of questioning. There is no evidence of any warning given
prior to the FBI interrogation nor is there any evidence of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI commenced its interrogation. The record simply
shows that the defendant did in fact confess a short time after being turned over to the FBI following interrogation by local police. Despite the fact that the
FBI agents gave warnings at the outset of their interview, from Westover's point of view the warnings came at the end of the interrogation process. In
these circumstances an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot be assumed.
We do not suggest that law enforcement authorities are precluded from questioning any individual who has been held for a period of time by other
authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. A different case would be presented if an accused were taken into custody by the
second authority, removed both in time and place from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity to
exercise them. But here the FBI interrogation was conducted immediately following the state interrogation in the same police station -- in the same
compelling surroundings. Thus, in obtaining a confession from Westover the federal authorities were the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local
in-custody interrogation. In these circumstances the giving of warnings alone was not sufficient to protect the privilege.
No. 584. California v. Stewart.
In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims had died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, respondent, Roy
Allen Stewart, was pointed out to Los Angeles police as the endorser of dividend checks taken in one of the robberies. At about 7:15 p. m., January 31,
1963, police officers went to Stewart's house and arrested him. One of the officers asked Stewart if they could search the house, to which he replied, "Go
ahead." The search turned up various items taken from the five robbery victims. At the time of Stewart's arrest, police also arrested Stewart's wife and
three other persons who were visiting him. These four were jailed along with Stewart and were interrogated. Stewart was taken to the University Station
of the Los Angeles Police Department where he was placed in a cell. During the next five days, police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions.
Except during the first interrogation session, when he was confronted with an accusing witness, Stewart was isolated with his interrogators.
During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart admitted that he had robbed the deceased and stated that he had not meant to hurt her. Police then
brought Stewart before a magistrate for the first time. Since there was no evidence to connect them with any crime, the police then released the other
four persons arrested with him.
Nothing in the record specifically indicates whether Stewart was or was not advised of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. In a number of
instances, however, the interrogating officers were asked to recount everything that was said during the interrogations. None indicated that Stewart was
ever advised of his rights.
Stewart was charged with kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and murder. At his trial, transcripts of the first interrogation and the confession at the last
interrogation were introduced in evidence. The jury found Stewart guilty of robbery and first degree murder and fixed the penalty as death. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of California reversed. 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P. 2d 97, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201. It held that under this Court's decision in Escobedo, Stewart
should have been advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to counsel and that it would not presume in the face of a silent record that the police
advised Stewart of his rights. 70
We affirm. 71 In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege
against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or that any effective
alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record. Furthermore, Stewart's steadfast
denial of the alleged offenses through eight of the nine interrogations over a period of five days is subject to no other construction than that he was
compelled by persistent interrogation to forgo his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, the judgments of the Supreme Court of Arizona in No. 759, of the New York Court of Appeals in No. 760, and
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 761 are reversed. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California in No. 584 is affirmed.
It is so ordered.