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What Did Italian
Americans Do during the War? The answer: “a great
deal more than is generally realized,” as indicated by a reading of Max
Corvo’s The O.S.S. in Italy 1942–1945.[1] Aside from a small segment of Italian
Americans, and an even smaller portion of the general public, Corvo is not
that well known, and yet he should be for his is an account of an anonymous
twenty-one year buck private who remarkably launched a project that was to
play a vital role in bringing about an Allied victory in the Second World War
and in positioning Italy as favorably disposed to the United States in the
post-war period. Born in the
eastern-Sicilian town of Augusta in 1920, (Biagio) Max Corvo was the son of
Cesare Corvo, prominent anti-Fascist who chose a self-imposed exile in the
United States rather than to submit to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.
Settling in Middletown, Connecticut, an unusual community that bespoke on
the one hand of a purist Yankee heritage, while on the other hand served as
the home of an Italian enclave consisting primarily of Sicilian immigrants
from Melilli, a town near Augusta. Cesare published the Italian-language
Middletown Bulletin that combined
coverage of Italian events with life in the adopted land. Thus, Max’s
formative years included intimate knowledge of anti-Fascism, familiarity with
anti-Fascist leaders, and superior background of Sicily that made an
indelible impression on the young man who also prized his American education. Max enlisted in the
United States Army prior to Pearl Harbor and immediately reckoned that it
would be necessary for the Allies to invade Sicily and Italy in order to win
the war in western Europe. He also concluded that he could exploit his
background to facilitate the Allied enterprise and surprisingly persuaded
army superiors, including future diplomat Angier Biddle Duke, to present his
ideas to higher officers in army intelligence. Specifically, he convinced
them that he could marshal together elements from anti-Fascists and other
Italian Americans that would provide portentous data that could be extremely
useful in promoting subversive activities behind enemy lines as the Allies
approached the decision to invade Sicily, Sardinia, and the Italian mainland.
The information elicited answers to such extremely important questions as
where are the enemy units? in what strength? with what capabilities? what
native help can be expected? who and where are their leaders? The
significance of this data is self evident and so swayed intelligence
officials that Corvo was put in charge of the Italian section of SI (Special
Intelligence) of OSS that included intelligence strategies, recruitment and
training of personnel in the United States, and directing field operations
in the Mediterranean theater of war. It must be remembered that this nation
did not then have a permanent, on-going intelligence system as had the
British. Indeed it seemed that the British possessed such a monopoly of that
commodity that any effort on the part of the United States was regarded as
an intrusion into their special area of competence. Corvo and a small cadre
of other Americans were convinced that it was much more desirable for this
country to develop its own intelligence system and indeed Italy was to
become a testing ground for the OSS. That Corvo possessed
vital knowledge was reflected in a detailed topographical map of Sicily he
constructed that entailed the location of German troop concentrations and
strategic facilities in such detail that it surpassed anything then in the
possession of OSS. As a result he played a major role in gathering vital
intelligence and in participating in strategic planning with high officers,
including generals, even though he bore the lowest of army ranks. He was soon
promoted a commissioned officer eventually becoming a major. Corvo recruited
members for SI after consulting veteran anti-Fascists throughout the country.
Accordingly he visited Don Sturzo, a Sicilian priest then residing in
Brooklyn, who presided over the Catholic Action party, and who was considered
the moral and spiritual leader of the Italian anti-Fascist movement. Corvo
met with Luigi Antonini, head of Local 89 of the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union, whose anti-Fascist leadership commended him to many
in the Italian-American community who could be useful for intelligence
purposes. Vicenzo Vacirca, an old friend of Max’s father, was another
prominent anti-Fascist sought out. Representing the province of Siracusa as a
Socialist member of the Italian parliament before his expulsion from Italy,
Vacirca, who had numerous contacts both in the this country and Sicily,
proved invaluable. Although beyond the normal military age, Vacirca became an
active participant in SI. In addition Corvo enlisted individuals like
Middletowners Vincent Scamporini, Frank J. Tarallo, and Emilio “Mim”
Daddario. A skilled lawyer, Scamporini took lessons in Italian from Max’s
father and became a chief administrator in SI. Tarallo, who grew up with Max
and frequently visited his father’s office, was a college graduate and army
officer who would lead important and dangerous missions for SI. Daddario, a
Wesleyan University graduate, future congressman, and gubernatorial
candidate, likewise played an important role in the operation. As overall operations
chief, Max coordinated and planned strategic operations, dealt with irksome
OSS political infighting and served as the general catalyst for the Italian
section of SI. It was not an facile task since he was part of an infant
United States intelligence system that only partially gained acceptance by
regular military army and navy units. He also experienced discrimination from
southern-bred military people whose anti-Italian prejudice was reflected in
pointed efforts to belittle and denigrate SI’s role. Fortunately Corvo did
have the support of officers like Earl Brennan, chief of the Italian
Division of the OSS and most importantly, General William Donovan, overall
chief of the OSS. As a consequence the Italian desk of SI performed important
work in facilitating the surrender of Sicily, Sardinia, and the Italian
mainland. SI personnel were sent on missions behind enemy lines to obtain
vital information such as gathering facts on enemy military strength,
contacting and coordinating activities with Italian partisan groups that
posed severe problems for the Germans, and establishing communication links
with Italian officials such as Marshal Pietro Badoglio, who succeeded
Mussolini as Prime Minister of Italy, and General Raffaele Cadorna, military
commander of liberation forces in northern Italy. On occasion SI forces
undertook consequential military operations especially in capturing
strategic islands and effecting the liberation of important prisoners. Accordingly, a daring
OSS operation was successful in securing some of the Aeolian Islands (Lipari,
Vulcano) where numerous political prisoners had been detained. With limited
personnel, the OSS contingent, led by Captain Tarallo, used a bluff stratagem
convincing defenders that they faced such overwhelming odds that they would
be wise to surrender. Thus Tarallo and eight other men captured forty-five
German troops. A similar daring raid was undertaken by Tarallo against
Ventotene Island which the Army wanted captured before it launched an
invasion at Salerno. Without firing a shot, an important German advance radar
station manned by 88 Germans was eliminated by a handful of SI men. Tarallo
followed this up by freeing 400 prisoners. Ironically at the
conclusion of the Italian phase of the war, the unique SI operation was
phased out as anti-Italian stereotyping played a part. OSS officials were
quoted as saying “Italian SI has no need to pound its chest or burst its
lungs in a frenzy of vainglory. . . . ‘you Italians have
politics in your blood’” (277). One report denigrated SI because its
membership was “largely of Sicilian origin . . . [with] peculiar
group loyalty” (281). While other accounts of World War II intelligence operations
provide little mention of the Italian aspect or focus on the conjectured role
of gangster Lucky Luciano, this is the first account that sincerely traces
the role of Italian Americans in an extended way. And without question it was
a significant one. Furthermore, one must consider that it was during the
Italian campaign that Allied military leaders learned a great deal about the
effectiveness of various strategies, weapons, invasion craft designs, etc.
The Italian campaign constituted the largest amphibious invasion to date in
storming Sicily. It was in Sicily, Sardinia, and the Italian mainland
assaults, furthermore, that the Allies were forced to deal with arduous
obstacles of resistance from a undermanned but stubborn German enemy. The
lessons learned were extremely important and paid off handsomely when the
Allies launched their great D-Day invasion of France. For this reviewer The OSS in Italy 1942–1945 is
especially welcome because I personally interviewed Corvo and Tarallo in the
1970s and encouraged them to get their story out. Thus, along with the
well-deserved acknowledgement accorded to such Italian-American heroes and
Medal of Honor recipients as Sergeant John Basilone and Captain Don Gentile,
the story of Italian-American participation in intelligence operations of the
OSS also merits its place of recognition. It provides genuine essence and
substance to answer the question of what Italian Americans did during the
Second World War. Nassau
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