While physical science studies things outside of man, social science studies human beings. When we study things, we cannot understand motivation because we reject the idea that inanimate objects (i.e. rocks) have motivation. In our society, in fact, one of the indicators of psychosis is the projection of motivation onto inanimate objects. If a friend tells us that the banana peel moved under his foot because it hates him, we would quite likely tell our friend to see a psychiatrist. Similarly, we do not try to understand the motivation of a kidney because we reject the idea that kidneys are self-motivated. Thus, the possibility of understanding motivation is peculiar to the study of human behavior (Abel, 1929).
The primary assumption of social science is that human beings can study themselves and therefore understand themselves. According to Weber the discovery of meaning is the understanding of motivation and understanding motivation is the primary object of sociological investigation. This kind of understanding is called Verstehen; it is the understanding of subjective meaning in that it is an attempt to understand what the subject thinks he is doing. Weber distinguishes understanding subjective meaning from direct understanding. Direct understanding is the ability to describe what happened. Subjective understanding involves comprehension of why the actor is acting that way-- the understanding of subjective meaning.
         Subjective meaning is the meaning given to an act by the actor himself.  For example, let's imagine a man from Mars who comes down to earth and sits in on our sociology class. He observes, after several classes, that one person always sits at the desk and the other people sit in chairs facing the desk.  Further, he observes that those persons facing the desk raise their hands before they speak and that all these people congregate in this particular room on the same days and hours each week. We can say, then, that this Martian directly understands what is happening. That is, if we ask him:  "What happened?" he could describe what happened.  But if we asked him: "Why do these people come here? Why do they get out of bed in the morning and come to this room at the appointed time even when it is raining or snowing?" Well, then our Martian would be stuck.  He would not understand "Why?";  he would not understand the intended purpose of all these people. The understanding of  "why” people act in a certain way, the understanding of motivations for action or intended purpose is “subjective understanding” – understanding from the standpoint of the subject or actor (Weber, 1947:93). Subjective understanding involves contextual understanding. This is rational understanding of motivation, which consists in placing the act in an intelligible and more inclusive context of meaning (Weber, 1947:95). Thiis means we cannot understand human behavior in itself, we must refer it to its context to comprehend its meaning.  Because our Martian does not know the context in which class activity takes place, subjective meaning is not available to him.
         Understanding the meaning of action by understanding the motivations of the actors seems like a
worthwhile goal to aim for, but how do we accomplish this?  The fundamental problem in being able to
understand subjective meaning is best exemplified in the saying:  "Put yourself in the other guy's shoes".
This is the essence of friendship according to conventional wisdom. Yet, let us ponder it for a moment.
Let us imagine that the Martian befriends a student who is a practicing Catholic, unmarried and she bets
pregnant. When he puts himself  "in her shoes" he comes up with what a Martian would feel and do if she
were pregnant and unmarried. However, a non-Catholic Martian and a Catholic American would feel
quite differently in that situation. Therefore, in order for the Martian to subjectively understand his
friend's position, he must imagine what it must feel like for an American Catholic to be unmarried and
pregnant.
            Weber offers us several means by which verstehen is accomplished. That is, there are three
methods sociologists can use to assign meaning to observed behavior.  The method the sociologist uses is
determined by the motivation underlying the action he is observing. First, if action is rational (i.e. the
means are related to the goal) then we can understand intellectually.  For example, we can intellectually
understand the subjective meaning of a strike when the employers have lowered workers wages;  the strike
is the means being used to get wages increased.  But let us take another situation where action is not
rational. We have all been in public situations when a child has a crying tantrum and the mother is
embarrassed and frustrated and slaps the child. Clearly, the action is not rational because the slap will
obviously make the child cry even harder; the means are not related to the goal. The mother's action was
motivated by a need to express emotion. We can subjectively understand this action by a second method--
empathy.  Some social action is not motivated by the need to express emotion or rational
considerations, but rather it is motivated by tradition. Thus, if a Chinese person asked us why we use
forks and knives instead of chopsticks, we would answer that: "This is the way we do it".  Therefore,
knowing the traditions of a culture is a third method of achieving subjective understanding. But now
you may ask: "What if the same action has more than one type of motivation?"
            Behavior is often motivated by more than one type of motivation (Weber, 1947:97). For example, the behavior in our classroom situation involves all three types of motivation: rational, emotional, and traditional. We raise hands and sit with students facing teacher because "that's the way it's always been done". We do not have any rational reason for sitting that way as opposed to in a circle-- it's traditional. We are polite to the teacher because of traditional reasons  (e.g. respect your elders, especially teachers), but we are also polite for rational reasons (e.g. if you wish to pass the course you cannot curse the teacher). If the teacher gets us very excited about an idea and we wave our hand madly to get called on and finally "call out", then our action was based on a need to express emotion. Therefore, each of the three types of motivation for social action Weber offers is rarely found in pure form-- each is an Ideal Type.

Ideal Type

        When sociologists wish to study broad idea such as "capitalism or “Protestantism", they are struck
by the fact that these phenomena vary from society to society and epoch to epoch. What was understood
as "Calvinism" in the 17th century is quite different than what we mean by it today (Freund, 1968:59) This creates grave difficulties in generalizing because comparing "capitalism” in two different countries may lead to the realization that there is very little that can be generalized. Weber did not believe that there were uniform laws which could explain social phenomena, but rather that social phenomena were caused by a  multiplicity of particular events which never repeat themselves in precisely the same way. At the same time, Weber believed that sociology was a generalizing science, unlike history. In order to come to grips with the problem of uniformity on the one hand and historical uniqueness on the other, Weber used the
"ideal type".
        The ideal type is a concept the sociologist constructs through inductive logic.  He observes several
instances of a particular phenomena (e.g. capitalism ) and then extracts from his observations elements
which are distinctive and characteristic of it. In order to extract what is essential about "capitalism", we use
Verstehen; we find the subjective meaning of the phenomena by understanding the underlying intentionality.
The ideal type is a tool which is only available to the social scientist because inanimate objects do not have
intentions and therefore we cannot have subjective understanding of them--direct understanding is the only
level possible with inanimate objects.
        Once the sociologist has constructed an ideal type, he uses it to compare the phenomena at
different times or in different places. For example we can use our ideal type of “capitalism” to compare
seventeenth century to twentieth century capitalism. We note how each of the two periods of capitalism
differ from the ideal type and from each other. The ideal type does not mirror reality; rather it is a
description of what the phenomena would be if inner intentions were fully realized. An ideal type does not
conform to reality by definition therefore, unlike hypotheses it is not discarded if any single concrete
situation does not conform to it (Abel,1929:155).  In fact, the purpose of the ideal type is to see to what extent the actual motives which have determined the situation differ from the ideal type. When we see how the reality deviates from the ideal construct we can then ascertain the relative importance of each of the factors which the ideal type comprises (Abel,1929:153).
     The ideal type does not refer to any moral ideal; the word "ideal” does not imply
evaluation. The word "ideal" refers to the fact that the construct reflects the intentions of
the phenomena rather than what it is in reality. For example, we can construct an ideal
type of "totalitarian society" The fundamental intention of a totalitarian society is that every aspect of human life be controlled by the political domain. Yet, in reality no state ever completely fulfills that intention--there is no society, in actuality, in which the
state controls every aspect of the lives of its citizens. Therefore, "ideal' does not refer to any moral
judgement, but to the ideal intentions underlying the phenomenon. If we can speak of an ideal type
"totalitarian society” or an ideal type "whorehouse”;  then clearly we are not speaking of any moral ideal.
       Ideal types can be constructed for historical particularities such as the "Protestant Ethic” or
"modern rational capitalism" or abstract elements of social reality such as "bureaucracy" as well as
motivations for social action.

Ideal Types of Motivation for Social Action

             Weber defined sociology as a science which:"...attempts the interpretive understanding of social
action in order to thereby arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects" (Weber,1947:88). By "interpretive understanding" Weber means Verstehen.  But what does he mean by "social action"?
      Weber distinguished between behavior, action, and social action.  Behavior is anything a person does which has no intention or subjective meaning attached.  If I slip on a banana peel, for example, there is no subjective meaning attached-- there is no motivation behind my behavior. When I blink or when my knee jerks when it is hit, that is unmotivated behavior--there is no intended purpose.  Action is "all human behavior when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it" (Weber,1947:88).   Therefore, if  everybody on the street opens their umbrellas when it starts to rain, that is action because it has an intention, but it is not social action because it is a response to the rain and not the other people.
        In order for action to be characterized as social action, however, it must have other characteristics aside from having subjective meaning attached to it. Action is social in sofar as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course (Weber, 1947:88)
Thus, social action is both intentional and reciprocal, according to Weber.  He offers us a typology of
three types of orientations toward social action.  Each one is an ideal type--an artificial construct which takes
the essence of the orientation to its logical extreme.  In actuality, we rarely find any social action based
purely on one kind of motivation or orientation, but usually one kind predominates.
        The first type of motivation for social action is rational.  But Weber distinguished between two kinds of rational motivation. Both kinds are similar in that the actor is aware of  the goals and means to achieve them; this is what Weber means by "rational".  Zweckrational motivation is instrumental rationality; that is, it involves a rational orientation to a set of discrete ends, none of which is absolute (Weber,1947:115).  It differs from Wertrational motivation in that the means and ends are both open to change if the secondary consequences of either the means or ends are unacceptable to the actor (Weber,1947:117).  For example, if we want to prevent a population explosion we could do that by passing a law that no woman can have more than two children. Despite the belief in the goal, the means are inconsistent with our overall moral view because such a law would attack the very foundation of civil rights. Therefore, we are willing to settle for an educational campaign to make people aware of the evils of population growth because the secondary consequences (attack on civil rights) are repugnant to us.
The second kind of rational motivation is Wertrational.  This type of motivation is oriented toward an absolute goal; the realization of the goal is of sole importance (Weber,1947:115). The actor whose action is based on wertrational motivation knows the secondary consequences of his means and goal, but he is not concerned with them; the end justifies the means. Hence, the revolutionary who is willing to die for the liberation of his country is acting with a wertrational orientation. This involves a conscious belief in an absolute value (goal) entirely for its own sake and regardless of any secondary consequences (i.e. his own death).
       The second type of motivation for social action is the affectual type.  This type of motivation involves specific feelings of the actor;  action is governed by the need to express feelings (Weber,1947:115). When audiences get so excited over a rock star or a demagogue that they run up to the stage, scream, throw things and cry hysterically, then that social action is based on an affectual orientation. It is not rational because the actor's motivation is based on affect, rather than any consideration as to the goal, the means to achieve it, or the secondary consequences.
         Traditional action is based upon the notion that what is being done has always been done that  way (Weber,1947:115). Thus, we say "hello" and "goodbye" at the beginning and end of conversations because of tradition;  we wear clothing in the hot summer months because of tradition; and we eat with a fork and knife because of tradition. Now, you may be asking yourself: "Why is Weber a sociologist when he is so concerned with the subjective meaning of social action?" First, although Weber emphasizes individual actors, he points out that he is not being a psychological reductionist -- he rejects explanations which explain uniformities of behavior in terms of innate desires or instincts. He emphasizes actors because he is attempting to clarify the fact that "society" is not a thing in itself, it is the word we use when we are referring, to the sum of interaction; only individual actors interacting with each other are real. Weber rejects both the organic model of society which sees society as a thing in itself, greater than the sum of its parts, and the mechanistic model which sees society as the sum of the individuals composing it.
        Weber's position can be called “interactionalist" model in that he clearly points out that interaction has emergent  properties. That is, what happens in a classroom is not simply the sum of all the personalities in that classroom because we each act very differently when we are alone or with our friends. And Weber realizes that whether Professor A or Professor B teaches the class, students will still sit facing the desk and raise their hands to speak. "Students" act in certain uniform way regardless of who they are or who the professor is. Therefore, the classroom as a social order is not simply the sum of the personalities sitting there. On this basis, Weber rejects the mechanistic view. On the other hand, he rejects the organic view that the classroom has a reality distinct from its component parts. Rather, Weber argues that all the individuals in the classroom share "typically appropriate subjective meaning" in that situation, and this is the basis for uniformities of social action (Weber1947:120). That is, we can speak of a mode of social action when different actors attach the same subjective meaning to it. But modes of social action are not collective realities--they do not exist outside of us. It is true that personalities can be interchanged and the same mode of social action would take place, but that is because all the actors attach the same subjective meaning to the situation, not because the reality is distinct from us. From this point of view a society is a set of broadly warranted predictions made by members about one another's behavior (Wrong,1970:25).

                             It is a monstrous misunderstanding to think that
                             an individualistic method should involve what is
                             in any conceivable sense an individualistic system
                             of values. Even a socialistic economy would have to
                             be understood sociologically in exactly the same
                             kind or 'individualistic' terms; that is, in terms
                             of the action of individuals, the types of ‘officials'
                             found in it, as would be the case with a system of
                             free exchange analyzed in terms of the theory of
                             marginal utility.. The real empirical sociological
                             investigation begins with the question: What motives
                             determine and lead the individual members and
                             participants in this socialistic community to
                             behave in such a way that the community came into
                             being in the first place and that it continues to
                             exist? (Weber,1947:107).
 

Although we must always remember, according to Weber, in reality only individuals interacting are real. But,
this individualistic method does not offer us an individualistic explanation.  All members of society must
have shared values and shared subjective meaning attached to their action and that cannot be explained by
unique individual early childhood experiences. Remember, Weber is concerned with motivations for social
action--which is intentional ,and reciprocal and so, by definition, that cannot take place without shared
meaning and shared values. Social action involves orienting our behavior to the behavior of others and that is
not possible without shared expectations about what behavior of others is likely to be.
        In our everyday experience we know that social action appears in ordered form and we know what
to expect in various social situations. Weber was interested in the question: "Why do we agree to act in
certain ordered ways?”  He was not concerned with our personal lives, but rather with the areas of life
which are collectively relevant--the economic order, the political order and the religious order. He felt that
order can not be explained by rational motivation alone because many of the things we do are not rational.
He concluded that order is based on a belief in the existence of a "legitimate order".  Legitimacy
involves a belief that rules are "right" (moral obligation) and the realization that disobedience would bring
disadvantageous results (normative obligation ) (Weber,1947:124). Weber then turned to the question of:
"What are the motivations for bestowing legitimacy?"
         Actors may grant legitimacy to an order on the basis of tradition, emotional attitudes, a rational belief
in its absolute value, or because it has been established in a way which is viewed as legal. One example of a
legitimate order is the political order. Therefore, Weber turned to the question: “What are the bases of
legitimate authority?"
        Weber defined power as "...the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which the probability
rests” (Weber,1947:152).  Imperative coordination  is distinguished from power because it is ". . .  the probability that
certain specific commands (or all commands) from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of
persons” (Weber,1947:324). Imperative control, then, involves a degree of voluntary submission--power does not. Usually imperative co-ordination of a number of men involves an administrative staff, but in order to maintain stability,  such  system attempts to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy (Weber1947:325).  The legitimacy of a system of authority is the "...probability that to a relevant degree the appropriate attitudes will exist, and the corresponding practical conduct ensue" (Weber,1947:326).  It involves a belief in the rightness of the authority system, the "right" of the administrative staff to carry out the rules. Authority,
then, is legitimate imperative co-ordination.
        There are three ideal types of legitimate authority, according to Weber.  Legitimacy may be based on
rational grounds, traditional grounds or charismatic grounds.  Rational authority rests on a belief in the
"legality" of rules and the right of those elevated to authority under the rules to issue commands (Weber,1947:328). Rational legal authority involves obedience to a legally established, impersonal order.  Obedience is given to the office, rather than to the person. The purest type of rational-legal authority is carried out by an administrative staff which is bureaucratically organized. Traditional authority is characterized by the fact that obedience is due to those persons who hold traditionally sanctioned positions of authority.
        Obedience is based on the person’s status, rather than the office itself. There is a basic belief in the
sacredness of the social order and hence people obey certain individuals personally because they are
hallowed by tradition. The best example of traditional authority is the patriarch such as a king. The third
type of authority is charismatic authority--a particular person is obeyed because of a characteristic of his
personality. The charismatic leader is not obeyed because he holds a legally sanctioned position of authority,
or a traditionally sanctioned position, but because of devotion to that individual person. The purest type of
charismatic leader is the prophet: Jesus Christ, Moses, or Buddha.
        Each type of' authority leads to a fundamentally different organizational structure. The organization
based on rational legal authority (bureaucracy) has a clearly defined hierarchy of positions based on spheres
of competence. Each position has specific requirements for training and recruitment is based on training.
The rules regarding requirements for recruitment, salary and sphere of authority are written dawn. Because
recruitment is based on skilled training, the bureaucracy is characterized by a complex division of labor.
Persons with varying skills can be recruited on the basis of their training.  All of these characteristics of
bureaucratic organizations follow from the inner intention of the rational-legal authority upon which it is
based--efficiency.  The civil service is an excellent example of a bureaucratic organization.  Everyone who
wants to work for the civil service must take a test and according to the results they are either rejected or
given a civil service job at a particular level. The levels are clearly defined in terms of' educational
requirements, responsibilities and salary ranges.  Changes in rational-legal organizations are enacted--that
is a new rule or new law is passed in order to effect change.
        The organization based on traditional authority also has a clearly defined hierarchy, but it is not
based on training but on who you are. If you are the first son of a king, you become the king. Following
from the fact that positions are based on birth there is a less complex division of labor in the traditional
organization as compared to the bureaucracy. It is difficult to fill complex positions in a traditional
organization because you can only choose people of a certain social strata, therefore traditional organizations
become increasingly more inefficient the more complex the division of labor.  There is a built-in inefficiency
in the traditional organization when it comes to complicated tasks because positions are not based on
training. The rules regarding who has authority and who succeeds people in authority are handed
down from generation to generation in a traditional organization.  Although they are not written as they are
in rational-legal organizations, both methods offer stability to the organization because it is clear who will
take over if, for example, the leader dies.  In a traditional organization or a traditional society change comes
from reinterpretation of tradition rather than enactment of new rules or law.
        The organization based on charismatic authority is based on loyalty to the charismatic leader.
Therefore, there is no real hierarchy-only the division between the leader and the disciples. The division of
labor in such an organization is based on loyalty also, because one's position depends on the leader's
perception of one's loyalty, or purity. Therefore, skilled training is not necessary for recruitment in a
charismatic organization and this makes it difficult to have a stable, complex division of labor. If you need
aeronautical engineers and you do not have any who are also "pure” then you are going to have difficulty
building airplanes. Another difficulty with charismatic organizations is that rules are neither written down
nor passed down, they change according to the whimsy of the leader. Therefore, there is a certain amount of
instability built into the charismatic organization. There is no procedure for succession when the leader
dies, for example. If obedience is based on loyalty to the leader, there is no reason to think that his son will
command the same loyalty, or his “right hand man" for that matter. Since charismatic authority is based
on the belief that the leader transcends the ordinary (e.g. he is the son of God), charismatic authority cannot
usually be passed on. The emphasis on the extraordinary in charismatic organizations, as opposed to the
ordinary, is at the root of the inherent instability of charismatic organizations. Charismatic authority
inevitably transforms into one of the more stable types of authority—either rational-legal  or traditional (Weber,1947:364). This is called the routinization of charisma.
        The routinization of charisma refers to the transformation of charismatic authority to either rational-legal authority or traditional authority so that the charismatic organization does not end because of the problem of succession.  But the process of routinization is not confined to the problem of succession; in fact the most crucial problem is the transition from a charismatic administrative staff and the corresponding principles of administration, to one which is adapted to everyday conditions (Weber,1947:371). Weber says that the major underlying motive for the routinization of charisma is the desire for security.  Routinization of charisma insures legitimation of positions of authority, social prestige, and economic advantages enjoyed by the followers of the charismatic leader (Weber,1947:370).
         Charisma can be routinized in several ways. It can be transformed into traditional authority if it is passed on to the kinsmen of its bearer or if there is a search for a new charismatic leader on the basis of fixed criteria which become traditional rules (unwritten). It can also be transformed into rational-legal authority. For example, when Christ said: "On this rock I shall found my Church", he was creating the basis for Peter as the first  Pope. The Catholic Church is essentially a rational-legal organization in that the College of Cardinals elect the Pope and although a cardinal is not infallible, as soon as he takes the office of the Pope he is infallible.  But even the Pope's infallibility is restricted to matters concerning the
Church. Any political statements made by the Pope, for example, are not subject to the doctrine of
infallibility.
         It is important to remember that each type of authority is an ideal type and does not reflect reality
exactly.  Further, authority is usually based of more than one of these modes of authority. For example, a
sociology professor is recruited on the basis of his training and competence in the field of sociology and the university is certainly a bureaucratic organization. Yet, we have all had teachers we did not respect, yet we often continued to sit in the class and take notes on what he or she was saying because traditionally that's what one does in class. And we have, hopefully, all had teachers to whom we were devoted because he or she had charisma rather than because of any traditional or rational considerations. Thus, the authority of the professor is not only based on rational authority, it is a combination of modes of authority.
 
 
 
 

References:

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Burke, Edmund. 1969. Reflections on the Revolution in France, Middlesex: Penguin                                                                                                     Books.

Eliot, T. S. 1936. Collected Poems of T.S.Eliot. New York:Harcourt, Brace and Co.

Gerth, Hans and C.Wright Mills. 1958. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.
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Marx, Karl and Friedrich Enge1s. 1947. The German Ideo1ogy, Parts I and III. New York: International Pub1ishers.

Veblen, Thorstein. 1915. Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution. Ann Arbor:
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Weber, Max. 1958. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capita1ism. New York:
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Weber, Max. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Free Press.
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Wrong, Dennis. 1970. Max Weber. Eng1ewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.