Was the Gulf War an Intelligence Failure?
|US Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, the two highest-profile diplomats during the crisis following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 1990.|
retrospect, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait should have been easy to
predict: Saddam Hussein had sent clear signals of his intent to annex
Iraq's "19th province" for months before the occupation. Why,
then, did the CIA fail to foresee the events? And did US intelligence
perform more poorly than had its British counterpart three decades before?
And then to the documents--from the State Department, the CIA, and Defense Department intelligence.
|First of all, a couple of announcements: Looking for a History course for the fall? Try History 41.6 (US, 1914-1950), which meets Wednesday nights, 6.30-9.10. Also, the BC Historical Society will be doing a walking tour of Ellis Island Saturday, April 27. Contact Professor Napoli for more details.|
|CIA case study, "US and Saddam, 1988-1990."|
|Richard Mobley, "Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s"|
|On the eve of the invasion, the Defense Department's IIR analyzes Saddam's intentions.|
|The State Department considers its policy options on Iraq, mid-1990|
|In April 1990, the Bush administration struggles to articulate a policy toward Iraq|
|After the invasion, the administration ponders how to counter Iraq's weapons of mass destruction|
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