PAPER ASSIGNMENTS: Pen a masterful seven-or-so page essay to two of brilliant questions below (no more than one from each section). The paper should thoroughly examine all documents posted for that topic's assignment. It is due at 11.59.59pm on December 28. A few more questions will come up in a few weeks' time.

Group One:

1.) Was there a Reagan "strategy" with regard to covert operations? Compare and contrast the Afghan campaign with William Casey's covert campaign in Nicaragua.

2.) Did covert action in Central America change over time? Compare and contrast PBSUCCESS with William Casey's covert campaign in Nicaragua.

Group Two:

1.) Analyze Sam Adams's critique of the US intelligence failure in Vietnam. To what extent could similar things have been said about the intelligence community's peacetime role? Compare and contrast Vietnam with one of the following--the CIA under Truman, Cuba (1961-1963), or Chile.

2.) To what extent did US intelligence in Vietnam function as all intelligence communities do in wartime? Compare and contrast the CIA's experience in Vietnam with that of either French or German intelligence during World War II, as detailed in Strange Victory.

Group Three:

1.) Compare and contrast the two May readings of this course--Strange Victory and the 9-11 Commission Report? To what extent do you see the "lessons" May offers in Strange Victory reflected in the recommendations of 9-11?

2.) Based on the presentations and the reading in Strange Victory, what do you see as the principal similarities and differences between the US intelligence community and that of the European nations?

Group Four:

1.) How significant was the role of the intelligence community in the US Cold war triumph? Use examples from at least three different decades in your response.

2.) Did  culture matter? To what extent did the portrayal of the intelligence community--based on the Le Carre reading and also the presentations--affect policy toward intelligence in the 1970s and 1980s?

 

Posted 1.06am--11 minutes to spare . . .